Riverview Intermediate Unit 6 v. Riverview Intermediate Unit 6 Education Assoc. ( 2021 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Riverview Intermediate Unit #6 :
: No. 1134 C.D. 2020
v. :
: Argued: May 10, 2021
Riverview Intermediate Unit #6 :
Education Association, :
Appellant :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: June 7, 2021
Riverview Intermediate Unit #6 Education Association (Association)
appeals from the September 25, 2020 order entered by Court of Common Pleas of
Clarion County (trial court), which granted Riverview Intermediate Unit #6’s (Unit)
petition to vacate a labor arbitration award (Award). On appeal, the Association argues
that the trial court departed from the limited, deferential review of arbitration awards,
and erroneously vacated the Award. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial
court erred in granting the Unit’s petition, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand
for entry of an order denying the Unit’s statutory appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
The relevant facts as found by the arbitrator are as follows.1 The Unit
provides special educational services to students in multiple Pennsylvania school
districts in four counties. The Association is the collective bargaining agent
representing certified educational support personnel who are assigned to assist teaching
professionals in various separate school districts within the four counties in which the
Unit provides services. The parties entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), which became effective on July 1, 2015, and continued in effect through June
30, 2020.
From time to time, it is necessary for the Unit to “realign” its professional
staff where the needs of the specific classroom are eliminated due to changes in student
population. The parties addressed the change of working conditions due to involuntary
realignment in the CBA, Article X (Vacancies, Transfers and Assignments), Section
B.3 (Transfers and Assignments), which provides, in relevant part:
If an employee is involuntarily transferred (X.B.1) or
realigned (X.B.3), and if the new assignment is more than
twenty (20) miles, round trip, from the previous assignment,
the base for calculating mileage shall remain the same for one
(1) year.
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 21a-22a.)
At the end of the 2017-18 school year, Grievant Donna Foster, a
bargaining unit member, was involuntarily realigned and her new assignment,
Cranberry High School, was more than 20 miles roundtrip from her previous
assignment, Pleasantville Elementary in Titusville. Ms. Foster’s new assignment was
1
“Under the essence test, the arbitrator’s findings of fact are binding on the courts, and the
reviewing court may not undertake any independent factual analysis.” Pennsylvania State System of
Higher Education, Lock Haven University v. Association of Pennsylvania State College & University
Faculties, 193 A.3d 486, 495 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
2
closer to her home. Pursuant to Article X, Section B.3 of the CBA, Ms. Foster
requested mileage compensation for the distance between her old and new assignments
for every day she worked during the 2018-19 school year. The Unit denied her request
because the new assignment was closer to Ms. Foster’s residential home and her
commute to work was shorter. Three other involuntarily realigned bargaining unit
members, Sarah Johnson, Sarah Kasanicky, and Amber Villar, requested mileage
compensation for the 2018-19 school year under this same provision. Like Ms. Foster,
their new assignments were more than 20 miles roundtrip from their previous
assignments. Their requests for mileage compensation under Article X, Section B.3 of
the CBA were denied by the Unit for the same reason, i.e., their new assignments were
closer to their respective homes, resulting in shorter commutes to work.
On January 25, 2019, the Association filed a group grievance on behalf of
Ms. Foster and the other affected employees (collectively, “Grievants”), alleging that
the Unit arbitrarily denied them mileage compensation under Article X, Section B.3.
The Unit denied the group grievance on the grounds that the displaced employees were
driving less distance from their homes to their new assignment and Article X, Section
B.3 was not intended to pay realigned employees for mileage not traveled.
After exhausting the steps of the arbitration process under the CBA, the
parties proceeded to binding arbitration and selected an arbitrator to hear the case. A
hearing was held before the arbitrator on October 11, 2019. Andrew Lugg, local
President of the Association, testified on behalf of the Association, as did Grievants.
The Unit’s Director, Michael Stahlman, testified on behalf of the Unit.
Before the arbitrator, the Unit relied heavily on a decision issued in 2007
by another arbitrator, Richard Dissen, (the 2007 Arbitration Case), involving the Unit
3
and the Association and the same provisions of the CBA.2 In the Unit’s view, the 2007
Arbitration Case was “law of the case” and supported its position that mileage
reimbursement is not available under Article X, Section B.3 in situations where the
employee’s commute from home to his/her new assignment is less than it was prior to
the involuntary realignment.
The 2007 Arbitration Case
In the 2007 Arbitration Case, the grievant was realigned and had to
commute a longer distance from his home to his new assignment. He sought mileage
reimbursement under Article X, Section B.3 for each day he was required to travel
from his home to his new assignment. His request was denied by the Unit. The parties
proceeded to arbitration and the grievance was assigned to Arbitrator Richard Dissen.
The issue before Arbitrator Dissen was whether there were any provisions in the CBA
that would limit the availability of a reimbursement under Article X, Section B.3. The
Unit argued that another provision of the CBA, specifically Article XII, Section B
(Travel Reimbursement),3 limited the amount of reimbursement for travel to those
2
The 2007 Arbitration Case appears at pages 86a-102a of the Reproduced Record.
3
Reimbursement to itinerant (i.e., traveling) employees for work-related travel is addressed
in Article XII, Section B of the CBA, which provides:
B. Each itinerant employee will have a designated base
employment location. The IU [Unit] will reimburse employees at the
prevailing IRS [Internal Revenue Service] rate for mileage from the
base location to and between all other work locations and back to the
base location. When an employee reports to their base, mileage
accumulates from the base to the various assignments and back to the
base provided the employee returns to the base. When the employee
does not report to base but to an alternative location, and does not
return to base, mileage will be allowed in total miles traveled less
miles from home to base and base back home. At no time is an
employee reimbursed for mileage between home and base. Mileage
reimbursement for traveling to conferences will be reimbursed from
home to home.
(R.R. at 26a) (emphasis added).
4
amounts that are deductible under IRS regulations. The Unit argued that mileage
charges incurred by employees to travel from their homes to the primary workplace are
not deductible expenses. It thus follows, argued the Unit, that because the grievant
sought reimbursement for roundtrip mileage from his home to base, he was not entitled
to the benefit under Article X, Section B.3. Arbitrator Dissen rejected the Unit’s
argument, concluding that Article XII did not express such limitation. Although
recognizing Article XII prohibited reimbursement for mileage between home and base,
Arbitrator Dissen nevertheless gave effect to Article X, Section B.3, explaining that the
distance between the two assignments must be computed, less the miles driven from
the employee’s home to the new assignment. Arbitrator Dissen went on to state,
however, that if the grievant had been involuntarily realigned to a school which was
closer to his home, then the Unit could have reasonably asserted that the grievant
should not be awarded mileage reimbursement under Article X, Section B.3.
Arbitrator’s Award
In this case, based upon the evidence presented and the parties’ post-
hearing briefs, the arbitrator issued the Award on February 11, 2020. The arbitrator
framed the issue as follows:
Did Riverview Intermediate Unit No. 6 arbitrarily deny the
mileage compensation to [Grievants], as required by Article
X, Section B.3 of the [CBA], when [Grievants were]
realigned at the end of the 2017-18 School Year and [their]
new assignment[s were] more than twenty (20) miles
roundtrip from [their] previous assignment[s], but the new
assignment[s] actually involved a shorter driving distance
from the employee[s’] home than was required prior to the
reassignment?
(Award at 8.)
5
Interpretating the CBA, the arbitrator found that Article X, Section B.3
clearly grants a “contract benefit,” which he described as a “displacement mileage
benefit.” Id. at 19, 22. The arbitrator found that the displacement mileage benefit
provided under Article X, Section B.3 “clearly requires two eligibility requirements,
namely, an involuntary transfer as defined under Article X, Section B.1 or as in this
case, an involuntary realignment, under its Section B.[3], and a new work assignment
to be greater than 20 miles, roundtrip, from the previous assignment.” Id. at 14
(emphasis in original).
