Com. v. Snyder, W. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM JOSEPH SNYDER
Appellant No. 1933 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed October 7, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County
Criminal Division at No: CP-18-CR-0000275-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2017
Appellant, William Joseph Snyder, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed on October 7, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Clinton County after entering a plea of guilty to the third-degree murder of
his wife and abuse of her corpse, as well as two counts of tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence and one count of unsworn falsification to
authorities.1 Appellant contends his aggregate sentence, while within the
standard range and consistent with his plea agreement, was excessive and
failed to consider his rehabilitative needs. Following review, we affirm.
The affidavit of probable cause in this case reflects that Appellant
strangled his wife Kelley Jo at their Renovo, Pennsylvania home on Easter
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18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 5510, 4910(2), and 4904(b).
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Sunday afternoon, April 5, 2015, while their children were in the home. He
placed her body in a sleeping bag in the basement of the home and then
drove the body to nearby Halls Run, dragging it down over an embankment
so that her feet were touching the water at Halls Run. Appellant then
proceeded to a nearby restaurant where he left the sleeping bag in the
restaurant’s dumpster. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/15/15, at 2.
The following day, Appellant contacted the Pennsylvania State Police to
report his wife missing. On April 9, he reported that he had received a
ransom note requesting payment of $60,000. On April 10, he showed his
pastor an email on his cell phone directing him to procced to a local
restaurant immediately or Kelley Jo would be killed. He told the pastor he
intended to go to the restaurant, but instead fled the area. He was
subsequently detained in Horseheads, New York. Upon his return to Renovo,
Appellant admitted sending the email and fabricating the ransom note. He
then admitted to taking his wife’s body to a remote location outside South
Renovo and leaving her body there before reporting her missing to law
enforcement, knowing she was dead. Id. at 1.
At Appellant’s guilty plea hearing on December 30, 2015, the
Commonwealth explained the terms of Appellant’s negotiated plea.
Appellant would plead guilty to third degree murder with a prior record score
of zero and an offense gravity score of 14. The standard range would be 72
months to the statutory limit of 20 years, with a 40-year maximum. The
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Commonwealth noted its agreement to the standard range sentence and
acknowledged the trial court would determine where within the range the
sentence would be appropriate. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Guilty Plea
Hearing, 12/30/15, at 5-6.
Appellant would also enter a guilty plea to the remaining charges:
abuse of corpse, a second-degree misdemeanor with an offense gravity
score of 3 and a standard range of restorative sanctions (“RS”) to one
month; two counts of tampering with and fabricating evidence,
misdemeanors of the second degree with an offense gravity score of 2 and a
standard range of RS; and one count of unsworn falsification, a
misdemeanor of the third degree with an offense gravity score of 2 and a
standard range of RS. The agreement on each of those charges was to a
standard range sentence. There was no agreement as to whether the
sentences would be consecutive or concurrent. Id. at 6-7.
The trial court then addressed Appellant, summarizing the terms of the
plea agreement as to each charge and the potential maximum sentence
Appellant could face. Id. at 9-19. Appellant acknowledged that the trial
court summarized the plea agreement as Appellant understood it. Id. at 19.
Appellant then entered his guilty pleas to all five counts and the trial court
found that the pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
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Id. at 20-22. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and the
scheduling of the sentencing hearing. Id. at 27.2
At Appellant’s October 7, 2016 sentencing hearing, statements were
presented by Kelley Jo’s relatives and by Appellant’s relatives. Appellant
also addressed the trial court on his own behalf, explaining that he suffered
from psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress syndrome
(“PTSD”), stemming from his military service as part of a communications
team in Iraq. He explained that an argument with Kelley Jo escalated on the
day she died, causing him to lose perspective of what was happening and to
panic. He did not want his kids to see what happened so he covered it up.
He regretted not calling 9-1-1 immediately. Notes of Testimony,
Sentencing, 10/7/16, at 35-42.
The trial court sentenced Appellant to a minimum of 240 months and
maximum of 480 months at SCI Camp Hill for third-degree murder. For
abuse of corpse, the trial court imposed a sentence of imprisonment of one
month to 24 months at SCI Camp Hill, consecutive to the sentence for
murder. Id. at 53-54. On the remaining charges, the trial court imposed a
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During a sidebar, the prosecutor noted on the record that “part of the
initial plea negotiation at the preliminary hearing included the fact that if
[Appellant] did not enter a guilty plea to the charges [at the guilty plea
hearing] and elected to go to trial, that the Commonwealth would be able to
amend the information to include [a] murder in the first degree count
without necessity of going back to further preliminary hearing.” N.T., Guilty
Plea Hearing, 12/30/15, at 26. Counsel for Appellant acknowledged that
agreement. Id.
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sentence of 24 months’ probation for each charge of tampering with or
fabricating evidence and 12 months’ probation for unsworn falsification to
authorities. Each sentence of probation would run concurrently with the
remaining sentences. Id. at 54-55. The trial court explained its intention
that the aggregate sentence would be 241 months to 504 months in prison,
with credit for time served. Id. at 56.
Appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider or modify his sentence.
The trial court denied the motion following an October 31 hearing. This
timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant asks us to consider one issue in this appeal:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it imposed
consecutive incarceration terms at the top end of the
standard range for each of the counts that entailed
incarceration?
Appellant’s Brief at 4. As such, Appellant presents a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of sentence.
In Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932 (Pa. Super. 2013), this
Court reiterated:
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
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preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super.
2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006).
Id. at 935 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.
Super. 2010)).
Here, Appellant filed a timely appeal; he properly preserved the issue
in his motion to reconsider/modify his sentence; and there is no fatal defect
in his brief, which includes the statement required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
Therefore, we must determine whether Appellant has presented a
substantial question that his sentence is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code.
In Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc), this Court explained:
“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider
the factors set out in 42 [Pa.C.S.] § 9721(b), that is, the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact
on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. And, of course, the court must consider the
sentencing guidelines.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d
843, 847–48 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
A court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence
concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a
substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2010
PA Super 128, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 609 Pa. 685, 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011). Rather, the
imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will
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present a substantial question in only “the most extreme
circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly
harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of
imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 2012 PA Super
180, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 621
Pa. 677, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2013).
To make it clear, a defendant may raise a substantial
question where he receives consecutive sentences within
the guideline ranges if the case involves circumstances
where the application of the guidelines would be clearly
unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence;
however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the
consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a
substantial question.
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 2013 PA Super 253, 77 A.3d 1263,
1270 (Pa. Super. 2013), reargument denied (Nov. 21, 2013),
appeal denied, 625 Pa. 648, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis
in original).
Id. at 768-69 (alteration in original).
In Caldwell, this Court recognized that a claim the sentencing court
failed to consider an appellant’s rehabilitative needs failed to raise a
substantial question and that a claim of excessive sentence does not present
a substantial question when the sentence falls within the sentencing
guidelines. Id. at 770 (citations omitted). At first blush, it would seem that
Caldwell demands that we find Appellant’s claim of excessiveness fails to
raise a substantial question. However, the en banc panel in Caldwell also
recognized that an appellant’s “challenge to the imposition of his consecutive
sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that the court failed
to consider his rehabilitative needs upon fashioning its sentence, presents a
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substantial question.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244,
1253 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014)).
Here, Appellant argues the trial court “ignored the numerous
mitigating factors and evidence presented by [Appellant] at sentencing.”
Appellant’s Brief at 11. He argues that he delivered a “sincere apology to
the victim’s family and the community as a whole” at sentencing and
“expressed extreme remorse[.]” Id. at 12-13. He also asserts that he had
no prior criminal history, never experienced the rage leading to his crimes
before he suffered PTSD stemming from combat service, and had sought
treatment for PTSD since his return. Id. at 13. Appellant further claimed
that he had accepted the gravity and effect of his actions and expressed
extreme remorse as to the effects of his actions on his victims, recognizing
his sentence would leave his children without either parent for the remainder
of their childhood. Id. at 14. “This acceptance of responsibility together
with having lived a productive life bereft of any other criminal conduct
indicates that [] Appellant has the ability to be rehabilitated and to return to
society. The sentence imposed, and the basis for it, ignore[s] the
rehabilitative potential of [] Appellant.” Id.
