E. Diaz v. 12th Judicial District ( 2021 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Eric Diaz :
(On behalf of himself and all others :
similarly situated, as well as :
all of the Voters of Dauphin County :
and the Citizens of Pennsylvania), :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 589 M.D. 2020
: Submitted: July 9, 2021
12th Judicial District, aka: Dauphin :
County Court of Common Pleas; :
Honorable John F. Cherry, P.J., in :
his Official Capacity; Dauphin County :
Work Release Center; and Director :
Matthew A. Miller, in his Official Capacity, :
Respondents :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CROMPTON FILED: September 20, 2021
Eric Diaz (Diaz), pro se,1 petitions this Court for review in the nature
of mandamus alleging that the 12th Judicial District of Pennsylvania violated the
1
Throughout his Petition, Diaz styles his argument as a class action suit, utilizing the
phrase “and all others similarly situated” in both the caption and within the text. This Court has
previously held that a prisoner proceeding pro se, such as Diaz, may not commence a class action
lawsuit, as a pro se litigant lacks the formal training in the law to adequately represent the interests
separation of powers doctrine of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions2
by operating the Dauphin County Work Release Center (DCWRC) as an agency that
is an entity of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. Diaz also submits an
Application for Summary Relief to this Court. The 12th Judicial District of
Pennsylvania, including the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas; the
Honorable John F. Cherry, P.J., in his Official Capacity; the DCWRC; and Director
Matthew A. Miller, in his Official Capacity (Respondents),3 submitted Preliminary
Objections (Objections) in response. Upon consideration, we sustain Respondents’
Objections and dismiss Diaz’s Petition. We also deny Diaz’s Application for
Summary Relief.
I. Background and Procedural History
On May 2, 2017, while housed at the DCWRC, Diaz was in possession
of a cell phone that was seized and subsequently searched. Petition at IV.A.3. Diaz
asserts that the search, conducted by the Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office
Criminal Investigative Division on May 4, 2017, was “warrantless.” Petition at
IV.A.4-5. As a result of the search, the contents of his cell phone revealed illegal
of his fellow inmates in a class action. Mobley v. Coleman, 65 A.3d 1048, 1051 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2013). Therefore, we consider Diaz’s Petition exclusively through the lens of his own
constitutional rights, not as rights of a similarly situated class.
2
See U.S. Const. arts. I-III; see also Pa. Const. arts. II-V.
3
In his Petition, Diaz lists two additional categories of individuals, “Other Indispensable
Parties Directly Impacted” and “Other Non-Judicial Parties of Interest Who Are Requested to
Intervene Upon this Civil Action In Order to Provide ‘Checks and Balances’ Upon the Judicial
Respondents,” that, in Diaz’s view, should be included in this action. Those listed include
individuals associated with Dauphin County Prison and the institution itself, as well as several
entities and individual members of Pennsylvania’s Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches.
While we note Diaz’s desire for full participation by parties he believes are relevant in the instant
case, we must clarify that this Court has not compelled, and will not compel, participation by these
individuals/entities as Diaz has not properly named them as parties in this matter.
2
activity, and Diaz was later charged on May 24, 2017, with possession of child
pornography. Petition at IV.A.6; Respondents’ Br., Ex. A at 4. Diaz’s criminal case
regarding that matter is still pending before the Dauphin County Court of Common
Pleas. See Petition at 10. Diaz has since filed two suppression motions in his
pending criminal case, asserting that evidence obtained from the cell phone may not
be used as it was obtained via a “warrantless” search. Petition at 10. Both
suppression motions were denied. See id.In his Petition before this Court, Diaz asserts that by administering the
DCWRC, Respondents violated the separation of powers doctrine because the
authority to manage the DCWRC properly rests with the Dauphin County Prison
Board. In support of his claim, Diaz provides an outline of the history of the
DCWRC and its management. As this background is relevant to the instant case, we
summarize Diaz’s historical account as follows.
Before 1996, the DCWRC, then the Work Release Program, was
administered by Dauphin County Prison. Petition at IV.B.2. In 1996, the Work
Release Program was then placed under the supervision of the Dauphin County
Adult Probation/Parole Department (Probation Office), an agency that is an “entity”
of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. Petition at IV.B.3. Diaz contends
that, as a result of this transfer,
the overriding authority over the care, custody, and control of Work
Release inmates was ceded from the Board of Prison Inspectors . . . of
[Dauphin] County’s Executive Branch . . . to that of the [Dauphin
County] Court of Common Pleas[,] . . . part of the Commonwealth’s
Judicial Branch of government.
