Strausser, T. v. Strausser, K. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S73013-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    TERRY STRAUSSER                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    KRISTEN STRAUSSER                        :
    :
    Appellant            :   No. 1180 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 28, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Civil Division at
    No(s): 2011-CV-1385-DV
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                             FILED APRIL 07, 2020
    Kristen Strausser (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the May 28, 2019 order
    of the Columbia County Court of Common Pleas in this protracted divorce
    matter initiated by Terry Strausser (“Husband”), effecting the equitable
    distribution of the parties’ marital estate. We affirm.
    Preliminarily, we note that we previously addressed the facial untimely
    filing of the notice of appeal and concluded that the notice of appeal, filed by
    Wife on July 17, 2019, within thirty days of July 2, 2019, was timely. See
    Strausser v. Strausser, 
    2020 WL 406850
    , 1180 MDA 2019 (Pa. Super. filed
    January 24, 2020).
    The factual and procedural history of this case reveals that Husband filed
    a complaint in divorce in 2011 and an amended complaint in 2014. Master’s
    Report, 2/6/19, at 1. Wife had been incarcerated at SCI Cambridge Springs
    J-S73013-19
    in Crawford County, Pennsylvania, beginning in January of 2011, upon an
    aggregated seventeen-to-thirty-four-year sentence for arson and attempted
    murder.     N.T., 12/4/18, at 7.1        At that time, two daughters born of the
    marriage, in 2002 and 2003, resided with Husband, as did Wife’s daughter
    from a prior relationship. Id. at 10; K.L.S. v. T.L.S.,2 
    121 A.3d 1133
    , 1651
    MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed April 15, 2015) (unpublished memorandum at 1)
    (addressing custody). The parties and maternal grandparents also litigated
    custody issues beginning in 2011.              K.L.S., 1651 MDA 2013 (unpublished
    memorandum at 1–3). The custody court, also the trial court herein, granted
    Father legal and primary physical custody and the maternal grandparents
    partial physical custody.       Id. at 3.      This Court ultimately reversed Judge
    James’s sua sponte denial of visitation to Wife. Id. at 16.
    Instantly, on April 17, 2015, the trial court herein entered an order
    authorizing bifurcation of the divorce from economic issues and directing
    Husband to schedule all unresolved equitable distribution issues before a
    Master by June 1, 2015. Order, 4/17/15. The trial court granted a bifurcated
    decree in divorce on May 8, 2015.
    ____________________________________________
    1   Commonwealth v. Strausser, 
    64 A.3d 269
    , 709 MDA 2011 (Pa. Super.
    filed January 3, 2013) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v.
    Strausser, 
    153 A.3d 1116
    , 1840 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. filed June 22, 2016)
    (unpublished memorandum). The Honorable Thomas A. James, Jr., the trial
    court herein, also presided over Wife’s criminal trial.
    2   Columbia County Court of Common Pleas Docket Number 934 of 2011.
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    Nothing further occurred in the case until Wife filed a petition on May 23,
    2018, relating to Husband’s failure to schedule a Master’s Hearing by June 1,
    2015, as had been ordered by the court in April of 2015. On June 5, 2018,
    the trial court, inter alia, referred the case to a Master, directing that the
    “matter should move along expeditiously in light of the delay.” Order, 6/5/18.
    A hearing before a Master occurred on December 4, 2018. Following entry of
    the Master’s Report (“Report”) to the court on February 6, 2019, Wife filed
    exceptions to the Report on March 28, 2019.3 On May 28, 2019, the trial court
    denied Wife’s exceptions. Order, 5/28/19.
    Wife filed a notice of appeal, and both Wife and the trial court complied
    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On January 24, 2020, we remanded this case to the trial
    court for preparation of a Supplemental Opinion within thirty days.
    Strausser, 
    2020 WL 406850
    , 1180 MDA 2019. The trial court complied, and
    the matter is now ripe for review.
    In her brief on appeal, Wife raises twenty-six issues as follows:
    1. [Wife] argues that Judge Thomas A. James violated PA Rules of
    Judicial Conduct 2.7, when he decided the order of the court dated
    May 28, 2019. Judge James had recused himself from all of
    [Wife’s] legal matters in the order dated May 29, 2015.
    2. Judge James improperly granted Bifurcation for the following
    reasons:
    ____________________________________________
    3 Wife requested and received an extension of time to file exceptions. Order,
    3/25/19. Additionally, without explanation in the record, the Honorable Gary
    E. Norton recused himself from the case. Order, 3/22/19.
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    a. [Husband] failed to notify [Wife] of motion for bifurcation
    in timeframe required by law.
    b. [Wife] did not receive notice of appointed counsel (4-16-
    2015) until day after the bifurcation hearing (4-15-2015).
    c. Judge granted bifurcation without protecting [Wife’s]
    economic claims.
    d. [Husband] failed to send settlement agreement indicated
    by the Judge in transcripts or arrange a Special Master’s
    Conference by June 1, 2015. Judge James should have
    found [Husband] in Contempt of Court when [Wife]
    petitioned for such.
    3. Attorney Anthony J. McDonald failed to serve brief to the [Wife]
    before argument/hearing on May 28, 2019.
    4. The Court failed to serve [Wife] a copy of Final order Dated May
    28, 2019 until July 9, 2019.
    5. [Husband] failed to provide updated property assessment
    making the value of marital property appear less than the current
    value. Well established precedent states that property value is to
    be determined at the date closest to the date of distribution.
    6. No documentation or independent assessment of vehicles [sic]
    value. Court relied on [Husband’s] opinion.
    7. All personal property belonging to the [Wife] remained in the
    marital home at the time of her departure; thus making the
    [Husband] responsible for the destruction and/or disposal of said
    property. [Wife] made numerous attempts through prior counsel,
    letter, and family to obtain her property throughout the years with
    [Husband] denying access every time.
    8. [Husband] has provided no proof of current mortgages or
    unsecured debt.
    9. [Husband] did not provide discovery as approved by the court,
    therefore [Wife] could not provide income or 401K data.
    10. When a home is refinanced during a marriage it becomes
    marital property. [Husband] has failed to supply any signed
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    documentation of [Wife’s] “alleged” relinquishment of Joint
    ownership of marital residence.
    11. Child custody and support are not to be considered in
    equitable distribution.
    12. [Husband] did not have custody of [Wife’s] child from a
    previous relationship (Alyssa Yoder) as she resided with her
    paternal grandmother, Kathy Yoder, until after the age of eighteen
    years.
    13. Land was not a gift to the [Husband] it was purchased after
    the marriage for $8,000.00 which [Husband] testified to during
    special master[’]s conference.    Value of the land is to be
    determined at the date of distribution, which is approximately
    $55,000.00 per acre.
    14. [Wife] filed pretrial statement with inventory and request for
    discovery on June 25, 2018.
    15. Judge James is biased in favor of [Husband] in both the child
    custody and divorce cases. Seven counts in [Wife’s] criminal case,
    that Judge James presided over, were overturned on appeal due
    to being illegal charges/convictions.
    16. In light of Judge James’ unsubstantiated estimate that a 50/50
    split would result in a $6,000.00 settlement, [Wife’s] agreement
    at the 2015 bifurcation hearing to accept $4,000.00 is extremely
    reasonable. This amount did not even consider the [Wife’s]
    personal property that the [Husband] has since disposed of.
    17. Court has refused to provide [Wife] with transcripts to any
    divorce related proceedings despite numerous requests
    throughout the years, inhibiting [Wife’s] ability to appeal.
    18. [Wife] argues that despite Judge James’ claim that [Husband]
    has taken responsibility for all marital debt, the following marital
    debt remains unaddressed...[W]ife’s student loans, legal fees
    (Attorney Lewis), medical bills, and credit cards.
    19. Court fails to consider Wife’s poor health and lack of future
    employability.
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    20. [Wife] excepts to the misinformed assumption by Special
    Master Dennehy that “all of wife’s housing, food, and medical care
    are all being provided for by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”
    21. 2010 Federal Tax Return was not addressed by court.
    22. Judge James did not address work history or future
    employability of [Husband] and/or [Wife].
    23. Court failed to take into consideration the Wife’s Contributions
    brought to the home from prior to the marriage.
    24. Court failed to consider [W]ife’s contribution to the marriage
    through her status as full-time homemaker and child caretaker
    throughout the marriage.
    25. Court fails to address [Husband’s] possession of [Wife’s] State
    Child Support Access Card which contained approximately
    $600.00 in arrearages owed to [Wife] for the Support of Alyssa
    Yoder from her biological father, Jeffery Yoder.
    26. Court fails to address [Husband’s] possession of [Wife’s]
    Driver’s License, Social Security Card, Birth Certificate,
    Psychological and medical documents, School records, Legal
    documents, EMT Certifications, children’s birth and school records,
    Photographs, etc.
    Wife’s Brief at 5–6.
    Our standard in reviewing equitable distribution awards is settled:
    Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a
    marital property distribution is whether the trial court
    abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure
    to follow proper legal procedure. An abuse of discretion is
    not found lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and
    convincing evidence.
    McCoy v. McCoy, 
    888 A.2d 906
    , 908 (Pa. Super.2005) (internal
    quotations omitted).       When reviewing an award of equitable
    distribution, “we measure the circumstances of the case against
    the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties
    and achieving a just determination of their property rights.”
    Hayward v. Hayward, 
    868 A.2d 554
    , 559 (Pa. Super.2005).
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    J-S73013-19
    Smith v. Smith, 
    904 A.2d 15
    , 18 (Pa.Super.2006).
    “The Divorce Code does not specify a particular method of valuing
    assets.” Thus, “the trial court must exercise discretion and rely
    on the estimates, inventories, records of purchase prices, and
    appraisals submitted by both parties.” When “determining the
    value of marital property, the court is free to accept all, part or
    none of the evidence as to the true and correct value of the
    property.” . . . “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in
    adopting the only valuation submitted by the parties.”
    Childress v. Bogosian, 
    12 A.3d 448
    , 456 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal
    citations omitted). Moreover, “the trial court has the authority to divide the
    award as the equities presented in the particular case may require.” Busse
    v. Busse, 
    921 A.2d 1248
    , 1260 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    The first issue Wife raises states as follows: “[Wife] argues that Judge
    Thomas A. James violated PA Rules of Judicial Conduct 2.7, when he decided
    the order of the court dated May 28, 2019. Judge James had recused himself
    from all of [Wife’s] legal matters in the order dated May 29, 2015.” Wife’s
    Brief at 5.
    Our review of the record, including the docketing statements supplied,
    reveals that Wife’s criminal litigation and the parties’ custody and divorce
    litigation all were occurring and ongoing in 2011.       In the custody case4
    referenced supra, Judge James filed the following order:
    ____________________________________________
    4 This Court may take “judicial notice of other proceedings involving the same
    parties.” Hvizdak v. Linn, 
    190 A.3d 1213
    , 1218 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing
    Estate of Schulz, 
    139 A.2d 560
    , 563 (Pa. 1958)).
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    AND NOW, to wit, this 29th day of May, 2015, after
    consideration of “[Wife’s] Petition for Disqualification (Recusal) of
    Judge,” the [c]ourt finds the petition to be meritless. This
    [c]ourt has been sensitive to the custody case and has attempted
    to issue Orders and mediate matters in the best interest of the
    children. As to [Wife’s] allegations of the Administrative Assistant
    working for former Defense counsel, the [c]ourt had no
    recollection and/or knowledge of the same until the filing of this
    petition.    In fact, the [c]ourt has never spoken to the
    Administrative Assistant concerning the background of [Wife]
    during her aforesaid criminal case. However, in light of the
    circumstances and what would be appearances in this case, the
    [c]ourt hereby on its own recuses itself from the Domestic
    Relations cases and from the PCRA case.
    Order, Columbia County Court of Common Pleas Docket Number 934 of 2011,
    6/1/15 (emphasis added); Wife’s Brief at B-1, B-2.        Because Judge James
    initially did not recall this order in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, we remanded
    for the trial court to provide a supplemental opinion, and the trial court has
    complied.
    We are satisfied with the explanation provided by the trial court. 5 The
    trial court has noted that the reference in its June 1, 2015 order regarding
    recusal related to the support case. Supplemental Opinion, 2/18/20, at 2.
    More importantly, in the four plus years since that order was entered, Wife
    did not reference recusal until she filed her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement,
    despite the fact that this trial court ruled upon many issues in the custody
    case and the instant case. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 9/4/19, at 1 n.1. Finally, “there
    ____________________________________________
    5  At various times throughout the period, this trial court was the only judge
    in the county. Supplemental Opinion, 2/18/20, at 4 n.2.
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    was no recusal notation or order in [the] divorce file.” Supplemental Opinion,
    2/18/20, at 3. Therefore, in light of the trial court’s Supplemental Opinion,
    we conclude the issue lacks merit.
    Initially, we observe that issues 2, 3, 6, 14, 16, and 25 are waived
    because they were not included in the exceptions filed by Wife. Wife sought,
    and was granted, an extension of thirty days to file exceptions. Motion for
    Extension of Time to File Exceptions, 3/13/19; Order, 3/25/19. Pennsylvania
    Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.55–2(b) states, in relevant part, “Matters not
    covered by exceptions [to the master’s report and recommendation] are
    deemed waived unless, prior to entry of the final decree, leave is granted to
    file exceptions raising those matters.” As our Court has previously explained,
    “This rule requires a party who is dissatisfied with a master’s report to file
    exceptions to the report, or waive any such objections.” Lawson v. Lawson,
    
    940 A.2d 444
    , 450 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    Issues 4 and 17 are moot. Regarding the timeliness of this appeal raised
    in issue 4, we noted supra that we previously held the instant appeal is timely.
    Strausser, 
    2020 WL 406850
    , 1180 MDA 2019. Regarding issue 17, Wife’s
    claim that she has not been given transcripts is belied by her references to
    notes of testimony in her appellate brief. See Wife’s Brief at 11, 14, 16, 18,
    19, 20, 22, 23.
    We addressed issue 15, relating to alleged trial court bias, supra.
    Moreover, the claims in issues 15, 11, 12, and 25 relate to the parties’
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    custody/support litigation, and thus, are not before us.6 Regarding issue 20,
    Wife fails to cite any support for her claim; thus the issue is waived. In re
    M.Z.T.M.W., 
    163 A.3d 462
     (Pa. Super. 2017) (failure to cite relevant authority
    results in waiver). Even if not waived, we would discern no abuse of discretion
    by the trial court’s reference to Wife’s daily needs being met by the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania during her incarceration.
    Thus, issues 5, 7–10, 13, and 18–24, 26 are before us. Husband asserts
    that because Wife failed to file a pretrial statement as require by Pa.R.C.P.
    1920.33, all issues are waived. Husband’s Brief at 19. The rule states, in
    pertinent part:
    Rule 1920.33. Joinder              of   Related   Claims.   Equitable
    Division. Enforcement
    (a) If a pleading or petition raises a claim for equitable division of
    marital property under Section 3502 of the Divorce Code, the
    parties shall file and serve on the other party an inventory. . . .
    (b) Within the time required by order of court or written directive
    of the master or, if none, at least 60 days before the scheduled
    hearing on the claim for equitable division, the parties shall file
    and serve upon the other party a pre-trial statement.
    * * *
    (d)(1) A party who fails to comply with a requirement of
    subdivision (b) may be barred from offering testimony or
    introducing evidence in support of or in opposition to claims for
    the matters omitted.
    ____________________________________________
    6  Contrary to Wife’s claims in issues 11 and 12, the trial court did not make
    findings regarding custody or support, it merely noted observations regarding
    the equities. Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/19, at 2–3.
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    Pa.R.C.P. 1920.33(b), (d). “It is clear that the rule implicates a filing and
    inventory of all marital property by both parties . . . .”       Anderson v.
    Anderson, 
    822 A.2d 824
    , 829 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis in original).
    On June 5, 2018, the trial court authorized Wife to proceed in forma
    pauperis. Order, 6/5/18, at unnumbered 1. Additionally, the court directed
    the parties to file “inventories, appraisements and income and expense
    statements within thirty days . . . .” 
    Id.
     at unnumbered 2. Husband filed his
    pretrial statement in July of 2018. N.T., 12/4/18, at 12. The record reflects
    that Wife did not comply.       Moreover, at the Master’s hearing, Husband
    additionally filed thirteen exhibits, as follows:
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 1     Inventory and Appraisement
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 2     Income and Expense Statement
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 3     Complaint in Divorce
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 4     Counter-Affidavit
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 5     Bifurcated Decree in Divorce and Order
    retaining jurisdiction of economic issues
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 6     Order of Court dated June 1, 2018
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 7     Letter from AgChoice Farm Credit
    regarding “Waiver of Marital Rights”
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 8     Appraisal of Property at 246 Mordansville
    Road, Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 9     Deed and Mortgage for Real Property
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 10 AgChoice Farm Credit Mortgage            on
    Mordansville Road Property
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    [Husband’s] Exhibit 11 Mortgage of Mordansville Road Property
    designating MERS as AgChoice Nominee
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 12 Satisfaction of AgChoice Mortgage
    [Husband’s] Exhibit 13 Pre-Hearing Statement of [Husband]
    Master Report to the Court, 2/6/19, at 2–3; N.T., 12/4/18, at 48. Wife did
    not present any documents. N.T., 12/4/18, at 2. We agree with Husband’s
    assessment, as the remaining issues would have required submission of
    documentation by Wife, and none was forthcoming.              In the absence of a
    pretrial statement by Wife, Wife is “barred from offering testimony or
    introducing evidence in support of or in opposition to claims for the matters
    omitted.” Pa.R.C.P. 1920.33 (d).
    Moreover, Wife’s complaints encompassed in the remaining issues7 lack
    any supporting documents from Wife.                As we noted supra, “Where the
    evidence offered by one party is uncontradicted, the court may adopt this
    value even though the resulting valuation would have been different
    if more accurate and complete evidence had been presented.”
    Childress, 
    12 A.3d at 456
     (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Smith, 
    653 A.2d 1259
    , 1267 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating if one party disagrees with other
    party’s valuation, it is objectant’s burden to provide court with alternative
    valuation). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in adopting the only
    ____________________________________________
    7  Those complaints involve the marital residence, property therein, Wife’s
    health, the parties’ future employability, prior tax liability, and marital debt,
    as identified in issues 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 18, 19, and 21–24.
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    valuation submitted by the parties.” Childress, 
    12 A.3d at
    456 (citing Biese
    v. Biese, 
    979 A.2d 892
    , 897 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
    Issues 9 and 26 are belied by the record. Regarding issue 9, relating to
    Husband’s 401K, Wife testified at the Master’s hearing, “I just want to say I’m
    not trying to touch [Husband’s] 401k [account] . . . . I just want this to be
    done. That’s it.”   N.T., 12/4/18, at 53. Regarding issue 26, Wife’s items
    allegedly in Husband’s possession, Wife clarified, “If my personal belongings
    are gone, I can’t recover that.”   
    Id.
       In response to the Master’s inquiry
    whether Wife was seeking “any sort of personal stuff,” Wife responded, “My
    grandmother’s dishes.    Other than that, no.”     
    Id.
       The Master directed
    Husband’s counsel to arrange to have them returned to Wife’s parents. 
    Id.
    We close noting our agreement with the trial court’s observations:
    The thrust of the total of [Wife’s] complaints are that the
    master’s decision and the court’s concurrence were not equitable
    and fair. Despite all of her complaints, [Wife] was able to
    participate in the master’s hearing despite serving 17-34 years in
    a State Correctional Facility. Moreover, this was essentially an
    insolvent marital estate. The Master noted on page 8 of his report
    that “as a practical matter, considering the limited amount of
    marital property in this matter, this marital estate was actually
    insolvent on the date of separation, and Husband has assumed
    sole responsibility of payment of debts.        In addition, while
    Husband has a significant amount of non-marital equity in the
    form of the equity in the marital residence, the marital debts plus
    the debts on the residence are nearly equal to the value of the
    residence.” (Master’s Report p. 8).
    In the order denying exceptions, this court summarized the
    reasons for adopting the [M]aster’s recommendations:
    [Wife] has filed a litany of exceptions. Most are
    irrelevant and immaterial. The court accepts the
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    Master’s findings. He found the estate to be insolvent.
    However, for argument’s sake, if per [Wife’s]
    inventory the home had a marital component, she
    values it at $145,000. After real estate commissions
    and transfer taxes, the equity pre-debt is $132,000.
    The vehicles had equity of $9,000.00. There was
    minimal personal property. The debt outstanding at
    separation was about $132,000. Even if the home
    were marital property, the marital estate equity was
    about $12,000. There might have been a small
    pension but there is no evidence of specifics. In light
    of all the facts and equities, the Master’s decision was
    very fair and equitable. There is very little equity,
    even assuming the house had a marital component,
    which it did not. In a 50-50 split, [Wife] would have
    received about $6,000. But, [Wife has been in prison
    for the great[er] part of her children’s minority. She
    will be there for several more years since the children
    are still minors. [Husband] has undertaken and will
    continue to be the sole support of the children,
    including financially.     The amount [Husband] is
    contributing to support the children alone is far
    greater than any possible marital equity. [Husband]
    is also contributing to [Wife’s] daughter from another
    relationship. Moreover, [Husband] has undertaken to
    pay all of the marital loans including interests thereon.
    The land for the house . . . was indisputably a gift to
    [Husband from his parents]. In summary, even if
    [Wife’s] exceptions that are relevant and material
    were to be construed in her favor, the equities in this
    case strongly support the Master’s recommendations
    and findings.
    The Master and this court tried to accommodate and be as
    fair to the parties as possible even though there are difficulties
    litigating a case with a long term SCI prisoner. There is nothing
    in the matters complained of, even if correct, that would negate
    the fact that this is essentially an insolvent estate and the
    [Husband] is assuming all the debts and assuming all financial
    support for raising and supporting the children.
    [Wife’s] complaints are specious and unreasonable in light
    of all the facts.
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    Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/19, at 1–3.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/07/2020
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