PCS Chadaga v. Torres, A. & L. ( 2021 )

J-A07042-21
2021 PA Super 84PCS CHADAGA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
AMANDA TORRES AND LUIS :
TORRES-USECHI :
: No. 1018 MDA 2020
:
APPEAL OF: AMANDA TORRES :
Appeal from the Order Entered July 16, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
2017-CV-05480-DJ
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 04, 2021
Appellant Amanda Torres appeals from the Order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Dauphin County on July 16, 2020, granting Appellee PCS
Chadaga possession of a rental premises following Appellee’s filing of a
landlord/tenant complaint.1 We affirm.
The trial court sets forth the procedural history herein as follows:
[Appellee] commenced this landlord-tenant action by
Complaint filed September 14, 2017, following [Appellant’s]
appeal of judgment in [Appellee’s] favor before the magisterial
district court. [Appellee] alleges that [Appellant] [is] in breach of
a rental agreement for property at 35 Oak Knoll Estates, a mobile
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant previously was married to Luis Torres-Usechi who had been named
as a defendant in the Complaint. The two are now divorced, and Mr. Torres-
Usechi no longer lives on these premises and is not involved in this appeal.
Brief for Appellant at 4. Thus, we refer to Appellant in the singular throughout
this Opinion.
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home community, by [her] frequent delinquencies in rent and
failure to pay any rent since July 2017. (Complaint, para. 1-7).
[Appellee] further alleges that [Appellant] breached the terms of
the rental agreement by harassing a neighboring tenant, allowing
[her] dog to foul another tenant's property, failing to maintain
the exterior of [her] mobile home, failing to maintain exterior
landscaping, and allowing accumulation of debris. (Id., para. 9-
14), [Appellant] filed an Answer with New Matter on October 5,
2017, to which [Appellee] filed an Answer on March 18, 2019.
During the pendency of the litigation, [Appellant] made monthly
deposits of escrow funds in accordance with Dauphin County Local
Magisterial District Justice Rule 1008B.I [Appellee] periodically
filed motions for release of funds.
On March 26, 2019, following compulsory arbitration,
arbitrators found in favor of [Appellee] in the amount of $5001.00
and granted possession of the property to [Appellee]. [Appellant]
appealed. [Appellant] continued to deposit escrow funds, which
the Court released to [Appellee] upon motion.
On June 10, 2020, we conducted a bench trial. We
announced our ruling in favor of [Appellee], and the reasons
therefore, at the close of testimony. On June 30, 2020; we entered
a written order award[ing] [Appellee] the sum of $6,222.80, which
included attorneys' fees. On July 16, 2020, we ordered:
Inasmuch as [Appellee’s] Complaint seeks possession of the
premises and judgment having been granted in [Appellee’s] favor
on June 10, 2020, [Appellee’s] demand for possession is
GRANTED. (Order, July 16, 2020).
On August 3, 2020 [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal which
stated:
AND NOW, this day of August 2020 comes [Appellant], by [her]
attorneys Richard K. Konkel, Esquire and CGA Law Firm, and give
this Notice of Appeal to [the] Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
appealing the Honorable John F. Cherry's Order of Court entered
July 16, 2020, granting [Appellee’s] demand for possession
because no evictions are being permitted to go forward at this
time due to COVID -19. Copy of Order is attached.
([Appellant’s] Notice of Appeal, August 3, 2020).
Pursuant to our order to so, [Appellant] filed a Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on October 9,
2020. [Appellant] asserted that orders of the Pennsylvania
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Supreme Court and Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Wolf apply to
the within action to prohibit eviction of [Appellant].
As stated above, we set forth our findings of fact, reasoning,
and conclusions of law in open court at the conclusion of the bench
trial, specifically finding the grounds for grant of possession in
favor of [Appellee]. Those reasons render [Appellant’s] claims on
appeal meritless.
___
1Dauphin County Local Rule of Magisterial District Court Rule
10081B, Landlord and Tenant Appeals provides:
In cases where the tenant in possession of real property
desires to appeal from a judgment for the possession of
said entered by a Magisterial District Judge of the court and
does not desire to or is unable to file a bond with surety as
required by Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1008B, such tenant, upon
application to and approval by the Court, may be permitted
to deposit rental payments corning due during the
proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas in an escrow
account in a bank or trust company approved by the Court.
No withdrawals shall be permitted from any such escrow
account except pursuant to court order. At the conclusion
of the proceedings, such deposits shall be applied to the
payment of any judgment (Including costs) against the
tenant rendered on appeal,
Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/4/20, at 1-3.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court stated the following on
the record:
Well, I've listened to the evidence and these things are
never pleasant because [Appellant] is a decent, hard-working
woman. She's owned the home since 2008. She admitted that
she's in violation. She needs to replace the porch and repair the
skirting and that she's been paying rent into escrow.
She also admitted that she was given notice to get rid of
the dog and obviously she didn't comply. Of course, those are
very hard things to do.
Nonetheless, there is a history here of nonpayment. And
the balance due is $6,222.80, roughly 2,400 of that attorney
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fees, which brings us to around 3,800 in past due rent and that's
for a long period of time.
