Com. v. Hawkins, Q. ( 2021 )

J-S55006-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
QUYDEEM JAMALL HAWKINS :
:
Appellant : No. 447 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0000215-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: May 11, 2021
Quydeem Jamall Hawkins appeals from the judgment of sentence of life
imprisonment imposed after a jury convicted him of assault by life prisoner,
assault by prisoner, aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”), and disorderly conduct, and the trial
court convicted him of summary harassment. We affirm.
On August 20, 2018, while serving a life sentence at SCI Fayette for the
2013 murder of Khaalid Boyd, Appellant participated in a prison fight in the
facility’s 300-inmate dining hall.1 He was observed wielding a dining tray and
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 As the parties stipulated that Appellant “is an inmate incarcerated for a life
sentence that has not been commuted,” the certified record does not reveal
the details of the conviction that led to the imposition of the life sentence. We
previously identified the victim in our memorandum affirming the murder
conviction. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 144 A.3d 199 (Pa.Super.
2016) (unpublished memorandum at 1).
J-S55006-20
swinging it at other inmates. Several correctional officers responded to the
scuffle, but Appellant continued to be aggressive and grappled with Officer
William Pletcher, Jr., who was the first officer on the scene. Sergeant David
Zebrowski came to Officer Pletcher’s assistance and while the two guards
attempted to subdue the prisoner, Appellant struck Sergeant Zebrowski on
the head with a weapon fashioned from a plastic dining cup that had been
melted and sharpened to a point. The blow to Sergeant Zebrowski’s head
opened a wound that required five sutures to close and left him scarred.
Additional officers arrived and eventually restrained Appellant. They
seized the hand-crafted weapon that is commonly referred to as a prison
shank. Officer Andrew Jennings was among the officers who responded to the
fracas. As he helped escort Appellant to the medical unit, Appellant spit on
Officer Jennings’s arm.
Based on the foregoing events, the Commonwealth charged Appellant
with five counts of assault-related offenses and disorderly conduct in relation
to Sergeant Zebrowski and one count each of aggravated harassment and
disorderly conduct stemming from his interaction with Officer Jennings. At
the subsequent jury trial, during which Appellant was removed due to his
disruptive outbursts, the Commonwealth presented, inter alia, the surveillance
video depicting the assault and the testimony of Sergeant Zebrowski, Officer
Pletcher, and Officer Jennings. Appellant did not present any evidence.
The jury convicted Appellant of the six offenses relating to Sergeant
Zebrowski and acquitted him of aggravated harassment and disorderly
-2-
J-S55006-20
conduct related to the spitting incident. As noted, the trial court convicted
Appellant of summary harassment.
On December 11, 2019, the trial court imposed the statutorily mandated
sentence of life imprisonment for aggravated assault by a life prisoner.2 The
sentence was imposed concurrent with the life sentence that Appellant was
currently serving. No further penalty was imposed on the remaining
conviction. The trial court permitted an appeal nunc pro tunc. Appellant
complied with the ensuing order to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents six issues for our review:
1. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the
crime of assault by life prisoner.
2. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the
crime of assault by prisoner.
3. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the
crime of aggravated assault.
4. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the
crime of simple assault.
____________________________________________
2 The court initially imposed ten to twenty years of incarceration for assault
by life prisoner; however, following the Commonwealth’s post-trial motion,
the court vacated that sentence and imposed a second term of life
imprisonment, which is the mandatory penalty for that offense. See
18 Pa.C.S. § 2704 (“[T]he penalty for which shall be the same as the penalty
for murder of the second degree.”).
-3-
J-S55006-20
5. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the
crime of recklessly endangering another person.
6. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to
prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the
crime of disorderly conduct.
Appellant’s brief at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We apply the following standard of review of Appellant’s assertion that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict against him:
[W]e examine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the
jury’s finding of all the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 151 A.3d 662, 664 (Pa.Super. 2016).
Appellant’s first five issues all relate to the necessary mens rea for the
respective offenses. Stated plainly, he argues that the Commonwealth failed
to adduce evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that he
possessed the necessary intent to commit the various forms of assault, REAP,
and disorderly conduct relating to Sergeant Zebrowski. As to all but the
disorderly conduct conviction, he recycles a single argument, i.e., that he
struck Sergeant Zebrowski unintentionally as a consequence of “being tackled
by several officers at once and being pushed backwards.” Appellant’s brief at
10. He attempts to support this contention by highlighting that the blow did
not prevent the officers from restraining him, that Sergeant Zebrowski only
become cognizant of the injury when he observed the blood, and “there was
-4-
J-S55006-20
no evidence or testimony of record that Appellant voluntarily moved his hand
down to strike the victim[.]” Id. The common thread among all of Appellant’s
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assault convictions
is that assault requires a voluntary movement that is intentional, knowing, or
reckless, an element that he asserts is missing in this case. Id. For the
following reasons, we disagree.
First, we observe that Appellant’s references to the effects of the assault
on Sergeant Zebrowski or the officers’ ability to restrain Appellant are wholly
irrelevant to the determination regarding whether the Commonwealth
established the necessary element of intent. Moreover, in contrast to
Appellant’s contentions, the certified record supports the inference that
Appellant acted with volition.
In order to convict Appellant of assault by life prisoner, assault by
prisoner3, aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP, the Commonwealth
was required to established beyond a reasonable doubt that, inter alia,
Appellant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2702(a) Aggravated assault (“attempts to cause serious bodily injury to
another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life”);18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 Simple assault (“attempts to cause or intentionally,
____________________________________________
3 When committed against a correctional officer, assault by prisoner, is an
assault with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means or force likely
to produce bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2703(a)(1)(ii).
-5-
J-S55006-20
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another”); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705
REAP (“A person commits [REAP] if he recklessly engages in conduct which
places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.”).
The integral component of assault by life prisoner is that the prisoner-
assailant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or instrument.
A person is guilty of that central offense if he or she “attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly under the circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). The Pennsylvania Crimes Code
defines “serious bodily injury” as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2301. Use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to
establish intent to cause serious bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Nichols,
692 A.2d 181, 184 (Pa.Super. 1991).
REAP and simple assault are lesser-included offenses of aggravated
assault, and evidence sufficient to prove aggravated assault is sufficient to
prove those offenses as well. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 A.2d 429,
432 (Pa.Super. 1992) (elements of REAP and simple assault are met by a
conviction for aggravated assault).
In rejecting Appellant’s argument, the trial court explained as follows:
-6-
J-S55006-20
Here, the prison shank that [Appellant] used to strike
Sergeant Zebrowski was clearly a deadly weapon. The way in
which the shank was made-formed by melting a dining hall cup to
a sharp point and then adding cloth around the handle-also shows
that [Appellant] premeditated an assault with such instrument.
Bringing the shank with him into the dining hall is further evidence
that Mr. Hawkins planned an assault. [Appellant] then in fact used
that weapon to strike Sergeant Zebrowski in the head after being
involved in a fight with another inmate. Although Sergeant
Zebrowski’s injury did not itself constitute a serious bodily injury,
an Aggravated Assault only requires that an attempt was made to
cause such an injury. Because [Appellant] used a deadly weapon
on a vital part of Sergeant Zebrowski’s body, it was proper for the
jury to conclude that Mr. Hawkins intended to commit the
Aggravated Assault-and therefore Assault by a Life Prisoner-on
Sergeant Zebrowski.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/20, at 6.
The certified record supports the trial court’s factual findings and legal
rationale. During the jury trial, Pennsylvania State Trooper Melinda Churney
testified about the criminal investigation of the assault. She described the
collection of evidence, including the weapon that she identified as a “shank”
and described as “a six and a half inch melted dining hall cup which is
sharpened to a point with a cloth handle.” N.T., 10/9/19, at 82. Similarly,
Corrections Officer Casey Morrison described the weapon that was confiscated
following the assault as “a plastic shank with a cloth handle wrapped around
it.” Id. at 77. Officer Morrison further explained that, it was “an inmate dining
hall cup [that was] melt[ed] down and then mold[ed] . . . into a sharp . . .
pointed object[.]” Id. at 79. The officer continued, “they will sharpen it down
on the floor [or] anything they can kind of rub it against to get it to a point.”
Id.
-7-
J-S55006-20
Sergeant Zebrowski, the victim, has fifteen and one-half years of
experience as a correctional officer at SCI Fayette. Id. at 54. He testified
that he first observed the shank, which he correctly assumed to be a weapon,
in Appellant’s right hand while Appellant was grappling with Officer Pletcher.
Id. 55-57. As Sergeant Zebrowski joined the fray, Appellant hit him on the
right side of the forehead with the shank. Id. at 56. After securing Appellant,
Sergeant Zebrowski discovered that he was bleeding from the area where he
had been struck by Appellant. Id. Sergeant Zebrowski was transported to
an urgent care facility in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, where physicians used five
sutures to close the wound, which left him scarred. Id. at 59.
While it is plausible that Appellant inadvertently slashed at Sergeant
Zebrowski’s face with the knife-like shank that he brandished during his scuffle
with the correctional officers, the jury, as the ultimate arbiter of fact, flatly
rejected that proposition. Instead, the jury credited the foregoing evidence
favoring the inference that Appellant attempted to injure Sergeant Zebrowski
by striking him in the head with a sharp weapon. Although the resulting injury
did not prove to be life-threatening, the fact that Appellant did not wield the
shank more effectively does not negate the inference that it was intended to
cause serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Rightley, 617 A.2d
1289, 1296 (Pa.Super. 1992) (“The mere fact that defendant could have
employed his ‘instrumentality’ more effectively, as the trial court intimates,
does not preclude” factfinder from inferring that he intended to cause serious
bodily injury.); Nichols, supra at 184 (use of deadly weapon on vital part of
-8-
J-S55006-20
body is sufficient to establish intent to cause serious bodily harm). Hence,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, the foregoing evidence was sufficient to satisfy the mens rea for
aggravated assault—attempts to cause serious bodily injury, and therefore the
evidence was legally sufficient to convict Appellant of assault by life prisoner,
which subsumes aggravated assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2704 (a life prisoner
“who commits an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or instrument
upon another, or by any means of force likely to produce serious bodily injury,
is guilty of [assault by life prisoner]”).
Similarly, since the elements of simple assault and REAP are met by a
conviction for aggravated assault, the instant evidence also supports those
convictions. See Brown, supra at 432. In addition, Appellant’s violent
behavior toward Sergeant Zebrowski also constitutes assault by prisoner. Id.
at 431-32 (“flinging fecal matter into the face of a prison guard . . . constitutes
an assault by a means or force likely to produce serious bodily injury” that
supports conviction for assault by prisoner).
As to Appellant’s final argument, which concerns the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the disorderly conduct verdict, Appellant asserts that the
Commonwealth failed to establish that “he intended to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk of a
hazardous or physically offensive condition.” Appellant’s brief at 13. The
familiar refrain underlying this argument is that Appellant was not in control
-9-
J-S55006-20
of the situation when he participated in the prison altercation and then
assaulted Sergeant Zebrowski. Id. Again, we disagree.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides,
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating
a risk thereof, he:
(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous
behavior;
(2) makes unreasonable noise;
(3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any
act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a).
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing evidence presented by Sergeant
Zebrowski and Officer Pletcher established that Appellant engaged in fighting
or violent and tumultuous behavior and created a hazardous condition by acts
that served no legitimate purpose. In summary, during the ordeal, Appellant
fought other inmates in a crowded prison dining hall, wrestled with Officer
Pletcher as the officer attempted to maintain order, and cut Sergeant
Zebrowski’s head with a prison shank. This evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Appellant either 1) intended to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm; 2) recklessly created a risk of triggering one or more of
those conditions; or 3) recklessly risked creating a hazardous or physically
offensive condition through actions that serve no legitimate purpose. See
- 10 -
J-S55006-20
Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. Super. 1990)
(explaining, “hazardous condition” involves danger or risk of potential injury
and “physically offensive condition” encompasses direct assaults on physical
senses); Commonwealth v. Roth, 531 A.2d 1133, 1137 (Pa.Super. 1987)
(“When Appellants proceeded to disrupt the Church services, albeit peaceably,
they in reality engendered a ‘hazardous’ condition. Appellant’s conduct of
moving towards the Church’s property certainly created a dangerous situation
in which altercations between the demonstrators and Church members could
have occurred.”). Hence, we reject Appellant’s assertion that the
Commonwealth failed to establish the mens rea for disorderly conduct.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2021
- 11 -