Adoption of: M.L.K., Appeal of: N.S.K. ( 2020 )


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  • J-S55043-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE MATTER OF: ADOPTION OF:             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    M.L.K..                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: N.S.K., MOTHER                  :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 695 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the Decree Dated June 12, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans' Court at
    No(s): 2020-209 IVT
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                            FILED DECEMBER 29, 2020
    N.S.K. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree dated and entered June 12,
    2020, granting the petition, filed by Cambria County Children and Youth
    Service (“CYS” or the “Agency”), seeking to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
    parental rights to M.L.K. (“Child”) (born in June of 2017), her minor, female
    child with J.S. (“Father”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §
    2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and
    Father (collectively, the “Parents”), on the same date. Father has not
    appealed the termination of his parental rights, nor has he filed a brief in this
    appeal.
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    On February 26, 2020, CYS filed the petition to involuntarily terminate
    Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
    2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).            On March 17, 2020, the trial court
    appointed Attorney Suzann Lehmier as Child’s guardian ad litem and legal
    interests counsel (“GAL/Counsel”).2            On May 14, the trial court appointed
    attorney Sydney Maurer to represent Mother.            Father proceeded pro se.
    ____________________________________________
    2 In In re Adoption of L.B.M., 
    639 Pa. 428
    , 
    161 A.3d 172
     (2017) (plurality),
    our Supreme Court held that 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) requires the appointment
    of counsel to represent the legal interests of any child involved in a contested
    involuntary termination proceeding. The Court defined a child’s legal interests
    as synonymous with his or her preferred outcome. In In re T.S., 
    648 Pa. 236
    , 
    192 A.3d 1080
     (2018) (filed August 22, 2018), the Supreme Court held
    that the trial court did not err in allowing the children’s GAL to act as their sole
    representative during the termination proceeding because, at two and three
    years old, they were incapable of expressing their preferred outcome. The
    Court explained, “if the preferred outcome of the child is incapable of
    ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be
    no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as
    such, the mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act that counsel be
    appointed ‘to represent the child,’ 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), is satisfied where the
    court has appointed an attorney-[GAL] who represents the child’s best
    interests during such proceedings.” Id. at 257, 192 A.3d at 1092-1093.
    Here, Child was almost three years old at the time of the hearing. The
    trial court determined there was no conflict between Child’s legal interests and
    best interest. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/20, at 1-2. We do not comment
    on the quality of the GAL/Counsel’s representation of Child. See In re:
    Adoption of K.M.G., 
    219 A.3d 662
    , 669 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (filed
    September 13, 2019) (holding that this Court has authority only to raise sua
    sponte the issue of whether the trial court appointed any counsel for the child,
    and not the authority to delve into the quality of the representation) (affirmed,
    ___ A.3d___ (Pa., filed November 10, 2020).
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    The trial court set forth the following factual background and procedural
    history of this appeal.
    3. CYS started services in December of 2017 for the following
    reasons:
    A. [Mother] was then 16 years old and a dependency
    petition had been filed in the interest of [Mother] on that
    date.
    B. [Mother] refused to take her prescribed mental health
    medication.
    C. [Mother] refused to meet with and cooperate with the
    potential service providers.
    D. [Mother] was relying upon her caregivers (her great-
    grandfather and her mother) to provide basic care for the
    child, refusing to take the initiative to do such basic tasks
    as feeding the baby or changing her diaper.
    E. The bond between [Mother] and the child appeared to
    be weak and [Mother] appeared content to have others
    care for the child.
    F. [Mother] had allowed inappropriate individuals to be
    around the child.
    G. There were reports that during visits with the child[,
    Mother] spoke on the phone with others while others cared
    for the child.
    H. [Father] lived in Florida and CYS had attempted to make
    contact with him without success (Petitioner’s Exhibit 5).
    4. Pursuant to a petition averring dependency, the Juvenile Court
    held a hearing on January 29, 2018 and issued an order that same
    date finding the child to be dependent, placing the child and her
    biological mother, a minor, in foster care together in the same
    home. The placement goal was return child to parent. [Mother]
    was ordered to actively participate, regularly attend, and
    successfully complete parenting skills classes and demonstrate
    her understanding of the skills and recommendations learned in
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    the parenting classes by using them within the home, and she was
    to fully cooperate with Teen Parenting, Justice Works Nurturing
    Parent, Nulton Diagnostic Family Based, and Northwestern Human
    Services. [Father] was, and remained, in Florida and had no
    contact with the child.