These and other issues involving the property, particularly
payment problem since 2013 but particularly now it appears to
be $3,800 in rent for that lot due and – which would amount to
around three years of rent with attorney fees of $2,399.50.
I find for [Appellee] in the amount of $6,222.80. As I
indicated, the attorney fees are included in that fee, Thank you.
N.T. Bench Trial, 6/10/20, at 33-34.2
In her brief, Appellant presents the following question for this Court’s
review:
Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by granting possession of the
premises at issue by its Order dated July 16, 2020, when an
Executive Order of the Governor of Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania was in effect which extended the evictions and
foreclosures moratorium through August 31, 2020, and that the
Governor's Executive Order applied to the Landlord/Tenant Act
of 1951 and the Manufactured Home Community Rights Act,
which is the Act under which the present case was brought?
Brief for Appellant at 3.
Before we determine the merits of this issue, we first consider whether
Appellant has preserved it for appellate review.
To preserve a claim of error for appellate review, a party must make a
specific objection to the alleged error before the trial court in a timely fashion
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2 In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, after finding no merit to Appellant’s appeal, the
trial court stressed Appellant’s failure to request a transcript of the Bench Trial
and include it in the certified record as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1911 impeded
its ability to consider any issues Appellant raised on appeal and, therefore,
rendered them waived. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/4/20, at 3-4.
However, Appellant filed a supplemental record containing the transcripts of
the proceeding and corresponding exhibits on December 24, 2020, and
provided this Court with those documents for our review.
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and at the appropriate stage of the proceedings; failure to raise such objection
results in waiver of the underlying issue on appeal. Commonwealth v. May,
584 Pa. 640, 887 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 832, 127 S.Ct. 58,
166 L.Ed.2d 54 (2006) (reiterating absence of specific and contemporaneous
objection to error waives issue on appeal); Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 555
Pa. 125, 723 A.2d 162 (1999) (explaining if ground upon which objection is
based is specifically stated, all other reasons for its exclusion are waived).
Additionally, “the law is clear that issues, even those of constitutional
dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different
theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 646 Pa. 735, 187 A.3d 210 (2018); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
At the outset of the June 10, 2020, bench trial, trial counsel and the trial
court engaged in the following exchange:
Attorney Konkel: Your Honor, I do have a motion to make
preliminarily, oral motion. Your Honor, making a motion to stay
this proceeding based on the governor’s order staying all
evictions, foreclosures, and such actions until July the 11th.
THE COURT: Well, this [c]ourt has an administrative order
that as of June 1st, any landlord/tenant actions were to continue
–were to begin. And so based on your motion—and there is a
Supreme Court order May 11th indicating that all landlord/tenant
actions may proceed—so based on all that, your motion is denied.
Attorney Konkel: Thank you.
N.T. Bench Trial 6/10/20, at 3-4.
As the foregoing evinces, while Appellant initially requested a stay of
the proceeding based on Governor Wolf’s Executive Order, she neither
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specified the basis upon which she deemed that Order applied to the within
matter nor did she object to the trial court’s explanation of its decision to
continue with the proceeding. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we find
Appellant's failure to object in a timely and specific manner to the trial court’s
decision to continue with the landlord/tenant action she now challenges,
coupled with her acquiescence in the trial court’s explanation for its decision
to proceed, has resulted in her waiver of the issue raised on appeal.
Notwithstanding, even if we were to deem Appellant’s claim properly
preserved for our review, it would afford her no relief. In 2020, Governor Wolf
issued consecutive Executive Orders, pursuant to his emergency powers under
the Emergency Code, that barred landlords from evicting residential tenants
for defaulting on their rent obligations or overstaying the terms of their
residential leases until further notice. See Order of the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for Staying the Notice Requirements for
Certain Actions Related to the Dispossession of Property (May 7, 2020),
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/upolads/ 2020/05/2020057-TWW-
dispossession-of-property-order.pdf; Order of the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Staying Notice Requirements for Specified
Actions Related to the Dispossession of Property (July 9, 2020),
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200709TWW-
eviction-order.pdf.
Section 4 of the July Order, entitled “Scope of Order,” specifically
provides in relevant part that:
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The provisions of this Order and the suspension of the Acts under
this Order apply only to matters involving the nonpayment of
monies as well as to those proceedings related to the removal of
any tenant solely because the tenant has held over or exceeded
the term of a lease. The Order does not apply to suspend notice
requirements relating to evictions for breaches of any other
covenants.
See id.Herein, Appellant’s eviction for maintenance violations and possession
of a dog pertain to breaches of covenants other than rent payment. In
addition, these violations predated and were in no way caused by the
pandemic. Therefore, Appellant’s position on appeal that her eviction was
prohibited by Governor Wolf’s Executive Orders does not present an
appealable issue under the plain terms thereof. Appellant does not advance
any other viable theory of recovery. Instead, she asks this Court to interpret
the Governor’s Orders in a manner which would be clearly inconsistent with
their stated terms and purpose.
As such, absent waiver, Appellant’s issue would lack merit. In light of
all of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s July 16, 2020, Order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/04/2021
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