The arbitrator found that the Article X, Section B.3 “displacement mileage
benefit” was first introduced into the CBA in 1997 and was “intended to defray the
costs incurred by the employees who are realigned to work at a different site.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
The arbitrator rejected the Unit’s suggestion that the distance between an
employee’s home to his/her new work assignment is relevant to the computation of the
displacement mileage benefit under Article X, Section B.3. In other words, the fact
that an employee’s home may be located closer to his/her new assignment is not a factor
to consider under Article X, Section B.3. The arbitrator found that Article X, Section
B.3 has nothing whatsoever to do with an employee’s “commute,” i.e., whether it was
farther or closer to his/her new assignment. The arbitrator rejected the Unit’s
interpretation of Article X, Section B.3, concluding that the term “home” cannot just
be inserted into the provision, and noting that he had no authority to add, subtract,
amend, or delete any provision contained in the document as bargained and agreed
upon by the parties. Id. at 20. The arbitrator found that the term “home,” as a location
from which any calculation can be made for reimbursement under Article X, Section
B.3, is not explicitly or even implicitly referenced in the language of this provision.
6
The arbitrator concluded that “the application of Article X, Section B.3 does not require
the inclusion of the commuting distance from an employee’s home to the assignment
site, but only from the former assignment to the new assignment locations.” Id. at 17.
Stated differently, Article X, Section B.3, “clearly identifies that the computing
distances are between the assignment sites and does not include the location of an
employee’s home in the calculation.” Id. According to the arbitrator, the Unit’s
interpretation “ignores the intended purpose of Article X, Section B.3 as a displacement
mileage benefit and that the [CBA] requires only the computation between the previous
and new work assignment sites and does not include a third point of reference, i.e., the
employee’s home to determine the measurement for this benefit.” Id. at 23. The
arbitrator concluded that,
from a reading of this Article, the statement contained
therein and the clear meaning from the bargained phrase ‘. .
. and if the new assignment is more than twenty (20) miles,
roundtrip, from the previous assignment,’ there can be no
doubt that the parties only intended the use of the two
worksites to determine the measurement for this benefit and
did not include the distance commuting to the site from an
employee’s home.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
The arbitrator also emphasized that the provision had been applied
consistently since 1997 without considering employees’ home locations, and then,
without any advance notice, the Unit unilaterally refused to provide the displacement
mileage benefit to employees in the 2018-19 contract year based on the fact that the
realigned employees’ new assignments were closer in distance to their “homes” than
their previous assignment locations. Id. at 14. The arbitrator found that this new
interpretation was inconsistent with past practice.
7
Addressing the 2007 Arbitration Case, the arbitrator found that Arbitrator
Dissen decided an issue unrelated to that which is involved here. Id. at 18. In the 2007
Case, Arbitrator Dissen focused on whether there were any provisions of the CBA or
IRS regulations that would limit the availability of reimbursement under Article X,
Section B.3. Id. at 15, 18. The arbitrator further distinguished the 2007 Arbitration
Case, noting that the employee in that case did not request reimbursement for the
mileage between his former assignment to his new assignment. Instead, the arbitrator
looked at the calculation measured from the employee’s home to his new assignment.
Id. at 14-15. The arbitrator concluded that, in any event, his interpretation and
Arbitrator Dissen’s interpretation of Article X, Section B.3 were consistent, i.e., they
both agreed that it required the actual calculation between the previous and new
assignment locations, without regard to the distance from the employee’s home to the
new assignment. Id. at 17.
Regarding the Unit’s contention that both Article X, Section B.3 and
Article XII, Section B regulate the same working conditions of mileage reimbursement,
which is only applicable to itinerant employees, the arbitrator found that, under Article
XII, Section B, the parties agreed to provide a travel reimbursement for itinerant
employees who travel between their work locations and back to the base location. Id.
at 21. That CBA provision, according to the arbitrator, was intended to reimburse the
employee for authorized miles traveled at the allowable Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
rate, which is a reportable income event and is “clearly differentiated from the value
of the benefit provided under Article X, Section B.3.” Id. (emphasis added). The
arbitrator explained that,
notwithstanding the word choice, Article XII, Section B.
(Travel Reimbursement) applies to ‘itinerant’ employees
who travel between work sites and seek a reimbursement for
8
work related miles traveled. Article X, Section B.3 uses the
measurement of miles between work assignments as a means
to determine the amount of the benefit intended by this
provision to defray the cost of the relocation.
Id. at 22.
The arbitrator further found that Grievants were not “itinerant” employees
because they did not travel for work, and they did not seek any reimbursement under
Article XII, Section B for travel from home to work. Id. at 11, 21. Therefore, the
arbitrator concluded, “the mileage computation analysis imposed by the [Unit] is in
opposition to that which is claimed by the Association.” Id. at 17. That is, Article XII
is irrelevant to this case.
In conclusion, the arbitrator found that Article X, Section B.3 must be
given its “full meaning and application” to provide a “displacement mileage benefit”
derived from “the measurement between two location sites only, namely the previous
and new work assignments” due to the realignment if greater than 20 miles roundtrip,
“regardless of the commuting distance the employees had to travel from their homes.”
Id. at 22, 25 (emphasis in original).
Trial Court’s Decision
Following the Award, the Unit filed a petition for review in the trial court,
arguing, inter alia, that the Award failed to draw its essence from the CBA because: it
effectively compensated employees for driving from their homes to work at the start of
the workday in direct contradiction of Article XII, Section B of the CBA; and the
arbitrator exceeded his powers by amending the CBA to expressly award miles from
home to work, which was expressly prohibited by Article XII, Section B of the CBA
and applicable law.
By order dated September 25, 2020, the trial court vacated the Award,
concluding, in relevant part, that the arbitrator’s decision was not rationally related to
9
the terms of the CBA. In an opinion supporting the order, the trial court found that the
arbitrator erroneously “recharacterized” the term “reimbursement” in Article X,
Section B.3 to mean “benefit” when, in the trial court’s view, “the language of the
CBA clearly indicates that the relevant sections are referring to ‘reimbursement’ for
actual miles driven by itinerant employees and nowhere is the word ‘benefit’ used.”
(Trial ct. op. at 6) (emphasis added). Rejecting the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
CBA, the trial court concluded “[t]he interpretation of the language of the CBA by the
[a]rbitrator resulting in the creation of a ‘mileage benefit’ to employees that are not
actually engaging in any [work] travel is not a rational interpretation.” Id. at 7
(emphasis added).
The trial court further found that the arbitrator “essentially ignore[d] the
language of Article XII that clearly indicates, ‘At no time is an employee reimbursed
for mileage between home and base.’” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The trial court found
that Article X, Section B.3 “does nothing more than prescribe that the original
assignment location should continue to be the ‘base’ location for mileage
‘reimbursement’ purposes” and “[t]he CBA clearly indicates that the only employees
being reimbursed mileage are ‘itinerant’ employees.” Id. (emphasis added). The trial
court concluded that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the language of the CBA, which
“create[d] a ‘mileage benefit’ to employees that [were] not actually engaging in any
travel is not a rational interpretation.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The trial court
concluded, on the contrary,
it creates a situation squarely at odds with the language of the
CBA that indicates employees are not entitled to
reimbursement for travel between home and work. The
[a]rbitrator’s Award clearly does not rationally flow from the
terms of the CBA as Article X.B.3 and Article XII.B are not
applicable to Grievants whatsoever. The unambiguous
10
language of the CBA makes it clear that Grievants are not
entitled to travel reimbursement. The court finds that the
[a]rbitrator’s Award is not rationally derived from the CBA
and fails to logically flow from its terms.
