Com. v. Johnson, J. ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • J-S66034-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee               :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    JUSTIN JUAN JOHNSON,                    :
    :
    Appellant              :   No. 803 WDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 8, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-37-CR-0001512-2011
    BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                FILED DECEMBER 22, 2015
    Justin Juan Johnson (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on
    May 8, 2015, which granted in part and denied in part his petition filed
    pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    We affirm in part and vacate in part.
    Following convictions for attempted criminal homicide, aggravated
    assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, Appellant was
    sentenced to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years of imprisonment.        This
    Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 17, 2013.
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    82 A.3d 1069
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished
    memorandum). Although Appellant requested that his counsel file a petition
    for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court, counsel failed to do so.
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S66034-15
    Appellant pro se timely filed a PCRA petition seeking restoration of his
    right to file post-sentence motions and a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. After
    numerous substitutions of counsel and continuances, counsel filed an
    amended petition on February 17, 2015. Therein, Appellant incorporated his
    pro se petition by reference, and also sought a new trial based upon multiple
    allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
    Following a hearing, the PCRA court entered an order reinstating
    Appellant’s direct appeal rights in the form of allowing him to file a petition
    for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    and dismissing “[a]ll other requests for relief” stated in the original and
    amended PCRA petitions.      Order, 5/11/2015, at 2.      Notably, the court did
    not inform Appellant as to the deadline for filing his petition for allowance of
    appeal nunc pro tunc. Additionally, in the opinion the PCRA court authored
    in support of its order, the court, inter alia, rejected Appellant’s requests for
    a new trial based upon his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, relying
    upon the reasons stated in its opinion authored for Appellant’s first appeal to
    this Court. PCRA Court Opinion, 7/16/2015, at 5-6.
    Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and, following a court order, a
    statement of errors complained of on appeal.          In both filings, Appellant
    claimed that the PCRA court erred in failing to reinstate his direct appeal
    rights as to issues prior counsel failed to raise in his brief to this Court.
    Concise Statement of Errors, 5/26/2015; Appellant’s Brief at 10.
    -2-
    J-S66034-15
    The Commonwealth did not appeal the PCRA court’s order,1 and
    Appellant has not rejected the PCRA court’s allowing him to file a nunc pro
    tunc petition in our Supreme Court. To the contrary, Appellant states that
    he has appealed the portion of the order denying his remaining claims “prior
    to filing his appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, unless this Honorable
    Court directs him otherwise.” Statement of Jurisdiction, 8/11/2015.       This
    Court now directs him otherwise.
    With his original direct appeal rights reinstated, Appellant’s judgment
    of sentence is not final, and all additional PCRA claims are premature. See
    Commonwealth v. Seay, 
    814 A.2d 1240
    , 1241 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (“Inasmuch as Appellant’s direct appeal is still pending…, it is patently clear
    that this PCRA petition is premature.”); Commonwealth v. Kubis, 
    808 A.2d 196
    , 198 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“Appellant filed a premature PCRA petition
    … while his direct appeal was still pending. The PCRA provides petitioners
    with a means of collateral review, but has no applicability until the judgment
    of sentence becomes final.”).
    Indeed, when the PCRA court determined that Appellant was entitled
    to file nunc pro tunc a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court,
    it should have refrained from addressing the merits of Appellant’s remaining
    claims, as Appellant is unable to appeal the disposition of those PCRA claims
    at this time.    Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    868 A.2d 578
    , 580 (Pa. Super.
    1
    The Commonwealth has not even filed a brief in this Court.
    -3-
    J-S66034-15
    2005) (“Because the PCRA court granted Appellant reinstatement of his
    appellate rights nunc pro tunc, its consideration of Appellant's additional
    issue did not result in a disposition Appellant could appeal.”).       At this
    juncture Appellant must exhaust his direct appeal rights prior to litigating
    any other PCRA claims.
    Therefore, we affirm that portion of the PCRA court’s order that
    granted Appellant leave to file nunc pro tunc a petition for allowance of
    appeal to our Supreme Court, and vacate that portion of the order that
    disposed of Appellant’s remaining PCRA claims. Appellant has 30 days from
    the date of this memorandum to file, nunc pro tunc, a petition for allowance
    of appeal to our Supreme Court.2 Upon the conclusion of Appellant’s original
    direct appeal, Appellant may exercise his rights under the PCRA to attack
    collaterally that final judgment of sentence.
    Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    2
    As we noted above, the order restoring Appellant’s right to file a direct
    appeal did not indicate that Appellant had to file a petition of allowance of
    appeal within 30 days of the court’s order to initiate a timely-filed direct
    appeal nunc pro tunc. Had the PCRA court instructed Appellant to file the
    nunc pro tunc petition within 30 days of the court’s order, our decision to
    allow Appellant to pursue his petition for allowance of appeal, at least
    arguably, would not be available to this Court. See Commonwealth v.
    Wright, 
    846 A.2d 730
    , 734-35 (Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that an
    appellant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order granting
    the reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc but further observing
    that the order granting those rights must inform the appellant that he or she
    has to file the notice of appeal within 30 days).
    -4-
    J-S66034-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/22/2015
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 803 WDA 2015

Filed Date: 12/22/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/22/2015