    5. Dennis Kashurba, a licensed psychologist, evaluated [Mother]
    on February 19, 2018. The purpose of the evaluation was to
    gather information pertinent to ascertaining what types of
    services would be appropriate to facilitate the possible
    reunification of [Mother] with her infant daughter (at that time
    eight months old).     After reviewing [Mother’s] records, Mr.
    Kashurba noted in his report that:
    “In mid-December 2017, [Mother] refused to take the
    medication she was prescribed at Nulton Diagnostic. She
    was subsequently discharged unsuccessfully from Nulton
    Diagnostic.       She reportedly had prior trials of
    antidepressant medication. Her history is also significant
    for engaging in self-mutilation in the form of cutting her
    left wrist and forearm. Numerous superficial scars were
    observed during the course of the evaluation today. As a
    result of these concerns, the custodial grandfather was
    described at [sic] being at his “wits end” with [Mother].
    This led to his indicating he can no longer control her since
    she engaged in tantrum behavior and would sometimes
    become physically aggressive to those in the home. Of
    additional concern was the interaction and the bond
    between [Mother] and [Child], which was described as
    being “very minimal” and typically lasted only for short
    durations.      [Mother’s] tantrum behaviors reportedly
    occurred whenever she was not permitted go to her
    friend’s house or was requested to do something of a
    responsible nature or to refrain from engaging in some
    activity.
    [Mother] has been the recipient of numerous
    interventions, including the aforementioned medication
    management at Nulton Diagnostic, as well as Family Based
    services through Nulton Diagnostic. However, CYS records
    indicate that it was the opinion of the Family[-]Based
    service providers that the mother and the child both need
    to be placed. Additionally, [Mother] has received services
    from Nurse Family Partnership and Justice Works Nurturing
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    Parent Program. Both of these have documented that
    [Mother] rarely cares for the needs of [Child] and often
    hands the child over to others to care for her needs.”
    Mr. Kashurba administered several standardized tests to
    [Mother]. She has an IQ of 77. Her scores on the standardized
    tests showed that she had a normal 9- to 10-year-old
    development and within the upper half of the borderline range.
    On the Parent Behavior rating scale, the foster mother rated
    [Mother] as being significant across all six of the measurements
    of that instrument. In his conclusion, Mr. Kashurba opines that
    “the total information available at the present time indicates that
    [Mother’s] cognitive and academic deficiencies make the
    prognosis poor for her learning and independently implementing
    appropriate parenting strategies to guarantee the best interests
    of her daughter.”
    Mr. Kashurba’s diagnostic impressions list Parent/Child
    Relational Problem, Relational Problem NOS [Not Otherwise
    Specified], Unspecified Disruptive Impulse Control Disorder, High
    Expressed Emotional Level within Family, Borderline Intellectual
    Functioning, Borderline Personality Traits with Dependent
    Features (Petitioner's Exhibit 8).
    6. The Juvenile Court conducted a Permanency Review Hearing on
    July 25, 2018 and issued its order on August 7, 2018[,]
    determining that [Mother] had been only minimally compliant with
    the Permanency Plan in that she had not been able to demonstrate
    that she was able to independently manage her mental health or
    maintain her mental health. Further, she had not been able to
    demonstrate that she is learning and maintaining parenting skills.
    She had made minimal progress towards alleviating the
    circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
    . . . The goal remained return to parent with a concurrent
    placement plan of adoption.
    7. A Permanency Review Hearing was held on December 19, 2018,
    with the Juvenile Court’s order entered on January 2, 2019.
    Again, the [trial court] found that [Mother] had only minimal
    compliance with the Permanency Plan, and had made only minimal
    progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
    the original placement. . . . The current placement goal was to
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    return the child to parent. The concurrent placement plan for the
    child was adoption.
    8. Another Permanency Review Hearing was held on June 10,
    2019, with the Juvenile Court's order entered on June 19, 2019.
    The [trial court] noted that the child appeared to be happy in her
    foster home and was bonded to her foster family. Further, [the
    court noted] that she was too young to share her views in any
    coherent way. This time the [trial court] found that [Mother]
    made moderate compliance with the Permanency Plan and that
    she now attends visits with her daughter, but still struggles to
    effectively care for her. The [trial court] also found moderate
    progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
    the original placement as to [Mother].
    . . . The child had now been in placement for 17 months.
    The [trial court] determined that [Mother] should continue to be
    compliant with her mental health treatment at Nulton Diagnostic
    and to continue to actively participate, regularly attend, and
    successfully complete the parenting skills classes.
    9. Mr. Kashurba again evaluated [Mother] on September 23,
    2019. After noting [Mother’s] prior treatment at Nulton Diagnostic
    and prior diagnoses, he noted a reference to [Mother’s] having
    experienced possible dissociative episodes, as well as claiming a
    29-year-old alter ego named Sally was responsible for rough
    treating of her daughter while in [Mother’s] care. Of particular
    note is the April 24, 2018 comment by her treating psychiatrist at
    Nulton Diagnostic that she “continues to seemingly dissociate at
    times, bordering on psychosis.” The psychiatrist also noted that
    she had “significant concerns about her safety around the infant
    and the foster mother confirmed she is doing all of the direct
    care.”
    [Mother] was given the Basic Personality Inventory,
    Parenting Stress Index, and Aggression Questionnaire. There
    were no significant elevations on the Parenting Stress Index, nor
    the Aggression Questionnaire.      However, two areas on the
    Personality Inventory showed significant elevation: Denial and
    Thinking Disorder. Mr. Kashurba noted that this area of elevation
    tends to be consistent with some of the aforementioned concerns
    from her prior mental health treatment.         He noted in his
    conclusion that [Mother] has adequate intellectual ability to learn
    appropriate parenting strategies to ensure the best interests of
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    the child, and at that time appeared to be free of any major
    affective spectrum disorder symptomology that had been the case
    prior to her resuming psychiatric treatment. He goes on to state:
    “Thus, this would seem to be the optimal opportunity
    for providing [Mother] with the types of services that will
    give her the best opportunity to demonstrate her ability to
    function at some time in the future as a primary figure for
    her daughter” (Petitioner's Exhibit 9).
    ***
    11. The last Permanency Review Hearing was held on November
    27, 2019, with an order entered on December 18, 2019. The
    Juvenile Court found that the parents had made only minimal
    progress with the Permanency Plan and that neither consistently
    attend[ed] visits nor followed through with the services provided.
    . . . The placement goal was changed to adoption. The child had
    now been in placement for 22 months. The [trial court] further
    found that CYS had made reasonable efforts to finalize the
    Permanency Plan in effect for this child[,] and that CYS need not
    make any further reasonable efforts to return the child to her
    parents. The Juvenile Court found that reunification of the child
    with her parents was not an appropriate option[,] as it would not
    be in the child’s best interest to make further attempts at
    reunification.
    12. Services rendered to the parents, primarily to [Mother], as
    [Father] was for most of this time in Florida, include:
    * CYS caseworker services;
    * Nulton Diagnostic medication management and
    counseling;
    * Merakey Family Finding and Engagement;
    * Justice Works Nurturing Parenting;
    * Merakey foster care;
    * Psychological evaluations by Dennis Kashurba;
    3).
    * Johnstown Christian Home independent living;
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    * The Meadows psychiatric hospitalization;
    * CYS Social Work Services (Petitioner’s Exhibit 3).
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/20, at 2-11.
    On June 1, 2020 and June 3, 2020, the trial court held evidentiary
    hearings on the petition. At the hearing on June 1, 2020, CYS presented the
    testimony of Kathy Pitman, CYS social worker; Dennis Kashurba, a
    psychologist who testified as a stipulated expert in psychology and who
    performed psychological evaluations of the Parents; Brooke Schreyer, the
    program director for JusticeWorks Youth Care; Jessica Mills, a CYS social
    worker; and Dorothy Wyatt, who is employed by Christian Home of Johnstown
    and worked with Mother on everyday living skills. N.T., 6/1/20, at 5, 46-48,
    81-82, 99-100, and 115. Father testified on his own behalf, questioned by
    the trial court on direct examination. Id. at 123. Mother testified on her own
    behalf. Id. at 146.
    At the hearing on June 1, 2020, CYS social worker, Ms. Pitman, testified
    that Mother: has been unable or unwilling to rectify any of her mental health
    needs and adequately be trained in her parenting abilities; does not have
    housing for herself; has been unable to care for herself, although she has
    become an adult; and has no plan. N.T., 6/1/20, at 29. Ms. Pitman believed
    that the severance of any bond between Mother and Child would not
    detrimentally impact Child. Id. at 29-30. In fact, Ms. Pitman testified that
    severing any bond between Child and Mother would promote Child’s
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    developmental, physical and emotional needs, because Child would have
    consistency in her life and her pre-adoptive foster family would meet those
    needs. Id. at 30. Ms. Pitman testified that Child will have the ability to bond
    with her pre-adoptive foster family in the future, as she had been placed with
    them for more than two years, and she is currently bonded with the family.
    Id.
    CYS’s expert psychologist, Mr. Kashurba, testified that Mother has
    adequate intellectual ability to learn appropriate parenting strategies. Id. at
    67.   He stated that Mother appeared to be free from any major affective
    spectrum symptomatology that had been the case prior to her resuming
    psychiatric treatment.    Id.   Mr. Kashurba further testified that Mother’s
    emotion and behavior appear to have stabilized considerably since she
    resumed psychiatric treatment and since Father had returned to Pennsylvania
    after living in Florida for a few years. Id. Mr. Kashurba testified that there is
    an optimal opportunity to provide Mother with services that would give her
    the best opportunity to demonstrate her ability to function at some point in
    the future as the primary caregiver for Child. Id. Mr. Kashurba stated that
    Mother does not appear to have any drug/alcohol use disorder that would
    adversely affect her ability to benefit from the services provided to her. Id.
    Mr. Kashurba testified that Mother had a diagnostic impression of parent-child
    relational   problem,   borderline   intellectual   functioning,   and   borderline
    personality traits. Id. Mother also had a diagnosis, by history of treatment
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    at Nulton Diagnostic, of major depressive order, generalized anxiety, and
    post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 67-68.     Mr. Kashurba recommended
    Mother should be treated with medication and psychotherapy.          Id.   Since
    Mother has borderline personality features and traits, he also recommended
    that Mother should have social skills training.      Id. at 68.    Further, Mr.
    Kashurba recommended that Mother should have intensive outpatient services
    including both individual and group therapy on a weekly basis in addition to
    the medication. Id. at 69.
    On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, Mr. Kashurba testified that,
    when he first evaluated Mother on February 19, 2018, he observed Mother
    interact with Child, and that they seemed to be affectionate and to share a
    bond. Id. at 77. Mr. Kashurba deferred to the personnel who conducted the
    parenting training classes with regard to Mother’s ability to parent Child, and
    whether her ability had improved with training, over time. Id. at 75, 78.
    JusticeWorks Youth Care program director, Ms. Schreyer, testified that
    she worked with Mother and provided family services to her, consisting of
    working on parenting, primarily in the goal areas of building a bond with Child,
    learning different parenting skills, and having appropriate interactions and
    observations, with the assistance of visit coaching.      Id. at 82-84.     Ms.
    Schreyer testified that, when Mother completed the services, Ms. Schreyer
    would not have been comfortable leaving Mother with Child if someone were
    not there to prompt Mother. Id. at 88-89. Ms. Schreyer testified that Mother
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    and Child have a strong bond when they are together for the visitation, but
    she is familiar with reports that Mother often misses her phone contact with
    Child. Id. at 89. Ms. Schreyer has observed Child with her foster family, and
    finds that they meet Child’s needs and that Child is bonded with them. Id.
    Ms. Schreyer opined that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is
    in Child’s best interests. Id. at 89-90. Ms. Schreyer opined that, when she
    worked with Mother, there were still areas that remained for Mother to address
    and work on before Mother could multi-task and have full-day visits with Child,
    let alone safely and successfully parent Child on her own. Id. at 90.
    CYS social worker, Ms. Mills, testified that Parents had goals of
    increasing parenting skills; obtaining housing; and improving decision-making
    skills.    Id. at 100.   Prior to the goal change hearing, Ms. Mills scheduled
    sixteen supervised visits and fourteen social work sessions with Mother, but
    Mother attended only eleven visits and eight social work sessions. Id. Ms.
    Mills utilized the parent-child interaction model known as the “Safe Care
    Program”. Id. at 101. This module has a goal of learning basic hands-on
    parenting skills to increase positive interactions with Child and increase
    Parents’ bond with Child by teaching new ways to help Child learn, grow, and
    develop.       Id. at 101-102.    Mother was able to provide basic hands-on
    parenting, such as changing Child’s diaper and comforting Child when she was
    crying, but she had difficulty in decision-making for Child’s daily activities,
    such as planning ahead. Id. at 102. Mother also had difficulty focusing on
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    Child for an extended period of time, such as following Child to Child’s next
    activity. Id. at 102-103.
    Ms. Mills stated that the level of parenting ability that Mother
    demonstrated while she worked with Mother did not reflect the level of
    parenting ability Ms. Mills would have expected, given Mother’s prior parenting
    training. Id. at 103. Ms. Mills testified that Mother appeared to have the
    ability to use basic hands-on parenting skills and was able to comfort Child
    when Child was crying, and there appeared to be a bond between Child and
    Mother; however, ongoing extensive parenting was difficult for Mother, as she
    had difficulty in focusing on Child. Id. at 104. Ms. Mills testified that Child
    would not be safe in Mother’s care, because Mother would have difficulty
    caring for Child on an extended basis and required prompting from Ms. Mills
    in caring for Child during the two-hour visits. Id. at 104-105. Mother did not
    bring the necessary materials with her when she attended the visits. Id. at
    105. Mother had difficulty retaining the skills she learned from week-to-week,
    as well as difficulty answering open-ended questions regarding why particular
    skills were important. Id.
    Ms. Mills testified that Mother did not have the level of ability to make
    progress in a reasonable amount of time, given her extensive training prior to
    working with Ms. Mills and her lack of motivation to show up to visits and to
    practice her skills while working with Ms. Mills. Id. at 106-107. Although Ms.
    Mills noted that Mother and Child are bonded to some degree, she opined that
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    the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests and
    that Child would not be emotionally harmed. Id. at 107.
    Next, Dorothy Wyatt, of Christian Home of Johnstown, testified
    regarding her work with Mother in the independent living program. Id. at
    115. Ms. Wyatt stated that, in particular, she focused with Mother on possibly
    pursuing post-secondary education and securing housing.      Id. at 115-116.
    Ms. Wyatt testified that, while Mother was in foster care, Ms. Wyatt met with
    her twice a month, but, when Mother was no longer in foster care, she met
    with Mother only once a month. Id. at 116. During the entire time while Ms.
    Wyatt met with Mother, Mother did not obtain a job or housing, and Mother
    did not establish that she could parent a child. Id. at 117-118. Mother only
    showed an interest in working with Ms. Wyatt in August and September of
    2019, and, after that date, Ms. Wyatt did not have any more contact with
    Mother, despite her attempts to continue to work with Mother. Id. at 117-
    120.
    At the hearing on June 3, 2020, the trial court heard the remainder of
    Mother’s testimony. During her testimony, Mother raised serious allegations
    regarding an adult male. Id. at 29-39. CYS then presented the testimony of
    Melissa Raho, the CYS social work supervisor, concerning what CYS would do
    to address and investigate Mother’s allegations which, to her knowledge,
    Mother was raising for the first time. N.T., 6/3/20, at 39-41. Ms. Raho stated
    that CYS would investigate the allegations per its protocol.    Id.   Mother’s
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    counsel requested the trial court take her allegations into consideration and
    stay its decision on the petition until an investigation was concluded.         Id. at
    42-43. At the close of the hearing, the GAL/Legal Counsel recommended that
    the Parents’ paternal rights to the almost three-year-old Child should be
    terminated so that Child may be adopted by her foster family, with whom she
    has lived for almost two and a half years and is bonded, and have permanency
    and stability in her life. Id. at 47-49. The GAL/Legal Counsel stated that the
    termination of Mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to Child’s
    emotional welfare.      Id.   The court declined Mother’s request to stay the
    proceedings, and asked counsel to keep it apprised of any developments. Id.
    at 49.
    In the decree entered on June 12, 2020, the trial court terminated the
    Parents’ parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (5), (8),
    and (b). On July 10, 2020, Mother filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    In her brief, Mother raises the following issues:
    A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and/or
    manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency
    sustained its burden of proving the termination of Natural Mother,
    N.S.K.’s, parental rights is warranted under Sections 2511(a)(1),
    2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
    B. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law or abused
    its discretion by terminating the natural mother’s rights before the
    completion of an investigation into an allegation which was
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    revealed during the hearing and which directly relates to the
    reason the natural mother and child were initially separated?
    Mother’s Brief, at 7.
    In her brief, Mother argues:
    [T]he Agency failed to establish the statutory factors necessary to
    terminate her parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1),
    2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act by
    clear and convincing evidence. Even in the event this Court were
    to conclude the Agency established grounds for the termination of
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act, Mother
    argues the [t]rial [c]ourt nevertheless erred in concluding the best
    interests of the Child would be served by terminating her parental
    rights.
    Mother also argues the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of
    law or abused its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental
    rights before the completion of an investigation into an allegation
    which was revealed during the hearing and which directly relates
    to the reason the natural mother and child were initially
    separated.
    Mother requests that the [t]rial [c]ourt’s decision
    terminating her parental rights be reversed and, upon the
    conclusion of the investigation by Agency of the allegation made
    by the [m]other, the record be updated.
    Mother’s Brief, at 11, 14.
    Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusion with regard to section
    2511(b), stating:
    Even in the event this Court were to conclude the Agency
    established one (1) or more statutory grounds to support the
    termination of Mother’s parental rights, the Agency failed to
    demonstrate the best interests of the [c]hild would be served by
    terminating Mother’s parental rights at this time. In the instant
    case, the [C]ourt should be guided by the fact that there was not
    any evidence presented which disputes the fact that the [c]hild
    has a bond with the [m]other. Mother is pregnant with another
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    child and she desires to be reunified with the [c]hild [M.L.K.] and
    maintain a family bond.
    The [m]other has experienced many issues which have
    impeded her efforts at reunification. However, Mother has stable
    housing and her mental health has improved, all of which were
    the primary reasons which lead [sic] to the [c]hild being removed.
    When Mother has been able to attend visits with the child, she was
    attentive to her needs and tended to her needs. Agency witness,
    Jessica Mills, testified that Mother exhibited basic hands-on
    parenting skills (T. 104). There was no testimony offered to
    dispute the bond that the [c]hild has with Mother. To the contrary,
    several of Agency witnesses testified that there is a bond between
    Mother and Child. The Agency failed to meet its burden to
    establish that Mother does not have a bond with the [c]hild.
    Furthermore, the [t]rial [c]ourt failed to fully consider the effect
    terminating Mother’s parental rights will have on the emotional
    needs and welfare of the [c]hild pursuant to Section 2511(b).
    Accordingly, even if this Court concludes the Agency established
    one or more statutory grounds terminating Mother’s parental
    rights, the [t]rial [c]ourt nevertheless erred in concluding the
    termination of Mother’s rights serves the needs and welfare of the
    [c]hild. Mother contends that it is in the [c]hild’s best interest to
    be reunified with Mother and to establish a relationship with her
    sibling.
    Id. at 22-23.3
    Moreover, with regard to the second issue in her brief, Mother asserts
    that, in her testimony on June 3, 2020, she raised serious allegations involving
    ____________________________________________
    3 We find the issue regarding section 2511(b) discussed in Mother’s brief was
    not subsumed into the first issue in her concise statement and statement of
    questions involved, which specified CYS’s failure to sustain its burden of proof
    with regard to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Thus, Mother waived any
    challenge to section 2511(b) for our review. See Krebs v. United Refining
    Co., 
    893 A.2d 776
    , 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve
    issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors complained of
    on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal
    results in a waiver of those issues); see also In re W.H., 
    25 A.3d 330
    , 339
    n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 
    163 A.3d 462
    , 465-66
    (Pa. Super. 2017).
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    J-S55043-20
    an adult male. Mother claims these allegations are the basis for her emotional
    outbursts and her subsequent admission into a psychiatric facility and
    separation from Child. Mother states that she reported the incident to a social
    worker, Kristin Caro, but the Agency’s witness, Melissa Raho, testified that
    she was never made aware of the allegations. Mother’s Brief, at 24 (citing
    N.T., 6/3/20, at 40).
    In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
    adhere to the following standard:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
    standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
    petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
    cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
    the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
    if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 
    608 Pa. 9
    , 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported,
    appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
    error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [
    614 Pa. 275
    ,
    284,] 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has
    been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
    because the reviewing court might have reached a different
    conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors
    America, Inc., 
    613 Pa. 371
    [, 455], 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa. 2011);
    Christianson v. Ely, [
    575 Pa. 647
    , 654-655], 
    838 A.2d 630
    , 634
    (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
    discretion     only     upon       demonstration      of     manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 
    Id.
    As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
    applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.
    We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
    equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
    record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
    relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
    hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-
    30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
    support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
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    J-S55043-20
    termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
    second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
    determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
    judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
    and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
    law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [
    539 Pa. 161
    , 165,] 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    616 Pa. 309
    , 325-26, 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826-27 (2012).
    The burden is upon the petitioner to prove, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
    rights are valid.    In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
    evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and
    convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
    hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re J.L.C.,
    
    837 A.2d 1247
    , 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
    This Court may affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights if
    any one subsection of section 2511(a) has been satisfied. See In re B.L.W.,
    
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we focus on section
    2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    ***
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
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    J-S55043-20
    for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
    or will not be remedied by the parent.
    ***
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a
    parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
    To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
    must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:
    (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
    incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential
    parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
    being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
    or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1272
    (Pa. Super. 2003).    The grounds for termination of parental rights under
    section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are
    not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may
    include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re
    A.L.D. 
    797 A.2d 326
    , 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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    J-S55043-20
    This Court has stated “once the statutory grounds for termination have
    been met under [s]ection 2511(a), the [trial] court must consider whether
    termination serves the needs and welfare of the child, pursuant to [s]ection
    2511(b).” See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1008 (Pa. Super.
    2008) (en banc).4       The focus in terminating parental rights under section
    2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section 2511(b).
    
    Id.
         In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section
    2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows.
    [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
    met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare
    of the child have been properly interpreted to include
    “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
    re K.M., 
    53 A.3d 781
    , 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [
    533 Pa. 115
    , 121, 
    620 A.2d 481
    , 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
    the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
    consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
    child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
    effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In
    re K.M., 
    53 A.3d at 791
    .
    In re: T.S.M., 
    620 Pa. 602
    , 628-629, 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (2013).
    When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
    expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
    well.    Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
    ____________________________________________
    4 Although Mother waived any challenge to the termination of her parental
    rights under section 2511(b), as part of our two-tiered analysis, we will,
    nevertheless, discuss the termination under that section to demonstrate that,
    even if Mother had not waived any challenge, CYS satisfied its requirements.
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    J-S55043-20
    evaluation.” In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
    citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
    make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where
    direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
    necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    Here, the trial court addressed both of Mother’s issues together, as
    follows:
    13. A representative of Justice Works Youth Care[, Ms. Schreyer,]
    testified concerning a Justice Works report for services rendered
    in 2019. Justice Works began providing services in December of
    2018. In their report, the referral listed multiple goal areas for
    [Mother] all involving around the concern that [Mother] was
    refusing to parent [Child].
    “It has also been shared that [Mother] had once again
    stopped taking medication, was not attending school,
    would not allow any suggestions on parenting, and often
    left home without [Child] to go see friends sometimes for
    days.”
    [Mother] was able to accomplish various goals. At times she
    would be able to provide a safe, productive visit with the child
    without prompting. Other times she would need assistance with
    being able to fully parent the child. Multitasking proved to be very
    difficult for [Mother]. [Mother’s] mental health was a noted area
    of concern during the review period, as it was believed to
    progressively decline. There were various times where [Mother]
    was encouraged to explore a deeper level of commitment to her
    mental health sessions, as she had shown continuing signs of her
    mental health deteriorating. When asked if she felt she was
    experiencing similar signs of depression or other diagnoses, she
    would disclose that “she felt fine” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 10).
    14. CYS had provided services through one of its social workers[,
    Ms. Mills,] through a training curriculum called “Safe Care.” In
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    J-S55043-20
    her report to the [trial court] (Petitioner’s Exhibit 11), the worker
    noted that both [Father] and [Mother] were often unprepared for
    their sessions as they frequently did not bring their Safe Care
    binders and frequently verbalized that they had not participated
    in the skills they were to be learning between sessions. . . . The
    report notes that [Mother] appeared to have significant cognitive
    limitations such as diminished memory, delayed mental
    processing, and difficulty problem-solving. The social worker was
    in agreement with CYS’ recommendation of goal change to
    adoption.
    15. Services were also provided to [Mother] and [Father] through
    the Independent Living Program overseen by The Christian Home
    of Johnstown, Inc.[, Ms. Wyatt]. Of special note is a comment in
    the report December 2019 through January 2020, which says:
    “Client made no contact with Case Manager for the month
    of January. Case Manager attempted to attend Client’s
    visit with minor child to sign paperwork and give stipends
    to the client, but the social worker informed the Case
    Manager that the Client canceled and was moving to
    Florida” (Petitioner's Exhibit 12).
    16. The [trial court] feels sorry for this young couple. They, as
    many of the parents who find themselves in involuntary
    termination court proceedings, never had a chance, then[,] when
    given an opportunity through CYS services[,] they are unable to
    take advantage of those services. They love their child, but
    cannot provide for the child. [Mother] testified to serious
    allegations concerning an adult male. The [trial court] has been
    assured that the allegations are being checked out by CYS.
    Notwithstanding those allegations, the fact remains that the child
    has not been in the custody of [Mother] since the child was eight
    months old. . . . [Mother] has no job, no independent living, and
    cannot be left alone with the child. . . .
    17. In the [trial court’s] opinion, this child needs support and
    affection and an opportunity to flourish. She is doing well in foster
    care.
    18. [CYS] has established a legal basis for terminating the
    parental rights of . . . [Parents].
    ***
    - 22 -
    J-S55043-20
    20. There is conflicting testimony as to a bond between [Mother]
    and her child. . . . Even though there is some type of a bond
    between [Mother] and her child, there is testimony that severing
    that bond will not have a detrimental effect on the child.
    21. In terminating the parental rights of these [p]arents, this
    [c]ourt has found this will best meet the developmental, physical,
    and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
    ***
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/12/20, at 11-15.
    After a careful review of the record, this Court finds the trial court’s
    decision to terminate the parental rights of Mother under section 2511(a)(2)
    and (b) is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the
    record. In re Adoption of S.P., 
    616 Pa. at 325-326
    , 
    47 A.3d at 826-827
    . In
    so finding, we have carefully reviewed the testimony of Ms. Pitman, Ms.
    Schreyer, Ms. Mills, and Ms. Wyatt, as well as Mr. Kashurba, as set forth
    above. There was competent evidence in the record from which the trial court
    could have concluded that CYS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that
    Mother demonstrated: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal to parent; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused
    Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
    for her physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
    abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption
    of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d at 1272
    .
    Moreover, although there was conflicting testimony regarding the
    existence of a bond between Child and Mother, as noted by the trial court, the
    - 23 -
    J-S55043-20
    trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in determining
    that the severance of any bond that existed would further Child’s
    developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and, thus, would
    further Child’s best interests, and would not be detrimental to Child.       Our
    Supreme Court has stated that the mere existence of a bond or attachment
    of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination
    petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often harbor some
    positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” See In re: T.S.M., 
    620 Pa. at 627
    , 
    71 A.3d at 267
     (quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 535 (Pa. Super.
    2008)).   The Supreme Court stated, “[t]he continued attachment to the
    natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect,
    and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the
    children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.”) See In re: T.S.M., 
    620 Pa. at 629
    , 
    71 A.3d at 267
     (quoting In re Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M.,
    
    839 A.2d 410
    , 418 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting)). Thus, had
    Mother preserved a challenge to section 2511(b), we would find that the trial
    court properly ruled that CYS met its burden with regard to section 2511(b).
    In re: T.S.M., 
    620 Pa. at 628-629
    , 
    71 A.3d at 267
    .
    Finally, Mother’s allegations of abuse by an adult male, made, for the
    first time, to the knowledge of CYS witness Ms. Raho, during the testimony at
    the second day of the hearing on the termination petition, was to be afforded
    due consideration by the trial court, and considered, if the CYS investigation
    - 24 -
    J-S55043-20
    bore out that Mother’s allegations had merit. We find that the trial court did
    not commit an abuse of discretion or an error of law in terminating Mother’s
    parental rights despite CYS’s opening of an investigation into Mother’s new
    allegations, especially since there has been no showing that the allegations
    were founded.
    While Mother may claim to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love
    and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights.
    In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). We stated in In re Z.P.,
    a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will
    summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” 
    Id. at 1125
    .
    Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his
    child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the
    child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in
    a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 856
    (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court decree.
    Decree affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/29/2020
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    J-S55043-20
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