Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc. v. WCAB (Bosco) ( 2021 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc., :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 569 C.D. 2020
: Argued: April 14, 2021
Workers’ Compensation Appeal :
Board (Bosco), :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge
HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE CROMPTON FILED: July 13, 2021
Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc. (Employer) petitions for review from the May
27, 2020 Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that reversed
the workers’ compensation judge’s (WCJ) Decision and Order granting the Petition
to Review Compensation Benefits (Review Petition) filed by Employer. For the
following reasons, we reverse the Board’s Order.
I. Background and Procedural History
On April 27, 2011, Joseph Bosco (Claimant) sustained a work injury in the
nature of a low back sprain/strain and an L5-S1 disc herniation. The injury was
accepted by Employer via a Notice of Compensation Payable. The parties
subsequently entered into a Compromise and Release Agreement (C&R), which was
approved in a decision and order of a workers’ compensation judge on May 19, 2014.
The same workers’ compensation judge who approved the C&R issued an amended
order on June 10, 2014, specifying that Employer was to continue to pay the medical
expenses associated with Claimant’s work injury until it funded a Workers’
Compensation Medicare Set Aside Arrangement (MSA) approved by the Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).1
On September 24, 2018, Employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a
C&R, a Petition to Review Medical Treatment and/or Billing (Petition to Review
Medical Benefits), and a Petition to Review Compensation Benefits (Review
Petition), which were assigned to the WCJ. The WCJ succinctly summarized the
issues raised in the Petitions as follows:
1
CMS explains MSAs as follows:
A Workers’ Compensation Medicare Set-Aside Arrangement [MSA] is a
financial agreement that allocates a portion of a workers’ compensation settlement
to pay for future medical services related to the workers’ compensation injury,
illness, or disease. These funds must be depleted before Medicare will pay for
treatment related to the workers’ compensation injury, illness, or disease.
All parties in a workers’ compensation case have significant responsibilities
under the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) laws to protect Medicare’s interests
when resolving cases that include future medical expenses. The recommended
method to protect Medicare’s interests is a[n] [MSA].
The amount of the [MSA] is determined on a case-by-case basis.
Workers’ Compensation Medicare Set Aside Arrangements, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery/Workers-
Compensation-Medicare-Set-Aside-Arrangements/WCMSA-Overview (last visited on July 12,
2021).
2
The gist of all three petitions was that . . . Claimant had entered
into a [C&R] wherein . . . [he] had agreed not only to [a] lump sum
settlement but also “to the potential establishment and funding [of] a[n]
[MSA].” It further averred that . . . Claimant “agreed to timely
complete all paperwork necessary for Employer and its Insurer/Third-
Party Administrator to apply for and secure a[n] [MSA] or Allocation.
. . .” It also averred that . . . Employer had “obtained a set-aside
approved by CMS and Claimant . . . refused to follow through with
executing the paperwork necessary to secure the [MSA].”
WCJ’s Dec. and Order, 7/8/19, Finding of Fact (FOF) No. 3.
The WCJ addressed Claimant’s Answers to the Petitions as follows:
Claimant filed Answers to the Petitions alleging the [C&R]
provided that . . . Employer would remain responsible for future work-
related medical expenses “without any reference to the establishment
of a[n] [MSA].” He further alleged that the proposed [MSA] “failed to
take into account all work-related medical treatment currently being
provided to . . .” Claimant. He also alleged that . . . Claimant was
prejudiced by the fact that . . . Employer waited almost four years to
have an [MSA] proposal performed and further alleged that . . .
Employer sought the [MSA] without any input from . . . Claimant. He
concluded by seeking the dismissal of all three Petitions.
FOF No. 4.
Four hearings were held by the WCJ, with Claimant testifying at one hearing.
Both parties presented exhibits. Employer submitted proposed findings of fact, and
Claimant submitted a brief. Subsequently, the matter became ripe for disposition by
the WCJ. FOF Nos. 5-6.
The WCJ found Claimant credible in regard to signing the MSA and his
acknowledgement that the MSA may not be submitted to CMS by Employer for
years,2 among other things. FOF No. 12. He found that Claimant knowingly and
2
At the May 13, 2014 hearing seeking approval of the C&R, Claimant testified that he
understood Employer could exercise its option to fund an MSA “now, five years, or ten years or
(Footnote continued on next page…)
3
voluntarily agreed that if Employer obtained approval of an MSA and properly
funded it, Claimant’s medical benefits would end. FOF No. 13. The WCJ made the
following additional findings of fact.
