In the Interest of: M.T., Appeal of: C.T. and M.T. , 101 A.3d 1163 ( 2014 )


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    2014 Pa. Super. 223
    IN THE INTEREST OF: M.T., A MINOR             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: C.T., III AND M.T., PARENTS
    No. 1138 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Order entered June 10, 2013,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County,
    Civil Division, at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000077-2012
    IN THE INTEREST OF: C.T., IV., A MINOR        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: C.T., III AND M.T., PARENTS
    No. 1139 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Order entered June 10, 2013,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County,
    Civil Division, at No(s): CP-07-DP-0000076-2012
    IN THE INTEREST OF: M.J.T., A MINOR           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: C.T., III AND M.T., PARENTS
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    No. 541 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Decree entered March 5, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County,
    Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 2013 AD 39A
    IN THE INTEREST OF: C.E.T., IV., A                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                                       PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: C.T., III AND M.T., PARENTS
    No. 542 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Decree entered March 5, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County,
    Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 2013 AD 39
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, SHOGAN, ALLEN,
    OTT, WECHT, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.
    OPINION BY ALLEN, J.:                                  FILED OCTOBER 08, 2014
    M.T. (“Mother”) and C.T., III (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”) have
    appealed from the June 10, 2013 Orders changing the permanency
    placement goal of the parties’ two dependent children, C.E.T., IV (d.o.b.
    September 2010), and M.J.T. (d.o.b. October 2011) (“the Children”), to
    adoption, and from the March 5, 2014 decrees terminating Mother and
    Father’s parental rights.
    We   initially   note   that   although   the    trial   court   conducted   the
    termination hearing on November 21, 2013, the trial court waited until this
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    Court affirmed the Children’s goal change on March 4, 2014 before entering
    the March 5, 2014 termination decrees.         On April 17, 2014, this Court
    entered an order granting en banc reargument, and withdrew the March 4,
    2014 decision affirming the goal change. The trial court did not vacate the
    termination decrees it entered on March 5, 2014. We find no error in such
    action, and note that “a goal change from reunification to adoption [i]s not a
    necessary   prerequisite   to   the   initiation   of   involuntary   termination
    proceedings.” In re N.W., 
    859 A.2d 501
    , 507 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing In
    re M.G., 
    855 A.2d 68
    (Pa. Super. 2004) (emphasis in original)).              Our
    Supreme Court has held that “an agency may file a termination petition even
    where reunification remains the permanency goal for the child.”            In re
    Adoption of S.E.G., 
    901 A.2d 1017
    , 1026 (Pa. 2006). This is due in part to
    the policy espoused by the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C.
    § 671-675, which imposes upon the states the requirement to focus on a
    dependent child’s need for permanency, rather than the parents’ actions.
    Consistent with the foregoing, we consider both the June 10, 2013 orders
    effectuating goal change, and the March 5, 2014 decrees terminating Mother
    and Father’s parental rights.
    Critical to our analysis in this appeal is the trial court’s compelling,
    detailed and accurate recitation of the evidence of record.       Because of its
    relevancy, we adopt and reproduce the trial court’s recitation of the facts
    and procedure below:
    Relative to the parents’ initial appeal concerning the goal
    change to adoption, [the Superior] Court entered a decision filed
    March 4, 2014 affirming [the trial] court’s Order of June 10,
    2013 by a 2-1 decision.      However, after submission of an
    application for re-argument by the parents, [the Superior] Court
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    subsequently entered an Order on April 17, 2014 granting their
    application and vacating its prior March 4, 2014 Order. On June
    3, 2014, [the Superior] Court entered an Order denying BCCYF’s
    motion to consolidate the goal change and termination of
    parental rights appeals, but indicated instead, that the cases will
    be listed as related appeals.       The matter of re-argument
    pertaining to the goal change, and the termination of parental
    appeals, is to be submitted on briefs by counsel of record for the
    parties before an En Banc panel on August 5, 2014.
    The subject children, C.E.T., IV and M.J.T., were removed
    from the care of their parents on June 22, 2012 pursuant to a
    Voluntary Placement Agreement signed by the parents, C.T., III
    and M.T. C.E.T., IV was placed in the [M.] foster home on such
    date, while M.J.T. was placed in the same foster home three (3)
    days later (June 25, 2012) upon her release from the hospital. A
    Dependency Petition was filed for both children on July 5, 2012,
    and an Adjudicatory Hearing was scheduled before the master
    on July 18, 2012. However, both parents and the paternal
    grandparents, C.T.J. and P.T., requested that the matter be
    heard by a judge in the first instance, therefore, the matter was
    subsequently scheduled before the undersigned on September
    13, 2012.
    By Orders of Adjudication entered September 17, 2012,
    both children were declared dependent and have remained in the
    custody of BCCYF since such time. BCCYF initially became
    involved with this family after receiving two (2) Childline reports
    on June 19, 2012. The initial Childline report (C.L. No. 07-
    11165) alleged that M.J.T. was the victim of abuse (serious
    physical injury and serious physical neglect) by her paternal
    grandfather, C.E.T., Jr., due to second degree burns suffered to
    her feet, ankles, thigh and buttocks. She was admitted to UPMC
    – Mercy Hospital in Pittsburgh, PA.          (RR 3-4; Order of
    Adjudication, 9/17/12 ¶15 (a)(1)). The second Childline report
    (C.L. No. 07-11166) alleged that M.J.T. was the victim of abuse
    (serious physical injury) as a result of severe proximal humerus
    fracture and metacarpal fracture, as well as various bruising to
    her face, head and extremities, and abrasions to the left eyelid,
    nose, upper lip and chin that were inconsistent for a child her
    age (at the time of the Childline referral the identity of the
    perpetrator(s) was unknown). (RR 4; Order of Adjudication,
    9/17/12, ¶15 (a)(1)).
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    The daughter, M.J.T., was seen by Dr. Janet Squires and
    Dr. Joy Richmond while at UPMC – Mercy. Both doctors opined
    that the bruising and fractures could not have been caused by an
    accidental source.     (RR 5).    More specifically, Dr. Squires
    reported that after reviewing an x-ray of M.[J.T.]’s injuries, the
    right humerus fracture was estimated to be one (1) to three (3)
    weeks old, and that the metacarpal fracture was most likely
    caused by squeezing or pounding of the hand. (See Dependency
    Petitions, p. 5).
    In our September 17, 2012 Order of Adjudication, we
    specifically made the following finding:
    “…the court finds clear and convincing evidence that the
    child, M.J.T., was the victim of abuse (serious physical
    injury) relating to the bruises, abrasions and fractures.
    The court further finds clear and convincing evidence that
    the bruising, abrasions, fractures and burns all would have
    caused M.J.T. severe pain and would have significantly
    impaired the child’s functioning and development for a
    period of time. With respect to the identify (sic) of the
    perpetrator of the bruises, abrasions and fractures,
    however, there is only prima facie evidence that the
    perpetrators of the abuse are the parents and
    grandparents due to the fact that they were the only ones
    responsible for the welfare of the children during the time
    that the injuries occurred…”
    Order of Adjudication, 9/17/12, ¶15(a)(1)
    The 6th Month Permanency Review hearing was held
    December 11, 2012.       In our Permanency Review Order of
    December 13, 2012, we found that “[t]he parents still must
    come to a greater understanding and appreciation relative to the
    burn injuries and fractures that [M.J.T.] suffered, including the
    cause(s) of such injuries.”       (Permanency Review Order,
    12/13/12, ¶3(b)(ii)). We also found that each child was doing
    well in the [M.] foster home and that Mr. & Mrs. M[.] were a
    permanent adoptive resource if reunification did not occur.
    (Permanency Review Order, 12/13/12, ¶23(b)). Finally, we
    found that the parents had made “slow progress relative to the
    FICS Reunification Services.”      (Permanency Review Order,
    12/13/12, ¶23(i)).
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    Reunification services were initiated through Family
    Intervention Crisis Services (hereinafter “FICS”) on July 26,
    2012 and remained open until June 10, 2013. (RR 10, 60, 128,
    275 & 283). During the course of time, visits were increased,
    but always remained fully supervised.         FICS also offered
    separate counseling sessions and parenting education sessions
    once per week with both parents. (RR 10, 61 & 134). The
    counseling and parenting sessions were later combined in
    February of 2013.       (Id.).  In addition, FICS facilitated the
    Women Aware Program for the mother, the Men Helping Men
    Program for the father, with the goal of assisting the parents in
    their relationship with one another. (RR 56 & 135).
    In addition to the services provided by FICS, the family
    was afforded numerous other services to assist them in reaching
    the goal of reunification. (RR 10-11, 55 & 70). For example, the
    parents attended the Family Resource Center Parenting Program
    in September 2012, and were scheduled to continue until
    November 15, 2012. (RR 10-11). However, both parents were
    discharged from the program due to the distraction caused by
    [Father] openly flirting with other women in the group (RR 70).
    Further, both parents were engaged with the Parents as
    Teachers Program (RR 55), and both children receive Early
    Intervention Services (RR 51 & 217). Shelley McCune of FICS
    noted that there were some positive attributes for the parents,
    for example, they were cooperative, kept a clean and orderly
    house, possessed a strong desire to have their children return
    home, and developed a good relationship with the resource
    parents. (RR 13-15).
    Ms. McCune, however, also noted several deficiencies that
    the parents shared, including a lack of understanding of the
    injuries that their daughter had suffered which resulted in her
    placement. (RR 17). A particular concern was the fact that
    neither parent recognized the child’s obvious body bruising; did
    not realize that she had suffered several broken bones, and had
    no knowledge nor any explanation as to how those injuries
    occurred. (RR 17). The parents’ lack of knowledge and their
    failure to offer a viable explanation as to what occurred to their
    daughter has been, and continues to be, a very serious concern
    to this court because of the difficulty this creates in ensuring that
    the children are safe in the care, custody and control of their
    parents. (RR 17).
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    Ms. McCune further noted that the parents were very
    dependent on the children’s paternal grandparents for basic
    support. For example, the grandparents provided child care,
    transportation, financial assistance and general assistance in
    every day matters that the parents could not understand or
    handle on their own. (RR 19-20). Although we recognize that a
    positive support system is important in any family situation, of
    particular concern to this court is that the serious and significant
    injuries suffered by the daughter occurred while she was solely
    in the care, custody and control of the paternal grandfather (RR
    19-20).
    During the supervised visits observed by FICS, there were
    several ongoing safety concerns. (RR 72, 76-78 & 81). Ms.
    McCune testified during one occasion, C.E.T. was playing with an
    open pair of adult scissors and the parents needed prompting to
    remove them from his possession. (RR 78). There was another
    occasion when the parents had a space heater on the floor of
    their residence that became hot enough to burn on contact with
    the skin. (RR 78). The children would walk over toward the
    heater, which needed to be addressed several times with the
    parents. (Id.). Ms. McCune expressed concern with the parents’
    inability to recognize situations that could jeopardize the safety
    of their children. (Id.).
    Another area of concern noted at the initial Adjudicatory
    hearing was the parents’ inability to recognize appropriate
    developmental stages for their children. For example, the father
    would refer to the daughter as walking when she was actually
    crawling; they both claimed that the daughter was crawling and
    pulling herself up at the age 4 months; etc. Due to these
    concerns, BCCYF requested that both parents undergo
    psychological evaluations to assess their intellectual functioning
    and parenting skills. (RR 8, 20-21).
    A 9th Month Interim Review Hearing was held March 5,
    2013. In our March 12, 2013 Permanency Review Order, we
    stated the following: “FICS has a concern in that despite the
    investment of services and the passage of time, the visits remain
    fully supervised as the parents are not always fully attentive to
    the children which raises safety concerns” and “the parents
    cannot consistently ensure that the children are safe in their
    care. FICS also expressed a concern with the father being
    disrespectful toward the mother, and that he has been verbally
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    abusive in the past as well, which negatively affects the mother’s
    self-esteem.”     (Permanency      Review      Order,     3/12/13,
    ¶¶3(a)(ii)and3(b)(ii).
    In our March 12, 2013 Permanency Review Order, we also
    indicated that before the children could be reunified with their
    parents, that “[t]he court needs to be satisfied that they are
    capable of being fully attentive to the needs of their children and
    that they can consistently provide a safe and secure
    environment.” (Permanency Review Order, 3/12/13, ¶7).
    The psychological evaluations of the parents occurred on
    January 30 and February 12, 2013, by Marilyn Morford, Ph.D.
    (RR 98). Dr. Morford is a licensed psychologist with a specialty
    in child psychology. The purpose of her evaluation was to
    determine the parents’ intellectual, personal, and emotional
    functioning, as well as their parenting ability and the relationship
    between the children and parents.          (RR 99; Psychological
    Evaluations, p. 1). Dr. Morford’s Psychological Evaluations were
    admitted as Petitioners’ Exhibits 1 & 2 at the March 13, 2013
    hearing and are incorporated herein.
    Dr. Morford testified that both parents have some
    limitations with intellectual functioning (RR 101; M.T.
    Psychological Report, p. 6; C.T. Psychological Report, p. 5).
    After conducting an assessment of [Mother’s] verbal
    comprehension, she was considered to have an approximate
    developmental age of an average 14 year old, while [Father’s]
    verbal comprehension placed him approximately at the
    developmental age of a 9 year old. (RR 103; Id.). Dr. Morford
    explained that at these developmental ages, the parents would
    have limitations with their abstract reasoning and planning.
    Such would also significantly affect their functioning in relation to
    their parenting ability. (RR 103-104). Further, the parents were
    observed to have difficulty with adaptive skills and daily
    functions. (RR 126).
    Dr. Morford also expressed concern with the mother’s lack
    of understanding of developmental milestones relative to the
    children. (RR 107). As to the father, Dr. Morford noted that he
    had a tendency to deny basic flaws and that he had issues with
    maturity, such as impulse control. (RR 109). Dr. Morford
    explained that the father’s level of intellectual maturity may be
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    affecting his ability to focus on monitoring the children and
    responding to them at an appropriate level. Consequently,
    [Father’s] intellectual immaturity was found to be one of the
    primary factors that affected his ability to properly parent the
    children. (RR 109-110).
    At the 9th Month Interim hearing, Dr. Morford continued to
    question whether the parents could remedy the circumstances
    related to the safety issues that necessitated the children’s
    placement in a reasonable amount of time due to their limited
    intellectual abilities and emotional needs. (RR 114 & 125).
    Further, Dr. Morford found it significant that the service
    providers who had been in the home the prior six (6) months
    offering reunification services determined that they could not
    scale back from a full level of supervision. (RR 115). Therefore,
    Dr. Morford did not foresee a time in the near future when daily
    checks and supervision would not be important to monitor the
    safety of the children in their parents’ home. (RR 115).
    At the time of the 9th Month Interim hearing in March
    2013, Ms. McCune confirmed that with the lack of progress being
    made relative to the visits and counseling, she concurred with
    Dr. Morford in her belief that she did not foresee any time in the
    near future that visitation could be scaled back from full-time
    supervision. (RR 147). Even though the parents were generally
    cooperative with the services, there remained a lack of
    consistency, the parents were easily distracted, they were not
    consistently implementing what they had been taught; and
    safety issues continued to persist. (RR 148-149). Ms. McCune
    stated that the parents also continued to have unrealistic
    developmental expectations for their children. (RR 152). Ms.
    McCune also noted that the parents provided inconsistent
    statements as to how the injuries to their daughter occurred.
    (RR 157-158).
    At the 9th Month Review hearing, it was expressed to the
    parents by this court and BCCYF that they needed to show
    significant improvement and consistency before reunification
    with the children would occur. (RR 184-185). Unfortunately,
    over the next three (3) month period, FICS felt the need to
    continue to provide fully supervised visits as they still had
    significant concerns concerning the parents not consistently
    implementing safety suggestions and being able to supervise
    their children on their own. Furthermore, if the grandparents
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    were present, the parents would tend to step back and rely upon
    the help of the grandparents. (RR 206-207). FICS still noted
    continued safety concerns concerning the children, and the need
    to intervene to avoid potential safety hazards. (RR 208-210 &
    215).
    Despite the numerous services provided to the parents, as
    of June 2013, Ms. McCune still could not recommend that the
    children be returned to the parents’ care. In fact, she was not
    able to provide a time frame for the parents to achieve a level of
    unsupervised visits due to their lack of progress to date. (RR
    217-218, 220). Ms. McCune also pointed out that there were
    more concerns in the most recent two (2) months than there
    had been in the prior months. (RR 231-238). Ms. McCune
    testified that the parents actually regressed in the area of
    consistently recognizing and addressing safety concerns. (RR
    218, 220).
    After the 12th Month Review Hearing held June 7, 2013,
    we entered an Order on June 10, 2013, wherein we made the
    following findings as to both parents:
    “[T]he mother and father have attended nearly all
    meetings and visits with FICS Reunification Services, but
    they have failed to recognize and appropriately address
    the safety concerns for the children on a consistent basis.
    The parents continue to work with Parents as Teachers in
    their home weekly. The child, [C.E.T., IV], continues to
    receive therapy for his developmental delays through both
    Denise Adams and the FICS Parent Educator, and the
    mother will utilize at times the tools and techniques that
    she has been taught, but not on a consistent basis. The
    visits that occur remain fully supervised due to safety
    concerns.     [The parents] have not demonstrated any
    ability to protect their children on a consistent basis, and
    often have immature responses to FICS’ staff when safety
    concerns are expressed. Despite the efforts and time
    investment by the service providers, there does not appear
    to be any hope of significant improvement. As a result, we
    cannot find that the children would be protected and safe
    in their parents’ care.”
    (Permanency Review Order 6/10/13, ¶3(a)(ii) and ¶3(b)(ii))
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    We also made the following specific factual findings:
    ***
    (c)  The foster parents are an adoptive resource, and
    both BCCYF and FICS support Mr. and Mrs. M[.] in their desire to
    adopt the children.
    (d) Despite the number of services that have been in
    place for the past one (1) year, the parents have not made
    significant progress and have not shown any insight or
    demonstrated any consistency that they can safely protect their
    children if they were in their custody.       This is especially
    concerning considering the children are only two (2) and one (1)
    year of age.
    (e) There has never been any plausible explanation or
    further information provided as to [M.J.T.]’s 2nd degree burn
    injuries to her feet/ankles, thigh and buttocks (CL No. 07-11165)
    nor her fractures and bruising (CL No. 07-11166) which occurred
    during times when only the parents and paternal grandparents
    were the caregivers.       As a result, the parents have not
    demonstrated any ability to remedy the circumstances that
    originally led to placement.
    (f)   There exists a parent-child relationship between the
    children and their biological parents, but the children have also
    developed a parent-child relationship with Mr. and Mrs. M[.],
    where they have been placed since 6/22/12. The children look
    to the M[.]s to meet their needs, and are provided safety,
    structure and appropriate care within their home.
    As a result, under the Order section, we changed the goal
    to adoption and directed that reasonable efforts were no longer
    required for either parent, and that compelling reasons no longer
    existed not to pursue TPR. (Permanency Review Order, 6/10/13,
    ¶23(b) – (c)).
    At the November 21, 2013 combined 18th Month
    Permanency Review and TPR proceeding (filed to Blair County
    No. 2013 AD 39 & 39A), the BCCYF caseworker Nicole Heidler
    testified.   Ms. Heidler confirmed that the children were
    comfortable in the M[.] foster home and that both children refer
    to the M[.]s as “mom” and “dad” and that they sought the M[.]s
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    out to meet their needs. (RR 242-243, 291-292). Ms. Heidler
    also testified that the children were not only bonded to their
    foster parents, but also to each other. (RR 292-293). In the
    M[.]’s care, C.E.T., IV was making progress with his speech
    development through Headstart, and M.J.T. was also progressing
    and had no developmental issues since her placement. (RR
    293).
    Even though the supervised visits at the BCCYF office with
    the parents generally went well, Ms. Heidler testified that the
    foster parents appeared to be more of the parental figures to
    these children based upon her own observations of their
    interactions together. (RR 307). There are no separation issues
    noted for the children at the end of visits with their parents. (RR
    299-300). [The pre-adoptive foster parents] also expressed a
    willingness to discuss [Parents’ continued contact with Children]
    if a TPR Petition was granted. (RR 300).
    Ms. Heidler testified that BCCYF believed it would be in the
    children’s best interests to terminate the parental rights of
    [Parents], as the children had been with their adoptive resource
    for nearly 1½ years, more than half of their respective young
    lives. (RR 302-303). The children’s needs have been met by
    Mr. & Mrs. M[.], and the children have grown and thrived within
    their home.      Therefore, BCCYF desired the termination of
    parental rights so that the children could achieve permanency.
    (Id.).
    Therefore, in our Permanency Review Order of November
    27, 2013, the goal remained adoption, reasonable efforts
    continued not to be required for either parent and compelling
    reasons did not exist. (Permanency Review Order 11/27/13,
    ¶23/Order). We also entered under separate cover an Order
    deferring any decision relative to the TPR Petition until the
    Pennsylvania Superior Court entered its decision relative to the
    parents’ appeal of our Permanency Review Order of June 10,
    2013, wherein we changed the goal to adoption.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/14, at 2–8 (bolded dates in original).
    On appeal, Mother and Father collectively raise three issues pertaining
    to the Children’s goal change:
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    I.     Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
    determining the best interests of the child would be served
    by changing the Placement Goal to Adoption where: there
    is insufficient evidence that such a Goal Change would be
    in the best interest of the child; there is insufficient
    evidence of conduct by the parents that places the health,
    safety or welfare of the child at risk; and the trial court
    fails to account for the parent-child relationship shared
    between the parents and their biological children.
    II.    Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
    changing the goal for the child from reunification to
    adoption when the parents had exhibited compliance with
    the permanency plan having attended nearly all visits and
    participated in or completed nearly all recommended
    services and the trial court failed to fully consider the bond
    between the parents and child.
    III.   Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion
    where an improper amount of weight was applied to the
    parents’ inability to explain the origin of injuries suffered
    by M.T., although the parents agree that some injury did
    occur without their knowledge.
    Parents’ Brief at 5.
    We address Parents’ issues together because they are interrelated,
    and implicate the sufficiency and weight of the evidence assessed by the
    trial court to the testimony at the twelve-month permanency review hearing.
    Our Supreme Court set forth our standard of review for dependency
    cases as follows:
    [T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
    appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
    determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
    record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the
    lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
    review for an abuse of discretion.
    In re R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010).
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    In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not
    the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the parent’s rights
    are secondary. In re A.K., 
    936 A.2d 528
    , 532-533 (Pa. Super. 2007). The
    burden is on the Agency to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s
    best interests.     In the Interest of M.B., 
    674 A.2d 702
    , 704 (Pa. Super.
    1996).       In contrast, in a termination of parental rights proceedings, the
    focus is on the conduct of the parents under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.            In re
    
    M.B., 674 A.2d at 705
    .
    Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as a child
    who:
    (1)     is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
    education as required by law, or other care or control
    necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
    morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper
    parental care or control may be based upon evidence
    of conduct by the parent, guardian or other
    custodian that places the health, safety or welfare of
    the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s,
    guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a
    controlled substance that places the health, safety or
    welfare of the child at risk[.]
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1) (emphasis added).
    In In re G., T., 
    845 A.2d 870
    (Pa. Super. 2004), this Court clarified
    the definition of “dependent child” further.
    The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care or
    control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete
    questions:    whether the child presently is without proper
    parental care and control, and if so, whether such care and
    control are immediately available.
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    Id. at 872
    (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also In re J.C.,
    
    5 A.3d 284
    , 289 (Pa. Super. 2010). Additionally, we note that “[t]he burden
    of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the petitioner to demonstrate by
    clear and convincing evidence that a child meets that statutory definition of
    dependency.” 
    G.,T., 845 A.2d at 872
    .
    With regard to a dependent child, in In re D.A., 
    801 A.2d 614
    (Pa.
    Super. 2002) (en banc), this Court explained:
    [A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to
    make a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the
    statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the
    court finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make
    an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s
    physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child
    to remain with the parents subject to supervision, transferring
    temporary legal custody to a relative or public agency, or
    transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42
    Pa.C.S. § 6351 (a).
    
    Id. at 617.
    Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, section 6351(e), (f),
    (f.1), and (g) of the Juvenile Act provides the trial court with the criteria for
    its permanency plan for the subject child. Pursuant to those subsections of
    the Juvenile Act, the trial court is to determine the disposition that is best
    suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of
    the child.
    Section 6351(e) of the Juvenile Act provides in pertinent part:
    (e) Permanency hearings.-
    15
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    (1) [t]he court shall conduct a permanency hearing for the
    purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency plan
    of the child, the date by which the goal of permanency for
    the child might be achieved and whether placement
    continues to be best suited to the safety, protection and
    physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. …
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(e).
    Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act prescribes the pertinent inquiry for
    the reviewing court:
    (f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.-
    At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of
    the following:
    (1)   The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
    placement.
    (2)   The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance
    with the permanency plan developed for the child.
    (3)   The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
    circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
    (4)   The appropriateness and feasibility       of   the   current
    placement goal for the child.
    (5)   The likely date by which the placement goal for the child
    might be achieved.
    (5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
    permanency plan in effect.
    (6)   Whether the child is safe.
    ***
    16
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    (9)   If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the
    last 22 months or the court has determined that
    aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts
    to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from
    the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve
    and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be
    made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to
    join an petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,
    recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the
    child unless:
    (i) the child is being cared for by a relative best
    suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare
    of the child;
    (ii) the county agency has documented a
    compelling reason for determining that filing a
    petition to terminate parental rights would not
    serve the needs and welfare of the child; or
    (iii) the child’s family has not been provided with
    necessary services to achieve the safe return to
    the child’s parent, guardian or custodian within
    the time frames set forth in the permanency plan.
    (f.1)   Additional determination. – Based upon the
    determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
    evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
    determine one of the following:
    (1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s
    parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return of
    the child is best suited to the safety, protection and
    physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
    (2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and
    the county agency will file for termination of parental
    rights in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian
    or custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and
    physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
    (3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal
    custodian in cases where return to the child’s parent,
    guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not
    17
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    best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
    and moral welfare of the child.
    (4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and wiling
    relative in cases where return to the child’s parent,
    guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption or being
    placed with a legal custodian is not best suited to the
    safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare
    of the child.
    (5) If and when the child will be placed in another living
    arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is
    approved by the court in cases where the county agency
    has documented a compelling reason that it would not be
    best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
    and moral welfare of the child to be returned to the child’s
    parent, guardian or custodian, to be placed for adoption, to
    be placed with a legal custodian or to be placed with a fit
    and willing relative.
    (f.2) Evidence. – Evidence of conduct by the parent that places
    the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including
    evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that
    places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be
    presented to the court by the county agency or any other party
    at any disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the
    conduct was the basis for the determination of dependency.
    (g) Court order.- On the basis of the determination made
    under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation,
    modification or termination of placement or other disposition
    which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical,
    mental and moral welfare of the child.
    ***
    42 Pa.C.S.A. §6351.
    Finally, the court should consider the bond between the child and his
    parents, foster parents, and siblings. In re H.V., 
    37 A.3d 588
    , 594-595 (Pa.
    Super. 2012).
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    This Court has stated:
    [T]he focus of all dependency proceedings, including
    change of goal proceedings, must be on the safety, permanency,
    and well-being of the child. The best interests of the child take
    precedence over all other considerations, including the conduct
    and the rights of the parent. . . . [W]hile parental progress
    toward completion of a permanency plan is an important factor,
    it is not to be elevated to determinative status, to the exclusion
    of all other factors.
    In re A.K., 
    936 A.2d 528
    , 534 (Pa. Super. 2007). In In re N.C., 
    909 A.2d 818
    , 823 (Pa. Super. 2006), another goal change case, the trial court
    granted a goal change to adoption despite the fact that the mother had
    made substantial progress toward completing her permanency plan.          This
    Court held that the mother’s parenting skills and judgment regarding her
    children’s emotional well-being remained problematic.
    Here, CYF presented ample testimony from which the trial court could
    properly change the Children’s goal from return to parents with a concurrent
    goal of adoption to a sole goal of adoption. Ms. Shelley McCune, a counselor
    with Family Intervention Crisis Services who worked with Parents, could not
    recommend that Children could be safely returned home to Parents, and she
    could not provide a time-frame for reunification.   N.T., 6/7/13, at 27-28.
    She testified that Paternal Grandparents are not a good option for placement
    because of M.J.T.’s burns, and she was also concerned that Paternal
    Grandparents would allow Parents to be with the Children unsupervised, and
    there was too great a risk to the Children’s safety. 
    Id. at 3,
    17, 30-31. Ms.
    McCune acknowledged that Children have a relationship with Parents, but
    view them as “fun mom and dad” because there is continuous entertainment
    19
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    during the visits.   
    Id. at 28,
    34.   Ms. McCune also observed that Children
    have a parent/child relationship with their foster parents, and noted that the
    foster parents are more structured, and allow Children to play on their own
    and be creative.     
    Id. at 29.
      Ms. McCune averred that stability was in the
    best interests of the Children. 
    Id. at 29-30,
    45. She testified that Parents
    were not demonstrating any insight into how to safely parent; Ms. McCune
    explained:
    It’s not just one situation. It’s the overall picture. It’s the
    continued things that we’re seeing and the continuing having to
    redirect and prompt and review. Some of the things that we see
    were things that were addressed last summer. We need to see
    at this point that [Parents] are able to transition these things
    over without somebody constantly saying, hey, that’s a risk to
    these children, that’s a danger, that’s a safety issue.
    
    Id. at 26.
    Ms. McCune stated that she felt “like we’ve gone backwards as
    opposed to going forward.”        
    Id. at 30.
      She averred that the longer the
    current situation continued, the more difficult it would be on the Children to
    change the goal to adoption at a later point in time. 
    Id. at 45.
    CYF Caseworker Nikki Heidler testified that Children had been placed
    with their foster parents since their removal from Parents’ care on June 22,
    2012, and that the foster parents were an adoptive resource. 
    Id. at 52.
    Ms.
    Heidler stated that Children are well-adjusted in the foster home, that they
    play with their own toys and occupy themselves for an age-appropriate
    amount of time, and that they are very focused. 
    Id. Ms. Heidler
    noticed an
    improvement in both of the Children’s speech.        
    Id. She recommended
    a
    change of goal to adoption, with Children remaining dependent and in CYF’s
    legal and physical custody until adoption.      
    Id. at 60.
      Ms. Heidler averred
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    that there would be a major risk to Children’s safety if Parents were caring
    for them with the assistance of Paternal Grandparents, as the four had been
    the caregivers for Children, and were unaware of M.T.’s burns, fractures and
    injuries prior to a physician diagnosing them.    
    Id. at 67-68.
       Ms. Heidler
    testified that Children were attached to their foster parents, and doing well
    in their home. 
    Id. at 59.
    Ms. Heidler testified that the foster parents would
    be willing and able to provide an ongoing relationship between Children and
    Parents. 
    Id. At the
    close of testimony, the trial court commented:
    What I gather from Miss McCune’s testimony and the position of
    the Agency is [--] I’m more concerned with a pattern being
    established here. For example, that particular bath toy might
    not have parts that can come apart or cause any kind of choking
    hazard, but what about other toys that do? As I understood Miss
    McCune’s testimony, the concern is having the [C]hildren do
    these things, engage in these habits and this routine that maybe
    present [sic] in this particular instance is not dangerous, does
    not present a hazard[,] but maybe down the road it would
    depending on a particular toy, depending on playing with a lawn
    mower that does have a blade, does have gas and so forth.
    N.T., 6/7/13, at 72-73. Finding that the CYF witnesses were credible in their
    testimony that Parents are not capable of safely parenting Children, even
    with the assistance of Paternal Grandparents, the trial court determined that
    the Children could not be safely returned to Parents, and that their best
    interests required a change in the placement goal to adoption.
    Father and Mother essentially seek for this Court to re-weigh the
    evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial court in order to find
    that the trial court committed an abuse of its discretion. Our Supreme Court
    21
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    has explicitly directed that we may not do so. In In re R.J.T., the Supreme
    Court persuasively stated:
    [W]e are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact-
    specific determinations. Not only are our trial judges observing
    the parties during the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they
    have presided over several other hearings with the same parties
    and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best
    interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must defer to
    the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine
    the credibility to be placed on each witness and, premised
    thereon, gauge the likelihood of success of the current
    permanency plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a
    different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a
    position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility
    determinations of the trial court.
    In re 
    R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190
    .      The Supreme Court noted that, as in the
    instant case, the trial court had not itemized its findings with the provisions
    of section 6351(f), but had considered those factors.       
    Id. The Supreme
    Court found the trial court’s reasons for its conclusion regarding the goal for
    the child in that matter to be supported by the record.
    Thus, in In re R.J.T., our Supreme Court has instructed that we
    cannot find an abuse of the trial court’s discretion where the record supports
    the trial court’s decision that a goal change to adoption is “best suited to the
    safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.” 
    Id. at 1190
    (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g)).       Here, the record supports the
    change of goal to adoption. We will not disturb the trial court’s credibility
    determinations and weighing of the evidence.
    With regard to the termination of parental rights, Mother and Father
    collectively raise four issues:
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    I.     Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
    determining that the best interests of the child would be
    served by terminating parental rights where: there is
    insufficient evidence that termination would be in the best
    interest of the child and there is insufficient evidence of
    conduct by the parents that places the health, safety or
    welfare of the child at risk.
    II.    Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
    terminating parental rights where there is not clear and
    convincing evidence to indicate that: any repeated and
    continued incapacity, abuse, neglect and/or refusal of the
    parents has caused the child to be without essential
    parental care, control or subsistence necessary for the
    child’s physical and mental well-being; those alleged
    conditions cannot or will not be remedied by the parents;
    and that the alleged conditions continue to persist.
    III.   Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
    terminating parental rights of the above-named minor
    child, C.T., where no abuse or neglect was clearly alleged
    relative to the child.
    IV.    Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
    terminating parental rights of the above-named minor
    child, M.T., where parents could not identify injuries that
    may have occurred while the child was not under their
    care.
    Parents’ Brief at 6-7.
    As with their goal change issues, Parents’ termination issues are
    interrelated and implicate the trial court’s assessment of the sufficiency and
    weight of the evidence. We therefore address the issues together.
    We review appeals from the involuntary termination of parental rights
    according to the following standard:
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    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
    when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
    termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
    standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
    they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 
    608 Pa. 9
    , 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010).           If the factual findings are
    supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
    made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; [In re]
    R.I.S., [___ Pa. ___, ___, 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572 (2011) (plurality
    opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does
    not result merely because the reviewing court might have
    reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett
    v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [___ Pa. ___], 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa.
    2011); Christianson v. Ely, [
    575 Pa. 647
    , 654-655], 
    838 A.2d 630
    , 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
    abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 
    Id. As we
    discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
    applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
    cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
    not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
    record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
    the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
    hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 
    608 Pa. 9
    , 9
    A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
    opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
    termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
    second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
    determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
    judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
    record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
    error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
    Atencio, 
    539 Pa. 161
    , 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
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    Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
    must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
    parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
    parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
    statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
    Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
    termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
    the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
    determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
    standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
    needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
    emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
    paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
    bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
    parental rights are valid.    In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276 (Pa. Super.
    2009). Here, the trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (8), and (b). Decrees, 3/5/14.
    With regard to section (a):
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
    may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    ***
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
    for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
    25
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    and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
    cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
    ***
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
    an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date
    of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
    removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
    and welfare of the child.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (8).
    This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
    termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
    2511(a).     See In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
    banc).
    Here, the Children were removed from Mother and Father’s care on
    June 22, 2012, when Mother and Father signed a Voluntary Placement
    Agreement.      The Children have remained in their foster/pre-adoptive
    placement.    Although the trial court did not enter the termination decrees
    until March 5, 2014, after this Court filed its March 4, 2014 memorandum
    affirming the goal change to adoption, the trial court based termination on
    the evidence presented at the November 21, 2013 hearing. At the time of
    the November 21, 2013 hearing, the Children had been removed from the
    care of the parents, approximately 17 months had elapsed from the date of
    the Children’s removal, and the conditions which led to the removal of the
    26
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    Children continued to exist, such that termination of parental rights best
    served the needs and welfare of the Children.         See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2511(a)(2) and (8).
    The trial court explained:
    We found that [the Agency] met its burden of providing
    clear and convincing evidence that grounds for terminating the
    parental rights of [Mother and Father] existed under both 23 Pa.
    C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (8). …
    This case originated because of two (2) separate findings
    of abuse relative to [M.J.T.] that occurred when she was in the
    exclusive care of the paternal grandparents and/or her parents.
    Neither the parents nor the paternal grandparents ever offered
    any plausible explanation as to the serious injuries, nor did they
    ever seem to appreciate the severe nature of such injuries. The
    child abuse investigation concluded with a finding that abuse
    occurred relative to the bruising and broken bones by clear and
    convincing evidence as a result of a serious injury, as well as a
    finding of prima facie evidence that the parents and paternal
    grandparents were perpetrators of that abuse due to the fact
    that they were the only individuals responsible for the welfare of
    the child during the time of the injuries. (RR 4-5; 9/17/12, M.T.
    Order of Adjudication, p. 4). This finding was never contested
    nor appealed by the parents or paternal grandparents.
    [The Agency] provided numerous services to the parents,
    including parent counseling and parent education through FICS;
    the Family Resource Center Parenting Program, the Parents as
    Teachers Program, and Early Intervention. In addition, [F]ather
    completed the Men Helping Men Program and [M]other
    completed the Women Aware Program and participated in
    counseling services with two different counselors. Despite all
    such effort by the various service providers, there remained a
    consistent and serious concern among those same service
    providers relative to the parents’ ability to both identify and
    adequately address safety issues. The concern over the parents’
    inability to recognize and appreciate safety issues resulted in
    FICS providing fully supervised visits, never being able to
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    transition to even a level of being “loosely supervised”, much
    less unsupervised visits.
    We are fully satisfied that [the Agency] provided a
    reasonable and good faith effort to reunify these children with
    their parents. As determined by Dr. Morford, these parents have
    an approximate intellectual capacity of a 9 year old ([Father])
    and a 14 year old ([Mother]) respectively. This borderline
    mental capacity prevents them from making progress toward
    providing a safe environment for their children. This court
    believes it to be appropriate to place the children’s needs for
    safety and permanency ahead of a parent’s fundamental right to
    parent a child if they lack the capacity to do so in a safe,
    effective and consistent manner.
    … These children have been removed from the care of their
    parents, initially by a voluntary agreement with the Agency.
    Well more than twelve (12) months or more has elapsed from
    the date of such removal and placement and the conditions
    which led to the removal or placement of the children continue
    to exist. In fact, at the time of the TPR proceeding, the children
    had been in placement for seventeen (17) months. As stated
    above, we are fully satisfied that a termination of parental rights
    is in the best interest of each child.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/14, at 12-13.
    The record supports the trial court’s reasoning. CYF Caseworker Nikki
    Heidler testified to being the Parents’ caseworker since July of 2012. N.T.,
    11/21/13, at 3. She confirmed that the Children had been in placement for
    seventeen (17) months, and had been in the same foster/pre-adoptive
    placement since June of 2012. 
    Id. Ms. Heidler
    testified that Parents visited
    the Children “one time a month” for “an hour and a half fully supervised at
    Children and Youth.” 
    Id. at 11.
    She explained, “In addition to receiving the
    FICS services, [Parents] were receiving Parents as Teachers which they had
    sought out on their own when the children came into placement. They were
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    also receiving Early Intervention for [Father] that was helping with parenting
    skills and helping them to help him develop.” 
    Id. at 22.
    Nonetheless, Ms.
    Heidler advocated for termination, and explained in detail and unequivocally:
    The children have been in placement for over twelve
    months. They have actually been in the same foster home for
    seventeen months now. … There still remain unremedied issues
    of incapacity, abuse, neglect by the parents. The injuries that
    [M.J.T.] suffered were found to be abuse by prima facie
    evidence. Those are still unexplained. However, the parents
    have consistently reported to the Agency and to service
    providers that they or the grandparents were the only people
    that could have been caregivers for the children at that time.
    The parents have not provided any information or documentation
    that they have been addressing their intellectual or functioning
    limitations.   Those were observed and testified to by [Ms.
    McCune from Family Intervention Crisis Services]. They were
    also reported by [Dr.] Marilyn Morford. [Dr.] Morford also noted
    that in her report that Mom is functioning at the level of a
    fourteen year old and Dad is functioning at the level of a nine
    year old. Both parents have difficulty understanding the safety
    and developmental needs of the children. They have never
    alleviated the safety concerns in the past or to proceed
    past supervised visitation. When they were visiting with
    FICS, they have never made the step to the point where
    they could be unsupervised because of safety concerns in
    those visits. In fact, in the last month that FICS was
    providing services, [Parents] had regressed and there
    were numerous issues that had to be addressed by FICS
    during the visitations.
    ***
    There has been no remedy to the circumstances that led to
    the placement regarding the injuries to [M.J.T.] or to the lack of
    supervision of the children.
    N.T., 11/21/13, at 13-14 (emphasis supplied).
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    Given the foregoing, we find the statutory grounds for termination
    under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (8) are supported by clear and
    convincing evidence of record. In re 
    R.N.J., supra
    .
    With regard to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), the statute provides:
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating
    the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
    the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
    welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
    terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
    such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing
    and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
    parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
    subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
    any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
    described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
    the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (b).
    The focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on
    the parent, but the focus turns to the children under section 2511(b). In re
    Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).
    Under section 2511(b), we examine whether termination of parental rights
    would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
    welfare of the child. In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    , 1286-1287 (Pa. Super.
    2005).    “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
    involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 
    Id. at 1287
    (citation omitted).
    30
    J-E02009-14
    J-E02012-14
    With regard to the needs and welfare analysis, the trial court in this
    case observed:
    It is also our belief that the record established by clear and
    convincing evidence, after taking into consideration the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
    subject children, that the termination of the parental rights of
    [Mother] and [Father] would best serve the needs and welfare of
    the children. It is interesting to note that the parents continue
    to argue that they need more time and additional services to
    effectuate reunification with their children. Despite the various
    services put into effect, the parents have demonstrated an
    inability to consistently provide a safe and secure environment
    for their children. The children are thriving in their foster home
    setting; they refer to their foster parents as “mom” and “dad”;
    the foster parents have met all of their needs; and these
    children, especially considering their young age, are entitled to
    permanency and a safe and stable living environment. The
    record also supports that the children have formed a loving and
    secure bond with their [foster parents, who are also] their
    adoptive resource.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/14, at 13.
    Again, the record supports the determination of the trial court.        For
    example, the CYF caseworker, Ms. Heidler, testified that the Children are
    “developing very well” and are “very bonded” with their pre-adoptive foster
    parents, as well as one another. N.T., 11/21/13, at 4. She explained that
    the pre-adoptive foster parents have been meeting the children’s needs and
    the children “are thriving and growing and developing in the adoptive
    home.”    
    Id. at 14-15.
        With regard to the parental bond, Ms. Heidler
    expressed:
    The relationship between the parents, with the children, …
    During those visits it appears to be more of a play date. They do
    seek out the parents … to meet their needs during that visitation
    when they need to go to the bathroom or if they need more food
    31
    J-E02009-14
    J-E02012-14
    or something. However, those visits are frequently a lot of play
    time, which it’s a play room.       They’re little children.   It’s
    understandable for the circumstances.           Whereas, in my
    observations with [the pre-adoptive foster parents], are that
    they’re more of a parental figure to the children than the parents
    are.
    
    Id. at 18-19.
    The above evidence supports the trial court’s consideration of the
    developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children in
    determining that the Parents’ rights should be terminated pursuant to
    section 2511(b). In re 
    C.M.S. supra
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court with respect to
    both the dependent Children’s permanency placement goal change to
    adoption, and the termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights.
    Orders affirmed. Decrees affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/8/2014
    32