Com. v. Davis, R. ( 2021 )

J-S43036-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RONEESE DANIA DAVIS :
:
Appellant : No. 13 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 13, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011185-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: April 29, 2021
Appellant, Roneese Dania Davis, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following the entry
of her negotiated guilty pleas to simple assault, harassment, criminal mischief,
and disorderly conduct.1 After careful review, we vacate the judgment of
sentence and remand for resentencing.2
The trial court previously set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as
follows:
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), 3304(a)(5), and 5503(a)(4),
respectively.
2On November 18, 2020, we stayed our disposition of this case pending this
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lopez, 2021 Pa. Super. 51 (filed March
23, 2021) (en banc). Now that this Court has issued its decision in Lopez,
we lift the stay order.
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On March 12, 2018, [Appellant and Co-Defendant] pled
guilty to the above referenced charges and were sentenced
in accordance with a plea agreement to two (2) years of
probation at the count of simple assault, followed by a
consecutive one (1) year period of probation for disorderly
conduct. The facts, which were stipulated to at the guilty
plea [hearing] are as follows[.] On May 20, 2017, police
responded to an assault in-progress on a Port Authority bus.
The officer observed the victim in the rear of the bus with
visible facial injuries, including blood inside and around her
mouth and nose. The victim complained of head and facial
pain, vision problems, and reported that her eyeglasses
were broken during the assault. Video surveillance footage
captured the assault and corroborated the victim and
witness accounts that [Appellant and Co-Defendant]
physically attacked the victim by repeatedly punching her
about the face. At sentencing, the Commonwealth
submitted a restitution order for $5,383.88 representing the
costs associated with some of the victim’s medical
treatment.1 [Appellant and Co-Defendant] requested a
restitution hearing. The hearing took place on April 13,
2018, wherein they argued that the medical records were
incomplete and that the Commonwealth failed to establish
direct causation between the assault and the detached
retina diagnosis.[3] The Court became aware during the
hearing that the Commonwealth had received additional
medical records, prompting a continuation of the hearing.
When the parties reconvened before [the c]ourt on May 8,
2018, [Appellant and Co-Defendant] reiterated their
argument regarding lack of direct causation and also
challenged the authority of the court to order restitution
payable to Equian. Citing 18 P.S. § 11.103, [Appellant and
Co-Defendant] argued that Equian, a third-party collection
agency seeking restitution on behalf of the medical provider,
UPMC, is not statutorily allowed to receive payment. Briefs
were ordered on the issue of Equian’s eligibility and
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3 At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth indicated that the victim
needed surgery for a detached retina as a result of the assault. (See N.T.
Plea Hearing, 3/12/18, at 16). At the subsequent restitution hearing,
Appellant’s counsel asserted she had reviewed the relevant medical records
and “there was no diagnosis of a detached retina that was caused by the
criminal assault.” (Restitution Hearing, 4/13/18, at 3).
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argument took place on June 21, 2018. After argument, the
court entered a restitution order in the amount of $5,383.88
payable to Equian, finding that payment to a collection
agency designated by an entity entitled to receive
restitution, achieves the legislative purposes of the statute:
rehabilitation and punishment.
1 Additional restitution was ordered payable to the
victim to replace the eyeglasses and to the Victim’s
Compensation Fund for medical care[.]
(Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/6/18, at 2-3) (some capitalization and footnotes
omitted).
Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, arguing: 1) the
Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the amount of
actual damages suffered by the victim; 2) the record did not establish a causal
connection between the crimes and the victim’s injury; and 3) Equian was not
entitled to restitution under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1). The court denied the
post-sentence motion, and Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On
August 29, 2019, this Court vacated Appellant’s sentence and remanded the
matter for resentencing. Citing Commonwealth v. Ramos, 197 A.3d 766
(Pa.Super. 2018), we determined “the trial court erred as a matter of law by
failing to determine the amount of restitution at the original time of
sentencing[.]” Commonwealth v. Davis, No. 1048 WDA 2018, unpublished
memorandum at 4 (Pa.Super. filed August 29, 2019).
On November 13, 2019, the court resentenced Appellant to the same
aggregate term of three (3) years’ probation. The court also awarded
restitution, including $5,383.88 to Equian and $1,296.71 to the Victim’s
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Compensation Fund. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on
November 22, 2019. Again, Appellant argued that Equian was not entitled to
restitution under Section 1106(c)(1), and the Commonwealth failed to
establish a causal connection between the assault and the victim’s injury. On
December 4, 2019, the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on January 2, 2020. On January
7, 2020, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed her Rule
1925(b) statement on January 28, 2020.
Appellant now raises three issues for our review:
Was the trial court’s sentence illegal in ordering $5,383.88
in restitution to Equian, a debt collector, under the
restitution statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, when Equian was not
an entity listed under the aforementioned restitution
statute?
Was the trial court’s sentence illegal because the record
supports no causal connection between the ordered
restitution for the injury complained of, a detached retina,
and the simple assault to which [Appellant] pleaded guilty?
Was the trial court’s imposition of certain court costs on
[Appellant] improper, given that the court costs were
imposed without consideration of [Appellant’s] financial
resources and ability to pay?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3).
In her first issue, Appellant challenges the court’s award of restitution
to Equian, a third-party debt collector. Appellant contends that the definition
of “victim” in the applicable version of Section 1106 does not include corporate
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entities like Equian.4 In light of the relevant statutory language, Appellant
insists Equian is not entitled to restitution under Section 1106. Appellant
concludes that this Court must vacate that portion of the judgment of
sentence. We agree.
The relevant scope and standard of review are as follows:
We note that [i]n the context of criminal proceedings, an
order of restitution is not simply an award of damages, but,
rather, a sentence. As such, [a]n appeal from an order of
restitution based upon a claim that a restitution order is
unsupported by the record challenges the legality, rather
than the discretionary aspects, of sentencing. Accordingly,
the determination as to whether the trial court imposed an
illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review
in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary. This case
will also necessarily call upon us to engage in statutory
construction, which similarly presents a pure question of law
and also implicates the legality of … sentence. Thus, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.
Hunt, supra at 585 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The version of Section 1106 in effect at the time of Appellant’s offenses
provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) General rule.—Upon conviction for any crime
wherein … the victim suffered personal injury directly
resulting from the crime, the offender shall be sentenced to
make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed
therefor.
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4 Relevant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended
Section 1106 on October 24, 2018. However, Appellant’s criminal actions and
the entry of her guilty pleas predate the statute’s amendment. Accordingly,
we analyze the prior version of Section 1106 for Appellant’s sentencing claim.
See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 585-87 (Pa.Super. 2019).
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* * *
(c) Mandatory restitution.—
(1) The court shall order full restitution:
(i) Regardless of the current financial resources
of the defendant, so as to provide the victim with
the fullest compensation for the loss. …
(ii) If restitution to more than one person is set
at the same time, the court shall set priorities of
payment. However, when establishing priorities,
the court shall order payment in the following
order:
(A) The victim.
(B) The Crime Victim’s Compensation
Board.
(C) Any other government agency which
has provided reimbursement to the victim as
a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.
(D) Any insurance company which has
provided reimbursement to the victim as a
result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.
* * *
(h) Definitions.—As used in this section, the following
words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them
in this subsection:
* * *
“Victim.” As defined in section 479.1 of the act of April 9,
1929 (P.L. 177, No. 175), known as The Administrative
Code of 1929. The term includes the Crime Victim’s
Compensation Fund if compensation has been paid by the
Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund to the victim and any
insurance company that has compensated the victim for loss
under an insurance contract.
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18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a), (c), and (h) (repealed Oct. 24, 2018, P.L. 891, No. 145,
§ 1, effective Jan. 31, 2005) (internal footnote omitted).
Regarding the statutory reference in the definitions section, “Section
479.1, formerly codified at 71 P.S. § 180–9.1, since has been recodified in the
Crime Victims Act, 18 P.S. §§ 11.101, et seq. (the ‘CVA’).” Commonwealth
v. Veon, 637 Pa. 442, 465, 150 A.3d 435, 449 (2016). The CVA defines
“victim” as follows:
(1) A direct victim.
(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct
victim, except when the parent or legal guardian of the child
is the alleged offender.
(3) A minor child who is a material witness to any of
the following crimes and offenses under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating
to crimes and offenses) committed or attempted against a
member of the child’s family:
Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).
Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).
Section 3121 (relating to rape).
(4) A family member of a homicide victim, including
stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a
fiance, one of whom is to be identified to receive
communication as provided for in this act, except where the
family member is the alleged offender.
18 P.S. § 11.103. “A ‘[d]irect victim’ is defined by the same section as ‘[a]n
individual against whom a crime has been committed or attempted and who
as a direct result of the criminal act or attempt suffers physical or mental
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injury, death or the loss of earnings under this act.’” Veon, supra at 465,
150 A.3d at 449 (emphasis in original). In Veon, our Supreme Court
scrutinized the language in Section 11.103 and determined that it applied to
human beings only:
Notwithstanding any legislative expansion of the definition
of “victim,” it is clear that the plain text of Section 11.103
still envisages “victims” as “persons” commonly understood.
A “victim” under Section 11.103 must be “a direct victim,”
i.e., an “individual” who has suffered injury, death, or loss
of earnings; or a “child,” “parent,” “guardian,” or “family
member.” Every relevant noun unequivocally describes a
human being, not a government agency, and nowhere else
is there a relevant definition that persuades us to broaden
the common understanding of these words.
Id. at 472, 150 A.3d at 454.
In light of the holding in Veon, this Court subsequently concluded that
the inter-related definitions of “direct victim,” “individual,”
and “natural person” pursuant to the pre-amendment
version of § 1106 do not include corporate entities…. Such
a conclusion is necessitated by a plain reading of these
statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving full weight
to the Supreme Court’s discussion of these same provisions
in Veon.
Hunt, supra at 591 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Instantly, the court ordered Appellant to pay restitution to Equian.
Based upon this Court’s holding in Hunt, the definition of “victim” under the
pre-amendment version of Section 1106 does not include a corporate entity
such as Equian. Therefore, Appellant’s sentence is illegal, and we vacate the
judgment of sentence. See Veon, supra; Hunt, supra. Accordingly, we
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remand for resentencing consistent with this decision.5
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded with instructions.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/29/2021
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5 Due to our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s remaining issues.
Nevertheless, we note this Court has already addressed the causal connection
between the criminal conduct and the victim’s eye injury, as Co-Defendant
raised the same claim on appeal from her judgment of sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 1878 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum
at 6-8 (Pa.Super. filed November 30, 2020). Additionally, regarding
Appellant’s complaint that the court imposed costs without considering
Appellant’s ability to pay, there is no “requirement that a court hold an ability-
to-pay hearing before imposing court costs on the defendant at sentencing.”
Lopez, supra at 4.
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