Claimant agreed to cooperate with Employer’s efforts to obtain an MSA. FOF
No. 14. “Under the C&R, . . . Employer’s only obligation [if it chose to exercise it],
was to obtain approval of a[n] [MSA] and fund the same. There was no provision
that . . . Employer needed to pay for anything other than the [MSA].” FOF No. 15.
Employer’s evidence demonstrated that it submitted an MSA to CMS, the MSA was
approved, the paperwork was forwarded to Claimant’s counsel, and Claimant’s
counsel refused to have Claimant sign the paperwork because the MSA allegedly
did not include all of Claimant’s ongoing medical treatment relative to his work
injury. FOF No. 16. Employer resubmitted the MSA proposal to CMS, which again
approved it with a “notation that medical marijuana is not covered by Medicare and
is thus not considered part of a[n] [MSA].” Id. Employer’s obligation was solely
to obtain an MSA and fund it, “not to obtain a[n] [MSA] and cover other services
not covered by Medicare.” FOF No. 17. “The evidence clearly shows that . . .
Claimant failed to cooperate by signing the structured settlement papers needed to
finalize the [MSA]. Therefore, . . . Employer could not obtain final approval of the
[MSA] and effectuated (sic) its part of the bargain.” FOF No. 18. “It is clear from
. . . Claimant’s testimony, his legal position in this matter . . . that the main issue is .
. . medical marijuana. He wants [to be] reimbursed for his past usage of medical
marijuana . . . and does not want to now agree to the [MSA] unless there is some
provision for the funding of his future use of medical marijuana.” FOF No. 19.
sometime in the future.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 45a; Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/13/14,
at 12.
4
The WCJ concluded that Claimant was attempting to re-write the C&R to
include payment for non-Medicare covered services “as part of . . . Employer’s
obligation if it wishes to end its obligations to pay for . . . Claimant’s medical
services.” Dec. and Order, 7/8/19, Conclusion of Law (COL) No. 6. The WCJ
added “Claimant has shown no basis for such a re-writing of a contract, and I
conclude as a matter of law that this is not part of the legal obligation that the parties
contractually agreed to in the C&R.” Id. “Claimant . . . wants to hold hostage his
previous agreement to allow . . . Employer to end its obligation to pay for medical
expenses through funding of an approved [MSA] unless the medical marijuana
payments are agreed to [sic].” COL No. 9. “Employer has shown that it lived up to
its end of the bargain, and . . . Claimant has not shown a good faith basis for his
failure to live up to his end of the bargain.” Id.
Accordingly, the WCJ granted Employer’s Review Petition and dismissed its
remaining two Petitions as moot. In his order, the WCJ stated that, if Employer
wished to end its obligation to pay for Claimant’s medical benefits, it was to “obtain
a new quote for the structured settlement portion of the [MSA] and forward the
necessary paperwork to . . . Claimant (and his counsel) for review and signing” and
give Claimant a minimum of 14 days to review and sign the paperwork. Dec. and
Order, 7/8/19, at 12. “If . . . Claimant signs the [MSA] paperwork, . . . Employer
and its Insurer shall be relieved of all future liability of medical expenses related to
the work injury as of the effective date of the [MSA]. If . . . Claimant should refuse
to sign the [MSA] paperwork . . . then . . . Employer may send . . . Claimant a check
for the value of the [MSA] . . . and [its] obligation to pay for medical expenses
related to the work injury shall end.” Id. Claimant appealed the WCJ’s decision to
5
the Board, which, in an Opinion and Order circulated on May 27, 2020, reversed the
WCJ.
II. Board’s Opinion
The Board stated that it agreed with Claimant’s argument that the WCJ has
no authority to require Claimant to execute the MSA documents. Citing Stroehmann
Bakeries v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Plouse), 768 A.2d 1193 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001), the Board determined that a C&R is enforceable only where there
has been a meeting of the minds on all of its terms. The Board opined:
As circumstances have changed and medical use of marijuana is now
approved in Pennsylvania, Claimant contends that medical marijuana
is a reasonable treatment for his work injury. [Employer] disagrees.
Accordingly, there is no meeting of the minds and the provision of the
C&R . . . requiring Claimant to execute documents for the approval of
the [CSA] and final settlement of his claim for medical benefits is not
enforceable.
Board Op. and Order, 5/27/20, at 7. Employer now petitions this Court for review
of the Board’s Order.3
III. Arguments
A. Employer’s Arguments
Employer argues that the present matter is primarily about “the integrity of
the [C&R] process utilized in workers’ compensation to resolve claims – and the
fundamental concept that [a]greements and testimony under oath matter. Further,
this dispute impacts the role of reviewing [c]ourts as to prior [a]greements – as well
3
Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported
by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights
were violated. Phoenixville Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830 (Pa. 2013).
6
as the limitations as to interpretation and enforceability that were ignored herein.”
Employer’s Br. at 5.
Employer asserts that the C&R did not contain any provision for Claimant to
amend or refuse the MSA proposal and that the C&R was a means for Employer to
end its medical liability. In addition, Employer notes that, in the proceeding seeking
approval of the C&R, Claimant testified, under oath, that he could read, write, and
understand the English language and that he had the opportunity to review the C&R
and that he understood its terms. Employer adds that Claimant also testified that he
understood he was relinquishing his right to weekly benefits and/or payment of
medical expenses in exchange for $155,000 and that Employer had the option of
either funding the MSA or choosing to remain responsible for Claimant’s medical
bills. Further, Employer states that “Claimant did not suggest that he believed he
had any input into the development or approval of the MSA to be completed and
submitted ‘by the employer.’” Employer’s Br. at 8.
Employer states that the MSA Allocation Report submitted to CMS proposed
medical expenses of $38,549 and prescription medication expenses of $2,131, for a
total of $40,680. Further, in correspondence dated July 13, 2018, CMS determined
that $44,913 would adequately protect Medicare’s interests and approved the
funding of the MSA with an initial deposit of $2,199, with equal payments of $1,186
over a 36-year period. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 280a-85a; Employer’s Br. at
11.
On September 17, 2018, Claimant’s and Employer’s respective legal counsel
communicated via e-mail. Claimant’s counsel advised that his client would not sign
any documents relative to the MSA because the analysis did not include medical
marijuana, which Claimant had been using to reduce his reliance on other
7
medications. Employer states that, up to that point, neither Claimant, nor his
attorney, had provided any information relative to Claimant’s use of medical
marijuana. Employer adds that its counsel responded to Claimant’s counsel that
“medical marijuana [is] illegal under Federal law and cannot be considered for an
MSA, and that no carrier would agree to pay for it.” Employer’s Br. at 13.
Citing DePue v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (N. Paone
Construction, Inc.), 61 A.3d 1062 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), Employer argues that a C&R
that has been approved by a workers’ compensation judge may only be set aside if
there was fraud, deception, duress, or mistake involved at the time the agreement
was reached. Employer asserts that none of these conditions apply to the current
matter. Employer maintains that a “meeting of the minds” standard is inapplicable
in the C&R context and that the Board improperly applied Stroehmann to the current
case. Employer’s Br. at 34. Employer argues that the Board should have recognized
that Stroehmann confirmed that a “fair and equitable” standard is not applicable to
a workers’ compensation judge’s approval of a C&R, and that “C&Rs are based
upon public policy that stresses finality.” Id. Further, Employer maintains that
despite the Board’s acknowledgement that “‘circumstances have now changed,’
years after the [C&R], [this] has no relevance to whether a ‘mistake’ existed at the
time the agreement was executed.” Employer’s Br. at 35 (emphasis in original).
In addition, Employer argues that Claimant failed to allege or prove unilateral
mistake of fact, which “must be shown to be attributable to some ‘fault’ by the other
party.” Id. Employer notes Claimant was, at all relevant times, represented by legal
counsel and that Claimant testified before a workers’ compensation judge that he
understood the C&R, as well as the associated rights and responsibilities of the
parties to it. Employer’s Br. at 38. Employer adds that even though Claimant
8
executed authorizations to allow for submission of an MSA for consideration by
CMS, he never provided information about medical marijuana prior to submission
of the MSA, and he never requested that medical marijuana be included in it.
Further, even when medical marijuana was submitted to CMS, the MSA did not
change, and CMS confirmed that medical marijuana cannot be considered.
Employer’s Br. at 40. Employer notes that Claimant’s contention that he should
have had input in what was submitted to CMS was without any support in the plain
terms of the C&R, and “Claimant’s testimony did not suggest an understanding of
[any such] ‘right.’” Id. Employer maintains that Claimant acted in bad faith by
refusing to follow through on the responsibilities to which he agreed in the C&R.
Employer’s Br. at 42.
Employer further suggests that even if Claimant retained any rights to refuse
or amend the MSA, laches would apply. Specifically, Claimant paid for medical
marijuana out-of-pocket and never submitted his bills to Employer or requested
reimbursement from Employer. Employer’s Br. at 47. Additionally, Employer
contends that Claimant’s entire argument should be estopped because he did not
appeal the approval of his C&R, and he cannot now allege he did not understand its
effects. Employer’s Br. at 49.
Employer argues
if Claimant truly believed Employer was responsible for medical
marijuana as it was “within reason,” as the [Board] asserted, then this
must be supported by evidence of record. Yet, Claimant acknowledged
during testimony that he always understood he had to pay for medical
marijuana out[-]of[-]pocket, and that it would not be paid by Employer
and Insurer. Further, and despite his apparent belief that Employer had
to pay for the medical marijuana as it was “within reason,” Claimant
never requested that it be billed to . . . Employer, and in fact never
provided his receipts for reimbursement until after the MSA was
approved. It is impossible to reconcile this testimony, Claimant’s
9
actions, and his inactions with some belief – only credited by the
[Board] – that Employer was responsible for the same as it was “within
reason.” Thus, and even if this “credibility finding” had been made –
which was the basis of the [Board’s] Opinion – and even if relevant, it
would be unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and thus
cannot be affirmed.
Employer’s Br. at 52.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Employer argues that the Board’s
Order should be reversed.
B. Claimant’s Arguments
Claimant argues that there has been no settlement of the medical portion of
his workers’ compensation claim because “there has not been a meeting of the minds
with respect to all aspects of settling [it].” Claimant’s Br. at 7. Claimant states that
since the “No” box is checked on the C&R form to indicate that the C&R did not
resolve the medical aspect of the claim, there would need to be another C&R,
approved by a workers’ compensation judge, to resolve the medical aspect of the
claim. Claimant’s Br. at 8. Claimant adds that, “[b]y answering “No” in paragraph
[seven of the C&R form], the issue of resolving the medical aspect of [his] claim
was reserved . . . . for future litigation and resolution.” Claimant’s Br. at 11.
Claimant argues that the WCJ found his testimony credible as to his
understanding “that the final resolution of the medical bill aspect of his claim would
include everything he needed for his back, within reason.” Id. Claimant adds
“[b]ecause the [MSA] did not include all treatment for his back, within reason, [he]
did not agree to a settlement of the medical bill aspect of his claim, as it did not
include medical marijuana, a legal treatment that he is receiving for his work injury.”
Claimant’s Br. at 8-9. Claimant states: “As properly noted by the [Board], because
the parties do not agree on this vital aspect of the resolution of the medical bill aspect
10
of [Claimant’s] claim, there is no meeting of the minds as required by
[Stroehmann].” Claimant’s Br. at 9.
Claimant adds that since he has been paying for medical marijuana out-of-
pocket, Employer’s medical costs have been substantially reduced. Further, he
continues to believe that settlement of the medical aspect of his claim was, and is, to
include all treatment within reason. All that has changed since the C&R was
approved are the treatment options available to him. Claimant’s Br. at 10.
Claimant asserts that he is not asking this Court to set aside the C&R but is,
instead, asking that we look at the C&R as a whole and determine it does not settle
the medical aspect of the case. Claimant’s Br. at 12. Accordingly, Claimant requests
we affirm the Board’s Order.
IV. Discussion
The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)4 provides a mechanism
by which parties may enter into a C&R. Section 449 of the Act reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(a) Nothing in this act shall impair the right of the parties
interested to [C&R], subject to the provisions herein contained, any and
all liability which is claimed to exist under this act on account of injury
or death.
(b) Upon or after filing a petition, the employer or insurer may
submit the proposed [C&R] by stipulation signed by both parties to the
workers’ compensation judge for approval. The workers’ compensation
judge shall consider the petition and the proposed agreement in open
hearing and shall render a decision. The workers’ compensation
judge shall not approve any [C&R] unless he first determines that
the claimant understands the full legal significance of the
agreement. The agreement must be explicit with regard to the
payment, if any, of reasonable, necessary and related medical
expenses. Hearings on the issue of a [C&R] shall be expedited by the
4
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
11
[Department of Labor & Industry], and the decision shall be issued
within thirty days . . . .
Section 449 (a),(b) of the Act, added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350,
77 P.S. §1000.5 (emphasis added).
The parties, here, entered into a C&R, which resolved Claimant’s wage loss
benefits in exchange for a lump sum payment of $155,000. The C&R did not resolve
Claimant’s medical benefits but, instead, provided Employer with the option of
funding an MSA or continuing to pay the medical bills related to Claimant’s work
injury. Specifically, the C&R states:
As to medical benefits, Employer and its Insurer/Third[-]Party
Administrator shall continue to remain liable for payment of all reasonable
and necessary medical expenses causally related to . . . Claimant’s work
injury through receipt of approval from the [CMS], or its agents, of a[n]
[MSA] and . . . Employer’s funding of the same. Claimant agrees to
timely complete all paperwork necessary for Employer and its
Insurer/Third-Party Administrator to apply for and secure a[n]
[MSA] or Allocation.
The parties intend to submit a proposal to the [CMS] for creation of
a[n] [MSA], which shall be funded solely by . . . Employer and its
Insurer/Third-Party Administrator. This [MSA] shall be self-
administered . . . by . . . Claimant. Upon completion of these conditions .
. . as to the funding of the [MSA], . . . Employer and its Insurer/Third-
Party Administrator shall no longer be liable for payment of any additional
medical treatment obtained by . . . Claimant.
As the parties have not yet secured a [MSA] Trust Proposal for
submission, or should the [CMS] not accept the [MSA] Trust Proposal
submitted for future medical benefits, . . . Employer and its Insurer/Third-
Party Administrator reserve the right to elect to not resolve . . . Claimant’s
entitlement to future medical care and treatment related to [his] work
injury. Instead, should they so elect, they shall remain liable for payment
of ongoing reasonable and necessary medical treatment causally related to
. . . Claimant’s work injury in accordance with the terms and provisions
of the [Act] and corresponding Medical Cost-Containment Regulations.
R.R. at 8a, 11a (emphasis added).
12
The C&R was approved by a workers’ compensation judge who confirmed,
via Claimant’s testimony, that Claimant understood its terms. Although the medical
aspect of Claimant’s workers’ compensation claim was left open at the time, the
language above clearly demonstrates that the parties agreed that Employer could
submit an MSA for CMS approval at a later date. If the MSA was approved by
CMS, and Employer chose to fund it, Employer would be absolved of further
responsibility for Claimant’s medical bills. As part of this agreement, Claimant
agreed to cooperate by preparing all necessary paperwork for Employer to submit
the MSA proposal.
Now, Claimant refuses to cooperate as he had promised in the C&R because
the MSA and/or Employer will not pay for his use of medical marijuana, which
became legal in Pennsylvania approximately two years after the C&R became
effective. Claimant relies substantially on this Court’s opinion in Stroehmann to
suggest that there is no meeting of the minds, and, thus, a new C&R would be
required for Employer to be relieved of its continuing responsibility for Claimant’s
medical expenses relative to his work injury. In Stroehmann, we stated:
[W]e recognize that prior to the 1996 amendments to the Act, which
provided for [C&Rs], a [workers’ compensation judge] could base a
decision on stipulations of fact if he or she was satisfied that it was “fair
and equitable to [the] parties involved.” The criteria now requires that
the [workers’ compensation judge] must determine that the claimant
understands the full legal significance of the agreement; the best
interests or the fair and equitable standard is no longer a necessary
prerequisite. Finally, we believe that the legislature intended that a
C&R should be on equal footing with civil settlements, which are based
on a public policy that encourages settlements and stresses finality.
Stroehmann, 768 A.2d at 1196 (internal citations omitted).
13
We reject Claimant’s assertion that Stroehmann requires the C&R to reflect a
meeting of the minds. Nowhere in Stroehmann is the expression “meeting of the
minds” used. However, Claimant seems to suggest that this is what is meant by a
C&R being “on equal footing with civil settlements.” Stroehmann, 768 A.2d at
1196. We disagree. The focus of Stroehmann was on bringing final resolution to
workers’ compensation claims in a way that had not been available to parties in
workers’ compensation litigation previously, i.e., prior to changes to the Act in 1996.
In DePue, we stated that “[a]n approved [C&R] can be set aside only upon a clear
showing of fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake caused by
an opposing party’s fault.” DePue, 61 A.3d at 1067.
While a workers’ compensation judge’s evaluation of a C&R is primarily
focused on the claimant’s understanding of the terms of the agreement, the fact that
the parties have agreed upon a resolution of the claim seems indicative of a meeting
of the minds. However, once a C&R has been approved, a claimant cannot ask a
workers’ compensation judge to negate it based on the contention that there was no
such meeting of the minds. At that point, the only means for a party to negate the
C&R is to convince the workers’ compensation judge that the agreement was entered
into as a result of fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake
caused by an opposing party’s fault. None of these conditions exist in the matter sub
judice. To the extent any of these reasons could even remotely apply to the present
case, only mistake might come at all close. Having said as much, we stress that we
do not equate a change in law, after the C&R’s approval, with a mistake at the time
the C&R was negotiated and approved by the WCJ.
