Padgett, L. v. Bradford County ( 2022 )

J-S28011-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LYNN A. PADGETT : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
BRADFORD COUNTY, : No. 872 MDA 2021
PENNSYLVANIA, JEFFREY A. SMITH :
AND ROBERT MCGUINESS, AND :
DANIEL J. BARRETT :
Appeal from the Order Entered June 4, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Civil Division at No(s):
2019IR0024,
CP-08-CR-0000888-1997
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 12, 2022
Appellant, Lynn A. Padgett, appeals pro se from the order entered on
June 4, 2021, which dismissed his eighth petition filed under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
As we previously explained:
On January 8, 1998, [Appellant] entered guilty pleas in two
cases to two counts of involuntary deviate intercourse and
one count of rape. The offenses took place in Lycoming and
Bradford Counties, and were prosecuted together in Bradford
County. [Appellant’s] initial sentence entered on March 5,
1998 was vacated, and he was resentenced on October 7,
1999, to an aggregate term of [15 to 30] years'
imprisonment. [Appellant] then filed a direct appeal which
raised challenges to jurisdiction. This Court affirmed
[Appellant’s] judgment of sentence on October 10, 2001.
[Appellant] did not file a timely petition for allowance of
appeal.
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Commonwealth v. Padgett, 131 A.3d 94 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished
memorandum) at 2 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the ensuing years, Appellant filed multiple, unsuccessful PCRA
petitions and, on October 16, 2017, this Court affirmed the dismissal of
Appellant’s seventh PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Padgett, 179 A.3d
566 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-3.
On May 6, 2019, Appellant filed the current petition, which he titled
“petition for emergency writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.” Within the
petition, Appellant sought relief from his judgment of sentence because: 1)
he is “actually innocent” of the crimes for which he was convicted; 2) the trial
court did not have venue over his criminal action; 3) the Commonwealth failed
to provide Appellant with formal notice of his charges; and, 4) the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to try Appellant for some of the crimes. Appellant’s
Current Petition, 5/6/19, at 1-12.
The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on June 3, 2021 and
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant primarily
claims that the PCRA court erred in construing his self-styled “petition for writ
of habeas corpus” under the PCRA. According to Appellant, the PCRA does
not encompass his claims and, therefore, the timeliness requirements of the
PCRA do not apply to his petition. Appellant’s contention fails and the PCRA
court properly dismissed Appellant’s patently untimely, serial PCRA petition.
We “review an order granting or denying PCRA relief to determine
whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by evidence of record and
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whether its decision is free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825
A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. 2003).
The PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes
they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain
collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. As the statute declares, the PCRA “is
the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
common law and statutory remedies . . . including habeas corpus and coram
nobis.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa.
1997). Thus, under the plain terms of the PCRA, “if the underlying substantive
claim is one that could potentially be remedied under the PCRA, that claim is
exclusive to the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233
(Pa. Super. 2004) (emphasis in original).
Within Appellant’s petition, Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief
from his judgment of sentence because he is “actually innocent” of the crimes
for which he was convicted and because the trial court did not have venue or
jurisdiction over his crimes. See Appellant’s Current Petition, 5/6/19, at 1-12.
However, the PCRA undoubtedly encompasses Appellant’s claims, as the
claims concern “matters affecting [Appellant’s] conviction [or] sentence.”
Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007), quoting Coady v.
Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. 2001) (Castille, J., concurring); see also 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (“[the PCRA] provides for an action by which persons
convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences
may obtain collateral relief”).
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Appellant’s claims thus fall under the rubric of the PCRA and, since the
PCRA encompasses Appellant’s claims, Appellant “can only find relief under
the PCRA’s strictures.” Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233; see also Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[petitioner’s legality of
sentence] claim is cognizable under the PCRA . . . . [Thus, petitioner’s]
‘motion to correct illegal sentence’ is a PCRA petition and cannot be considered
under any other common law remedy”).
The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited
statutory exceptions. This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition,
including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the
date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the]
petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the
timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever,
947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, since
the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, we are
required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are able to
consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d
581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:
All PCRA petitions including a second or subsequent petition,
shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment
becomes final. The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional
in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this
Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition.
Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
authority to address the substantive claims.
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Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (quotation
marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “Because the timeliness [of a PCRA
petition] implicates our jurisdiction, we may consider the matter sua sponte.”
Yarris, 731 A.2d at 587.
In the present case, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence on October 10, 2001 and Appellant did not file a timely petition for
allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment
of sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA at the end of the day on
November 9, 2001, when the period for seeking review in our Supreme Court
expired. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Under the terms of the PCRA, Appellant
thus had until November 9, 2002 to file a timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1). As Appellant did not file his current petition until May 6, 2019,
the current petition is manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell upon
Appellant to plead and prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the
one-year time-bar applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1);
Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to
properly invoke a statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA
demands that the petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements of
the relied-upon exception).
Here, Appellant did not even attempt to plead a valid statutory exception
to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. Thus, since Appellant’s PCRA petition is
manifestly untimely and Appellant did not plead any of the statutory
exceptions to the one-year time-bar, our “courts are without jurisdiction to
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offer [Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d
516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). We, therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s order,
which dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/12/2022
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