* * *
For the reasons discussed above, the Petition to Vacate
Arbitration Award is granted, as [the a]rbitrator exceeded his
power pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. [§]7314(iii) by reading a
mileage “benefit” into the CBA where only a mileage
reimbursement is outlined by the specific terms at issue.
The express provisions of the CBA do not coincide with the
[a]rbitrator’s Award. The Award should be vacated because
it is not rationally based on the language of the CBA.
Id. (emphasis added).
Analysis
We begin with this Court’s narrow standard of review of a grievance
arbitration award under the Public Employe Relations Act.4 Our Supreme Court has
held that a reviewing court must accord great deference to the award of an arbitrator
chosen by the parties. State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State
College University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa.
1999). In the vast majority of cases, an arbitrator’s decision is final and binding upon
the parties. Id. The narrow exception to this finality doctrine is the so-called “essence
test.” Id. In applying the essence test, a reviewing court conducts the following two-
prong analysis:
First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly
defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the
agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, the
arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s
4
Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§1101.101 – 1101.2301.
11
interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective
bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only vacate
an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably and
genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow
from, the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. A reviewing court does not review the merits of an arbitration award. Westmoreland
Intermediate Unit #7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants
Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA/NEA, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa.
2007). A court may not disturb an award even if it is “manifestly unreasonable.” Id.We consider the Association’s appeal with the above principles in mind.
First Prong –Whether the Issue Decided by
the Arbitrator Was Embraced by the CBA
Under the first prong of the essence test, the Court must determine
whether the issue decided was embraced by the CBA and, thus, properly before the
arbitrator. Here, the trial court concluded that a claim for some type of compensation
under Article X, Section B.3 is within the terms of the CBA and, therefore, the issue
raised by Grievants and addressed by the arbitrator was contemplated within the terms
of the CBA. We agree with the trial court that the first prong of the essence test was
satisfied.
Article XVI of the CBA defines a “grievance” as “a complaint or dispute
by any aggrieved person about the meaning, interpretation, or application of any
provision of this agreement.” (R.R. at 33a.) The issue of whether Article X, Section
B.3 provided a mileage benefit to compensate displaced employees who had been
involuntarily realigned into a new position more than a 20-mile roundtrip distance from
their previous assignment is an issue that arose out of the interpretation and application
of Article XVI of the CBA. Moreover, the arbitrator found that the issue was properly
12
before him, and that finding is entitled to deference. See Millcreek Township School
District v. Millcreek Township Educational Support Personnel Association, 210 A.3d
993, 1004 (Pa. 2019) (“[W]e hold that the reviewing court must give deference to the
arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA including for purposes of the first prong of the
essence test.”).
Second Prong—Whether the Arbitrator’s Award
Was Rationally Derived From the CBA
Under the second prong of the essence test, the Award must be upheld if
it can rationally be derived from the CBA. In conducting this analysis, courts must be
mindful that “[t]he words of the CBA are not the exclusive source of rights and duties.
. . . The arbitrator is authorized to make findings of fact to inform his interpretation of
the CBA.” Id. at 1006 (quotations omitted). Further, “even though an arbitrator is not
permitted to ignore the CBA’s plain language in fashioning an award, the arbitrator’s
understanding of the plain language must prevail. A reviewing court should not
reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract.” Id.
(quotations omitted) (emphasis added). All that is necessary is that the arbitrator’s
interpretation “can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light
of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention.” Id. at 1002
(quotations omitted).
With this deferential standard in mind, we conclude that the Award
satisfied the second prong of the essence test, and the trial court erred in holding to the
contrary.
At the outset, we note that the trial court misstated the issue. The trial
court framed the issue as whether the arbitrator “exceeded his powers” by “awarding
Grievants mileage from home[s] to and from work in his Arbitration Award.” (Trial
13
ct. op. at 3) (emphasis added). Contrary to the trial court’s account, the arbitrator did
not award Grievants mileage from their home to and from work. Rather, based on his
interpretation and understanding of Article X, Section B.3, the arbitrator found
Grievants were entitled to a “displacement mileage benefit,” which he determined is
calculated by measuring the distance between two location sites only, namely
Grievants’ previous and new work assignments. The arbitrator specifically found that
an employee’s home location was not relevant for purposes of deciding whether to
provide a “displacement mileage benefit” under Article X, Section B.3, or for purposes
of calculating the benefit. For each day of work, the arbitrator found that Grievants
were entitled to receive mileage compensation for the distance between the former
and new work assignments (so long as that distance is greater than 20 miles) as a
“displacement mileage benefit” under Article X, Section B.3.
Next, the trial court found that the Award was not rationally related to the
CBA because the “terms of the CBA clearly indicate that employees are not to be
reimbursed for miles traveled between home and work.” (Trial ct. op. at 7.) The trial
court charged the arbitrator with “ignoring” the language of Article XII, which “clearly
indicates, ‘[a]t no time is an employee reimbursed for mileage between home and
work.’” Id. at 6 (citing Article XII, Section B). The trial court found that the CBA
clearly indicates that only itinerant employees are reimbursed for mileage and none of
Grievants are itinerant employees. Id. Again, the trial court’s rationale is factually
flawed because the Award did not reimburse Grievants “for miles traveled between
home and work.” Therefore, this factually flawed reasoning did not support vacating
the Award.
Significantly, and seemingly fundamental to the trial court’s finding that
the Award did not rationally flow from the CBA was its disagreement with the
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arbitrator’s understanding and conclusion that Article X, Section B.3 provided a
“displacement mileage benefit,” which was intended to offset the results from a
realignment. See Award at 19. The trial court disagreed with the arbitrator’s
assessment for the reason that “nowhere is the word ‘benefit’ used” in Article X,
Section B.3. (Trial ct. op. at 6.) The trial court concluded instead that “Article X,
Section B.3 does nothing more than prescribe that the original assignment location
should continue to be the ‘base’ location for mileage reimbursement purposes.” Id. In
other words, the trial court disagreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation and substituted
its own interpretation for that of the arbitrator. By doing so, the trial court clearly
exceeded the limited scope of arbitral review.
In Millcreek, a school district was a party to a CBA with a union
representing a bargaining unit consisting solely of custodians for the school district's
properties. The CBA provided that “[n]o work of the bargaining unit shall be
subcontracted for the life of the CBA.” Millcreek, 210 A.3d at 996. During
negotiations for a successor agreement, the school district submitted a proposal that
included the elimination of the existing “no subcontracting” provision. Id. The union
rejected the proposal. Id. A month later, while negotiations were still ongoing, the
school district issued a request for proposals (RFP) for the provision of custodial
services. Id.
Upon learning that the school district had issued an RFP to subcontract
the bargaining unit’s work, the union filed a grievance contesting the RFP. Id. at 997.
The grievance eventually proceeded to arbitration, where an arbitrator determined the
school district violated the parties’ CBA. Id. at 998. Noting that the school district had
not entered into a subcontract with the successful bidder, the arbitrator determined that
the question of whether the school district’s actions constituted subcontracting fell
15
within the confines of the CBA. Id. at 999. Relying on witness testimony and the
parties’ bargaining history to inform his interpretation of the CBA, the arbitrator
concluded subcontracting began when the school district decided to pursue outside
contracting options, and that the school district’s actions violated the CBA. Id. The
school district filed a motion to vacate the award, which was rejected by the trial court.
Id. However, this Court reversed the trial court’s decision, prompting an appeal.
In reversing our decision, the Supreme Court concluded that we erred in
substituting our judgment for that of the arbitrator, who was authorized to make
findings of fact and to interpret undefined terms in the CBA. Millcreek, 210 A.3d at
1006. The arbitrator had found that the district issued an RFP on subcontracting
custodial services as a bargaining tactic in its effort to eliminate the parties’ no
subcontracting provision. Id. at 1006. The Supreme Court explained that, when
reviewing the propriety of the award, the court was required to rely on the arbitrator’s
findings of fact, including his determination that the parties’ no contracting provision
was intended to prohibit the process of subcontracting. Id. at 1006, 1014. The Supreme
Court further explained that the arbitrator’s interpretation and resulting award reflected
a reading of the CBA “that was informed by his understanding of the parties’ history
and the context.” Id. at 1006. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the award
was rationally derived from the parties’ CBA, and found that this Court had
erred in substituting its own interpretation of the contract for
the arbitrator’s interpretation where the latter rationally
derived from the [CBA]. It erred further in concluding that
the arbitrator’s award violated a dominant public policy.
Under the highly deferential essence test and its
exceptionally narrow public policy exception, when
reviewing the propriety of the arbitration award, the
Commonwealth Court was required to rely on the arbitrator’s
Findings of Fact, including his view that the parties intended
16
to prohibit the process of subcontracting. Because the
Commonwealth Court did not adhere to this standard, we
reverse.
Id. at 1013.
An important takeaway from Millcreek is the Supreme Court’s emphasis
upon the reviewing court’s obligation to rely on the arbitrator’s findings of fact,
including the meaning of the CBA that was informed by his understanding of the
parties’ history and the context. Moreover, contrary to the trial court’s viewpoint that
the arbitrator was required to base his decision on “purely an interpretation of the
relevant language,” in Millcreek, the Supreme Court emphasized that the words of the
CBA are not “the exclusive source of rights and duties.” Id. at 1006. It is not necessary
for an award to reflect the narrowest possible reading of the CBA’s plain language. Id.
The essence test has always contemplated that arbitrators would consider the parties’
agreement “in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’
intention.” Id. at 1002.
Here, the arbitrator performed a similar analysis of the issue before him,
considering the evidence presented at the hearing, and the parties’ history of treating
the payments to displaced teachers, while calculated based on mileage, as a
displacement mileage benefit rather than a travel reimbursement for itinerant
employees. (Award at 22-23.) The Association’s witness, Mr. Lugg, explained that
when a teacher loses (i.e., “is bumped from”) his/her classroom, that teacher must go
through a “bumping and bidding” procedure to receive a new assignment. (R.R. at
57a.) If the realignment results in a change of work assignment, which increases the
driving distance from the former assignment to the replacement assignment and that
distance is over 20 miles roundtrip, the affected employee is entitled to receive a
bumping mileage compensation benefit for the roundtrip for a period of one year. Id.
17
Mr. Lugg explained that the benefit under Article X, Section B.3 is distinguishable
from mileage “reimbursement” in Article XII, which is meant to reimburse itinerant
i.e., traveling, employees for miles actually traveled for Unit business. Id. at 58a-59a.
Mr. Lugg explained that employees use different forms to submit requests for
reimbursement for business travel under Article XII and for the Article X, Section B.3
benefit. Id. Mr. Lugg also testified that historically, since 2007, and until the 2018-19
school year, employees who requested the bumping mileage compensation benefit
received it even though their new assignments were closer to their residential homes.
Id. at 61a. The arbitrator clearly credited this testimony, as was his prerogative, and
considered it when interpreting Article X, Section B.3.
Like this Court in Millcreek, the trial court erroneously rejected the
arbitrator’s credibility determinations, his findings of fact and his interpretation of
Article X, Section B.3 and substituted its own interpretation. The trial court found that
Article XII, Section B of the CBA allows mileage reimbursement only to itinerant
employees, and because Grievants were not itinerant, they were not entitled to mileage
reimbursement under any other provision of the CBA, including Article X, Section B.3.
The problem with the trial court’s analysis is this: it disregarded the arbitrator’s finding
and conclusion that Article X and Article XII addressed two completely different
situations. That is, the arbitrator concluded that Article X provided a benefit for
involuntarily displaced employees, while Article XII addressed reimbursement for
mileage for itinerant employees who travel to different schools for work. Because the
arbitrator interpreted the phrase “and if the new assignment is more than twenty (20)
miles, roundtrip, from the previous assignment,” and the terms “new assignment,”
“previous assignment,” and “home” and ascribed them “clear meanings,” we cannot
say that his Award was not rationally related to or failed to flow from the terms of the
18
CBA. The arbitrator’s interpretation, as off beam as it may have appeared to the trial
court, was the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA, an interpretation that the parties
bargained for and to which they agreed to be bound.
Because Millcreek instructs that a reviewing court lacks the authority to
reject the arbitrator’s findings of fact and his interpretation of disputed contract
language in this manner, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erroneously
vacated the Award and its decision is contrary to law.5
Conclusion
In conclusion, we cannot say that the Award is indisputably without
foundation in or fails logically to flow from the CBA. The arbitrator’s decision
considered language of the CBA and decided upon its meaning. The Award was
rationally derived from the CBA as informed by the arbitrator’s understanding of “the
5
The Unit argues that this Court should consider that the arbitrator disregarded the “final and
binding” 2007 Arbitration Case, interpreting the same language which is presently at issue. (Unit’s
Br. at 15.) It is true that an arbitrator’s award has precedential value and must be followed in future
arbitrations involving the same contract language. American Federation of State, County &
Municipal Employees, District Council 84, Local 297, AFL-CIO v. Board of Public Education of
School District of Pittsburgh, 503 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). However, as the Association points
out, the section of the 2007 Arbitration Case relied on by the Unit on page 15 of its brief merely states
that the Unit might have made a “more plausible” argument had it not focused on the fact that the
grievant in that case lived in the same location as the first assignment for purposes of Article X,
Section B.3. But, because this argument was not raised before Arbitrator Dissen and was inapplicable
to the case he was considering, Arbitrator Dissen made no final determination regarding the current
grievance. Merely because he believed that such an argument was “more plausible” does not mean
that he endorsed or adopted that argument. It simply was not germane to the issue before him and
played no part in the ultimate holding of the case. It is thus considered dicta, not binding precedent.
Judicial dictum has been defined as “[a]n opinion by a court on a question that is directly involved,
briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the Court, but that is not essential to the
decision.” City of Lower Burrell v. City of Lower Burrell Wage & Policy Commission, 795 A.2d 432,
437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Binding precedent only applies to issues actually raised, argued, and
adjudicated, and only where the decision was necessary to the determination of the case. Ario v.
Reliance Insurance Company, 980 A.2d 588, 598 (Pa. 2009). Accordingly, contrary to the position
of the Unit, the arbitrator here was not obligated to adopt or follow dicta contained in the 2007
Arbitration Case.
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parties’ history and the context.” Millcreek, 210 A.3d at 1006. That the trial court may
have reached a different result is of no moment, even if it viewed the Award as
manifestly unreasonable. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7, 939 A.2d at 863.
Because the trial court erred in granting the Unit’s petition to vacate the
arbitration award with respect to Grievants’ entitlement to a displacement mileage
benefit under Article X, Section B.3, we reverse its order and remand for entry of an
order denying the Unit’s statutory appeal in favor of the Association.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Riverview Intermediate Unit #6 :
: No. 1134 C.D. 2020
v. :
:
Riverview Intermediate Unit #6 :
Education Association, :
Appellant :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of June, 2021, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Clarion County dated September 25, 2020, is REVERSED, and
the above-captioned matter is REMANDED for entry of an order in favor of
Riverview Intermediate Unit #6 Education Association.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge