In Re: Adoption of D.A.L., Appeal of: J.A. ( 2021 )

J-A02008-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF D.A.L. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: J.A. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 948 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Orphans' Court at No(s):
OA No. 49-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 12, 2021
J.A. (“Mother”) appeals the order entered on September 1, 2020, that
involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor son, D.A.L., pursuant
to the Adoption Act.1 We affirm.
D.A.L. was born in May 2012. Butler County Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”) first became involved with the family during 2014 when
D.A.L. was adjudicated dependent due to drug abuse by Mother and S.A.L. 2
(“Father”). That adjudication was discharged in 2015, and the family was
____________________________________________
1 While dated August 31, 2020, the order was not filed and entered for
purposes of Pa.O.C.R. 4.6(b) until September 1, 2020 upon the docketing of
notice.
2The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of S.A.L., who did not
appeal or participate in the instant appeal.
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reunited. On March 6, 2018, CYS again intervened after it received a report
regarding Father’s drug use. Specifically, the caseworkers observed a bloody
needle and a spoon with suspected heroin in the home. At that time, Mother
was incarcerated in the Butler County Prison. D.A.L. was habitually truant and
it was expected that he would have to repeat kindergarten.
The juvenile court removed D.A.L. from Father’s care and placed him
temporarily with a paternal aunt in York County. Soon thereafter, he was
placed with a different paternal aunt and uncle, L.D. and R.D. (“Paternal Aunt
and Paternal Uncle”), who remained a kinship placement until March 2019,
when Paternal Aunt and Paternal Uncle indicated that they were no longer a
placement option. Since March 2019, D.A.L. lived with a confidential foster
family who is a potential adoptive resource.
The juvenile court adjudicated D.A.L. dependent on March 28, 2018.
Mother remained incarcerated with no clear release date. While Mother’s
visitations with D.A.L. were subject to the Butler County Prison’s visitation
protocol, her primary reunification objective was to maintain an active role in
her son’s life.
For the majority of the year, Mother was moderately compliant with the
permanency plan insofar as she participated in available prison programs and
she regularly mailed correspondence to her son. After her release from prison
in March 2019, Mother’s objectives were expanded to include demonstrating
an ability to satisfy D.A.L.’s needs, providing CYS weekly updates, obtaining
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a legal source of income, maintaining appropriate housing, and ensuring that
all household members or potential caregivers are drug-free and safe.
On June 13, 2019, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of Mother and Father pursuant to § 2511(a) (1), (2), (5), and
(8). By July 12, 2019, Mother had achieved substantial compliance with the
permanency plan and had made moderate progress toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement. For example, she
entered an outpatient drug-treatment program, completed a mental health
evaluation, and initiated psychological therapy. Nevertheless, problems
persisted regarding Mother’s ability to satisfy D.A.L.’s need for safety and
stability.
Before the court held the evidentiary hearing on CYS’s petitions, L.D.
and R.D. reemerged and requested visitation with their nephew. The court
consolidated the petition for visitation with CYS’s petition to terminate
parental rights and scheduled hearings that ultimately took place on
December 3, 2019, January 23, 2020, and June 30, 2020.3 Subsequent to
the hearings and the submission of a brief by Mother, the orphans’ court
issued the underlying order terminating Mother’s parental rights and denying
____________________________________________
3Pursuant to the order entered on July 18, 2019, the orphans’ court appointed
Ronald Thomas, Esquire counsel for D.A.L. See CYS Exhibit A, Order
Appointing Counsel, 7/18/19. Counsel filed a brief in support of termination.
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the motion to resume visitation filed by L.D. and R.D.4 Mother filed a timely
notice of appeal and as concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
She presents the following questions for our review:
I. Whether the evidence in the record is inadequate for the
[orphans’] court to have concluded, by clear and convincing
evidence, that grounds for involuntary termination of parental
rights existed pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
and (8) where Mother unequivocally tested negative in drug
screens and maintained safe and stable income and housing
arrangements.
II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in concluding that
termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the child,
as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) where the [orphans’] court
failed to cite adequate evidence of record and where there was a
significant bond between Mother and [D.A.L.]
Mother’s brief at 4.
The following applies to our review of matters involving involuntary
termination of parental rights:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the [orphans’] court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed
for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The
[orphans’] court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. We
have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
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4 L.D. and R.D. did not participate in this appeal.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). “The trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free
to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of the
grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
At the outset, we address Mother’s argument that the orphans’ court
relied upon facts not of record in concluding that CYS had satisfied its burden
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of proof. See Mother’s brief at 23-24. Specifically, she refers to the court’s
recitation as to the family’s prior history with CYS from 2014 to 2015. Id. at
24. She contends:
The [orphans’] court abused its discretion and erred when it used
facts not part of the record in its opinion. In its' [sic] opinion, the
[orphans’] court used facts that were not a part of the record for
the instant case. This case began on March 6, 2018 when CYS
caseworkers investigated a report at Father’s trailer. Upon
witnessing suspected drug paraphernalia and interviewing Father,
CYS detained [D.A.L.]. The record begins on this date. However,
the [orphans’] court outlined within its opinion, multiple pages of
facts that were not part of this case. Specifically, pages two (2)
through five (5) of the court’s opinion are not part of the record.
These facts refer to a separate case involving this family from
[orphans’] court outlined at length facts of that case, and then
relied on them in its evaluation of the case at bar. Because this
is an abuse of discretion and in legal error, this Court should
reverse the [orphans’] court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
rights.
Mother’s brief at 23-24.
Mother’s argument concerning the orphans’ court’s reference to the
family’s prior involvement with CYS in 2014-2015 fails for several reasons.
First, contrary to Mother’s protestations, the trial court did not invoke any
facts relating to the first dependency adjudication to establish the statutory
grounds to terminate her parental rights. In reality, the orphans’ court simply
recounted the family’s history with the agency in order to frame the narrative
that was relevant to the present determination. Mother’s assertion that “[t]his
case began on March 6, 2018 when CYS caseworkers investigated a report at
Father’s trailer” belies her understanding of these child-welfare proceedings
and disregards the family’s interaction with CYS as far back as 2014. Indeed,
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the CYS caseworkers ostensibly would not have been at Father’s home on
March 6, 2018, but for the agency’s prior involvement with the family due to
the drug abuse of Mother and Father three years earlier. As this Court has
often repeated, the orphan’s court “must consider the whole history of a given
case[.]” In Interest of: T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 623 (Pa.Super. 2018)
(eschewing the mechanical application of the six-month statutory period
outlined in section 2511(a)(1)).
It is evident from the orphans’ court’s analysis that it only considered
Mother’s behavior commencing March 2018 in finding that CYS satisfied the
statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. See Findings of Fact,
Opinion, and Order, 9/1/20, at 21-28. While the orphans’ court cited facts in
its opinion that related to the family’s prior interaction with CYS, the court
simply outlined the history of this case and it did not rely upon those facts in
reaching its decision to terminate parental rights. Hence, we reject Mother’s
allegation of error.
Next, we address Mother’s substantive challenge to the termination of
her parental rights. The orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm
a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the orphans’ court
as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Instantly, the
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certified record supports the orphans’ court’s termination decree pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(2)5 and (b), which provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2),
we have indicated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
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5 Sections 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) are not applicable to Mother because she
was incarcerated at the time of D.A.L.’s removal from Father’s care. In re
Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121, 1123 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2010) (recognizing
termination was not proper under subsections (a)(5) and (a)(8) where parent
did not exercise custody when child was removed from care of custodial
parent).
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such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). We have stated, “[t]he grounds for termination due to parental
incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative
misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as
well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R.,
111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015). Accordingly, “[p]arents are required
to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period
of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., supra at
340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), the
orphans’ court reasoned:
Mother has not effectively addressed her problems with
drugs and alcohol or her mental health. Mother did not submit to
all required drug tests and was dismissed from drug treatment
therapy for failure to attend. Even though Mother then enrolled
in another program, the [c]ourt finds Mother’s inconsistency in
attendance evidences [that] Mother does not understand the
importance of remaining drug and alcohol free. Further, Mother
did not successfully complete any portion of her mental health
treatment. Mother’s continued incapacity in this respect has
caused [D.A.L.] to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.
Mother’s failure to complete the [c]ourt[-o]rdered [s]ervices
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within the timeframe set forth clearly shows that she cannot or
will not remedy the cause/conditions of placement.
....
The [c]ourt holds that based upon the facts, clear and
convincing evidence was presented to allow for a termination as
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2).
Findings of Fact, Opinion, and Order, 9/1/20, at 23-24.
Mother challenges the orphans’ court’s reliance on her non-compliance
with drug and alcohol and mental health treatment. Id. at 27-30. Mother
suggests that she maintained negative drug screens, corrected her failure to
attend screens with the appropriate frequency, and that there were no
reported concerns related to drugs and alcohol. Id. at 28-29. She contends
that she attended drug and alcohol treatment and any absences as to such
treatment were due to memory loss resulting from a head injury sustained
when she was nineteen years old. Id. at 28. She further indicates that she
sought new treatment and pursued other avenues with respect to treatment
when necessary. Id. Mother also asserts that she attended mental health
treatment, emphasizing that the treatment reports established her compliance
with that component. Id. at 29-30. Mother concludes, “The [orphans’] court
improperly concluded [she] was not consistent with her drug and alcohol
compliance[.]” Id. at 29.
Notwithstanding Mother’s pronouncements of compliance, a review of
the certified record reveals that Mother failed to complete her objectives aimed
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at reunification with D.A.L. following her release from incarceration,6 or
address the issues related to safety and lack of protective capacity.
Former CYS caseworker, Tiffany Crotzer, was assigned to the family
between March 28, 2018, and February 14, 2020. See N.T., 6/30/20, at 5,
45, 70-71. She reported that Mother’s objectives upon her release from
incarceration in March 2019 included participating in mental health and drug
and alcohol evaluations and following treatment recommendations. Id. at 58-
59. While Mother was frequently confused about her objectives, she managed
to obtain employment and appropriate housing, participate in visitations,7
maintain contact with CYS, and comply with the drug-screen program
approximately 30 percent of the time.8 Id. at 16, 19, 21-24, 27, 49-51, 53.
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6 As Mother was released from prison in March 2019, her incarceration does
not constitute a continuing incapacity. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d
817, 828, 830 (Pa. 2012). (“[I]ncarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a
determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist
under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent
due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not
be remedied.”).
7 Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Mother’s in-person visitation with D.A.L was
suspended from mid-March through the end of May 2020. Although CYS
offered Mother virtual visitations during the interim period, Mother did not
download Skype until immediately before the in-person visitations resumed.
N.T., 6/30/20, at 77-80.
8 Mother was required to submit two drug screens per week. She complied
during nineteen of fifty-nine weeks. During thirty weeks, Mother submitted
only one screen, and on ten weeks, five of which were during the COVID-19
restrictions, she failed to submit any drug screens. N.T., 6/30/20, at 22, 75;
Mother’s Exhibit B.
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However, while recognizing Mother’s engagement in substance abuse
and mental health treatment, Ms. Crotzer confirmed that Mother never
completed these objectives. Id. at 23-24, 46, 49-51, 57-59. Specifically,
when asked about Mother’s engagement in services from March of 2019 to
June 2019, Ms. Crotzer described Mother’s participation as “not so much with
the drug and alcohol, and she did not even receive her mental health
assessment until May 20 of 2019.” Id. at 46.
The certified record confirms Mother’s attendance problems with respect
to both drug and alcohol treatment and her mental health program, problems
that Mother admitted during her testimony. See N.T., 6/30/20, at 49-50,
104-05; N.T., 1/23/20, at 83, 88-89, 90-91, 100-01. Indeed, Mother was
discharged from her initial drug and alcohol treatment program at the Gaiser
Addiction Center due to persistent attendance problems. See N.T., 1/23/20,
at 100. Likewise, despite Mother’s assertion that she had addressed her
mental health problems, her current mental health therapist testified that
Mother had not completed any portion of her treatment plan. N.T., 1/23/20,
at 84-85.
Furthermore, neither Ms. Crotzer nor Kristin Caro, the current CYS
caseworker, recommended reunification. Id. at 5, 45, 55-56, 82-83. Ms.
Crotzer identified Mother’s lack of protective capacity, as evidenced by her
continued devotion to Father despite his drug abuse and possible domestic
violence, as raising safety concerns that impeded reunification. Id. at 24-26.
She explained, “the Agency’s biggest concern was [Mother]’s ability to keep
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the child safe, and that level of function was diminished, so we had significant
concerns about relationships that [Mother] had.” Id. at 24. She further
elucidated,
I would argue the fact that there is a significantly diminished
protective capacity when [Mother] is okay with the child being
exposed, and I don’t know as though it’s been addressed
consistently with how to enhance that protective capacity of
making good choices and not allowing the child to be around such
activities. . . .”
Id. at 26. Notably, such concerns were echoed by Eric Bernstein, Psy.D., who
conducted bonding assessments. Dr. Bernstein testified,
With respect to [Mother], what stood out most was just a
lack of familiarity about her son’s needs and perhaps appreciation
or articulation of appreciation for the impact of her own respective
difficulties upon her child. There was a certain level of conveyed
entitlement, if you will, that I am the mother, and, therefore, I
should have the child without any constructive critical assessment
of her own strengths and limitations as a parent or how, for that
matter, [D.A.L.] may adjust in her care as compared to in [the
foster parents’] care.
I’m also mindful of the -- at least report by [CYS] that there
presents a history of domestic violence between the parties, just
as I’m aware that the parties denied that ever being the case. So
I don’t know how to reconcile that issue other than to acknowledge
that the parties have a history of legal difficulties, one of which
with the father having a simple assault charge in years past. But
aside from that, I don’t know what -- if that even gives rise to
concerns about domestic violence with [Mother] or what have you.
And other than that, both parties have a history of legal
difficulties which did raise concerns about their future, to the
extent they will again incur legal issues an how will that, if at all,
compromise the child’s stability should he be placed into their
care; and to what degree would the child be at risk should they
relapse as well, especially given, at least according to [CYS], that
there was considerable drug paraphernalia within the home to
which [D.A.L.] was exposed, and that certainly raised alarms, if
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that is indeed accurate, about potential risk of his safety and well-
being.
N.T., 1/23/20, at 28-29.
Hence, the record substantiates the orphans’ court’s conclusion that
Mother demonstrated a repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal to parent that has caused D.A.L. to be without essential parental
control or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental well-being. See
In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra at 1272. While Mother made steps toward
maintaining sobriety and addressing her mental health problems, that
progress was incomplete and she continues to display a diminished protective
capacity, as demonstrated by her son’s safety and welfare as subordinate to
her relationship with Father and she either cannot or will not remedy this
situation. As we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, we do not
disturb the orphans’ court’s findings.
Having determined that the record supports the orphans’ court’s
analysis under 2511(a), we next determine whether termination was proper
under § 2511(b). As to § 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly
interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security,
and stability. . . . [T]he determination of the child’s needs and
welfare requires consideration of the emotional bonds between
the parent and child. The utmost attention should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. However, . . . evaluation of a child’s bonds is not
always an easy task.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (cleaned up). Essentially, “the extent of any
bond analysis . . . necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation
omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, § 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the [§] 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless
only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In finding that D.A.L.’s emotional needs and welfare favor termination
pursuant to § 2511(b), the orphans’ court reasoned as follows:
Dr. Eric Bernstein conducted a bonding assessment for
Mother and [D.A.L.], Father and [D.A.L.], and the foster parents
and [D.A.L.]. Dr. Bernstein opined that [D.A.L.] has a very strong
bond with Father and a significant bond with Mother. Dr.
Bernstein further opined that [D.A.L.] will experience a loss if his
relationship with Mother, Father, or the foster parents is severed
which would need to be addressed through counseling.
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Dr. Bernstein raised concerns regarding Mother’s history of
rebelliousness and difficulty with the law, and Father’s lengthy
legal history with periods of incarceration and long history of drug
abuse, due to the effect those difficulties would have on stability
and permanence for [D.A.L.] if [D.A.L.] was reunified with the
parents. Dr. Bernstein testified that the foster parents provide
the opportunity for [D.A.L.] to have a safe, secure, stable home
environment with predictability and they recognize and appreciate
his needs.
....
In this case, a bond unquestionably exists between [D.A.L.]
and Mother[.] However, the [c]ourt finds neither Mother nor
Father are able to offer [D.A.L.] a secure, stable home. Mother[’s]
. . . unwillingness or inability to remedy the problems that exist
cause it to be in the best interests of [D.A.L.] to have parental
rights terminated so that [D.A.L.] can have safety, permanency,
and stability. The [c]ourt acknowledges that [D.A.L.] is currently
in a confidential placement but notes that, since Mother does not
have a history of violence, the ideal situation would be for Mother
to be permitted to have some contact with [D.A.L.].
The [c]ourt has given primary consideration to the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
[D.A.L.] and determines that the needs and welfare of [D.A.L.]
are best met by the termination of Mother and Father’s parental
rights. As such, it is in child’s best interest that Mother[’s] . . .
parental rights are terminated.
Findings of Fact, Opinion, and Order, 9/1/20, at 28-30.
Mother argues that the conclusion of the orphans’ court is faulty because
it failed to conduct an in-depth analysis of the child’s needs and welfare.
Rather, she maintains, the court offered conclusory statements without
citation to evidence with specificity. See Mother’s brief at 32-33. Further,
Mother asserts that the court failed to analyze the bond she shares with D.A.L.
to determine the impact of severing it. Id. at 33, 35. She contends that the
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orphans’ court's decision “runs in direct contrast to the evidence presented of
the ‘significant’ and ‘important’ bond between Mother and Child.” Id. at 35.
Lastly, Mother challenges the finding that she posed a threat to her son’s
safety. Id. at 35-36. She opines,
The [orphans’] court baselessly concluded that Mother was
unable to offer [D.A.L.] a secure, stable home. Rather, the
evidence demonstrated that since Mother’s release from
incarceration, Mother held suitable housing. She maintained the
same home, where she prepared a bedroom for [D.A.L.],
therefore her living accommodations show permanency and
stability. No evidence suggested Mother posed a safety threat to
[D.A.L.], and the [orphans’] court even stated Mother does not
have a history of violence and thus should be permitted to have
contact with the [D.A.L.]. Therefore, the [orphans’] court’s
conclusion that Mother cannot provide a secure, stable home or
offer [D.A.L.] safety, permanency, or stability is contrary to the
evidence and must be reversed on appeal.
Id. (cleaned up).
Again, we discern no abuse of discretion. The certified record supports
the orphans’ court’s finding that D.A.L.’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to § 2511(b). As indicated supra, neither CYS caseworker who was
assigned to the family recommended reunification. N.T., 6/30/20, at 5, 45,
55-56. Indeed, Ms. Crotzer expressly cited safety concerns relating to
Mother’s relationship with Father and Mother’s diminished protective capacity.
Id. at 24-26. Furthermore, having performed bonding evaluations, Dr.
Bernstein reiterated Ms. Crotzer’s concerns and highlighted the dangers
associated with Mother’s sense of parental entitlement. Id. at 28-29.
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Moreover, D.A.L. has been in his current pre-adoptive foster home,
where he is happy and doing well, with his needs satisfied, since March 2019.
N.T., 6/30/20, at 30-31, 48-49, 81-82; N.T., 12/3/19, at 77, 79-80. Ms.
Crotzer noted D.A.L. was “thriving” in the foster home and described the home
as “natural, very comfortable, supportive.” N.T., 6/30/20, at 48-49.
Dr. Bernstein recognized that D.A.L. shared bonds with Mother, Father,
and the foster parents. N.T., 1/23/20, at 19, 27. Hence, he noted that,
regardless of the outcome, D.A.L. would experience some form of loss. Id. at
29-30. He testified,
I think no matter how you decide in this case, [D.A.L.] is well
aware enough, at least on some level, that he’s going to be
negatively impacted, either by the loss of his existing stability and
relationship with [his foster parents], or the potential -- or the
potential for difficulties if placed in the parents’ care should they
again incur a relapse or have any issues in their domestic
situation.
And if he is placed with [foster parents] permanently, there
is going to be the felt loss of his father and mother, depending
upon [the foster parents’] decision and/or the [c]ourt’s decision
about what kind of contact, if any, is going to occur between them
and their son in the future. So there is really no good situation
that is completely going to shelter the child from this.
Id.
Emphasizing the effect of safety and stability on D.A.L.’s needs and
welfare, Dr. Bernstein stated, “[The foster parents] provide [D.A.L.] with an
opportunity to have a safe, secure, stable home environment with
predictability, and they recognize and appreciate his needs and offer him a
balance, which I think is imperative as well.” Id. at 30. Hence, Dr. Bernstein
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opined that termination of parental rights serves D.A.L.’s needs and welfare.
Id. at 78; see also CYS Exhibit E at 13.
While Mother may love D.A.L., a parent’s own feelings of love and
affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights.
See In re Z.P., supra at 1121. At the time of the conclusion of the hearings,
D.A.L. had been in placement for over two years, and is entitled to
permanency and stability. As we have stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be
put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the orphans’ court did not err of abuse
its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/12/2021
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