Charney, D. v. Reitz, J. ( 2018 )

J-S12029-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DOUGLAS C. CHARNEY, SON & IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
D’ARCY C. WAGONHURST, DECEASED,
Appellant
v.
JENNA REITZ AND FRIENDS OF PEACE
CHURCH, INC.,
Appellees No. 1573 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order entered September 21, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County,
Civil Division, at No(s): 2015-03977.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2018
Douglas Charney, on behalf of himself and the estate of his mother,
D‘Arcy Wagonhurst, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the causes of action
he filed against Friends of Peace Church, Inc. (FOPC). 1 After careful review,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
____________________________________________
1 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Friends of Peace
Church, Inc. Jenna Reitz did not file for summary judgment. Because the
trial court order was not a final order, as defined by Pa.R.A.P. 341(b),
Charney filed an Application for Determination of Finality Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). The trial court issued an order indicating that this order
was a final order and that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of
the entire case. Accordingly, we will proceed with a decision in this matter.
J-S12029-18
This case stems from a fatal car accident on December 7, 2014, when
Jenna Reitz fatally struck 84-year-old D’Arcy Wagonhurst, as Ms.
Wagonhurst was crossing the street to attend a Christmas program at her
church, FOPC. FOPC does not have adequate parking; it is undisputed that
the church has only four (4) paved parking spots on site. As a result, FOPC
instructed visitors to park across the street in a private commercial lot. This
has gone on for decades. When visitors park at the commercial lot, they
must walk across St. John’s Church Road, which has very heavy traffic.
At various times, FOPC undertook safety measures to assist those
crossing the street. On occasion, they gained assistance with traffic control
from local police or firemen. They also used four reflective safety cones to
aid people crossing the street. FOPC used the cones on the night of the
accident. The location of the cones, on that night, is in dispute.
Mr. Charney raises one issue on appeal: Whether summary judgment
was inappropriate as to FOPC, because the undisputed facts establish that
the FOPC voluntarily assumed a duty of care for attendees.
Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying
summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial
court's order will be reversed only when it is established that the court
committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Englert v. Fazio Mech.
Services, Inc., 932 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations
omitted).
-2-
J-S12029-18
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record clearly shows
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2. The reviewing
court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact against the moving party. Englert, 932 A.2d at 124. Only
when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not differ can a trial
court properly enter summary judgment. Id.
The trial court granted summary judgment based on this Court’s
decision in Newell v. Montana W. Inc., 154 A.3d 819 (Pa.Super. 2017),
which involved similar, but not identical, facts. In that case, Victor Newell
was attending a concert at Montana West, a nightclub located on the side of
a four-lane state highway maintained by the Commonwealth. Id. Without
permission of DHL Machine Company, Newell parked his car on its property,
across the highway from Montana West. Id. While crossing the highway to
return to his car, Newell was hit and killed by a vehicle driving on the
highway. Id. Newell’s estate sued Montana West, and the trial court,
granting summary judgment, found that Montana West owed no duty to
Newell. Id.
In this case, the trial court found the facts to be substantially similar to
Newell and likewise granted summary judgment. The trial court concluded
that FOPC owed no duty to Ms. Wagonhurst.
-3-
J-S12029-18
On appeal, Mr. Carney argues, that the facts of Newell are
distinguishable from this case, because, here, FOPC voluntarily assumed a
duty to protect pedestrians who parked across the street. In so doing, he
claims FOPC may be held liable if it was negligent in fulfilling that duty. We
agree.
In Newell, a panel of this Court held that Montana West had no duty
to protect the safety of those who parked across the street. We thoroughly
addressed three key issues in that case. First, we determined that a
landowner owed no duty to pedestrians on adjoining roadways. Id. at 823-
827. Second, we concluded that a landowner owed no duty to provide
adequate parking on its premises. Id. at 827-836. Finally, we found the
landowner did not voluntarily assume a duty by employing prior safety
measures. Id. at 836–39.
Significantly, with respect to this third issue, the complaint in Newell
did not allege that Montana West voluntarily assumed a duty of care.
Rather, it alleged that Montana West “failed to do anything to protect its
customers who were crossing the street to [its] business.” We concluded
that the evidence failed to show any consistent or ongoing pattern of
conduct by Montana West to voluntarily undertake safety precautions
regarding invitees parking outside its premises. Id. at 837.
In Newell, we also noted that occasional past voluntary measures to
protect patrons did not change the application of the no-duty rule. Id. at
837-38 (citing Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 688 (R.I. 1994), where a
-4-
J-S12029-18
church did not assume a duty to request traffic control by the police or to
warn parishioners of danger, because it sometimes requested such traffic
control services in the past).
Finally, in Newell, we looked at Section 323 of THE RESTATEMENT
SECOND OF TORTS, which provides that if someone voluntarily undertakes to
render services to another for their protection, that person is liable for
negligence in performing the duty that it voluntarily assumed. 2 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has adopted Section 323. See Feld v.
Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 746-47 (Pa. 1984). The Supreme Court
emphasized, however, that an invitee “may rely upon a program of
protection only within the reasonable expectations of the program” that the
person voluntarily provided. Id. at 747. Thus, if a business voluntarily
offers its invitees services in addition to those that it has a legal duty to
provide, the business may be held liable for negligent provision of those
____________________________________________
2 Section 323 provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the
other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,
or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323.
-5-
J-S12029-18
services only to the extent of the business’ voluntary undertaking, beyond
which it has no duty. See, e.g., Kerns v. Methodist Hosp., 574 A.2d 1068
(Pa. Super. 1990). We noted in Newell that, under Section 323, the mere
fact that a party gratuitously provides a service does not obligate that party
to continue to provide the service indefinitely and that the party is free to
abandon the undertaking. Newell, 154 A.3d at 838, citing THE RESTATEMENT
SECOND OF TORTS § 323, comment c.
Applying this rule to the facts, we concluded in Newell that Montana
West did not voluntarily assume a duty to protect its invitees from accidents
on the adjacent highway. Even if Montana West engaged in some protective
conduct on some sporadic prior occasions, such conduct did not rise to the
level of voluntary assumption of a legal duty that obligated Montana West to
provide protective services at all later events. Additionally, we found no
evidence of any promise or undertaking by Montana West to Newell, implicit
or otherwise, to provide him personally with safe passage to and from the
nearby property or to protect him from an accident on the highway if he
parked across the street.
Here, Mr. Charney argues that the facts demonstrate that FOPC
voluntarily assumed a duty to its visitors who parked across the street.
First, unlike in Newell, where Montana West attempted to dissuade its
patrons from parking across the street, FOPC encouraged its visitors to park
across the street. FOPC instructed visitors to use the parking lot across St.
John’s Church Road. Second, FOPC utilized reflective traffic cones on St
-6-
J-S12029-18
John’s Church Road. Mr. Charney argues that the use of traffic cones at
every event since they were purchased, ironically by Ms. Wagonhurst,
demonstrates an undertaking to protect visitors of FOPC. Use of the cones
on a regular basis, he alleges, unequivocally establishes a consistent or
ongoing pattern of conduct to voluntarily undertake safety precautions
regarding invitees parking in the lot across the street. Third, FOPC hired an
employee whose duties included, among other things, assisting patrons in
crossing St. John’s Church Road. This employee was working on the night of
the accident. We believe these facts distinguish this case from Newell, and
establish that FOPC voluntarily undertook a duty to assist those who parked
in the lot across the street from the church.3 Thus, we conclude that FOPC
owed a duty to Ms. Wagonhurst on the night of her accident.
Additionally, Mr. Charney suggests that the use of volunteers in the
past and prior requests for officer support also distinguish this case from
Newell, and give rise to the assumption of a duty on the part of FOPC. We
disagree with this argument. As the court noted in Newell, the mere fact
____________________________________________
3 Mr. Charney also argued that the FOPC board of directors attempted to
undertake additional steps to aid visitors in safely crossing St. John’s Church
Road. They had discussions about placing signs, installing a crosswalk and
requesting volunteer firemen or police to aid in traffic control. For various
reasons, FOPC was prevented from taking any affirmative action to alert
drivers, other than using the traffic cones. Essentially, any additional or
permanent measures were prohibited by PennDOT. We are not persuaded
that any of these additional actions gave rise to a duty on behalf of FOPC.
-7-
J-S12029-18
that a party gratuitously provides a service does not obligate that party to
continue to provide the service indefinitely and that the party is free to
abandon the undertaking. Newell, 154 A.3d at 838. (citing Rest. 2d Torts,
323, comment c.).
Nonetheless, we conclude that the FOPC undertook sufficient steps to
voluntarily assume a duty to protect its visitors who parked in the lot across
St. John’s Church Road on the night of the accident. This duty started when
FOPC instructed its visitors to park in this lot. This fact, alone, might not
create a duty on the part of FOPC. See Newell, 154 A.3d at 829-30.4
However, this, coupled with the additional facts that FOPC hired an
employee to assist in ensuring the safety of pedestrians, and used reflective
traffic cones regularly, including on the night in question, suggests FOPC
undertook “a consistent or ongoing pattern of conduct to voluntarily protect
invitees who parked across the street.” Newell, 154 A.3d at 837. Thus,
whether it acted negligently in undertaking these duties on the night Ms.
Wagonhurst was killed created a question of fact for the jury to decide.
Wilson v. PECO Energy Co., 61 A.3d 229, 233 (Pa. Super. 2012) (whether
____________________________________________
4 In Newell, this Court cited with approval a New York case, where the court
found no duty on the part of a funeral home whose employee instructed
patrons to park at a lot across the street. Id. at 829-830 (citing Santoleri
v. Knightly, 663 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty, 1997). In Santoleri,
the court held patrons who were injured when they were struck crossing the
street had no cause of action against the funeral home. Santoleri, 663
N.Y.S.2d at 506, 508.
-8-
J-S12029-18
a defendant exercised reasonable care in the performance of a duty under
section 323 is a question for the jury).
Although the facts here are somewhat similar to Newell, they differ
significantly, because, unlike Montana West, FOPC regularly undertook
actions to assist visitors when crossing the street. Therefore, we are
constrained to reverse the decision of the trial court in this matter, with
respect to the issue of whether FOPC owed a duty to pedestrians, like Ms.
Wagonhurst, and remand for a jury trial consistent with this memorandum.
In its counterstatement of issues on appeal, FOPC asks that, if we
reverse the trial court’s decision regarding lack of a legal duty, we affirm the
dismissal of Mr. Charney’s claim for punitive damages against FOPC.
Although FOPC requested summary judgment on the claim for punitive
damages, the trial court did not rule on this issue, because it granted
summary judgment on the no-duty argument. As the trial judge failed to
rule on this issue, we are unable to address it in this appeal.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/20/18
-9-