Petition at IV.B.4.
In 2007, the Work Release Program separated from the Probation
Office and became its own department with its own director who reports to the
3
President Judge of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. Petition at IV.B.5.
This separation resulted in the agency’s renaming as the DCWRC, and as with the
Probation Office, the DCWRC is an “entity of the court.” Petition at IV.B.6.
DCWRC personnel consists entirely of probation officers, who are employees of the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, and also, therefore, employees of the
Commonwealth’s Judicial Branch. Petition at IV.B.7-8.
Thus, in sum, because members of the Commonwealth’s Judicial
Branch superintend the DCWRC as opposed to officials associated with the Dauphin
County government’s Executive Branch, in Diaz’s view, an illegal transfer of
authority has occurred. Petition at IV.B.11. Further, Diaz argues that as employees
of the Judicial Branch, probation officers do not properly have the authority that they
currently exert over the penal and correctional functions for the care, custody, and
control of work release inmates at the DCWRC. Petition at IV.C. Diaz contends
that this work should be reserved exclusively for correctional officers, who are
presumably employees of Dauphin County’s Executive Branch. See id.The history of the DCWRC relates to Diaz, in his view, because he was
subject to a “warrantless” search by individuals who lack the proper authority to
administer the DCWRC. Petition at IV.A.4-5. Because the individuals exercised
authority that is not properly their own, Diaz implies that his criminal charges
resulting from his cell phone seizure are similarly inappropriate. Thus, on October
26, 2020, Diaz filed his Petition with this Court, and on November 24, 2020, he filed
an Application for Summary Relief.4 While Diaz opines in his Petition that he is not
4
Diaz filed an additional, related civil complaint with the Dauphin County Court of
Common Pleas, alleging that the judge who presided over his criminal case, involving the content
of his cell phone, violated his civil rights. See Diaz v. Hon. Curcillo, 2019-CV-03206 (Dauphin
Co.). This case is currently pending.
4
asking this Court “to make any sort of direct ruling(s) upon his pending criminal
matters, as they are out of this Court’s jurisdiction to do such,” he proceeds to explain
that “[a] ruling upon this [Petition] by this Honorable Court in [Diaz’s] favor upon
this matter would be proof of an underlying primary taint for the [] warrantless
search(es) of the alleged cell phone that led up to his pending criminal charges.”
Petition at 11 n.6; Petition ¶10.
Diaz requests relief in the form of this Court ordering: (1) a reversal of
the 12th Judicial District’s ministerial management of the DCWRC; (2) the 12th
Judicial District to immediately cease and desist any and all functions relating to
penal and correctional functions; (3) all probation officers to cease and desist from
supervising any person who is not released on probation or parole; (4) the April 18,
2012 Administrative Order5 by the 12th Judicial District to be a legal nullity; (5)
collaboration between the 12th Judicial District and the Prison Board to transfer
management of the DCWRC to the Prison Board; (6) the Prison Board to take back
control of the DCWRC; (7) the Prison Board to assign its Director of Corrections,
or another qualified correctional expert, to work as a “receiver” for the transfer of
the DCWRC to the executive powers of Dauphin County; (8) the Honorable John F.
Cherry, P.J., to assign Director Matthew A. Miller of the DCWRC, or another
designated court-appointed judicial official, to work as a “liaison” to ensure the
transition of the control of the DCWRC; and (9) the 12th Judicial District to
5
The Order in question reads:
AND NOW, this 8th day of June, 2007, it is hereby ordered that effective July 1,
2007, operation of the [DCWRC] will be separated from the management and
budget of the Dauphin County Adult Probation Office, and be supervised by a
Director who will report directly to the President Judge and District Court
Administrator.
Pet’r’s Appl. for Summ. Relief, 11/04/2020, Ex. G.
5
specifically order its designated “liaison” to work in a “subservient” manner to that
of the entire Prison Board and to its assigned “receiver” during the transition period.
Petition at VII.1-9. Diaz also requests a ruling on his Petition by this Court in the
form of a published opinion directing all of the Commonwealth’s Judicial Districts
to cease and desist from “usurping control” of any and all penal and correctional
functions and from having their appointed probation officers supervise any person
who is not released on probation or parole. Petition at VII.10.
This Court now considers Respondents’ Preliminary Objections, filed
on November 9, 2020, in response to Diaz’s Petition and Application for Summary
Relief.6
II. Discussion
In their Preliminary Objections, Respondents assert that this Court is
without jurisdiction to provide the relief requested, specifically in the form of
mandamus, by Diaz. Further, Respondents argue that Diaz’s Petition does not state
a claim for relief and that Diaz lacks standing to bring his Petition. Additionally,
Respondents present the doctrine of lis pendens as barring Diaz’s instant claims and,
also, raise the issue that his present claims may constitute an impermissible collateral
6
In ruling on preliminary objections, we accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations
in the petition for review and any reasonable inferences that we may draw from the averments.
Meier v. Maleski, 648 A.2d 595 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). However, the Court is not bound by legal
conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of
opinion encompassed in the petition for review. Id. We may sustain preliminary objections only
when the law makes clear that the petitioner cannot succeed on his claim, and we must resolve any
doubt in favor of the petitioner. Id. When considering preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer, we may sustain a demurrer only when a petitioner has failed to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Moreover, we have
held that “a demurrer cannot aver the existence of facts not apparent from the face of the challenged
pleading.” Martin v. Dep’t of Transp., 556 A.2d 969, 971 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
6
attack on his pending criminal case. Finally, Respondents contend that all parties
named by Diaz are protected from such claims under sovereign immunity.
A. Mandamus
Before this Court, Diaz seeks multiple forms of relief against
Respondents, including mandamus relief compelling Respondents to perform the
above-numbered actions, as outlined by Diaz. Respondents contend that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus because they are judicial entities. The
power to supervise and administer the judiciary lies solely with our Supreme Court.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ designed to compel the
performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty. Duncan v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
137 A.3d 575 (Pa. 2016); Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
“This Court may only issue a writ of mandamus where: (1) the petitioner possesses
a clear legal right to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty;
(2) the [respondents] possess[] a corresponding duty to perform the act; and (3) the
petitioner possesses no other adequate or appropriate remedy.” Allen, 103 A.3d at
369-70 (internal citation omitted). “Mandamus can only be used to compel
performance of a ministerial duty and will not be granted in doubtful cases.” Allen,
103 A.3d at 370 (internal citation omitted).
The Supreme Court is vested with the Commonwealth’s supreme
judicial power and exercises general supervisory and administrative authority over
all courts of the Commonwealth. See Pa. Const. art. V, §§ 2, 10(a). Further, 42 Pa.
C.S. § 721(2), states, in relevant part:
The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of
all cases of:
....
(2) Mandamus or prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction.
7
Thus, in considering both the difficult burden on Diaz’s part to demonstrate that
mandamus would be appropriate in this matter and the apparent jurisdictional
impediment to our Court providing this type of relief, Respondents maintain that
Diaz is not entitled to a writ of mandamus from this Court, as it relates to the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas.
In Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), this Court
stated that “in order for [the] Commonwealth Court to have any [mandamus]
jurisdiction over [courts of common pleas,] there must be an appeal from that court
pending before this Court.” “[T]he onus of general superintendence over the courts
of this Commonwealth has been allocated to th[e] [Supreme] Court.” Mun. Publ’ns,
Inc. v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 489 A.2d 1286, 1288 (Pa. 1985). In the instant case,
Diaz is not before this Court in its appellate jurisdiction, but, instead, petitions this
Court for review in its original jurisdiction. A pending appeal does not exist before
this Court in the instant matter.
In the absence of this Court’s capacity to issue a writ of mandamus
against a court of common pleas without a pending appellate case, we cannot provide
mandamus relief of the kind requested by Diaz in his Petition. 7 Therefore, we
7
42 Pa. C.S. § 761(c) states:
(c) Ancillary matters. — The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction
in cases of mandamus and prohibition to courts of inferior jurisdiction and other
government units where such relief is ancillary to matters within its appellate
jurisdiction, and it, or any judge thereof, shall have full power and authority when
and as often as there may be occasion, to issue writs of habeas corpus under like
conditions returnable to the said court. To the extent prescribed by general rule the
Commonwealth Court shall have ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other
matter which is related to a claim or other matter otherwise within its exclusive
original jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.)
8
decline to evaluate whether Diaz has met his burden to demonstrate that mandamus
relief is appropriate. Accordingly, we sustain Respondents’ Objections as related to
this Court’s lack of mandamus jurisdiction in this matter.
B. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
In his Petition, Diaz acknowledges that granting mandamus relief is
inappropriate where other remedies are available. Accordingly, Diaz seeks a
declaration and/or an injunction against Respondents in the alternative.
Respondents assert that Diaz does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted
because he does not meet the requirements necessary for either declaratory or
injunctive relief. Specifically, Respondents note that declaratory and injunctive
relief are forward looking, and Diaz seeks relief based on an alleged prior
controversy.
Declaratory actions are intended to resolve uncertainty about legal
rights, status, and relations, but only where there is an interest that is “direct,
substantial, and present” and an “actual controversy related to the invasion or
threatened invasion” of legal rights. Waslow v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 984 A.2d 575,
580 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); see Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7531-7541.
To properly grant declaratory relief, a “real controversy” must exist. Gulnac v. S.
Butler Cnty. Sch. Dist., 587 A.2d 699, 701 (Pa. 1991). Further, our Supreme Court
has held that the “presence of antagonistic claims indicating imminent and inevitable
litigation coupled with a clear manifestation that the declaration sought will be of
practical help in ending the controversy” is “essential” for a granting of declaratory
relief. Id. Thus, declaratory relief is inherently forward looking. See Phanton
Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Wolf, 198 A.3d 1205, 1218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
9
Diaz claims that he is aggrieved and deserving of declaratory relief
because “he was unlawfully subjected to the dominion of Judicial authorities while
he was incarcerated at the DCWRC.” Petition at IV.A.10. Additionally, Diaz
explains that “[a] ruling upon [his Petition] by this Honorable Court in [his] favor
upon this matter would be proof of an underlying primary taint for the [] warrantless
search(es) of the alleged cell[]phone that led up to his pending criminal charges.”
Id. Essentially, Diaz believes he has an immediate interest that may be satisfied by
declaratory relief because the seizure of his cell phone harmed him.
Diaz is no longer housed at the DCWRC and has not been since May
2017. Pet’r’s Appl. for Summ. Relief at II.1. Thus, Diaz is not subject to any
ongoing or future contact with the DCWRC or its administrators. The alleged harm
that Diaz experienced, the seizure of his cell phone, is not due to Respondents’
current or future operation of the DCWRC, and the alleged harm is not ongoing.
However, notably, Diaz seeks declaratory relief from this Court to address the
alleged prior conduct because it is currently the subject of his pending criminal
charges before the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. While Diaz explains
in his Petition that he does not expect this Court to provide a ruling on his ongoing
criminal case, he believes a ruling from this Court in his favor will demonstrate the
“underlying primary taint” associated with the cell phone seizure and his resulting
prosecution. Petition at IV.A.10.
“[A]n action seeking declaratory judgment is not an optional substitute
for established or available remedies and should not be granted where a more
appropriate remedy is available.” Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Pa. Horse
Racing Comm’n, 844 A.2d 62, 67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Where a plaintiff has a “more
appropriate remedy,” a court should decline to exercise its discretion. Bronson v.
10
Off. of Chief Couns. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 245 M.D. 2008, filed January 9, 2009), 2009
Unpub. LEXIS 427,8 slip op. at 4-5 (holding that declaratory relief was not
appropriate where an inmate sought declaratory relief stating that correctional
facility employees unlawfully withheld a check because the inmate had the more
appropriate remedy of a tort action).
In the instant case, Diaz seeks declaratory judgment from this Court to
provide further support for his ongoing criminal and civil cases before the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas. However, his issues regarding an alleged
“warrantless” search and seizure of his cell phone are best presented and settled
before the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas during his criminal proceedings.
Diaz is effectively asking this Court to provide a declaration in the instant civil case
regarding a seizure that supports his criminal charges. To do so would evade the
proper channels for defendants to challenge matters related to evidence and criminal
procedure. Diaz must challenge the seizure of the cell phone before the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas in connection with his criminal case.
Diaz’s claims regarding the seizure of his cell phone do not present a
“direct,” “substantial,” or “present” interest that warrants declaratory relief. While
Diaz attempts to frame the institutional history of the DCWRC as a constitutional
issue that directly impacts his present criminal prosecution, this scenario is not one
where declaratory judgment is appropriate. An ancillary challenge to Diaz’s pending
criminal charges should not be validated by this Court’s issuance of a declaration.
Similarly, Diaz requests that this Court grant injunctive relief. Our
Court has previously explained:
8
An unreported opinion of this Court may be cited and relied upon for its persuasive value
in accordance with Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code
§69.414(a).
11
[T] he standards for mandamus and injunctive relief are similar in many
important respects. A party seeking an injunction must establish the
right to relief is clear, there is an urgent necessity to avoid an injury
which cannot be compensated for by damages and greater injury will
result from refusing rather than granting the relief requested. . . .
Whether a petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus or an injunction, his
threshold burden is to establish a clear legal right to relief.
United Sportsmen of Pa. v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 950 A.2d 1120, 1132 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). As with the standard for
declaratory judgment, Diaz fails to meet his burden to demonstrate the necessity of
injunctive relief in the instant matter.
Most importantly, Diaz is no longer a resident of the DCWRC. Thus,
Diaz does not possess an “urgent necessity to avoid an injury which cannot be
compensated for by damages” and no “greater injury will result from refusing rather
than granting the relief requested.” United Sportsmen of Pa., 950 A.2d at 1132.
Even if Diaz’s claims regarding the DCWRC’s authority are valid, Diaz is no longer
under the control of the DCWRC, thus negating the threat of injury.
Respondents also note that Diaz’s inability to satisfy the requirements
for the granting of both declaratory and injunctive relief relates directly to the
question of whether he has standing to bring these claims. It is well known that
judicial intervention, including declaratory and injunctive relief, is appropriate only
where the controversy is “real and concrete, rather than abstract.” City of Phila. v.
Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 559 (Pa. 2003). Without an actual imminent or
inevitable controversy, a party lacks standing to maintain a declaratory judgment
action. Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
A party must have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the
outcome of litigation to have standing. Soc’y Hill Civic Assoc. v. Pa. Gaming
Control Bd., 928 A.2d 175, 184 (Pa. 2007). An interest is substantial only if it
12
surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law, is
direct only if the matter complained of caused harm to the party, and is immediate
only if it is not remote or speculative. Id. (citations omitted). Respondents assert
that by the very nature of Diaz’s four-year absence from the DCWRC, his interest is
indirect and remote. Additionally, Diaz’s interest in the DCWRC’s adherence to the
law does not surpass those of all citizens, nor is he more appropriately situated than
others to bring this type of claim.
While Diaz attempts to convince this Court that the instant action is
brought without a desire to influence his pending criminal case, his inability to
satisfy the requirements for either declaratory or injunctive relief indicates
otherwise. The present case originates solely from the confiscation and search of
Diaz’s cell phone during his residence at the DCWRC, which resulted in his pending
criminal prosecution. Without the existence of criminal charges, Diaz has not been
aggrieved so as to appropriately bring a claim for relief. Thus, as we will not make
a determination that will produce the collateral effect of impacting ongoing criminal
proceedings, Diaz has not stated a claim for which relief may be granted. We
therefore sustain Respondents’ Objection as related to Diaz not stating a claim for
relief.
C. Additional Objections
Respondents additionally object to Diaz’s Petition on the basis of
standing, the doctrine of lis pendens, Respondents’ entitlement to sovereign
immunity, and Diaz’s alleged collateral attack on his criminal case. As we sustain
Respondents’ Objections regarding our lack of mandamus jurisdiction in this matter
and Diaz’s failure to state a claim upon which declaratory or injunctive relief may
be granted, we will not evaluate Respondents’ additional Objections in detail.
13
III. Conclusion
Because Diaz failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
both as a result of this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to provide mandamus relief and
his failure to state a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief, we sustain
Respondents’ related Objections, dismiss Diaz’s Petition for Review and dismiss
Diaz’s Application for Summary Relief as moot.
______________________________
J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Eric Diaz :
(On behalf of himself and all others :
similarly situated, as well as :
all of the Voters of Dauphin County :
and the Citizens of Pennsylvania), :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 589 M.D. 2020
:
12th Judicial District, aka: Dauphin :
County Court of Common Pleas; :
Honorable John F. Cherry, P.J., in :
his Official Capacity; Dauphin County :
Work Release Center; and Director :
Matthew A. Miller, in his Official Capacity, :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of September 2021, we SUSTAIN
Respondents’ Preliminary Objections, specifically those related to this Court’s lack
of mandamus jurisdiction and Eric Diaz’s failure to state a claim for relief, DISMISS
Eric Diaz’s Petition for Review and DISMISS AS MOOT Eric Diaz’s Application
for Summary Relief.
______________________________
J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge