Jones, B. v. McGreevy, D. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A20022-21
    J-A20023-21
    
    2022 PA Super 8
    BRIAN W. JONES, ASSIGNEE OF     :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    WILSON C. FOX                   :              PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    Appellant        :
    :
    :
    v.                    :
    :
    :         No. 269 WDA 2021
    JANICE MCGREEVY,                :
    ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF :
    DANIEL MCGREEVY, JANICE         :
    MCGREEVY, SNOWDEN CAPITAL       :
    ADVISORS LLC, ALSO KNOWN AS     :
    SNOWDEN LANE PARTNERS,          :
    PERSHING LLC, BANK OF NEW YORK :
    MELLON NA, ALSO KNOWN AS BNY    :
    MELLON                          :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 4, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
    No(s): GD-09-016053
    BRIAN W. JONES                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant          :
    :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    JANICE MCGREEVY,                    :   No. 286 WDA 2021
    ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE        :
    OF DANIEL M. MCGREEVY, JANICE       :
    MCGREEVY, LAUREN ROSE               :
    MCGREEVY-GRUSZKA, BRENT             :
    GRUSZKA, BRENDAN MCGREEVY,          :
    JANICE MCGREEVY,                    :
    ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE        :
    OF DANIEL M. MCGREEVY, AS           :
    J-A20022-21
    J-A20023-21
    TRUSTEE FOR THE DANIEL M.                    :
    MCGREEVY SEPARATE SHARE                      :
    TRUST, AND ALL OTHER                         :
    IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE
    TRANSFEREES
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Civil Division at
    No(s): A.D. 454 of 2020
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.
    OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                                FILED: January 11, 2022
    Brian W. Jones (“Appellant”), assignee of Wilson C. Fox (“Fox”), appeals
    from the February 4, 2021 judgment entered at docket no. 269 WDA 2021
    after a non-jury verdict in favor of the debtor, Daniel M. McGreevy
    (“McGreevy”), and the garnishees, Snowden Capital Advisors LLC, a/k/a
    Snowden Lane Partners (“Snowden”), Pershing LLC (“Pershing”), and Bank of
    New York Mellon NA, a/k/a BNY Mellon (“BNY Mellon”) (collectively
    “Garnishees”).       In addition, Appellant appeals from the February 18, 2021
    order entered at docket no. 286 WDA 2021, which sustained the preliminary
    objections filed by the defendant, McGreevy, and the transferees, Janice
    McGreevy,      Lauren    Rose     McGreevy-Gruszka,          Brent    Gruszka,   Brendan
    McGreevy, the Daniel McGreevy Separate Share Trust, and all other
    immediate      and    mediate     transferees        (collectively   “Transferees”),   and
    dismissed Appellant’s complaint.1              After careful review, we vacate the
    ____________________________________________
    1As the appeals at nos. 269 WDA 2021 and 286 WDA 2021 involve the same
    parties and the issues raised therein are closely related, we consolidate the
    appeals sua sponte for ease of disposition.
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    judgment entered at docket no. 269 WDA 2021, vacate the February 18, 2021
    order entered at docket no. 286 WDA 2021, and remand these cases for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    We glean the following relevant facts and procedural background of
    these matters from the record. On December 16, 2008, Fox commenced a
    civil action against McGreevy in the Westmoreland County Court of Common
    Pleas at docket no. 14497 of 2008, after McGreevy defaulted on an agreement
    to purchase two collectible shotguns from him for $40,000.00. On July 10,
    2009, Fox obtained a default judgment against McGreevy in the amount of
    $50,800.00. On September 17, 2009, the judgment was transferred to the
    Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas at docket no. GD-09-016053
    (“Garnishment Action”). Fox subsequently sold and assigned the judgment to
    Appellant.
    On August 2, 2018, Appellant began post-judgment enforcement
    proceedings via the Garnishment Action, by requesting the issuance of a writ
    of execution and naming PNC Bank as the garnishee.2 That action resulted in
    the garnishing of funds from McGreevy’s individual checking and savings
    ____________________________________________
    2 “Garnishment is a proceeding through which a creditor collects his debt out
    of property of the debtor in the hands of a third party….” Garden State
    Standardbred Sales Co., Inc. v. Seese, 
    611 A.2d 1239
    , 1241 (Pa. Super.
    1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Service of a writ of
    execution on a garnishee “attaches all property of the defendant in the
    possession of the garnishee, including property that comes into the
    garnishee’s possession after service.” Korman Commercial Properties,
    Inc. v. Furniture.com, LLC, 
    81 A.3d 97
    , 100 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing
    Pa.R.C.P. 3111(b)).
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    accounts with PNC Bank in the amount of $4,945.17, which was paid towards
    the balance owed to Appellant on the judgment.
    On January 23, 2019, Appellant requested a writ of execution be
    reissued and served on BNY Mellon, as garnishee.3      The sheriff personally
    served BNY Mellon with the writ of execution, along with interrogatories in
    attachment on January 24, 2019. BNY Mellon never filed an answer to the
    interrogatories. On February 27, 2019, Appellant filed a praecipe to reissue a
    writ of execution, naming Snowden and Pershing as garnishees.4 Appellant
    subsequently served Pershing with the writ of execution, along with
    ____________________________________________
    3 BNY Mellon is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of New York Mellon
    Corporation, which provides check services for customers such as McGreevy
    who maintain BNY Pershing Corestone accounts. See Appellant’s Brief
    (“Appellant’s Brief I”), 5/19/21, at 7.
    4  Snowden and Pershing, also subsidiaries of Bank of New York Mellon
    Corporation, maintained control of the following accounts owned by McGreevy
    at the time the writ was reissued: (1) individual brokerage/checking account;
    (2) separate share trust; (3) individual retirement account (“IRA”); (4)
    inherited/decedent IRA; and (5) joint brokerage/checking account. N.T.
    Deposition of Robert Feldman, 6/11/19, at 8-11. Snowden is an independent
    brokerage dealer and registered investment advisory firm which managed
    McGreevy’s investments, while Pershing was the custodian of the assets in
    McGreevy’s accounts. Id.; N.T. Trial, 3/2/20, at 18-19. Robert Feldman is
    the Senior Partner and Managing Director of the Feldman Group at Snowden’s
    Pittsburgh office. As an employee and agent of Snowden, Mr. Feldman
    provided investment advice and brokerage services for McGreevy for more
    than ten years prior to McGreevy’s death. See id. at 9-10; Affidavit of Robert
    Feldman, 3/5/19, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
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    interrogatories in aid of execution,5 on March 1, 2019, via certified mail at its
    corporate office located in New Jersey, as agreed upon by Pershing.6 On April
    1, 2019, Pershing filed its answers to the interrogatories, in which it indicated
    that it had frozen the funds in McGreevy’s individual brokerage/checking
    account, totaling $102,549.08, and that it elected not to freeze the assets in
    McGreevy’s other accounts, because there were enough funds in his individual
    checking account to pay the balance owed on the judgment.
    In February and March of 2019, McGreevy filed claims for exemption
    and immunity of his assets in Garnishees’ custody from levy or attachment,
    pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3123.1(a).7 Additionally, in April of 2019, McGreevy
    filed preliminary objections to the writ of execution served on Pershing, in
    which he asserted that his property held in Pershing’s custody was exempt or
    immune from execution.8 On September 25, 2019, McGreevy’s wife, Janice
    McGreevy (“Wife”), joined the Garnishment Action as an interested party and
    ____________________________________________
    5 In the context of an attachment proceeding, interrogatories are analogous
    to a complaint and are designed to ascertain the property in the possession of
    a garnishee. See Painwebber, Inc. v. Devin, 
    658 A.2d 409
    , 412 (Pa. Super.
    1995) (citing Pa.R.C.P. 3144, 3145).
    6   Service of the writ was never obtained on Snowden.
    7 Rule 3123.1(a) provides, in relevant part: “A defendant may claim
    exemption or immunity of property from levy or attachment by filing with the
    sheriff a claim substantially in the form provided by Rule 3252(a).” Pa.R.C.P.
    3123.1(a).
    8Rule 3142 allows a defendant or garnishee to raise the defenses of immunity
    or exemption of property from attachment in the form of preliminary
    objections. See Pa.R.C.P. 3142(a).
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    adopted McGreevy’s preliminary objections. On September 29, 2019, the trial
    court stayed the preliminary objections and declared that the issue of whether
    McGreevy’s assets in Pershing’s custody are exempt or immune from
    execution would be decided at a non-jury trial.
    Senior Judge Paul F. Lutty, Jr., presided over the non-jury trial held on
    March 3, 2020.       At the close of trial, Judge Lutty directed McGreevy and
    Appellant to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Both
    parties complied. On June 23, 2020, Judge Lutty entered the following order:
    AND NOW, this 23rd day of June 2020, it is hereby ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED AND DECREED that verdict is entered in favor of …
    McGreevy and against … Appellant…. The writs of execution
    issued against … Garnishees on January 23, 2019 and February
    27, 2019 are dismissed and dissolved, and all property owned and
    held by [McGreevy], or established for the benefit of [McGreevy]
    or otherwise associated with [McGreevy], including all accounts in
    the custody of Pershing … is hereby ordered, adjudged and
    decreed to be immune and exempt from attachment, levy and
    execution. Pershing … is hereby ordered and directed to release
    any and all holds and/or freezes on the accounts of … McGreevy
    on deposit and within the custody of Pershing….
    Trial Court Order (“Order”), 6/23/20, at 1-2 (unnumbered; some capitalization
    omitted).9 See Pa.R.C.P. 3121(a)(4) (requiring the court to set aside a writ
    of execution upon the showing of exemption or immunity of property from
    execution). No findings of fact were issued by the trial court, nor was the
    Non-Jury Verdict accompanied by a memorandum explaining Judge Lutty’s
    decision.
    ____________________________________________
    9 On the same date, Judge Lutty amended the Order solely for the purpose of
    renaming it “Non-Jury and Amended Verdict,” which we refer to herein as
    Non-Jury Verdict. See Non-Jury Verdict, 6/23/20, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
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    On June 29, 2020, Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief. Oral
    argument was held on the post-trial motion on September 24, 2020, and
    continued on October 15, 2020. Both parties subsequently submitted briefs
    at the trial court’s request. On February 4, 2021, Appellant filed a praecipe
    for entry of judgment on the Non-Jury Verdict pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
    227.4(1)(b), as more than 120 days had passed since the filing of his request
    for post-trial relief and the trial court had not yet disposed of the motion.
    Judgment was entered on the same date. On February 8, 2021, Appellant
    filed a timely notice of appeal at docket no. 269 WDA 2021, followed by the
    filing of a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.
    McGreevy died on January 17, 2021, just prior to the filing of the appeal
    in the Garnishment Action. Wife was appointed as administratrix of his estate
    (“Administratrix”) in February of 2021 and, on March 23, 2021, McGreevy’s
    counsel filed a notice of McGreevy’s death, along with a request to substitute
    Administratrix for the deceased as the defendant in the Garnishment Action,
    in compliance with Rules 2355 and 2352. See Pa.R.C.P. 2355(a) (“If a named
    party dies after the commencement of an action, the attorney of record for
    the deceased party shall file a notice of death with the prothonotary. The
    procedure to substitute the personal representative of the deceased party
    shall be in accordance with Rule 2352.”); Pa.R.C.P. 2352 (directing the filing
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    of a statement of material facts on which the right to substitution of a party
    is based). The prothonotary adjusted the caption accordingly.10
    While the Garnishment Action was still pending, Appellant instituted a
    separate action on October 9, 2020, in the Warren County Court of Common
    Pleas at docket no. A.D. 454 of 2020, with the filing of a complaint against
    McGreevy, in which he alleged that McGreevy attempted to harbor transferred
    and subsequently acquired assets and/or funds from the reach of creditors, in
    violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“PUVTA”), 12
    Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5114.11          On November 9, 2020, PUVTA Appellees filed
    preliminary objections to the complaint, asserting, inter alia, that the trial
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a result of the Non-Jury Verdict
    entered in the Garnishment Action, in which Judge Lutty declared all of
    McGreevy’s assets exempt and immune from attachment, levy, and execution.
    In response, Appellant filed preliminary objections to PUVTA Appellees’
    preliminary objections.       On February 17, 2021, following argument on the
    preliminary objections, the trial court entered an order sustaining PUVTA
    Appellees’ first objection regarding the court’s lack of subject matter
    ____________________________________________
    10Administratrix and Garnishees, the appellees in this matter, are referred to
    collectively herein as “Garnishment Appellees.”
    11We refer to this action herein as the “PUVTA Action.” With regard to the
    PUVTA Action, McGreevy and Transferees are referred to collectively herein as
    “PUVTA Appellees.”
    -8-
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    jurisdiction, which rendered their remaining objections moot, and dismissing
    the complaint without prejudice.
    On February 23, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal
    at docket no. 286 WDA 2021. The trial court directed Appellant to file a Rule
    1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.          Appellant
    timely complied.12
    ____________________________________________
    12 On April 29, 2021, this Court issued an order directing Appellant to show
    cause why this appeal should not be dismissed, as an appeal filed from an
    order sustaining a preliminary objection and dismissing the appellant’s
    complaint without prejudice is generally interlocutory and unappealable. Per
    Curiam Order, 4/29/21 (single page) (citing Mier v. Stewart, 
    683 A.2d 930
    ,
    930 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that an order dismissing a complaint without
    prejudice for the plaintiff to file an amended complaint is not a final order);
    Levitt v. Patrick, 
    976 A.2d 581
    , 588 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting the key
    inquiry in determination of finality of a judgment is whether there is any
    outstanding claim; if any claim remains outstanding then the order is generally
    not appealable subject to exceptions); Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (providing that a
    final order is any order that disposes of all claims and of all parties)).
    Appellant filed a timely response, in which he explained that the trial judge
    predicated Appellant’s ability to refile his PUVTA complaint on the reversal of
    the Non-Jury Verdict pending appeal in the Garnishment Action. Appellant’s
    Response to Rule to Show Cause, 4/30/21, at 1. Moreover, Appellant argues
    that the PUVTA contains a four-year “look back” period which was not tolled
    by the dismissal of his complaint and that the trial judge did not grant him
    leave to refile or amend the complaint within a time certain. Id. at 1-2.
    Appellant concludes that he was effectively placed out of court and that there
    are no outstanding claims before the trial court in the PUVTA Action. Id. at
    2-3. See also id. at 2 (citing Fastuca v. L.W. Molnar & Associates, 
    950 A.2d 980
    , 986 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[T]o determine whether finality is achieved,
    we must consider whether the practical ramification of the order will be to
    dispose of the case, making review appropriate.”) (citation omitted); West v.
    West, 
    446 A.2d 1342
    , 1342 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“The finality of an order is a
    judicial conclusion which can be reached only after an examination of its
    ramifications. If the practical effect of an order is to put an appellant out of
    court by precluding him from presenting the merits of his claim, the order is
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    On July 2, 2021, Garnishment Appellees filed an application to dismiss
    the appeal at docket no. 269 WDA 2021 as moot. We denied their application.
    Per Curiam Order, 8/27/21 (single page).13
    ____________________________________________
    appealable.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly,
    we discharged the rule to show cause and allowed the appeal to proceed. See
    Per Curiam Order, 5/7/21 (single page).
    13 Garnishment Appellees requested dismissal of this appeal pursuant to the
    mootness doctrine, as they argued that the issues raised by Appellant became
    moot during the pendency of the appeal. Application to Dismiss, 7/2/21, at
    5-9 (unnumbered) (citing Deutsche Bank Nat’l Co. v. Butler, 
    868 A.2d 574
    ,
    577 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“[A]n actual claim or controversy must be present at
    all stages of the judicial process for the case to be actionable or
    reviewable[.]”); In re Duran, 
    769 A.2d 497
    , 502 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“If
    events occur to eliminate the claim or controversy at any stage in the process,
    the case becomes moot.”)). Instantly, Appellant seeks a reversal of the Non-
    Jury Verdict declaring McGreevy’s assets exempt and immune from execution
    by a judgment creditor and a remand with instructions to reinstate his writs
    of execution. Garnishment Appellees argued that such an order by this Court
    would have no legal force or effect, as the subject accounts in Pershing’s
    custody are now closed and no longer exist. Id. at 9. They explained that,
    on July 15, 2020, subsequent to the entry of the Non-Jury Verdict dissolving
    the writs of execution and releasing the hold on the funds in McGreevy’s
    checking account, McGreevy transferred the balance of his individual checking
    account to the joint checking account he held with Wife. McGreevy and Wife
    then transferred the funds from their joint account to their son, Brendan
    McGreevy, as a gift. Id. at 6-7. Additionally, after McGreevy’s death, Wife
    exercised her option as the beneficiary of the inherited/decedent IRA to roll
    over the funds into a new IRA created for her benefit. Id. at 7. Finally, upon
    McGreevy’s death, McGreevy’s brother, Shawn McGreevy, became the
    successor trustee of the separate share trust. On February 16, 2021, the
    assets of the separate share trust were divided and distributed to the late
    McGreevy’s three adult children, pursuant to the trust agreement. Id. at 8.
    Thus, Garnishment Appellees asserted that any opinion and order issued by
    this Court as to the immunity and/or exemption of McGreevy’s former assets
    would be purely advisory in nature. Id. at 9 (citing Erie Ins. Exchange v.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Appeal from Garnishment Action
    ____________________________________________
    Claypoole, 
    673 A.2d 348
    , 352 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“It is impermissible for
    courts to render purely advisory opinions.”)).
    In response, Appellant argued that the issues it raised on appeal are certainly
    not moot, as a reversal of the Non-Jury Verdict would allow Appellant to
    pursue his fraudulent claim action in Warren County. Answer to Application
    to Dismiss, 7/9/21, at 4-5 (unnumbered) (noting that, “according to the trial
    court in Warren County, because of Judge Lutty’s order, Appellant could never
    sufficiently plead the existence of any assets that could be fraudulently
    transferred[,]” rendering his PUVTA claim null and void absent a reversal).
    Moreover, Appellant filed a claim against McGreevy’s estate on February 17,
    2021. Id. at 5. Administratrix filed an objection to his claim, stating “all
    property of the decedent … was property by the entireties … and was judicially
    determined during his lifetime to be immune and exempt from attachment
    and execution by creditors…. [T]he judgment upon which the alleged claim is
    based is void under Pennsylvania law.” Id. Thus, Appellant explained that
    without a reversal of the Non-Jury Verdict, he may be prevented from pursuing
    his claim against the estate. Id. at 6. Finally, Appellant asserted that Judge
    Lutty’s ruling could also be used by unscrupulous married debtors in the future
    to avoid paying valid debts, thus causing public harm. Id. at 7.
    We agree with Appellant that, even though some or all of the funds which
    were previously in Pershing’s possession may have changed hands, an actual
    claim or controversy continues to be present in this matter, see id. at 4;
    Deutsche Bank Nat’l Co., supra, and that a reversal of the Non-Jury Verdict
    “would have significant legal force and effect.” Id. at 6. We discern no
    intervening change in the facts of this case that would render this appeal
    moot. See In re Gross, 
    382 A.2d 116
    , 119 (Pa. 1978) (“[A] legal question
    can become moot on appeal as a result of an intervening change in the facts
    of the case.”). We do not believe that the transfer of funds and depletion of
    assets of the estate by the appellees in this matter are the type of intervening
    changes in the facts that would render this appeal moot. “[O]ur courts have
    never held that an adverse party may create mootness through deliberate
    factual manipulation.” Jefferson Bank v. Newton Assocs., 
    686 A.2d 834
    ,
    838 (Pa. Super. 1996) (noting that the appellant had “taken no action which
    would divest it of a real interest in the outcome of [the] proceedings, and [the]
    appellees’ unilateral actions to that effect will not result in a finding of
    mootness”).
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    We first address the issues raised on appeal in the Garnishment Action.
    Herein, Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
    1. Whether [A]ppellant properly exercised his right under
    Pa.R.C.P. [] 227.4(1)(b) to move the case along instead of
    waiting for the trial court to dispose of his post-trial motion[?]
    2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
    sustained [McGreevy’s] preliminary objections, dissolved the
    writs of execution directed to Pershing … and BNY Mellon, and
    declared the entirety of … McGreevy’s assets to be “immune
    and exempt from attachment, levy, and execution[,”] even
    though the evidence clearly demonstrated that [] McGreevy’s
    single     party      brokerage/checking      account,     his
    decedent/inherited IRA, and his trust account were not exempt
    or immune from execution[?]
    Appellant’s Brief I at 4.
    We begin by addressing Appellant’s first issue, which concerns the
    timeliness of this appeal. Instantly, Judge Lutty issued a memorandum in lieu
    of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which he asserts that this appeal is untimely, as
    Appellant had not yet received a decision from the trial court on his post-trial
    motion.     Trial Court Memorandum (“TCM”), 4/9/21, at 2 (unnumbered).
    Accordingly, he suggests that the appeal be quashed.             To the contrary,
    Appellant argues that he merely exercised his right to move the case along
    with the filing of a praecipe to enter judgment on the Non-Jury Verdict,
    pursuant to Rule 227.4(1)(b), and that the appeal is timely. Appellant’s Brief
    I at 17.
    We agree with Appellant. Rule 227.4 provides, in pertinent part:
    [T]he prothonotary shall, upon praecipe of a party:
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    (1) enter judgment upon a nonsuit by the court, the
    verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge following a trial
    without jury, if
    …
    (b) one or more timely post-trial motions are filed and
    the court does not enter an order disposing of all motions
    within one hundred twenty days after the filing of the first
    motion.     A judgment entered pursuant to this
    subparagraph shall be final as to all parties and all issues
    and shall not be subject to reconsideration…[.]
    Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(1)(b).
    This Court previously established:
    The Rules of Civil Procedure governing post-trial practice were
    amended to allow the parties to minimize post-trial delay.
    Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 (Explanatory Comment—1995). Rule 227.4(1)(b)
    is optional with the parties; they may await the decision of the
    trial court or move the case along. 
    Id.
     The judgment entered
    pursuant to Rule 227.4(1)(b), is effective as to all parties and all
    issues. 
    Id.
     Reconsideration is strictly prohibited and the case is
    ready in its entirety for the appellate process. 
    Id.
    In view of the language of Rule 227.4(1)(b) and the explanatory
    comment, it is clear that once the requisite 120[-]day period runs
    and a party opts to praecipe for the entry of judgment, the
    judgment becomes final[] and immediately appealable[] when it
    is entered on the docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (date of entry of
    order in matter subject to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is
    the day clerk makes notation in docket that notice of entry of order
    has been given pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236(b)).
    Conte v. Hahnemann University Hospital, 
    707 A.2d 230
    , 231 (Pa. Super.
    1998). Hence, “all that [Rule] 227.4(1)(b) does is to provide an opportunity
    for a party to the litigation to move the case forward, so that the judgment
    entered on the verdict is a final, immediately appealable order.” Gibbs v.
    Herman, 
    714 A.2d 432
    , 434 (Pa. Super. 1998).
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    Here, Appellant filed his post-trial motion on June 29, 2020.     Oral
    argument was held on October 15, 2020, and briefs were submitted by both
    parties. As 221 days had elapsed since the filing of his post-trial motion and
    no decision had been entered by the trial court, we conclude that Appellant
    properly exercised his right under Rule 227.4(1)(b) to praecipe the court for
    the entry of a final judgment on the Non-Jury Verdict.14       Based on the
    foregoing, we deem the judgment entered on February 4, 2021 to be final and
    appealable.     Thus, we will proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s
    remaining claim.
    In his second claim, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in
    declaring the entirety of McGreevy’s assets to be “immune and exempt from
    attachment, levy, and execution[,]” and in dissolving the writs of execution
    directed to Pershing and BNY Mellon. Appellant’s Brief I at 23.15 Appellant
    claims that the trial court’s findings regarding the exemption status of
    ____________________________________________
    14 While we acknowledge that, to some extent, delays in this matter were
    caused due to court closures related to the COVID-19 pandemic, under the
    circumstances of this case, such closures did not have any effect on
    Appellant’s exercising his right to move the case along under Rule
    227.4(1)(b).
    15 We note that Appellant also avers the trial court erred in sustaining
    McGreevy’s preliminary objections; however, Judge Lutty’s Non-Jury Verdict
    does not expressly sustain McGreevy’s preliminary objections. Appellant
    merely postulates that the trial court accepted McGreevy’s arguments and
    granted his objections, as the order signed by Judge Lutty is identical to the
    proposed order submitted by McGreevy, along with his proposed findings of
    fact. Id. at 24-25.
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    McGreevy’s assets are contrary to the law and against the weight of the
    evidence.   Id. at 17.    Additionally, he argues that the Non-Jury Verdict
    declaring the entirety of McGreevy’s assets immune and exempt from
    execution extends “way beyond the scope of the trial[,]” as the court’s findings
    were supposed to be limited to the status of McGreevy’s assets in Pershing’s
    custody at the time Pershing was served with the writ of execution. Id. at 16.
    Preliminarily, we note:
    Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is
    to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
    by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
    error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
    judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
    verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
    only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
    in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
    However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope
    of review is plenary. The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal
    originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate
    court because it is the appellate court’s duty to determine if the
    trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.
    Wyatt Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, 
    975 A.2d 557
    , 564 (Pa.
    Super. 2009) (citation, brackets, quotation marks, ellipsis, and paragraph
    break omitted).
    Based on our extensive review of the instant matter, we deduce that
    Judge Lutty agreed with McGreevy’s position that all of his assets in Pershing’s
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    possession constituted entireties property.16 Moreover, while we do not have
    the benefit of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, we deem the record to be sufficient as
    to not impede our appellate review, as the parties have thoroughly briefed the
    legal issues upon which this matter must be resolved.        See Hess v. Fox
    Rothschild, LLP, 
    925 A.2d 798
    , 805 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to remand
    to the trial court for preparation of an opinion that describes its rationale for
    the order under appeal for reasons of judicial economy, where the parties
    have thoroughly argued the legal issues upon which the case must be
    resolved). Thus, we delve into the legal arguments presented by the parties.
    Instantly, there is no dispute that McGreevy had a legal interest in the
    following accounts held in Pershing’s custody at the time the writ of execution
    was issued: (1) individual brokerage/checking account; (2) separate share
    trust; (3) individual IRA; (4) inherited/decedent IRA; and (5) joint
    brokerage/checking account. Appellant concedes that the individual IRA and
    the joint checking account were not subject to execution in a garnishment
    action; however, he argues that McGreevy’s individual checking account, the
    separate share trust, and the inherited/decedent IRA were subject to
    attachment. Appellant’s Brief I at 26. Garnishment Appellees, on the other
    ____________________________________________
    16 See McGreevy’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 3/23/20,
    at 3 ¶ 24 (“All assets and property owned by … McGreevy and in the custody
    of … Pershing … constitute marital property, i.e.[,] tenancies by the entireties,
    and is therefore exempt and immune from execution, attachment and levy by
    any judgment creditors of … McGreevy.”). See also Non-Jury Verdict at 1-2
    (unnumbered) (appearing identical to the proposed order attached to
    McGreevy’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
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    hand, essentially argue that all the foregoing assets were immune and exempt
    from the reach of McGreevy’s creditors because the funds constituted property
    held as tenants by the entireties. Garnishment Appellees’ Brief at 8. For the
    reasons set forth infra, we deem Garnishment Appellees’ argument to be
    wholly without merit.
    Preliminarily, we recognize that the accounts at issue have been closed
    and that the funds are no longer in Pershing’s possession. See n.14, supra.
    Nevertheless, we deem it necessary to address whether each of these
    accounts should have been found subject to attachment, because these three
    accounts were the subject of the non-jury trial which led to Judge Lutty’s
    incredibly broad Order and Non-Jury Verdict declaring all of McGreevy’s assets
    exempt and immune from execution by his creditors and dismissing
    Appellant’s writs of execution.   Without reversal of the Non-Jury Verdict,
    Appellant would be prevented from pursuing collection on his judgment
    against any assets owned by McGreevy and/or his estate.
    It is well-established:
    A tenancy by the entireties is a form of co-ownership of real or
    personal property by husband and wife, with its essential
    characteristic being that “each spouse is seised per tout et non
    per my, i.e., of the whole or the entirety and not of a share, moiety
    or divisible part.” In re Gallagher’s Estate, … 
    43 A.2d 132
     ([Pa.]
    1945). When one spouse dies, the surviving spouse takes no new
    estate; rather, the only change is in the properties of the legal
    entity holding the estate. Beihl v. Martin, … 
    84 A. 953
     ([Pa.]
    1912). For the duration of the entireties estate, either spouse has
    the presumptive power to act for both, so long as both spouses
    share the proceeds, and neither spouse may appropriate property
    for his or her own use, to the exclusion of the other spouse,
    without the consent of the other spouse. Fazekas v. Fazekas,
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    737 A.2d 1262
    , 1264 (Pa. Super. 1999). Entireties property is
    unavailable to satisfy the claims of the creditor of one of the
    tenants. Patwardhan v. Brabant, … 
    439 A.2d 784
    [, 785] ([Pa.
    Super.] 1982). However, a conveyance in fraud of creditors may
    be appropriately attacked, but the proceedings must conform to
    proper procedures. 
    Id.
    Johnson v. Johnson, 
    908 A.2d 290
    , 295 (Pa. Super. 2006). Further, we
    recognize that, “in this Commonwealth, a presumption exists that property
    held by a husband and wife is held by the entireties and that said presumption
    can be overcome only when the opposing party demonstrates, through clear
    and convincing evidence, that the property was not intended to be held by the
    husband and wife as entireties property.” 
    Id. at 296
    . We remain mindful of
    these principles while examining the trial court’s determinations regarding the
    exempt status of each of the three contested accounts.
    1. Individual Brokerage/Checking Account
    Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding McGreevy’s individual
    brokerage/checking account (“checking account”) exempt and immune from
    attachment, levy, and execution, as the account was titled only in McGreevy’s
    name, and McGreevy was the only person who made contributions to and/or
    used the account. Appellant’s Brief I at 28. Contrarily, Garnishment Appellees
    maintain that the funds in McGreevy’s individual checking account constituted
    tenancy by the entireties property and, thus, were exempt from attachment
    by McGreevy’s creditors. Garnishment Appellees’ Brief at 9-10 (citing In re
    Holmes’ Estate, 
    200 A.2d 745
    , 747 (Pa. 1964) (presuming husbands and
    wives take property as tenants by the entireties unless there is clear and
    convincing evidence to the contrary)). Additionally, they baldly assert that
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    Appellant failed to produce any evidence to support his contention that only
    McGreevy made contributions to and/or used his individual checking account.
    
    Id. at 12
    . Garnishment Appellees’ claims are belied by the record and are
    wholly without merit.
    First, Garnishment Appellees correctly note that the judgment assigned
    to Appellant was “strictly and exclusively a judgment entered against …
    McGreevy alone[,]” 
    id. at 10
    , and that despite claims McGreevy and Wife had
    separated in 2007, see Appellant’s Brief I at 33, the two remained legally
    married until McGreevy’s death in January of 2021.17 See Seese, 
    611 A.2d at 1243
     (“It is well settled that Pennsylvania subscribes to the majority view
    which holds that entireties property is unavailable to satisfy the claims of the
    creditor of only one of the tenants.”).            However, their argument fails to
    recognize that the checking account was opened in McGreevy’s name only and
    that Wife had no authority to use the account. See N.T. Trial, 3/2/20, at 24
    (Robert Feldman’s testifying that Wife was not a signatory on the account and
    that she had no authority to write checks on the account or to transfer money
    from the account). In fact, all the cases cited by Garnishment Appellees in
    ____________________________________________
    17Our review of the record reveals that no divorce action was ever instituted
    by either party, nor did McGreevy and Wife ever enter into a formal separation
    agreement. Id. at 10-11. Yet, Wife did acknowledge that she and McGreevy
    separated in 2007. N.T. Deposition of Wife, 2/5/19, at 7. See also N.T.
    Deposition of McGreevy, 2/5/19, at 5 (McGreevy’s explaining that he and Wife
    are “still married” but separated “[a]pproximately 10, 11 years ago[,]” and
    that he still communicates with her on a regular basis and relies on her to help
    keep him organized with day-to-day business).
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    support of their argument that McGreevy’s individual checking account
    constituted entireties property are distinguishable from the instant matter, as
    those cases involve property titled to both a husband and wife.            See
    Garnishment Appellees’ Brief at 9-10 (citing In re Holmes Estate, 200 A.2d
    at 747 (“Where property or an account is placed in the names of a husband
    and wife, a gift and the creation of an estate by the entireties is presumed
    even though the funds used to acquire the property or to establish the account
    were exclusively those of the husband. The placing of the property in both
    names, without more, creates an estate by the entireties.”) (internal citations
    omitted; emphasis added); In re Barsotti, 
    7 B.R. 205
    , 207 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
    1980) (describing the creation and nature of tenancy by the entireties
    property where a conveyance is made to husband and wife)).
    After careful review, we detect no competent evidence in the record to
    support the trial court’s conclusion that this account constituted entireties
    property. Rather, the record establishes that McGreevy opened the checking
    account in his name only, utilizing his individual funds, and that only McGreevy
    contributed to and withdrew from the account. Appellant produced a copy of
    McGreevy’s Corestone Account Application (“Application”), which designated
    the account title as “Daniel M. McGreevy” and contained only McGreevy’s
    signature as account owner, along with a copy of the Account Transfer Form
    (“Transfer Form”), which directed Merrill Lynch to transfer all of McGreevy’s
    assets in his individual account with Merrill Lynch to his checking account at
    Pershing. See Appellant’s Evidence, 9/6/19, at Exhibit 7 (Application); 
    id.
     at
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    Exhibit 7 (Transfer Form). Step 7 of the Application required the signature of
    “all account owner(s), authorized persons and additional signatorie(s)[,]” and
    contained only McGreevy’s signature.           Application at 3 (emphasis added).
    Wife did not sign the Application as a joint owner or additional signatory. 
    Id.
    Moreover, the Transfer Form specified the receiving account as a single party
    account and was signed only by McGreevy as the “primary account holder.”
    Transfer Form at 1, 3. The space for the signature of a secondary account
    holder remained blank. Id. at 3.
    Given the documentation in the record establishing that the checking
    account was an individual account titled in McGreevy’s name only, and
    Garnishment Appellees’ failure to produce any evidence to the contrary, we
    determine there is no presumption that McGreevy’s opening of the account
    created an estate by the entireties. See Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 
    520 A.2d 1195
    , 1201 (Pa. Super. 1987) (noting the creation of entireties property
    requires that the property be acquired in joint names of husband and wife).
    See also Constitution Bank v. Olson, 
    620 A.2d 1146
    , 1149 (Pa. Super.
    1993) (“[T]he legal unity of time, title, interest, possession and marriage
    create a tenancy by the entireties[.]”).18         It is clear that Wife was not a
    ____________________________________________
    18   As we explained in In re Estate of Rivera, 
    194 A.3d 579
     (Pa. Super. 2018),
    [a] tenancy by the entireties requires a legally binding marriage
    plus the satisfaction of all four unities, which are further defined
    below:
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    signatory on the account and had no authority to withdraw funds from the
    account; thus, we determine that none of the four unities have been satisfied
    with respect to McGreevy’s individual checking account.19
    Finally, we acknowledge that where a spouse’s individual funds are
    commingled in a joint checking account held by both husband and wife or used
    to purchase property in the name of husband and wife, the presumption of a
    ____________________________________________
    Unity of time requires that the interests of the tenants vest
    at the same time. Unity of title requires the tenants to have
    obtained their title by the same instrument. … Unity of
    possession requires the tenants to have an undivided
    interest in the whole estate. … Unity of interest requires the
    tenants to have estates in the property of the same type,
    duration and amount.
    Id. at 586 (quoting Fenderson v. Fenderson, 
    685 A.2d 600
    , 607 (Pa. Super.
    1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). “If one of the unities is
    lacking, then, by common law, there can be no joint tenancy or entirety.”
    Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 
    200 A. 624
    , 631 (Pa. 1938).
    19 Even if there was a presumption of entireties, the record contains evidence
    of McGreevy’s intention to create ownership other than as tenants by the
    entireties, which would be sufficient to rebut the presumption.                See
    Constitution Bank, 
    620 A.2d at
    1152 n.3 (“Intention is the cardinal and
    controlling element in determining if a husband and wife shall take ownership
    of property by the entireties, and if such … sufficiently appears, it will be given
    effect.”). Here, in addition to the overwhelming evidence contained within the
    account documents reflecting McGreevy’s intention to open an individual
    checking account solely for his use, the fact that McGreevy and Wife opened
    a joint checking account with Pershing around the same time as McGreevy’s
    individual checking account further supports Appellant’s argument that
    McGreevy clearly did not intend for his individual checking account to be
    entireties property. See Appellant’s Brief I at 38-39.
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    gift and creation of an estate by the entireties arises.20 Such a presumption
    does not arise here, however, as Garnishment Appellees have failed to
    produce any evidence whatsoever of commingling of the funds. We emphasize
    that the mere existence of a marriage does not render all property owned by
    either spouse tenancy by the entireties property.          See In re Estate of
    Rivera, 194 A.3d at 586 (indicating Pennsylvania jurisprudence has not
    adopted a de facto tenancy by entireties).
    2. Separate Share Trust
    Next, we consider Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in finding
    McGreevy’s separate share trust exempt and immune from attachment by his
    creditors. See Appellant’s Brief I at 42-43. It is undisputed that the trust,
    formally titled as the “Daniel M. McGreevy Generation Skipping Tax Exempt
    Trust,” was an irrevocable trust that was established by McGreevy’s deceased
    father’s will and trust agreement, dated July 9, 2008.          See Appellant’s
    Evidence at Exhibit 8 (Trust Account Documents); McGreevy’s Evidence,
    7/16/19, at Exhibit B (Affidavit of Robert E. Feldman, 3/28/19, at 1-2)
    (unnumbered). McGreevy was the sole beneficiary and the sole trustee of the
    trust. See Trust Account Documents; N.T. Deposition of Robert Feldman at
    29.
    ____________________________________________
    20See Constitution Bank, 
    620 A.2d at 1150
     (quoting In re Holmes’ Estate,
    200 A.2d at 747 ) (“Where property or an account is placed in the names of a
    husband and wife, a gift and the creation of an estate by the entireties is
    presumed even though the funds used to acquire the property or to establish
    the account were exclusively those of the husband. The placing of the
    property in both names, without more, creates an estate by the entireties.”).
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    Garnishment Appellees claim that the separate share trust was
    entireties property and was therefore exempt from attachment by Appellant.
    See Garnishment Appellees’ Brief at 8 (asserting generally that “all property
    of … McGreevy constituted entireties property”). This claim is meritless, as
    the record clearly establishes that McGreevy was the sole beneficiary and sole
    trustee of the separate share trust created by his deceased father. See Trust
    Account Documents (containing only McGreevy’s signature). Wife has failed
    to provide any evidence that she was vested an interest in the trust at the
    same time and by the same document as McGreevy. See Madden, 200 A. at
    631 (declaring that if even one of the unities is lacking, there can be no
    entirety); Constitution Bank, 
    620 A.2d at 1149
     (recognizing that the legal
    unity of time, title, interest, and possession are required to create a tenancy
    by the entireties).
    Alternatively, Garnishment Appellees claim the trust funds could not
    be reached by McGreevy’s creditors pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 7745, which
    provides that “[a] judgment creditor or assignee of the settlor of an
    irrevocable trust may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed to
    or for the settlor’s benefit.” Garnishment Appellees’ Brief at 19 (quoting 20
    Pa.C.S. § 7745(2) (emphasis added)). Garnishment Appellees’ argument that
    the trust funds were exempt from execution by McGreevy’s creditors because
    McGreevy was the beneficiary, not the settlor, of the trust is seemingly based
    on their interpretation of section 7745(2) to mean that creditors can only
    reach the assets of an irrevocable trust if the claims are against the settlor.
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    We deem this argument to be faulty and their reliance on section 7745 to be
    misplaced, as section 7745 only governs creditor’s claims against settlors.
    See 20 Pa.C.S. § 7745.
    As Appellant notes, Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trust Act, 20 Pa.C.S. §§
    7701-7799.3 (“PUTA”), provides numerous situations where a judgment
    creditor of a trust beneficiary can reach the assets of the trust. For instance,
    section 7741, which pertains to the rights of a beneficiary’s creditor, provides:
    “A judgment creditor or assignee of the beneficiary may reach the
    beneficiary’s interest by attachment of present or future distributions to or for
    the benefit of the beneficiary or other means to the extent the beneficiary’s
    interest is not subject to a spendthrift provision.”      20 Pa.C.S. § 7741.21
    ____________________________________________
    21   The legislature explained:
    This section applies only if the trust does not contain a spendthrift
    provision…. Absent a valid spendthrift provision, a creditor may
    ordinarily reach the interest of a beneficiary the same as any other
    of the beneficiary’s assets. This does not necessarily mean that
    the creditor can collect all distributions made to the beneficiary.
    The interest may be too indefinite or contingent for the creditor to
    reach or the interest may qualify for an exemption under the
    state’s general creditor exemption statutes. See [Restatement]
    (Third) of Trusts § 56 (2003); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§
    147-149, 162 (1959). Other creditor law of the State may limit
    the creditor to a specified percentage of a distribution. This
    section does not prescribe the procedures (“other means”) for
    reaching a beneficiary’s interest or of priority among claimants,
    leaving those issues to the enacting State’s laws on creditor rights.
    This section does clarify, however, that an order obtained against
    the trustee, whatever state procedure may have been used, may
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Additionally, section 7748 states: “Trust property that is subject to a power of
    withdrawal, during the period the power may be exercised and after its lapse,
    release or waiver, may be reached by a creditor or an assignee of the holder
    of the power whether or not the interest of the holder in the trust is subject
    to a spendthrift provision.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 7748.
    Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s determination regarding the
    exemption status of the separate share trust is not supported by competent
    evidence in the record and that the trial court erred in its application of the
    law. See Wyatt Inc., supra.
    3. Inherited/Decedent IRA
    Finally, we address the trial court’s finding regarding McGreevy’s
    inherited/decedent IRA (“inherited IRA”). The inherited IRA was funded by
    proceeds of an IRA owned by McGreevy’s late father.           McGreevy was the
    named beneficiary on his father’s IRA. McGreevy’s financial advisor, Robert
    Feldman, established the inherited IRA account for the purpose of enabling
    McGreevy to receive minimum annual distributions over the expectancy of his
    life, thereby minimizing his tax liability.        See N.T. Deposition of Robert
    Feldman at 13-14. Garnishee Appellees claim that the inherited IRA was a
    retirement account, which was immune and exempt from execution, pursuant
    ____________________________________________
    extend to future distributions whether made directly to the
    beneficiary or to others for the beneficiary’s benefit….
    20 Pa.C.S. § 7748, Uniform Law Comment (some citations omitted).
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    to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)(1)(ix).       Garnishees’ Appellees’ Brief at 14, 16.
    Contrarily, Appellant contends that such an IRA does not constitute retirement
    funds and, therefore, he concludes that the trial court erred in finding the
    funds exempt or immune from attachment by a judgment creditor.
    Appellant’s Brief I at 42.
    Pennsylvania law       protects retirement funds and accounts from
    attachment or execution by judgment creditors. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)
    (enumerating the types of retirement funds and accounts that shall be exempt
    from attachment or execution on a judgment). However, no courts in this
    Commonwealth have discussed whether the statute covers inherited IRAs.
    Thus, whether an inherited IRA is considered a retirement account for the
    purpose of attachment involves a question of statutory interpretation. When
    considering issues of statutory interpretation, the applicable standard of
    review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Trout v. Strube, 
    97 A.3d 387
    , 389 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). As we have explained:
    When we undertake statutory interpretation, our object is to
    ascertain and then effectuate the intention of the Legislature. 1
    Pa.C.S.[] § 1921(a). When possible, this Court construes every
    statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions. If the terms of
    a statute are clear and free of all ambiguity, we will not disregard
    the letter of the law in favor of pursuing its apparent spirit.
    However, when the words of a statute are not explicit, this Court
    must determine what it was that the General Assembly intended.
    We then apply the legislators’ intent when interpreting the law in
    question.
    Id. at 389-90 (citation omitted).
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    The statutory provision in question here is subsection 8124(b)(1)(ix),
    which exempts the following from attachment or execution on a judgment:
    Any retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401(a),
    403(a) and (b), 408, 408A, 409[,] or 530 of the Internal Revenue
    Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-514, 
    26 U.S.C. § 401
    (a), 403(a) and
    (b), 408, 408A, 409[,] or 530), the appreciation thereon, the
    income therefrom, the benefits or annuity payable thereunder and
    transfers and rollovers between such funds.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)(1)(ix).22           Although “[t]he statute’s plain language
    generally provides the best indication of legislative intent[,] where … the
    statutory language at issue is determined to be ambiguous[,] we may go
    beyond the text and look to other considerations to discern legislative intent.”
    Harmon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    207 A.3d 292
    , 304 (Pa. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Such
    considerations include, inter alia, the occasion and necessity for the statute,
    ____________________________________________
    22   Subsection 8124(b)(1)(ix) shall not apply to:
    (A)   Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or
    annuity fund within one year before the debtor filed for
    bankruptcy. This shall not include amounts directly rolled
    over from other funds which are exempt from attachment
    under this subparagraph.
    (B)   Amounts contributed by the debtor to the retirement or
    annuity fund in excess of $15,000 within a one-year period.
    This shall not include amounts directly rolled over from
    other funds which are exempt from attachment under this
    subparagraph.
    (C)   Amounts deemed to be fraudulent conveyances.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)(1)(ix)(A)-(C).
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    the mischief to be remedied, the consequences of a particular interpretation,
    and the contemporaneous legislative history.” Id. (citation omitted).
    Instantly, section 8124(b)(1)(ix) is ambiguous as to whether the term
    “retirement fund” includes an inherited IRA. See Burke ex rel. Burke v.
    Independence Blue Cross, 
    103 A.3d 1267
    , 1273 (Pa. 2014) (“An ambiguity
    exists when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the specific
    text under review.”). Thus, we look first to the relevant section of the Internal
    Revenue Code, section 408, which is referenced in the foregoing statutory
    provision and governs the taxability of distributions from an IRA.       See 
    26 U.S.C. § 408
    . Section 408(a) defines an IRA as “a trust created or organized
    in the United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or his
    beneficiaries,” subject to certain requirements enumerated in the statute. 
    26 U.S.C. § 408
    (a). An inherited IRA is defined under the Internal Revenue Code
    as “an individual retirement account or individual retirement annuity” that a
    beneficiary acquired “by reason of the death of another individual, and such
    [beneficiary] was not the surviving spouse of such other individual.” 
    26 U.S.C. § 408
    (d)(3)(C)(ii).
    Additionally, we observe that similar to the Pennsylvania Consolidated
    Statutes which exempt certain property from attachment or execution on a
    judgment, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to
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    exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate.23 Specifically, section
    522(b) provides that, unless a state has statutorily “opted out” and thereby
    foreclosed the use of federal exemptions, a debtor may choose between the
    federal exemptions listed in section 522(d) and state law exemptions to
    exempt property from the bankruptcy estate. See 
    11 U.S.C. § 522
    (b). See
    also Ambrosia, 572 A.2d at 779 (“Under the federal construct, a debtor must
    choose between these two alternatives; he or she is not permitted to take
    certain exemptions which are allowed by the state and other exemptions which
    are prescribed by § 522(d).”).           Pennsylvania has not enacted “opt out”
    legislation. Id.
    Under section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor is
    authorized to exempt from his bankruptcy estate “retirement funds to the
    extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation
    under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal
    Revenue Code of 1986.” 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 522
    (b)(3)(C), 522(d)(12). The term
    “retirement funds” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, and a split
    developed in the federal appellate courts as to whether funds in an inherited
    IRA qualify for the section 522 exemption. See In re Clark, 
    714 F.3d 559
    ,
    562 (7th Cir. 2013) (determining “inherited IRAs represent an opportunity for
    current consumption, not a fund of retirement savings” and, therefore, do not
    ____________________________________________
    23 Under the Bankruptcy Code, when a debtor files for bankruptcy, “all legal
    and equitable property interests of the debtor at that time are included as part
    of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.” Ambrosia v. Yerage, 
    572 A.2d 777
    , 779
    (Pa. Super. 1990) (citing 
    11 U.S.C. § 541
    ).
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    qualify for the exemption under section 522); In re Chilton, 
    674 F.3d 486
    ,
    489 (5th Cir. 2012) (deciding inherited IRAs are exempt from the bankruptcy
    estate under section 522(d)(12), as they constitute funds that others had
    originally set aside for their retirement and that the transfer of these
    retirement funds to the debtor does not alter their status as retirement funds).
    Upon a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States heard
    the In re Clark debtor-beneficiary’s appeal and affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s
    decision, ruling that inherited IRAs are not included in the definition of
    “retirement funds” under section 522(b)(3)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code. Clark
    v. Rameker, 
    573 U.S. 122
     (2014). To begin its analysis, the Clark Court
    defined “retirement funds” as “sums of money set aside for the day an
    individual stops working[,]” since the term is not defined by the Bankruptcy
    Code.    
    Id.
     at 127 (citing American Heritage Dictionary 712, 1489 (4 th ed.
    2000) (stating the ordinary meaning of “funds” and “retirement”)).           To
    determine whether funds in an account qualify as “retirement funds,” the
    Clark Court dictated that “courts should not engage in a case-by-case, fact-
    intensive examination into whether the debtor actually planned to use the
    funds for retirement purposes as opposed to current consumption. Instead,
    we look to the legal characteristics of the account in which the funds are held,
    asking whether, as an objective matter, the account is one set aside for the
    day when an individual stops working.” 
    Id.
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    The Clark Court concluded that funds held in inherited IRAs are not
    objectively set aside for the purpose of retirement, based on the following
    three legal characteristics of such accounts.
    First, the holder of an inherited IRA may never invest additional
    money in the account. 
    26 U.S.C. § 219
    (d)(4). Inherited IRAs are
    thus unlike traditional and Roth IRAs, both of which are
    quintessential “retirement funds.” For where inherited IRAs
    categorically prohibit contributions, the entire purpose of
    traditional and Roth IRAs is to provide tax incentives for
    accountholders to contribute regularly and over time to their
    retirement savings.
    Second, holders of inherited IRAs are required to withdraw money
    from such accounts, no matter how many years they may be from
    retirement. Under the [Internal Revenue] Code, the beneficiary
    of an inherited IRA must either withdraw all of the funds in the
    IRA within five years after the year of the owner’s death or take
    minimum annual distributions every year. See § 408(a)(6); §
    401(a)(9)(B); 
    26 CFR § 1.408-8
     (Q-1 and A-1(a) incorporating §
    1.401(a)(9)-3 (Q-1 and A-1(a)))….
    Finally, the holder of an inherited IRA may withdraw the entire
    balance of the account at any time—and for any purpose—without
    penalty. Whereas a withdrawal from a traditional or Roth IRA prior
    to the age of 59½ triggers a 10 percent tax penalty subject to
    narrow exceptions, … a rule that encourages individuals to leave
    such funds untouched until retirement age[,] there is no similar
    limit on the holder of an inherited IRA. Funds held in inherited
    IRAs accordingly constitute “a pot of money that can be freely
    used for current consumption,” [In re Clark,] 714 F.3d at 561,
    not funds objectively set aside for one’s retirement.
    Id. at 128.
    Moreover, the Clark Court opined:
    Our reading of the text is consistent with the purpose of the
    Bankruptcy Code’s exemption provisions. As a general matter,
    those provisions effectuate a careful balance between the
    interests of creditors and debtors. On the one hand, we have
    noted that “every asset the Code permits a debtor to withdraw
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    from the estate is an asset that is not available to … creditors.”
    Schwab v. Reilly, 
    560 U.S. 770
    , 791 … (2010). On the other
    hand, exemptions serve the important purpose of “protect[ing]
    the debtor’s essential needs.”     United States v. Security
    Industrial Bank, 
    459 U.S. 70
    , 83 … (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
    concurring in judgment).3
    3As the House Judiciary Committee explained in the process
    of enacting § 522, “[t]he historical purpose” of bankruptcy
    exemptions has been to provide a debtor “with the basic
    necessities of life” so that she “will not be left destitute and
    a public charge.” H.R.Rep.No. 95-595, p. 126 (1977).
    Allowing debtors to protect funds held in traditional and Roth IRAs
    comports with this purpose by helping to ensure that debtors will
    be able to meet their basic needs during their retirement years.
    At the same time, the legal limitations on traditional and Roth IRAs
    ensure that debtors who hold such accounts (but who have not
    yet reached retirement age) do not enjoy a cash windfall by virtue
    of the exemption—such debtors are instead required to wait until
    age 59½ before they may withdraw the funds penalty-free.
    The same cannot be said of an inherited IRA. For if an individual
    is allowed to exempt an inherited IRA from her bankruptcy estate,
    nothing about the inherited IRA’s legal characteristics would
    prevent (or even discourage) the individual from using the entire
    balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car
    immediately after her bankruptcy proceedings are complete.
    Allowing that kind of exemption would convert the Bankruptcy
    Code’s purposes of preserving debtors’ ability to meet their basic
    needs and ensuring that they have a “fresh start” into a “free
    pass[.”] We decline to read the retirement funds provision in that
    manner.
    Id. at 129-30 (some internal citations omitted).       Based on its foregoing
    analysis, the Court determined “[t]he text and purpose of the Bankruptcy
    Code make clear that funds held in inherited IRAs are not ‘retirement funds’
    within the meaning of § 522(b)(3)(C)’s bankruptcy exemption.” Id. at 127.
    Instantly, Appellant relies on the holding in Clark in support of his
    argument that McGreevy’s inherited IRA did not constitute retirement funds
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    J-A20023-21
    and, thus, it was not exempt or immune from attachment by a judgment
    creditor. Appellant’s Brief I at 41-42. Garnishment Appellees simply aver that
    Clark does not apply here, because this matter does not involve a debtor in
    a bankruptcy proceeding. Garnishment Appellees’ Brief at 16.
    While Garnishment Appellees are correct in stating the underlying
    matter here is not a bankruptcy proceeding, we agree with Appellant that
    Clark is controlling. The very purpose of the exemptions under the federal
    Bankruptcy Code, which is “to provide a debtor with the basic necessities of
    life so that she will not be left destitute and a public charge[,]” Clark at 129
    n.3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), is also served by this
    Commonwealth’s analogous exemptions under section 8124, which are
    likewise intended to protect an individual’s retirement income from execution
    by creditors. See In re Barshak, 
    106 F.3d 501
    , 504 (3d. Cir. 1997) (citing
    In re Houck, 
    181 B.R. 187
    , 193 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1995) (“The Pennsylvania
    legislature has made a policy decision that, for purposes of state law, IRAs
    should be insulated from involuntary alienation via a creditor’s execution.”)).
    Moreover, subsection 8124(b)(1)(ix) contains substantially similar language
    to the statutory bankruptcy exemption under section 522(b). Hence, we apply
    the Clark Court’s logic to the instant matter and conclude that McGreevy’s
    inherited IRA did not qualify for an exemption under section 8124.
    Finally, we address Appellant’s claim that the Non-Jury Verdict extends
    beyond the scope of the Garnishment Action. Appellant is correct in stating
    that the issue presented at trial was limited to whether certain assets owned
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    J-A20023-21
    by McGreevy and in the possession of Pershing—namely, McGreevy’s
    individual checking account, the separate share trust, and the inherited IRA—
    were subject to execution.    See Appellant’s Brief I at 25 (citing TCM at 1
    (acknowledging the issue before the court “is whether certain property owned
    by [McGreevy] was subject to execution in order to pay a judgment held by
    [Appellant]”) (unnumbered; emphasis added)). See also Trial Court Order,
    9/26/19 (single page) (“The issue of whether the assets in the custody of
    Pershing … are subject to execution or conversely, immune and exempt from
    execution shall be determined after a non-jury trial scheduled for January 15,
    2020….”) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Non-Jury Verdict declared “all
    property held by [McGreevy], or established for the benefit of [McGreevy] or
    otherwise associated with [McGreevy], including all accounts in the custody of
    Pershing” to be immune and exempt from attachment, levy and execution.
    Non-Jury Verdict at 1-2 (unnumbered; emphasis added). We deem the trial
    court’s declaration of all property being immune from attachment to be in
    error, as the order goes well beyond the scope of the relief sought by Appellant
    and the procedural posture of this case.
    In sum, we do not discern any competent evidence in the record to
    support Judge Lutty’s conclusion that McGreevy’s individual checking account,
    separate share trust, and inherited IRA, let alone all of his assets, are immune
    and exempt from attachment, levy, and execution by creditors. We deem
    such findings to be based on a misapplication of the law. The Non-Jury Verdict
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    J-A20023-21
    must be reversed, so as not to impede Appellant’s pursuit of his PUVTA claim,
    as well as his pending judgment claim against McGreevy’s estate.
    Accordingly, we vacate the judgment entered on February 4, 2021, at
    docket no. 269 WDA 2021, and remand this matter with instructions for the
    trial court to enter a verdict consistent with this opinion and to reinstate the
    January 23 and February 27, 2019 writs of execution to the extent that
    Garnishees may still have any assets of McGreevy and/or his estate in their
    possession.
    Appeal from PUVTA Action
    Next, we address the issues raised on appeal in Appellant’s PUVTA
    Action. Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
    A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
    sustained PUVTA Appellees’ preliminary objection no. 1 and
    dismissed the entire complaint as to … McGreevy, individually,
    and … McGreevy, as trustee for the Daniel M. McGreevy
    Separate Share Trust, even though the death of … McGreevy
    deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over
    litigation by or against the deceased because the proper parties
    were never substituted?
    B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
    sustained PUVTA Appellees’ preliminary objection[] no. 1,
    dismissed the entire complaint, and held that Allegheny County
    Court of Common Pleas Judge Paul F. Lutty[,] Jr.’s June 23,
    2020 [N]on-[J]ury [V]erdict was issue preclusive and
    collaterally estopped Appellant from litigating his civil
    complaint, even though the judgment on the [N]on[-J]ury
    [V]erdict was not final for purposes of collateral estoppel, the
    issues and/or claims involved in the prior action were not
    identical, Appellant did not have full and fair opportunity to
    litigate the exempt status of assets not within the scope of the
    prior action, and/or finding in the [N]on[-J]ury [V]erdict fell
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    J-A20022-21
    J-A20023-21
    within one or more of the exceptions to collateral estoppel, law
    of the case, lis pendens, or the coordinate jurisdiction rule[?]
    C. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining
    PUVTA Appellees’ preliminary objection [no.] 1 and dismissing
    the entire complaint, because even if the issue regarding the
    exempt status of some or all of … McGreevy’s assets was
    collaterally estopped, the complaint in civil action should more
    properly have been either stayed altogether pending the
    outcome of the appeal in the prior litigation, [or] stayed as to
    assets within the scope of the previous action pending the
    outcome of the appeal in the prior litigation and allowed to
    proceed as to the transfer of … McGreevy’s assets that were
    not within the scope of the trial[?]
    Appellant’s Brief (“Appellant’s Brief II”), 5/10/21, at 3-5.
    To reiterate, PUVTA Appellees filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s
    complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction because the entirety of McGreevy’s assets were found to be
    exempt from attachment.       Appellant filed preliminary objections to PUVTA
    Appellees’ preliminary objections on December 15, 2020.         On January 17,
    2021, McGreevy died. A notice of death was filed in the Warren County Court
    of Common Pleas on February 17, 2021, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2355; however,
    no substitution of party was filed on behalf of McGreevy in his individual
    capacity or as trustee for the separate share trust. Regardless, after hearing
    argument on the parties’ preliminary objections on February 17, 2021, the
    trial court issued an order that same day sustaining PUVTA Appellees’
    preliminary objection regarding lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
    dismissing Appellant’s complaint without prejudice.
    Appellant argues that the trial court did not have authority to rule on
    PUVTA    Appellees’   preliminary   objections   to   the   complaint,   because
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    McGreevy’s death deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over
    claims brought by or against him. Appellant’s Brief II at 11. He avers that
    “[u]ntil a proper party is substituted for [] McGreevy individually, and a
    successor trustee is substituted for … McGreevy, as trustee for the Daniel M.
    McGreevy Separate Share Trust, any rulings in favor of or against those
    parties are null and void.” Id.24 We agree.
    It is clear that “the death of a party deprives the trial court of subject
    matter jurisdiction over litigation by or against the deceased until such time
    as the deceased’s personal representative is substituted in his or her place.”
    Grimm v. Grimm, 
    149 A.3d 77
    , 84 (Pa. Super. 2016). As we explained in
    Grimm, “Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2355 provides that, ‘if a named
    party dies after the commencement of an action, the attorney of record for
    the deceased party shall file a notice of death with the prothonotary. The
    procedure to substitute the personal representative of the deceased party
    shall be in accordance with Rule 2352.’”           
    Id.
     (quoting Pa.R.C.P. 2355(a)
    (emphasis added)).25 Thus, “under Rules 2352 and 2355, the filing of a notice
    ____________________________________________
    24 We acknowledge that Appellant failed to include this issue in his Rule
    1925(b) concise statement; however, a challenge to subject matter
    jurisdiction cannot be waived. Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    929 A.2d 205
    , 210
    (Pa. 2007). Moreover, it is well-settled that this Court may raise the question
    of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Barndt v. Barndt, 
    580 A.2d 320
    (Pa. Super. 1990).
    25   Rule 2352 provides:
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-A20022-21
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    of death and the substitution of a personal representative is mandatory.” 
    Id.
    (emphasis added).
    Moreover, this Commonwealth “has long recognized that a trial court
    lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim filed against a deceased party.”
    
    Id.
     (citing Thompson v. Peck, 
    181 A. 597
    , 598 (Pa. 1935) (declaring a suit
    filed against a deceased individual “void”); Valentin v. Cartegena, 
    544 A.2d 1028
    , 1029 (Pa. Super. 1988) (deeming a suit filed against a deceased
    individual a “nullity”)). “A dead man cannot be a party to an action, and any
    such attempted proceeding is completely void and of no effect.” Id. at 84-85
    (quoting Lange v. Burd, 
    800 A.2d 336
    , 341 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation
    omitted)). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not
    have the authority to enter the order sustaining PUVTA Appellees’ preliminary
    objection and dismissing Appellant’s complaint.26
    ____________________________________________
    (a)    The successor may become a party to a pending action by
    filing of record a statement of the material facts on which
    the right to substitution is based.
    (b)    If the successor does not voluntarily become a party, the
    prothonotary, upon praecipe of an adverse party setting
    forth the material facts shall enter a rule upon the successor
    to show cause why the successor should not be substituted
    as a party.
    Pa.R.C.P. 2352.
    26   It is well-established:
    Before a court may issue an order, it must have authority to act.
    Mintz v. Mintz, [
    1924 WL 3939
    , at *1 (Pa. Super. January 1,
    1924)]. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is fundamental to a
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Accordingly, we vacate the February 18, 2021 order entered at docket
    no. 286 WDA 2021 and remand this matter to the trial court to permit
    substitution of a personal representative for McGreevy, in accordance with the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
    Based on our disposition of Appellant’s first issue, we need not address
    the remainder of Appellant’s claims raised on appeal regarding the PUVTA
    Action.
    Judgment vacated at docket no. 269 WDA 2021.          Order vacated at
    docket no. 286 WDA 2021. Cases remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    court’s authority to act. Leveto v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Dist. Corp.,
    … 
    366 A.2d 270
     ([Pa. Super.] 1976).
    Jurisdiction is the capacity to pronounce a judgment of the
    law on an issue brought before the court through due
    process of law. It is the right to adjudicate concerning the
    subject matter in a given case…. Without such jurisdiction,
    there is no authority to give judgment and one so entered
    is without force or effect.
    Mintz …, supra [at *1].
    Rieser v. Glukowsky, 
    646 A.2d 1221
    , 1223 (Pa. Super. 1994).
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/11/2022
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