Com. v. Dunn, O. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A19012-20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    OSCAR DUNN III                           :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 97 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003035-2018
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                          Filed: April 22, 2021
    Oscar Dunn III appeals from his August 19, 2019 judgment of sentence,
    which included the imposition of mandatory court costs and monthly offender
    supervision fees. He argues he was entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing before
    the court imposed these costs at sentencing. We recently rejected an almost
    identical claim in Commonwealth v. Lopez, -- A.3d --, 1313 EDA 2018, 
    2021 WL 1096376
     (Pa. Super. March 23, 2021) (en banc), and therefore affirm
    Dunn’s judgment of sentence on the basis of that decision.
    Police found a firearm and drugs on Dunn following a traffic stop on
    March 14, 2018. Dunn was arrested and charged with various offenses.
    Following a stipulated bench trial, he was found guilty of illegally possessing
    a firearm and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced
    Dunn to an aggregate term of five to ten years’ imprisonment. It also directed
    J-A19012-20
    Dunn to pay the costs of prosecution as well as monthly offender supervision
    fees.
    Dunn filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently complied with the
    trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained
    of on appeal. The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in response.
    In that opinion, the trial court rejected Dunn’s sole claim that the court was
    required to hold an ability-to-pay hearing before it imposed the costs of
    prosecution and the offender supervision fees at sentencing. Dunn now argues
    in his appeal to this Court that the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion.
    However, this claim plainly fails under our recent decision in Lopez.
    In Lopez, this Court explicitly held that a trial court is not required to
    hold an ability-to-pay hearing prior to imposing the mandatory costs of
    prosecution on a defendant at sentencing. See Lopez, 
    2021 WL 109376
     at
    *1, *5. Rather, we explained that Pa.R.Crim.P. 706 only requires a trial court
    to hold such a hearing before a defendant faces incarceration for failing to pay
    those costs. See 
    id.
     As Dunn has not been threatened with incarceration for
    defaulting on the court costs imposed on him, he was not entitled to a hearing
    on his ability to pay those costs under Lopez and his claim to the contrary
    necessarily fails.
    Dunn also maintains that he was entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing
    before the trial court directed him to pay the monthly offender supervision
    fees at sentencing. We found in Lopez that Lopez had not raised his claim
    -2-
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    related to supervision fees in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and therefore,
    had not preserved the issue for our review.1 Unlike Lopez, Dunn did raise his
    claim that the court was required to hold an ability-to-pay hearing prior to
    imposing the supervision fees in his 1925(b) statement. Nonetheless, we find
    that the claim is without merit.
    In support of his claim, Dunn points to 18 P.S. § 11.1102(c), which
    provides that the court “shall impose … a monthly supervision fee … unless
    the court finds that the fee should be reduced, waived or deferred based on
    the offender’s present inability to pay.” 18 P.S. § 11.1102(c). However, as the
    trial court explained when finding that Section 11.1102(c) did not require it to
    hold an ability-to-pay hearing prior to imposing the supervision fees:
    [T]he provisions of 18 P.S. § 11.1102 clearly indicate that the
    “court shall impose” a monthly supervision fee. While the court
    may make findings regarding the ability of an offender to pay a
    fee, such a finding is not required nor is a finding of the offender’s
    financial ability a precondition to the imposition of the fee.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/2020, at 4 (emphasis in original).
    We agree. As the Commonwealth points out, nothing in Section
    11.1102(c) dictates that a trial court must conduct an ability-to-pay hearing
    before it imposes a supervision fee at sentencing. Rather, while the trial court
    may conduct such a hearing at that time, Section 11.1102(c) does not require
    ____________________________________________
    1 Lopez’s claim regarding the supervision fees differed from Dunn’s in that
    Lopez’s claim involved a local court policy in Philadelphia County not to waive
    supervision fees unless requested by the Philadelphia Probation Department.
    See id. at *5. Dunn’s case took place in Montgomery County.
    -3-
    J-A19012-20
    it to do so. We see no reason to distinguish supervision costs from those costs
    addressed in Lopez.
    Moreover,    we   note   that   Lopez    left   this   Court’s   decision   in
    Commonwealth v. Childs, 
    63 A.3d 323
     (Pa. Super. 2013), completely
    undisturbed. See Lopez, 
    2021 WL 1096376
     at *4 - *5. In Childs, the
    appellant argued that the sentencing court was required to hold an ability-to-
    pay hearing prior to imposing costs, which included both court costs and a
    monthly supervision fee. The Childs Court rejected the appellant’s claim,
    holding that the sentencing court was not required to hold a hearing on his
    ability to pay the ordered costs unless and until he risked incarceration for
    failure to pay those costs. See Childs, 
    63 A.3d at 326
    . The Childs court made
    clear that although a trial court has the discretion to hold a hearing prior to
    imposing court costs and the monthly supervision fee at sentencing, it was
    only required to hold “such a hearing prior to any order directing incarceration
    for failure to pay the ordered costs.” 
    Id.
    Childs remains good law and, along with Lopez, controls Dunn’s claim
    here. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to hold
    an ability-to-pay hearing prior to imposing the court costs and monthly
    supervision fees on Dunn at sentencing. No relief is due.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -4-
    J-A19012-20
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date:4/22/21
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97 EDA 2020

Filed Date: 4/22/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/22/2021