At the time the parties, here, entered into their C&R, and it was approved,
there was apparent agreement on its terms. The only notable change is that medical
14
marijuana became available in Pennsylvania. However, given that (1) medical
marijuana was neither contemplated nor legal in Pennsylvania when the C&R was
approved, (2) Claimant never appealed approval of the C&R, (3) Claimant accepted
$155,000 to resolve the indemnity portion of his claim, (4) Claimant agreed to
cooperate in Employer’s efforts to secure an MSA, (5) it was up to Employer’s sole
discretion whether to fund the MSA, and (6) CMS will not fund medical marijuana,
despite changes in State law, we cannot agree with Claimant that a new C&R is
required for Employer to exercise its option to resolve the medical portion of
Claimant’s workers’ compensation claim.
Although outside of the workers’ compensation context, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court’s opinion in Felix v. Giuseppe Kitchens & Baths, Inc., 848 A.2d 943(Pa. Super. 2004), is instructive here. Felix involved a breach of contract relative to
a remodeling and reconstruction project at Dr. Felix’s home. The parties
subsequently entered into a settlement agreement, which required the contractor to
pay Dr. Felix $6,333.75 and to order and deliver cabinets as necessary to fulfill the
original contract requirements. However, the contractor reneged on its obligations
under the settlement agreement, and Dr. Felix filed a motion with the trial court to
enforce it. The trial court determined that the contractor was in default and ordered
it to pay Dr. Felix $450.00 in attorney’s fees, the originally agreed upon $6,333.75,
plus interest, and an additional $20,551.25, plus interest, for the cabinets it failed to
replace. The contractor appealed to the Superior Court, contending that the trial
court erred by (1) enforcing the agreement, rather than voiding it and setting the
matter aside for trial, (2) rewriting the agreement, and (3) substituting money
damages for the consideration that had been bargained for between the parties. The
15
Superior Court affirmed the trial court and remanded for a determination of
attorney’s fees.
In its affirmation of the trial court’s enforcement of the settlement agreement,
the Felix Court stated that “[s]ettlement agreements are enforced according to
principles of contract law. Courts will enforce a settlement agreement if all its
material terms are agreed upon [sic]. A settlement agreement will not be set aside
absent a clear showing of fraud, duress or mutual mistake.” Felix, 848 A.2d at
947 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Superior Court added that
“[i]t is well settled that a party assumes the risk of his or her own inability to perform
contractual duties.” Id. at 948. And, “the purposes of settlement agreements are to
expedite the transfer of money . . . and to reduce the burden on the court system.”
Id. at 950.
In the instant matter, we are not faced with a party’s inability to perform
contractually agreed upon duties. We are presented with something more substantial
- an unwillingness to perform. Thus, per the instruction provided by the Superior
Court in Felix, and in light of the inability of the WCJ to require Claimant to sign
the MSA paperwork, we see no error in the WCJ’s determination to enforce the
settlement agreement rather than set it aside. The remedy imposed by the WCJ, i.e.,
requiring Employer to obtain a new quote for the MSA from CMS and giving
Claimant two weeks to review and sign the paperwork, followed by the opportunity
for Employer to send Claimant a check for the value of the MSA should Claimant
choose not to cooperate, is reasonable. The WCJ’s approach balances the
humanitarian purposes of the Act with the terms of the C&R in order to give the
agreement its full and intended effect.
16
In the instant matter, the Board erred by altering the standard upon which
C&Rs are to be evaluated. Employer is correct that the Board’s standard would open
a Pandora’s box that could potentially unravel countless C&Rs based on the
contention that there was no “meeting of the minds” at the time the agreements were
approved. This, in turn, would defeat the true meaning of Stroehmann, which was
to underscore the value of bringing permanent resolution to workers’ compensation
claims by encouraging settlements and stressing finality.
Accordingly, we reverse the Board’s Order and reinstate the Decision and
Order of the WCJ.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s Order which reversed the
Decision and Order of the WCJ.
______________________________
J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
17
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc., :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 569 C.D. 2020
:
Workers’ Compensation Appeal :
Board (Bosco), :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of July 2021, the Order of the Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board is REVERSED. Accordingly, the Decision and Order
of the Workers’ Compensation Judge granting Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc.’s
Review Petition is reinstated.
______________________________
J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge