P. Bronson v. J. Wetzel, Sec'y. of DOC ( 2021 )

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Purcell Bronson, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 576 M.D. 2018
: Submitted: April 16, 2021
John Wetzel, Secretary of DOC; :
and his Agents; Barry R. Smith, :
Facility Manager; Crystal Loy, :
Unit Manager; Kelly Latterner, :
Counselor; D. Mowrey, Counselor; :
Tab Bickel, Deputy Secretary; :
Michelle Ivicic, CCPM; Brook Kelly, :
Unit Manager; David Close, Deputy :
Facility Manager; Darren Ginter, :
Unit Manager; Kenneth Hollibaugh, :
Deputy Facility Manager; Unknown :
Named DOC Personnel; Unknown :
Named SCI-Houtzdale Staff; In their :
official and private capacity, :
Respondents :
BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE BROBSON FILED: August 3, 2021
Before the Court are the preliminary objections of Respondents Secretary of
the Department of Corrections, John Wetzel, and other officials of the Department
of Corrections1 (collectively, DOC) to an amended petition for review (Amended
Petition) filed by Petitioner Purcell Bronson (Bronson), an inmate at the State
Correctional Institution (SCI) at Houtzdale. For the reasons set forth below, we
overrule, in part, and sustain, in part, DOC’s preliminary objections.
I. BACKGROUND
Bronson initiated this matter in August 2018 by filing a petition for review
against DOC in this Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking a declaratory judgment
that specific DOC policies and practices violated his constitutional rights or
otherwise violated the law, as well as an order requiring that DOC expunge reports
of misconduct based on the challenged policies and practices. DOC filed
preliminary objections to Claims A, B, and H through K of Bronson’s petition. By
memorandum opinion and order dated September 13, 2019, the Court sustained
DOC’s preliminary objections.2 Bronson then petitioned this Court for leave to file
an amended petition for review, which we granted as to Claim J (relating to
deductions from Bronson’s inmate account) and Claim K (relating to housing).
Bronson then filed the Amended Petition, in response to which DOC filed the
preliminary objections now before the Court.
1
Bronson’s petition further named as Respondents in their official and individual capacity
Barry R. Smith, Facility Manager; Crystal Loy, Unit Manager; Kelly Latterner, Counselor; D.
Mowrey, Counselor; Tab Bickel, Deputy Secretary; Michelle Ivicic, CCPM; Brook Kelly, Unit
Manager; David Close, Deputy Facility Manager; Darren Ginter, Unit Manager; Kenneth
Hollibaugh, Deputy Facility Manager; Unknown Named DOC Personnel; and Unknown Named
SCI-Houtzdale Staff.
2
Bronson v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 576 M.D. 2018, filed September 13, 2019)
(Bronson I).
2
As to Claim J, Bronson avers in the Amended Petition that he has no
“[Act] 84 judgment”3 against him that would authorize DOC to “make monetary
deductions from [his] inmate . . . account[] for the purpose of collecting restitution
or any other court-ordered obligation,” and DOC cannot produce such a court order.
(Amended Petition, Claim J ¶ 1.) Thus, he avers that DOC’s ongoing seizure of 100
percent of his funds is an arbitrary taking of property and constitutes theft by
deception, and DOC should have afforded him a hearing to contest what he
characterizes as “the arbitrary . . . seizure of his funds to pay a non-existent
[Act] 84 debt.” (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) Bronson avers that DOC’s normal practice is to
seize 20 percent of incoming funds to pay off debts unrelated to Act 84, such as
postage, sick call, or photocopy fees, which debts Bronson admits he has.
(Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) He further avers that, if an Act 84 judgment exists against an inmate,
the required assessment is 20 percent, not 100 percent. (Id. ¶ 3.) Bronson claims,
however, that DOC continues to seize 100 percent of his funds, apparently under the
guise of an Act 84 debt, and has improperly calculated the seizure of funds from his
account. (Id. ¶¶ 2-5.) Bronson asserts that DOC’s actions, along with its failure to
provide him with a due process hearing at which he could contest its actions, violate
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.
(Id. ¶ 2, 8.) He seeks a declaratory judgment that DOC’s actions, practices, and
3
Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b)(5), is commonly
referred to as “Act 84” and provides:
[DOC] shall make monetary deductions of at least 25% of deposits made to inmate
wages and personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution, costs imposed
under section 9721(c.1) [of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9721(c.1)], filing
fees to be collected under section 6602(c) [of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.
C.S. § 6602(c)] (relating to prisoner filing fees) and any other court-ordered
obligation.
3
policies are unlawful as to these seizures and an injunction enjoining DOC from
seizing more than 20 percent of his funds without first providing him with a due
process hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) He also seeks a return of what he refers to as “the 80
[percent] excess unauthorized seized funds since 1993, totaling $3,231.68[]
to[ ]date,” along with expenses, costs, and attorney’s fees. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)
As to Claim K, Bronson avers in the Amended Petition that DOC arbitrarily
voted to retain what he refers to as his “Z” and “H” housing codes without setting
forth a rational reason and that DOC denied him his procedural due process rights
by failing to hold a hearing at which he could contest its decision. (Amended
Petition, Claim K ¶¶ 1-2.) With regard to the H code, Bronson avers that DOC failed
to submit evidence that Bronson attempted to escape from a DOC prison, which
Bronson claims is a requirement of the H-code status; as a result of his H-code status,
DOC requires him to move to a new cell every 90 days. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 24-30.) Bronson
also avers that DOC officials relied on a forged or falsified document, which
indicated that Bronson killed his cell mate, as the basis for voting to retain Bronson’s
Z-code status that confines him to a single cell. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 17-18.) Bronson avers
that DOC’s decision serves no penological purpose other than to retaliate against
him for his litigation activities against DOC. (Id. ¶¶ 6-12, 21-23.) Bronson also
avers that DOC’s intent was to prevent him from moving to a lesser custody
classification, which would allow him to engage in programs beneficial for his
commutation application. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9, 16.) As a result of DOC’s housing code
decision, Bronson avers that he is being treated differently than the
alleged “3,889 [l]ife[-]sentenced prisoners that are allowed to [a] double cell, and
. . . the 645” life-sentenced inmates similarly confined to a single cell, because the
circumstances of his confinement are baseless. (Id. ¶¶ 13-16.) For all these reasons,
4
Bronson maintains that DOC’s housing code decision and the denial of a due process
hearing at which he could contest it are in violation of his First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶ 33.)
DOC preliminarily objects to both Claim J and Claim K on the basis that
Bronson failed to plead facts with sufficient specificity4 and failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted (demurrer).
II. DISCUSSION
As set forth above, this matter comes before the Court on preliminary
objections, and our review, therefore, is limited to the pleadings. Pa. State Lodge,
Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 415
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), aff’d, 924 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 2007). We must accept as true the
well-pled averments set forth in the petition for review and any inferences
reasonably and logically drawn therefrom. See Pa. State Troopers Ass’n v. Cmwlth.,
606 A.2d 586, 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). We need not accept, however, “conclusions
of law, unwarranted inferences from [the] facts, argumentative allegations, or
expressions of opinion.” Meier v. Maleski, 648 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
Nevertheless, given Bronson’s pro se status, we engage in a liberal review of the
Amended Petition to determine whether he is entitled to legal relief. See Madden v.
Jeffes, 482 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1028(a) sets forth the bases upon
which a party may preliminarily object to a pleading, including failure of a pleading
to conform to a rule of court, insufficient specificity in a pleading, and demurrer.
With regard to the first two bases set forth above and relevant to this matter,
4
See Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(2), (3) (permitting preliminary objection based on failure of
pleading to conform to rule of court and insufficient specificity in pleading, respectively).
5
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1019(a) provides that “[t]he material facts
on which a cause of action . . . is based shall be stated in a concise and summary
form.” General allegations of wrongdoing, without the support of specific factual
averments, fail to meet this pleading standard. McCulligan v. Pa. State Police,
123 A.3d 1136, 1141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff’d, 135 A.3d 580 (Pa. 2016). As to the
last basis set forth above, in order to sustain a preliminary objection based on a
demurrer, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery on the
claim. Pa. State Lodge, 909 A.2d at 416. Any existing doubt must be construed
against sustaining the objection. Id.Lastly, a demurrer “cannot aver the existence of facts not apparent from the
face of the challenged pleading.” Martin v. Dep’t of Transp., 556 A.2d 969, 971
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). “A speaking demurrer is defined as one which, in order to
sustain itself, requires the aid of a fact not appearing on the face of the [objected-to]
pleading . . . .” Regal Indus. Corp. v. Crum and Forster, Inc., 890 A.2d 395, 398
(Pa. Super. 2005) (internal quotations removed) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 299 (6th ed. 1991)). A speaking demurrer cannot be relied upon or
considered in sustaining a preliminary objection. Id. An exception to this general
prohibition exists, however, where a petitioner avers the existence of a written
agreement and the agreement is relied upon to establish the petitioner’s cause of
action. Martin, 556 A.2d at 971. A respondent may in such a case attach the written
agreement to its demurrer without creating an impermissible speaking demurrer. Id.A. Preliminary Objections to Claim J
1. Failure to Plead Facts with Sufficient Specificity
As to DOC’s preliminary objection that Bronson failed to plead facts with
sufficient specificity in Claim J, DOC contends that, because Bronson references
6
Respondents, generally, in the Amended Petition and fails to identify any one
particular Respondent responsible for the wrongful withdrawal of his funds, the
Amended Petition fails to conform to Rule 1019(a). Bronson responds that the
individual(s) responsible for the wrongful seizure of his funds would be identified
through the discovery process. Preliminarily, we disagree with DOC’s position that
Bronson has not pled his claim with sufficient specificity. Bronson has identified
that DOC is generally in charge of managing his inmate account and that, to the
extent necessary, the specific individual(s) responsible for handling his inmate
account can be identified through discovery.
2. Demurrer
As to DOC’s preliminary objection to Claim J based on a demurrer, DOC’s
position is two-fold. First, as to any deductions from Bronson’s account that DOC
may have made pursuant to Act 84, DOC argues that Bronson cannot prevail because
DOC had the statutory authority to make such deductions and the statute of
limitations applicable to any Act 84 deductions has expired. Second, DOC asserts
that Bronson’s inmate account is in the negative and has been since the filing of his
original petition. Any incoming funds are, thus, being used to pay down Bronson’s
outstanding balance, and Bronson is not entitled to a due process hearing relating
thereto.
Although Bronson argues that Claim J focuses on non-Act 84 deductions (a
term which he does not define), DOC asserts that Bronson has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted based on Act 84, seemingly implying that
Bronson’s claim is, in actuality, based on Act 84. DOC does this despite never
stating that it made any Act 84 deductions from Bronson’s account. Rather, DOC
merely recites its legal authority to make Act 84 deductions and the statute of
7
limitations for challenges to Act 84 deductions. We note, however, that Bronson’s
Amended Petition is equally unclear as to whether Claim J is based on Act 84, as we
are unable to ascertain whether his stance that DOC has been taking unauthorized
deductions from his inmate account is: (1) based upon his averment that there is no
order that would authorize Act 84 deductions, such that any deduction by DOC
(regardless if it was for restitution, filing fees, or court-ordered obligations)
necessarily would be a non-Act 84 deduction; (2) based upon his characterization of
non-Act 84 deductions as deductions for debts, such as postage, sick call, and
photocopies that are not the subject of Act 84; or (3) both. Thus, at this early stage
of the litigation, we cannot reach a conclusion that DOC made any deductions
pursuant to Act 84, let alone that Bronson cannot prevail on his claim as to those
deductions because they are barred by the statute of limitations.
With regard to non-Act 84 deductions, DOC, seemingly characterizing these
“deductions” as its application of incoming funds to pay down the negative balance
of Bronson’s inmate account, alleges in the alternative that it may apply funds in
such a manner.5 DOC attached to its demurrer a copy of Bronson’s inmate account
to demonstrate that the account has had a negative balance since the filing of
Bronson’s original petition and that DOC, therefore, has the authority to make the
deductions. As to our ability to rely on the attached document, as discussed above,
we cannot consider facts or documents raised by DOC that are not apparent from the
face of Bronson’s Amended Petition; the exception to this rule requires the document
in question to be a written agreement, which the copy of Bronson’s inmate account
clearly is not. See Martin, 556 A.2d at 971. Even if we were to consider the attached
5
Bronson notes in his Amended Petition that he has other debts, such as postage, sick call,
and photocopy fees. (Amended Petition, Claim J ¶ 3.)
8
copy of Bronson’s inmate account for its bearing on DOC’s authority to withhold
Bronson’s funds, the document reflects only the eighteen-month period after
Bronson filed his original petition. (See Preliminary Objections, Exhibit A.) It does
not address the time period prior to the filing of the petition for review, which is the
relevant period. In sum, we cannot conclude with certainty on the facts before us
that the law will permit no recovery on Bronson’s claims. Pa. State Lodge, 909 A.2d
at 416.
As to DOC’s statute of limitations argument, DOC mischaracterizes
Bronson’s Amended Petition as “admit[ting] that Act 84 deductions have been
ongoing since 1993.” (Preliminary Objections ¶ 19.) Rather, Bronson avers in the
Amended Petition that he seeks the return of “unauthorized seized funds since 1993,
totaling $3,231.68[] to[ ]date.” (Amended Petition, Claim J ¶ 10.) Based on that
supposed admission, DOC contends that the statute of limitations on Bronson’s
Act 84 claim has expired because more than two years has elapsed since DOC began
making deductions. As DOC’s argument is based solely on its mischaracterization
of Bronson’s Amended Petition, it is not clear to the Court at this stage whether
Bronson’s claim is time-barred.
B. Preliminary Objections to Claim K
1. Failure to Plead Facts with Sufficient Specificity
DOC first objects to Claim K of Bronson’s Amended Petition by arguing that
Bronson’s claims for relief under the First and Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution are not pled with sufficient specificity, as required under
Pennsylvania’s fact-pleading standard as set forth in Rule 1019(a). (See Preliminary
Objections ¶ 32.) We agree. Bronson’s Amended Petition states that “[DOC] ha[s]
violated [Bronson’s] rights as protected by the [Fir]st, [Eigh]th, and [Fourteen]th
9
[A]mendments to the U[nited] S[tates] Constitution,” but Bronson does not elaborate
how DOC’s housing decision infringes upon his First and Eighth Amendment rights,
other than to say that those rights were violated. (Amended Petition, Claim K ¶ 33.)
Without sufficient averments of fact demonstrating that Bronson’s First or Eighth
Amendment rights were violated, this general allegation of wrongdoing fails to
conform to Rule 1019(a). McCulligan, 123 A.3d at 1141. We, therefore, sustain
DOC’s preliminary objection to Bronson’s First and Eighth Amendment claims.
2. Demurrer
i. Retaliation
As to Bronson’s remaining claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment, DOC
first demurs to Claim K of Bronson’s Amended Petition by arguing that Bronson
fails to state a claim for relief concerning retaliation where, under our precedent, a
housing determination is not considered an adverse action for purposes of a
retaliation claim. DOC further contends that Claim K does not (1) specify a
connection between a particular court case involving Bronson, (2) identify the
individuals responsible for retaliating against him, and (3) aver that the lawsuit was
a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action, all of which DOC asserts
are required to state a claim for retaliation. Lastly, DOC insists that prison officials
must be accorded wide-ranging deference in managing the institutional security and
internal order of a correctional facility, and DOC asks that we defer to its judgment
in this case.
In Mays v. Kosinski, 86 A.3d 945 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), an inmate claimed that
DOC officials increased his custody level for no apparent reason other than to
retaliate against the inmate for filing a grievance against DOC. Mays, 86 A.3d
at 948-49. Taking that allegation as true, we sustained DOC’s preliminary
10
objections, holding that “[a] change of [an inmate’s] custody level and his
subsequent transfer [to more restrictive housing] cannot be considered adverse
actions for the purpose of a prison retaliation claim.” Id. at 949.
Citing to Mays, we held in Bronson I that Bronson’s original petition failed to
state a claim for relief as to retaliation, because a housing determination is not an
adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim. Here, after careful review, it is
clear Bronson’s retaliation claim in the Amended Petition is virtually identical to his
original averment. Bronson continues to argue that DOC officials made the housing
code decision in retaliation for Bronson’s litigation activities, but he fails to plead
any facts or law that could support a claim that a legally cognizable adverse action
occurred for purposes of a retaliation claim. See also Yount v. Dep’t of
Corr., 966 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2009). Consequently, Bronson fails to state a claim
for relief concerning retaliation.
ii. Equal Protection
DOC next demurs to Claim K on the ground that Bronson is not being treated
differently than the other life-sentenced inmates at SCI-Houtzdale as it concerns the
Z and H housing codes. According to DOC, Bronson’s Fourteenth Amendment right
under the United States Constitution to equal protection of the laws is, therefore, not
violated by the housing code decision. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment assures that “all similarly situated persons are treated alike.”
Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 672 (Pa. 1998). Where the government action at issue
does not burden a fundamental right, however, “it does not offend the Equal
Protection Clause as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
11
interest.”6 Id. Under the rational basis test, the government does not necessarily
have to articulate the purpose or rationale in support of its decision. Id. Rather, “it
is enough that some rationale may conceivably . . . have been the purpose . . . of the
relevant governmental decisionmaker.” Id. (internal quotations removed) (quoting
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992)).
Bronson’s Amended Petition claims that DOC’s housing code decision
confines him to a single cell and requires him to “change cells every 90 days . . . for
no rational reason, causing [him] to suffer unnecessary arthritic pain . . . from
moving heavy personal property from cell to cell.” (Amended Petition, Claim K
¶ 27.) Bronson does not aver, however, that he is the only inmate being moved to a
different cell every 90 days. Bronson also admits that an alleged 645 life-sentenced
prisoners are similarly confined to segregated housing. Even accepting Bronson’s
allegations as true, he has not pled facts to support a claim that he is being treated
differently than other similarly situated life-sentenced inmates.
Bronson also contends, however, that DOC’s housing code decision prevents
him from receiving benefits that may help his commutation application.7 The
powers of commutation, pardon, and reprieve are granted in the Pennsylvania
Constitution to the Governor of Pennsylvania and a Board of Pardons, which, upon
application, may issue clemency as within their discretion. PA. CONST. art. 4, § 9.
There is no constitutional right of access to these methods of clemency, however.
See Commonwealth v. Michael, 56 A.3d 899, 903 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam)
(noting there is no constitutional right to clemency and only minimal due process
6
The government action must also not offend a suspect or quasi-suspect classification to
receive rational basis treatment, neither of which are relevant here. Small, 722 A.2d at 672.
7
Furthermore, we note that Bronson does not elaborate how he is treated differently from
other inmates as it concerns commutation privileges.
12
protections apply in executive consideration process); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of
a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence.”) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). DOC’s housing code decision, therefore, does not
affect any of Bronson’s fundamental rights. It is further clear that DOC’s housing
code decision is rationally related to the legitimate interest of maintaining the
internal order and institutional security of SCI-Houtzdale. “[P]rison officials must
be accorded wide ranging deference on the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are necessary to preserve internal order and to
maintain institutional security.” Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1980); see also Yount, 966 A.2d at 1121 (“[A]dministrative prisoner
transfers are presumed to further a legitimate penological objective.”). For these
reasons, Bronson fails to state a claim for relief as it concerns equal protection, his
housing codes, and opportunities for commutation.
iii. Procedural Due Process
Finally, DOC contends that Bronson does not have a right to be confined to a
housing unit of his choosing and, without an underlying liberty interest or right at
issue, Bronson’s procedural due process rights are not violated by DOC’s housing
code decision. Bronson nevertheless avers that DOC singled him out because it “set
forth no rational reason . . . why [DOC] would not remove [his housing codes],” and
13
because DOC failed to provide him a due process hearing at which he could contest
the decision.8 (Amended Petition, Claim K ¶ 15.)
In Feliciano v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 250 A.3d 1269 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2021), we held that whether an inmate is entitled to procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution depends on
whether the inmate has been deprived of a “legally cognizable liberty interest,”
which interest we recognized as arising from the imposition of an “atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275 (citing and quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
484 (1995)). To make this determination, the Feliciano Court adopted the
fact-specific test established by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016), which provides:
[T]he proper methodology for evaluating [procedural due process]
deprivation claims under Sandin is to consider (i) the conditions of
confinement relative to administrative segregation, (ii) the duration of
that confinement generally, and (iii) the duration relative to length of
administrative segregation routinely imposed on prisoners serving
similar sentences. We also emphasize that a liberty interest can
8
The inmate in Mays, similarly argued that DOC’s decision had no valid reasons
supporting it, and the decision, therefore, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Mays, 86
A.3d at 949. We addressed the question as a procedural due process claim, writing:
Mays also asserts that DOC violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by singling him out absent a reasonable rationale. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations
of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection
must establish that one of these interests is at stake. For an inmate, a liberty interest
in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state action. A
liberty interest may [also] arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees
implicit in the word liberty. However, such a liberty interest arises only when the
restrictive condition imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Id. (emphasis added) (quotations, citations, and footnote omitted).
14
potentially arise under less-severe conditions when the deprivation is
prolonged or indefinite.
Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1279 (quoting Aref, 833 F.3d at 255).
As we have already concluded that Bronson is treated no differently in relation
to his fellow life-sentenced inmates as it concerns housing, Bronson has not
established that the conditions of his confinement are “atypical and significant . . .
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275.
Because there is no liberty interest or constitutional right to clemency, Bronson has
not demonstrated that he is entitled to procedural due process by reason of his
commutation application. Michael, 56 A.3d at 903. Accordingly, Bronson has
failed to state a claim for relief as it concerns procedural due process.9
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we overrule DOC’s preliminary objections to Claim J and
sustain DOC’s preliminary objections to Claim K, thereby dismissing Claim K.
P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge
9
Insofar as Bronson alleges that DOC’s housing code decision violates DOC’s housing
policies, in Dantzler v. Wetzel, 218 A.3d 519 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), we held that “[a] prison
authority’s adoption of policies and practices creates neither rights in inmates nor a constitutionally
protected interest triggering the inmates’ due process protection,” and a “failure to comply with
prison policy is not a basis for a cause of action.” Dantzler, 218 A.3d at 524, abrogated on other
grounds by Feliciano (quoting Orozco v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 268 C.D. 2013, filed
January 14, 2014) slip op. at 4-15); see also Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275 n.9 (explaining DOC’s
“regulations do not, in themselves, confer upon inmates any actionable rights.” Accordingly,
Bronson’s contention that DOC’s housing code decision was in violation of DOC’s housing
policies does not provide a basis for a cause of action. Bronson, therefore, fails to state a claim for
relief in this regard.
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Purcell Bronson, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 576 M.D. 2018
:
John Wetzel, Secretary of DOC; :
and his Agents; Barry R. Smith, :
Facility Manager; Crystal Loy, :
Unit Manager; Kelly Latterner, :
Counselor; D. Mowrey, Counselor; :
Tab Bickel, Deputy Secretary; :
Michelle Ivicic, CCPM; Brook Kelly, :
Unit Manager; David Close, Deputy :
Facility Manager; Darren Ginter, :
Unit Manager; Kenneth Hollibaugh, :
Deputy Facility Manager; Unknown :
Named DOC Personnel; Unknown :
Named SCI-Houtzdale Staff; In their :
official and private capacity, :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2021, Respondents’ preliminary
objections to Claim J of Petitioner Purcell Bronson’s Amended Petition for Review
(Amended Petition) are OVERRULED, and Respondents’ preliminary objections to
Claim K of Petitioner’s Amended Petition are SUSTAINED. Claim K is hereby
dismissed. Respondents shall file an answer to Claim J of the Amended Petition
within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.
P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge