In Re: Lehigh County TCB Upset Sale of September 19, 2018 ~ Appeal of: M. Tchorzewski & A. Malinowski ( 2021 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In Re: Lehigh County Tax Claim :
Bureau Upset Sale :
of September 19, 2018 :
: No. 169 C.D. 2020
Appeal of: Marek Tchorzewski and : Submitted: February 19, 2021
Anthony Malinowski :
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: September 20, 2021
Marek Tchorzewski and Anthony Malinowski (Purchasers) appeal an
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court) setting aside the
tax sale of property owned by Robert Ryan Berkheiser (Owner). Purchasers were
the successful bidders on the sale of Owner’s property but did not participate in the
proceeding on Owner’s objection petition, which Owner filed pursuant to the Real
Estate Tax Sale Law (Tax Sale Law).1 Purchasers contend that they were
indispensable parties to that proceeding and should have been named or joined as
respondents in Owner’s objection petition. Concluding that Purchasers were not
indispensable parties to the proceeding to set aside the tax sale of Owner’s property,
we affirm the trial court.2
On September 19, 2019, the Lehigh County Tax Claim Bureau (Tax
Claim Bureau) conducted an upset tax sale of properties that included a property at
6691 Church Road in Heidelberg Township (Property), where Owner resided.
1
Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended, 72 P.S. §§5860.101-5860.803.
2
The Lehigh County Tax Claim Bureau did not file a brief in this matter.
Thereafter, the Tax Claim Bureau filed a consolidated petition for a decree nisi to
confirm all the September 19, 2019, upset tax sales.3 On November 22, 2019, Owner
filed objections to the sale of his Property, alleging that the Tax Claim Bureau did
not strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Tax Sale Law and requesting
that the sale of his Property be set aside. On the same day, the trial court issued a
rule upon the Tax Claim Bureau to show cause why Owner’s objections to the tax
sale should not be sustained.
On January 13, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Owner’s
objections, at which both the Tax Claim Bureau and Owner appeared with counsel.
The Tax Claim Bureau’s counsel made the following representations to the trial
court:
Your Honor, we had the opportunity to meet before the hearing
today to discuss this matter and the Tax Claim Bureau learned
that [Owner] in this case, at the time he was served by the Sheriff,
was undergoing medical treatment . . . . And, Your Honor, I have
no doubt, I have no reason to doubt what was offered based upon
my conversations with additional family members who are here
in the courtroom as well and are prepared to testify . . . to the
medical condition of [Owner].
Having said that, Your Honor, we did reach an agreement
whereby the tax sale would be set aside and the taxes would be
paid within 20 days based upon the understanding that --
***
3
Section 607(a) of the Tax Sale Law states, in part:
(a) It shall be the duty of the bureau, not later than sixty (60) days after a sale was
held, to make a consolidated return to the court of common pleas of the county . . .
No consolidated return shall be made to the court until notice has been given to the
owner . . . .
72 P.S. §5860.607(a) (emphasis added).
2
--the testimony is going to show that although [Owner] was at
the home and physically present, he did not understand what he
was receiving from the Sheriff at that time.
Considering the circumstances and considering the fact that
[Owner] or [Owner’s] family is willing to pay the taxes and that
he’s continuing to undergo medical treatment, I have no reason
to take this man’s home. And the circumstances are that this is a
family farm that has been subdivided . . . and this [P]roperty is
part of the family farm.
I have not had any, received any communications from the
[successful bidders]. This is an upset sale, so there are questions.
I would also like to note for the record that although we have
personal service, we do not have any other service [as] the
mailings were all returned.
Notes of Testimony, 1/13/2020, at 2-4 (N.T. __) (emphasis added); Reproduced
Record at 17a-19a (R.R. __). Counsel for Owner stated that he had “nothing” to add
as “[t]his is really what [his] client is seeking, just being able to pay the back taxes[.]”
N.T. 4; R.R. 19a. That same day, the trial court entered an order setting aside the
tax sale based “upon agreement of counsel.” Trial Court Order, 1/13/2020; R.R.
23a.
On February 12, 2020, Purchasers appealed the trial court’s order to
this Court. In their notice of appeal, Purchasers complained that they had not been
named in, or served with, Owner’s objection petition, and, further, both were
required because they were “indispensable parties to this action.” Notice of Appeal,
2/12/2020. In its PA. R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that it set
aside the tax sale of Owner’s Property on the basis of the agreement of the parties
that was presented in open court. Further, the Tax Claim Bureau, by its counsel,
acknowledged that it could not prove compliance with the notice requirements of the
3
Tax Sale Law. With respect to Purchasers’ assertion that they were indispensable
parties, the trial court explained as follows:
The Commonwealth Court has held that the filing of exceptions
overcomes the presumption of regularity in the tax sale and, thus,
the burden is on the [Tax Claim] Bureau to demonstrate strict
compliance with the notice provisions of the Tax Sale Law.
Although these challenges are often defended by both the [Tax
Claim] Bureau and the purchaser, the purchaser must seek to
intervene in order to participate. The . . . Tax Sale Law does not
make successful bidders, whose purchases have not been
confirmed, parties to objection proceedings as a matter of course.
PA. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 3/17/2020, at 1-2 (citation omitted) (emphasis added);
R.R. 24a-25a.
In their appeal to this Court,4 Purchasers raise one issue. They contend
that they were indispensable parties to Owner’s challenge to the tax sale of his
Property. As such, Owner should have named Purchasers in his objection petition
so they could participate in the hearing thereon. Owner responds that the trial court’s
order should be affirmed because successful bidders are not, as a matter of course,
parties to proceedings to set aside a tax sale. Successful bidders must petition to
intervene if they wish to participate in these proceedings.
We begin with a review of the statutory procedures for the conduct of
an upset tax sale. Section 602 of the Tax Sale Law requires the tax claim bureau to
provide three separate types of notice in advance of an upset tax sale: (1) publication
at least 30 days prior to the sale; (2) direct notification to each owner by certified
mail at least 30 days prior to the sale; and (3) posting of the property at least 10 days
4
Our review in tax sale cases determines whether the trial court abused its discretion, erred as a
matter of law, or rendered a decision not supported by substantial evidence. In Re: Balaji
Investments, LLC, 148 A.3d 507, 509, n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (Balaji).
4
prior to the sale. 72 P.S. §5860.602.5 If the property listed for upset sale is occupied
by the owner, Section 601(a)(3) of the Tax Sale Law also requires the tax claim
bureau to effect personal service on the owner by a sheriff. 72 P.S. §5860.601(a)(3).6
The above-listed notifications give the owner of the property exposed to an upset tax
sale the opportunity to take steps to prevent the involuntary sale of his property by,
for example, paying the delinquent taxes owed thereon or entering an agreement
with the tax claim bureau for their payment.
5
Section 602(a) and (e)(1) of the Tax Sale Law states:
(a) At least thirty (30) days prior to any scheduled sale the bureau shall give notice
thereof, not less than once in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
county, if so many are published therein, and once in the legal journal, if any,
designated by the court for the publication of legal notices. Such notice shall set
forth (1) the purposes of such sale, (2) the time of such sale, (3) the place of such
sale, (4) the terms of the sale including the approximate upset price, (5) the
descriptions of the properties to be sold as stated in the claims entered and the name
of the owner.
***
(e) In addition to such publications, similar notice of the sale shall also be given by
the bureau as follows:
(1) At least thirty (30) days before the date of the sale, by United
States certified mail, restricted delivery, return receipt requested,
postage prepaid, to each owner as defined by this act.
72 P.S. §5860.602(a), (e)(1).
6
Section 601(a)(3) provides, in relevant part:
No owner-occupied property may be sold unless the bureau has given the owner
occupant written notice of such sale at least ten (10) days prior to the date of actual
sale by personal service by the sheriff . . . . The sheriff . . . shall make a return of
service to the bureau . . . setting forth the name of the person served, the date and
time and place of service, and attach a copy of the notice which was served.
72 P.S. §5860.601(a)(3).
5
After a tax sale, the tax claim bureau must give the owner notice of the
tax sale of the owner’s property and of the opportunity to challenge that sale.7
Section 607(a.1)(1) provides:
Notice shall be given by the bureau within thirty (30) days of the
actual sale to each owner by United States certified mail,
restricted delivery, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to
each owner at his last known post office address as determined
in [S]ection 602(e)(2) that the property was sold and that the
owner may file objections or exceptions with the court relating to
the regularity and procedures followed during the sale no later
than thirty (30) days after the court has made a confirmation nisi
of the consolidated return.
72 P.S. §5860.607(a.1)(1) (emphasis added). The Tax Sale Law does not require the
tax claim bureau to copy the successful bidder on the notice sent to each owner
pursuant to Section 607(a.1)(1).
Section 607 of the Tax Sale Law next addresses the procedure for
challenging an upset tax sale. Section 607(b) states that an “owner or lien creditor”
may file objections. 72 P.S. §5860.607(b). Section 607(d) addresses the scope of
these objections:
Any objections or exceptions to such a sale may question the
regularity or legality of the proceedings of the bureau in respect
to such sale, but may not raise the legality of the taxes on which
the sale was held, of the return by the tax collector to the bureau
or of the claim entered. In case any objections or exceptions are
7
Section 102 of the Tax Sale Law defines “owner” as
the person in whose name the property is last registered, if registered according to
law, or, if not registered according to law, the person whose name last appears as
an owner of record on any deed or instrument of conveyance recorded in the county
office designated for recording . . . .
72 P.S. §5860.102 (emphasis added). A successful bidder is not included in this definition.
6
filed they shall be disposed of according to the practice of the
court. If the same are overruled or set aside, a decree of absolute
confirmation shall be entered by the court.
72 P.S. §5860.607(d) (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, an objection challenges
the “regularity or legality of the proceedings” of the tax claim bureau, which is the
only respondent that must be named in the owner’s petition.
The case law construing these provisions of the Tax Sale Law has
established several relevant principles. First, the Tax Sale Law was intended to assist
in the collection of taxes, not to deprive delinquent taxpayers of their property or to
create investment opportunities for members of the public. Sampson v. Tax Claim
Bureau of Chester County, 151 A.3d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Second,
because due process is implicated in the government’s involuntary sale of a citizen’s
real property, the tax claim bureau bears the burden of proving strict compliance
with each and every notice provision in the Tax Sale Law. Rice v. Compro
Distributing, Inc., 901 A.2d 570, 575 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). This includes a
reasonable effort to locate the owner where notices sent by certified and first-class
mail are returned to the tax claim bureau. Maya v. County of Erie Tax Claim Bureau,
59 A.3d 50, 55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Third, the Tax Sale Law does not require or
entitle a successful bidder to notice of an owner’s objections to a tax sale. In In re:
Tax Sale Held September 10, 2003 by Tax Claim Bureau of County of Lackawanna,
859 A.2d 15, 18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (Sposito), this Court specifically rejected the
claim of a successful bidder that the tax claim bureau has the duty to give the
successful bidder notice of an owner’s objections, or the responsibility to “file a
petition to add [the successful bidder] as an additional party[.]” Id. To the contrary,
the Tax Sale Law “does not make successful bidders, whose purchases have not been
7
confirmed, parties to objection proceedings as a matter of course.” Sposito, 859
A.2d at 18.
Likewise, it is not the responsibility of the owner who files objections
under Section 607 of the Tax Sale Law to name the successful bidder as a party or
serve him with a copy of the owner’s objection petition. In re 2005 Sale of Real
Estate by Clinton County Tax Claim Bureau Delinquent Taxes, 915 A.2d 719, 722-
23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (Clinton County). Rather, “successful bidders must petition
to intervene in order to be considered parties in an objection proceeding challenging
a confirmation nisi.” Id. at 723. Accordingly, this Court has established, quite
specifically, that successful bidders “are not indispensable parties for purposes of
Owner’s objections to the confirmation nisi.” Id.In summary, there is no language in the Tax Sale Law to support
Purchasers’ claim that they were indispensable parties to the proceeding that set
aside the tax sale of Owner’s Property, for which they were the successful bidders.
There is, however, binding precedent that has established that Purchasers, in their
capacity as successful bidders, were not indispensable parties to that proceeding.
Clinton County, 915 A.2d at 723.
Undaunted, Purchasers direct the Court to cases that they believe can
be read to support their position that they were indispensable parties to Owner’s
objection petition. We turn, then, to those cases.
Purchasers, first, direct the Court to language from Balaji, 148 A.3d at
513 (emphasis in original), which states as follows:
However, while upset sale purchasers may not immediately
possess legal title, they do have an equitable interest in the
property. Pivirotto v. City of Pittsburgh, . . . 528 A.2d 125 (Pa.
1987). A “purchaser at a tax sale obtains a vested equitable
ownership at the fall of the auctioneer’s hammer.” In re Golden,
8
190 B.R. 52, 58 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995); accord Butler v. Lomas
& Nettleton Co., 862 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1998); In re
Rouse, 48 B.R. [236,] 240 [(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985)].
Purchasers assert that their “equitable interest in the premises” made them
indispensable parties to Owner’s objections to the tax sale of the property.
Purchasers’ Brief at 11. We disagree.
To begin, Purchasers omitted the final sentence of the above-quoted
paragraph in Balaji, which states as follows:
[B]arring redemption by the record owner during the statutory
period, the successful bidder at a tax sale is entitled to compel
conveyance by treasurer deed, and thus, he is the equitable
owner.
Balaji, 148 A.3d at 513 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Stated
otherwise, a successful bidder’s “equitable interest” is subordinate to the owner’s
right to redeem a property sold at an upset tax sale. Purchasers also omitted the
statement in Balaji that “[i]n fact, the successful bidder is not even a party if
objections or exceptions to an upset sale are filed.” Id. In any case, Balaji is
inapposite. Balaji had nothing to do with the ability of successful bidders to
participate in an objection proceeding. Rather, it concerned whether a successful
bidder can be held liable for real estate taxes that accrue between the time of the tax
sale and the actual conveyance of the deed to the successful bidder, and the answer
is yes. As we observed in Balaji, the obverse is also true. If the owner succeeds in
setting aside the tax sale, then the owner is liable for the taxes that accrue during that
period of time. Id. (successful bidder is “entitled to a refund of any amount it paid
to the bureau, with interest” if a tax sale is set aside).
9
Purchasers next direct the Court to In re Tax Claim Bureau of
Montgomery County, 272 A.2d 186 (Pa. Super. 1970) (Wheatcroft), and M.J.M.
Financial Services, Inc. v. Burgess by Dignazio, 533 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)
(M.J.M. Financial). Purchasers contend that these cases support their position that
successful bidders are indispensable parties in an owner’s challenge to a tax sale.
Otherwise, Purchasers warn, the door may be opened to fraud, whereby “the
[b]ureau could repudiate an otherwise valid sale for frivolous or illegal reasons[.]”
Purchasers’ Brief at 12-13 (quoting M.J.M. Financial, 533 A.2d at 1095). Again,
we disagree.
Wheatcroft concerned a tax sale to which the owner filed objections.
On a schedule attached to the tax claim bureau’s consolidated return for a decree nisi
was a notation that the sale of the owner’s property should not be confirmed:
“Improper notice and question of validity of claim.” Wheatcroft, 272 A.2d at 187.
The trial court’s decree nisi, inter alia, declared the sale of the owner’s property null
and void on the basis of the notation in the tax claim bureau’s schedule. The
successful bidder filed exceptions to the decree nisi, but his petition was dismissed
for the stated reason that he lacked standing to object to said decree.
The Superior Court reversed. It held that “in the circumstances of this
case,” the successful bidder had standing to challenge the decree nisi. Wheatcroft,
272 A.2d at 188. In doing so, it further explained as follows:
We do not disapprove of the action of the [b]ureau in making
suggestions to the court and of its giving evidence upon which
the court might base a decision on the propriety of confirming a
tax sale. However, we believe that when the [b]ureau makes the
required [r]eturn, as it did in this case, in the interest of justice
the purchaser should have an opportunity to hear and refute any
evidence offered by the [b]ureau or owner. Without a full
hearing on the matter, the door might be opened to fraud,
10
whereby the [b]ureau could repudiate an otherwise valid sale for
frivolous or illegal reasons.
Id. The Superior Court concluded that instead of relying on a notation in the tax
claim bureau’s schedule, the trial court should have developed a record before
ordering the tax sale to be set aside. Wheatcroft holds that a successful bidder has
standing to participate in a proceeding to set aside a tax sale. Although not the
precise holding, Wheatcroft also stands for the proposition that a notation on the tax
claim bureau’s schedule has limited or no evidentiary value in such a proceeding.
Wheatcroft is distinguishable. Here, there was a record hearing before
the trial court at which the Tax Claim Bureau, by its counsel, confessed error to the
trial court, i.e., that it could not prove compliance with the notice provisions of the
Tax Sale Law. This is a far cry from an incomplete sentence of unknown provenance
made on a tax claim bureau’s schedule filed as part of its consolidated return.
Further, at the hearing before the trial court, the parties entered a stipulation of
settlement on the record, which became the basis of the trial court’s order. Notably,
a settlement recited by counsel in open court is binding and enforceable. DeLuca v.
Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary Authority, 234 A.3d 886, 899 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).
M.J.M. Financial concerned the tax sale of property titled to an owner
who had been declared incompetent and was subject to a guardianship. The tax
claim bureau conceded that it knew of the guardian’s appointment but, instead,
mistakenly sent the statutory notices to the incompetent owner. The trial court set
aside the tax sale, and the successful bidder petitioned to open the judgment and
allow it to intervene. The trial court denied the petition for the stated reason that the
successful bidder lacked standing. This Court reversed.
Adverting to Wheatcroft, this Court held that the trial court should have
allowed the purchaser to intervene even though its application was untimely filed
11
because the case presented “extraordinary circumstances.” M.J.M. Financial, 533
A.2d at 1094. Noting that the successful bidder alleged that there was a factual
question about notice to the guardian, this Court held that the value of the trial court’s
hearing was “substantially diminished” when the successful bidder was denied
intervention. Id. at 1095. This Court reversed the denial of intervention and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.8
Wheatcroft and M.J.M. Financial are anomalous decisions.9 They
stand for the principle that a successful bidder, who seeks to intervene, has standing
and should be granted intervention. These cases are not instructive here because
Purchasers were not denied intervention. Purchasers did not seek intervention
before, during, or after the proceeding on Owner’s objections to the tax sale of the
Property.
Purchasers, nevertheless, argue that they could not be expected to
intervene in the objection proceeding before the trial court because they were not
given notice of Owner’s objections or the hearing thereon.10 As a result, they will
8
The dissent would have affirmed the trial court for the stated reason that the tax claim bureau
“stipulated that it was aware of the guardian but simply failed to give him notice. There is nothing
more to be decided.” M.J.M. Financial, 533 A.2d at 1095-96 (MacPhail, J., dissenting).
9
Purchasers also rely on Rex v. Tax Claim Bureau of Montgomery County (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1248
C.D. 2011, filed June 4, 2012) (unreported), to support their assertion that they were entitled to
participate in a hearing on Owner’s objections. Purchasers’ Brief at 13. However, the successful
bidders in Rex filed a petition to intervene with the trial court, and Purchasers did not.
10
Purchasers cite Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983), and First
Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. v. Lancaster County Tax Claim Bureau, 47 A.2d 938 (Pa. 1983), to
support their argument that they were entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend their interest
in the Property. Purchasers’ Brief at 11. In those cases, the courts held that the Indiana and
Pennsylvania statutes, respectively, did not meet the requirements of due process because the
taxing authorities were not required to notify mortgagees, who had a legally protected property
interest in the mortgaged property, when that property was sold for nonpayment of taxes.
12
lose their equitable interest in the Property without the notice required by “the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause of the United States Constitution.”11 Purchasers’ Brief at 7.
There are several flaws in this argument.
Owner’s objection petition was not a secret. Rather, it was a matter of
public record available to the world, as are all filings on a court’s docket. The simple
answer to Purchasers’ complaint is that it was appropriate to expect them to file a
timely intervention petition if they desired to participate in Owner’s objection
petition. The hearing on Owner’s objections was held four months after the sale of
the Property. It was Purchasers’ responsibility during that period, periodically, to
check the court docket or touch base with the Tax Claim Bureau. Instead, Purchasers
waited until after the tax sale of Owner’s property was set aside to take action by
appealing to this Court.
Purchasers’ complaint starts from a flawed premise, i.e., that persons
with an interest sufficient to confer standing in a litigation matter are entitled to
direct and personal notice of that litigation. They cite no authority for this extreme
proposition. If they are correct, then it would be the duty of every plaintiff to look
for and give notice to any person that might wish to intervene. Simply, this is not
the law. See, e.g., PA. R.C.P. No. 402 (requiring original process to be served on the
defendant); PA. R.C.P. No. 440(a)(1) (“[c]opies of all legal papers other than original
process filed in an action or served upon any party to an action shall be served upon
every other party to the action”) (emphasis added). The Rules of Civil Procedure do
These cases are inapposite. First, Purchasers are not lien creditors. Second, Purchasers’
appeal does not concern notice of the tax sale but whether they were entitled to participate in
Owner’s objections to the tax sale without having to file an intervention petition.
11
It states, in relevant part: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
13
not require service upon persons who may, or may not, desire to participate as a
party in a civil proceeding.
Likewise, due process does not require persons with an interest in
litigation sufficient to confer standing to be served with notice of that litigation. It
seems clear that Purchasers’ inchoate, or “equitable,” interest in the Property was
sufficient to give them standing to participate in Owner’s objection proceeding had
they intervened. Husak v. Fayette County Tax Claim Bureau, 61 A.3d 302, 310 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2013); Shipley v. Tax Claim Bureau of Delaware County, 74 A.3d 1101,
1106-07 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Purchasers chose not to do so. Purchasers essentially
argue that their equitable interest in the Property entitled them to automatic party
status and excused them from having to file an intervention petition. Purchasers
offer no authority for this proposition, and we reject their claim that due process
obligates owners to keep successful bidders or other putative intervenors advised of
their objections to a sale of their property at a tax sale.
There is no merit in Purchasers’ argument that they were indispensable
parties to the proceeding in Owner’s objections to the tax sale and, thus, not required
to file a timely intervention petition in order to participate in that hearing. Our
holding in Clinton County, 915 A.2d at 723, is binding precedent and dispositive of
this issue on appeal.
A tax sale must be set aside where the tax claim bureau cannot prove
strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Tax Sale Law. Sampson, 151
A.3d at 1168. Here, the Tax Claim Bureau, by its counsel, admitted that it could not
prove that Owner received the statutory notices of the upset tax sale. In addition,
the parties presented an on-the-record settlement of Owner’s challenge to the tax
14
sale of his Property. On this record, the trial court was required to set aside the tax
sale of Owner’s Property and did not need to hear, first, from Purchasers.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court.
____________________________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In Re: Lehigh County Tax Claim :
Bureau Upset Sale :
of September 19, 2018 :
: No. 169 C.D. 2020
Appeal of: Marek Tchorzewski and :
Anthony Malinowski :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of September, 2021, the order of January 13,
2020, of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County is hereby AFFIRMED.
____________________________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita