In the Interest of: F.F.W., a Minor ( 2017 )

J-S50020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: F.F.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: F.W., FATHER :
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:
:
: No. 480 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree January 11, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000206-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF: F.F.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: F.W., FATHER :
:
:
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: No. 483 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001439-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2017
Appellant, F.W. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered January
11, 2017, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the
petition of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and involuntarily
terminating his parental rights to his minor, dependent son, F.F.W. (“Child”),
J-S50020-17
born in September 2012, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Father also appeals from the order
entered January 11, 2017, changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption
pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history
as follows:
The family in this case became known to DHS in 2010,
prior to Child’s birth in September 2012. DHS received
General Protective Service (“GPS”) reports addressing
situations related to Child’s siblings. At a hearing in
November 2011, Child’s siblings were not determined
dependent. On April 15, 2014, [M]other was arrested for
recklessly endangering a child and recklessly endangering
another person, and was imprisoned at Riverside
Correctional Facility. On May 17, 2014, a dependency
action was filed for Child’s siblings. Prior to incarceration
in April 2014, [M]other left this child with Father. Child
remained in Father’s care. On June 18, 2014, DHS
amended the siblings’ dependency petition to include this
Child. On June 19, 2014, the court found Child’s siblings
to be dependent and ordered DHS to obtain an Order for
Protective Custody (“OPC”) for this Child. DHS was unable
to locate Child and was unsuccessful in attempts to reach
Father. On June 23, 2014, Father contacted DHS stating
he had Child in his care since [M]other left Child with him
before her incarceration. Child had not seen a doctor in a
year and Father did not know whether Child had received
all of his immunizations, claiming it was Mother’s
responsibility. Father would also leave Child in the care of
paternal aunt, who has a lengthy criminal history,
____________________________________________
1
The parental rights of J.A.S. a/k/a J.S. (“Mother”) to Child were also
terminated on the same date by separate decree. Mother did not file an
appeal and is not a party to the instant appeal.
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whenever he worked odd jobs. As of June 23, 2014,
Father did not have stable housing or a job. Father has a
criminal history beginning in 1992, whereby Father
pleaded guilty to an indecent assault charge. In 2011,
Father was found guilty of possession of marijuana.
On June 26, 2014, during a shelter care hearing, the
OPC was lifted and temporary commitment to DHS was
ordered to stand. On June 30, 2014, Child was
adjudicated dependent based on present inability and was
fully committed to DHS. Father appealed Child’s
dependency adjudication upon which the trial court was
affirmed. Father was ordered to the Clinical Evaluation
Unit (“CEU”) for drug and alcohol, the Achieving
Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting, housing, anger
management, employment, domestic violence and
visitation with Child. At different permanency hearings,
the trial court always found reasonable efforts on behalf of
DHS. Father has been minimally compliant with the
permanency plan and has not successfully completed his
parental objectives.
Trial Court Op., 3/21/17, at 1-2 (“1925(a) Op.”) (citations to record and
footnotes omitted).
On March 1, 2016, DHS filed petitions to terminate parental rights and
for a goal change. On January 11, 2017, the trial court held a
termination/goal change hearing. DHS presented the testimony of DHS
worker Yolanda Bronson-Williford and Children’s Choice caseworker Juliana
Keegan. DHS also admitted into evidence DHS Exhibits 1 through 6, 8
through 12, 14, and 15.2 Father testified on his own behalf.3 Mother, who
was not present, was represented by counsel.4
____________________________________________
2
The remaining exhibits were related to Mother.
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By decree and order entered January 11, 2017, the trial court
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and changed Child’s permanency goal to
adoption.5 On February 1, 2017, Father, through appointed counsel, filed
timely notices of appeal of the decree terminating his parental rights and of
the goal change order, along with a concise statements of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court
consolidated Father’s appeals sua sponte on February 14, 2017.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the Trial Court err[] as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights where the
Department of Human Services (DHS) did not prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Father had not relieved the
circumstances which brought the child into care and could not
rel[ieve] them within a reasonable amount of time?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
3
Father also presented Exhibit F-1, certificates related to his
completion of parenting and anger management classes, and housing and
life skills workshops. Although this exhibit was not included with the
certified record, it does not affect our disposition as the court took judicial
notice of Father’s completion. N.T., 1/11/17, at 33.
4
The court noted that it previously took testimony as to Mother and
the termination of her parental rights on May 20, 2016 and held its decision
in abeyance. N.T., 1/11/17, at 24.
5
We observe that, while the Permanency Review Order of May 20,
2016 indicates a change of goal to adoption, the subsequent two orders
reflect a goal of return to parent or guardian. Permanency Review Order,
5/20/16; Permanency Review Order, 6/24/16; Master’s Recommendation,
10/7/16.
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2. Did the Trial Court err[] as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights where there
is no clear and convincing evidence that Father has evidenced
a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the child
or has refused or failed to perform her parental duties?
3. Did the Trial Court err[] as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights as there was
insufficient evidence presented to break the bond the child
shared with Father and where there was no clear and
convincing evidence that the child would not be harmed by
the termination of Father’s parental rights?
4. Did the Trial Court err[] as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion when it changed the child’s goal to adoption as
substantial, sufficient, and credible evidence was presented at
the time of trial which would have substantiated denying the
Petition for Goal Change?
Father’s Br. at 4.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they
are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the
parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9
A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013); see also In re Adoption of
S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (“[E]ven where the facts could
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support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess
the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and
judgment.”).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section
2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights
does the court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter
of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm a
termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to
any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re
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B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze
the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). This
Court has stated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
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such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). “The
grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied
are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds
may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.”
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)).
In finding sufficient evidence supporting termination of Father’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court in this case
stated as follows:
Child was taken into DHS custody because Father was
unable to provide essential parental care: he lived in a
house without enough room for him and Child; was not
keeping Child’s medical needs updated; had substance
abuse problems; and would leave Child in the care of
paternal aunt, who had a lengthy criminal history. Father
is unable to remedy the causes of his repeated and
continued incapacity to provide Child with essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for Child’s
physical and mental well-being. Father did not
successfully complete his [family service plan (“FSP”)]
objectives. Father continues to live in the same home that
DHS deemed inadequate throughout the lifetime of the
case and from which Child was removed. Father was
ordered by the trial court and DHS referred him to CEU for
drug and alcohol treatment. Father [wa]s unable to attend
and complete any drug and alcohol programs. At the time
of the termination trial, Father was not enrolled in any
drug or alcohol program. Father continues to test positive
for cocaine and marijuana, his drugs of choice. Father has
not verified his employment. He completed the program
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at ARC, but he is not making any effort to find a job.
Father never progressed to unsupervised visits and only
attended roughly seventy-four percent of the weekly visits.
Father’s visits need to be supervised since he sometimes
dozes off. Father has failed to take affirmative steps to
place himself in a position to parent Child. Child needs
permanency, which Father cannot provide. Father is
unable to be the sole caretaker of Child. Therefore, DHS
met its burden under §2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act and
termination under this section was also proper.
1925(a) Op. at 8-9 (citations to record omitted).
Father argues that he has made efforts to complete his FSP goals.
Father’s Br. at 12. Father states that he completed parenting and anger
management classes and a housing and life skills workshop, and, although
unable to provide proof of employment, Father stated that he works “under
the table.” Id. at 12-13. Father also asserts he has attended a majority of
visitations with Child and had appropriate interaction with Child. Id. at 13.
Lastly, Father notes he participated in a drug and alcohol treatment program
for 2½ to 3 months, which he was unable to complete due to deaths in the
family, and missed drug screens because he lost his phone. Father does not
believe he has a drug problem and contests a positive drug screen from
October 7, 2016; however, he is willing to attend a treatment program. Id.
at 13.
Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
Father failed to complete his established FSP goals. DHS caseworker
Yolanda Bronson-Williford, recounted Father’s FSP goals as visitation,
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compliance with CEU, housing, employment, and parenting.6 N.T., 1/11/17,
at 35, 38, 44. Ms. Bronson-Williford testified that she discussed these goals
with Father at an October 7, 2016 hearing.7 Id. at 36. She further
confirmed no indication that Father did not understand these goals. Id. at
36-37. Ms. Bronson-Williford described Father’s compliance as “minimal.”
Id. at 40. When asked for an explanation why, she stated:
Because it seems like Father has had the same goal
since [Child] has been in placement. He has had the same
goals of housing, employment -- Father did make some --
well, let me finish. He had the same goals of housing,
employment, CEU, visitation, parenting -- well the
parenting capacity was later on, Your Honor.
But he was able to do a couple of things, which is anger
management and parenting through ARC. But that’s --
that’s been 2½ years, so he hasn’t progressed to the point
where I think he needs to be to the point of more anything
[sic] more than minimum.
Id. at 40-41.
Although Father completed a housing and life skills workshop, id. at
33, he remained in the same housing deemed inappropriate for Child. Id. at
37, 45, 54-55, 62-64. Further, despite testifying that he worked “under the
table,” Father presented no confirming documentation as to employment.
____________________________________________
6
Father completed parenting classes. N.T., 1/11/17, at 33, 35, 71.
7
Ms. Bronson-Williford additionally advised Father of an FSP meeting
scheduled for October 19, 2016, which he did not attend. N.T., 1/11/17, at
at 36.
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Id. at 11, 45-46, 62, 88. In addition, although Father maintained “fairly
consistent” visitation with “appropriate” interactions with Child,8 id. at 57,
65-66, visitation remained supervised, id. at 39, 57-58. Significantly, Ms.
Bronson-Williford further testified that she would not recommend
progression to unsupervised visitation. Id. at 39-40. She testified as
follows:
Well, since – when I reviewed the record it seems like
since [Child] has been in placement, Your Honor, [Father]
has not successfully completed CEU goal of randoms being
clean. And that’s one of our issues regarding -- a safety
regarding the children.
He has been in care over 2½ years, so -- and he still
has supervised visits, so I am not in agreement with -- at
this time, for him to progress to unsupervised.
Id. at 40. Ms. Keegan similarly stated that she would not expand Father’s
visitation. Id. at 72.
Moreover, and most importantly, Father never successfully completed
drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 44, 61, 78. Although Father commenced
drug and alcohol treatment at The Wedge North, he was discharged due to
noncompliance.9 Id. at 30, 94-95. Subsequent to discharge, Father has not
engaged in treatment. Id. at 37, 95-96. He also failed to present for
____________________________________________
8
Children’s Choice caseworker Juliana Keegan, who scheduled and
supervised the visits, reported attendance at roughly seventy-four percent of
visits. N.T., 1/11/17, at 57.
9
Father was previously referred to the NET, but failed to engage in
treatment. N.T., 1/11/17, at 98-99; see also DHS Exhibit 15.
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requested drug screens.10 Id. at 37. Critically, his last drug screen from
October 7, 2016 was positive for cocaine and marijuana.11 Id. at 30-31;
see also DHS Exhibit 12. Although Father stated that he would be willing to
engage in treatment, he testified that he does not believe he has a drug
problem. Id. at 78-79.
In response to inquiry as to providing Father more time to complete
his objectives, Ms. Keegan expressed, “It’s been a long time that [Child] has
been in care. And I believe that to prolong this process may be to the child’s
detriment. It’s a difficult process for a child to be in and it’s going on 3
years.” Id. at 70. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held
in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims
of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Child to be without essential parental
____________________________________________
10
Father challenged receipt of the drug screen requests, explaining
that he lost his telephone for a period of time. N.T., 1/11/17, at 79.
11
Father contested the results of this drug screen. N.T., 1/11/17, at
94.
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control or subsistence necessary for his physical and mental well-being and
that Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. See In re Adoption of
M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272.
We next determine whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), we have stated as follows:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As
this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not
explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is
not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however,
provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with
his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many
factors to be considered by the court when determining
what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights favored
Child’s needs and welfare, the court reasoned:
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Father’s visits with Child were always supervised; he never
progressed to unsupervised visits. Father also only attended
seventy-four percent of his weekly visits with Child. Child
transitions from Father’s visits to his foster home smoothly;
Child does not get upset and is well-behaved. Child occasionally,
but not infrequently, asked to go home to the foster parent
during visits with Father. Father and Child do not have a
parental bond, and Child would not suffer permanent harm if
Father’s parental rights were terminated. Adoption is in Child’s
best interests. The DHS social worker testified that Child views
the foster parent as the parental figure who takes care of all
Child’s needs. Child is bonded with the foster parent and calls
her “Mom.” Father does not inquire about Child’s medical or
educational needs. Child is in a safe, permanent, and pre-
adoptive home. DHS witnesses were credible. Consequently,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found, by clear
and convincing evidence, that there was no parental bond and
that termination of Father’s parental rights would not destroy an
existing beneficial relationship.
1925(a) Op. at 12-13.
Father argues that he and Child “share a beneficial bond that should
not be destroyed through termination of Father’s parental rights.” Father’s
Br. at 19. Father highlights that Child recognizes him and calls him “dad”
and that the CUA caseworker noted a relationship. Id.
We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that
Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor
termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Although Ms. Keegan acknowledged a relationship between Father and
Child, noting recognition and positive interaction, she could not say there
was a bond. Id. at 64-66. Rather, Child is in a pre-adoptive home where
he enjoys a nurturing, parent-child relationship with his foster mother. Id.
at 41-42, 56, 74. As described by Ms. Bronson-Williford, “[Child] sees
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[foster mother] as -- he calls her ‘Mommy[.’] He sees her as the person
who takes care of his needs, consoles him, takes him to the doctor, educates
him. They go out for different family events: Disney on Ice, circus. So he
has, like, a great bond with [foster mother].” Id. at 41-42. He additionally
has a “wonderful relationship” with his foster sibling. Id. at 42. This was
echoed by Ms. Keegan. Id. at 56. Notably, Ms. Keegan acknowledged that
Father did not inquire as to Child’s medical and educational concerns. Id. at
56-57. Likewise, she referenced a “smooth transition” from Father back to
foster mother after visitation, noting Child “does not get upset.” Id. at 58.
Ms. Keegan also testified to occasions where Child has asked to go home
during visits. Id.
As such, Ms. Keegan did not believe Child would suffer irreparable
harm if visitation with Father were to end or if his rights were terminated.
Id. at 59. In fact, as Child had been in his foster home for 2½ years, she
expressed that he would suffer harm if removed. Id. at 60. Further, both
Ms. Bronson-Williford and Ms. Keegan opined that adoption was in Child’s
best interests. Id. at 43, 59-60. Ms. Bronson-Williford offered,
[Child] needs -- has been in care for a long time and he
needs permanency for -- in order for him to progress.
There has not been compliance regarding -- I mean,
enough compliance for us to progress to unsupervised
visits with the [f]ather. And he -- [Child] just needs
permanency to the point where he can continue with his
life. I think he knows Father, but he doesn’t know his
father as the person to take care of all his needs.
Id. at 43.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights serves
Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare.
Lastly, we turn to the question of whether the trial court appropriately
changed the permanency goal to adoption. In so doing, our standard of
review is the same abuse of discretion standard as noted above. See In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010); In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977
(Pa.Super. 2008).
This Court has stated:
Pursuant to § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent
child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the
continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family
service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the
original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility
of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a likely
date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in
placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two
months. The best interests of the child, and not the
interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. As this
Court has held, a child’s life simply cannot be put on hold
in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to
handle the responsibilities of parenting.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, Section 6351(f.1) requires the trial court to make a
determination regarding the child’s placement goal:
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(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
determine one of the following:
...
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption,
and the county agency will file for termination of
parental rights in cases where return to the child’s
parent, guardian or custodian is not best suited to
the safety, protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1).
Here, Father argues that it was not in Child’s best interests for the trial
court to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Father’s Br. at 19.
Father highlights the bond between him and Child, as well as his efforts at
completion of his FSP goals. Id. at 19-20. Father argues as follows:
Father and Child share a bond evidenced by the fact
that Child recognizes Father and calls him dad.
Furthermore, the case worker, Juliana Keegan also
testified that there is a relationship between Father and
Child. As such, breaking this bond and forever breaking
apart this family is not in the best interest of the child.
This is especially true as testimony was offered that there
were no safety concerns during Father’s weekly visits with
Child.
In addition, Father has worked towards his FSP goals . .
. in an attempt to remedy any other situations that might
have previously created a safety issue for the child. As
such changing [C]hild’s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption was against the weight of the
evidence.
Id. (citations to record omitted).
We conclude that Father’s claim lacks merit. The record reveals that a
change of the permanency goal to adoption was in Child’s best interests.
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Father had not successfully completed and was not currently engaged in
drug and alcohol treatment. N.T., 1/11/17, at 30, 37, 44, 61, 78, 94-96.
Further, Father had failed to present for screenings, id. at 37, and, when
last screened on October 7, 2016, he tested positive for cocaine and
marijuana. Id. at 30-31; DHS Exhibit 12. Additionally, despite a
relationship with Father, Child’s parent-child relationship is with his foster
mother. Id. at 41-42, 56, 64-66. Therefore, the record supports that a goal
change was in the best interests of Child. Accordingly, after review of the
record, we discern no abuse of discretion, and conclude that the trial court
properly changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s termination of
Father’s parental rights and change of the Child’s permanency goal, we
affirm the decree and order of the trial court.
Decree and order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/26/2017
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