Appellant acknowledged that the sentence imposed fell within the
standard range and the terms of the plea agreement. However, he contends
the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion “because this sentence left
no room for consideration of any of the mitigating factors and evidence
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presented at sentencing, most, if not all of which was uncontested.” Id. at
14-15. In light of this Court’s holding in Caldwell, we find Appellant has
asserted a substantial question, asserting an excessive sentence claim in
conjunction with a claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating
factors. Therefore, we grant Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal and
shall address the merits of his claim.
As this Court reiterated in Caldwell:
When reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing, we determine whether the trial court has abused its
discretion. [Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842
(Pa. Super. 2014)]. We observe:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this
context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish,
by reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at
a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Raven, supra at 1253 (quoting Commonwealth v. Shugars,
895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770.
Here, as in Caldwell, Appellant exercised his right to allocution at his
sentencing hearing, before the court sentenced him. He talked about his
background and his educational and professional successes prior to his
service in Iraq. He explained how his experiences in Iraq led to his PTSD
and struggles upon his return. He explained that his first wife took their son
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and left him a few months after he returned home. He then told of meeting
Kelley Jo, ultimately marrying her, and explained that they had a daughter
together and that he adopted her son from a previous relationship. N.T.,
Sentencing, 10/7/16, at 35-42.
Appellant explained the circumstances of the argument that escalated
into Kelley Jo’s death. He talked of panicking when he realized what had
happened, his regrets for not calling for help, and the relief he felt after
telling the state police what really happened. He apologized to Kelley Jo’s
family, the community and the police, noting and accepting that there was a
price for him to pay but hoping he would be given a chance to be a part of
his children’s lives. Id. at 42-44.
The trial court then acknowledged Appellant’s guilty pleas and
explained that the court had considered certain factors—including
retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation—in fashioning a
sentence in accordance with sentencing guidelines. Id. at 45-46. The court
then summarized Appellant’s background, including his military service and
military awards. Before imposing the sentences, the trial court explained, in
part:
Mr. Snyder, what I’m doing is I’m looking at who you are and
what you were thinking, and applying that to the facts of this
case. In looking at this case, this is what I see. You and your
deceased wife got into a verbal argument which escalated to a
physical altercation. Because you were bigger and stronger, you
straddled her, you put your hands around her neck, and you
choked her to death. After causing her death you took her body
to the basement of your residence, put her in a sleeping bag,
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and eventually transported her body to an embankment in the
Halls Run area. This all occurred on April 5, of 2015.
You then put together a story telling everyone your wife had left
the residence and was picked up by somebody who wanted a
ransom. You then told a version that she overdosed on
hydrocodone and anxiety pills. It took until April 11 until you
finally admitted to strangling her to death with your bare hands.
During these seven days, you tortured her family and you
tortured the community. The [c]ourt rejects any argument that
your actions should be excused or mitigated as a result of your
military service. You were aware of your symptoms, you were
provided with treatment through a combination of
psychotherapy, antidepressants, and antianxiety medication.
The tools were there for you to use. You refused to accept these
tools. You chose to ignore them or to reject them. The sad
thing is that treatment was available and because of your own
weaknesses you refused treatment. You argue to this [c]ourt
that at the time of this incident that you were suffering from
post traumatic stress syndrome. The psychological evaluation
that your counsel provided to the [c]ourt supports that
diagnosis. [The psychologist who completed the psychological
evaluation] opines that it is common for a person diagnosed with
PTSD to experience feelings of anger when they become
stressed out, leading to dissociation and mental confusion. [The
psychologist] further opines that in your case your PTSD caused
you to become enraged, resulting in you killing your wife by
choking her to death.
Quite honestly, I have trouble accepting that theory. I listened
to you today, Mr. Snyder. You gave a detailed version of these
events. You told the probation officer that you blacked out, but
listening to you today I find that hard to believe. You told a
story today almost second by second of what occurred once the
argument was initiated. If you truly lost your senses and lost
perspective of what was happening, this [c]ourt would have
expected a different reaction from you when you regained your
senses and your perspective of what you did. Instead of
immediately notifying someone – and as you had indicated you
didn’t call 9-1-1 – you hid the body and pursued your ruse on
the family, the authorities, and the public for approximately a
week. You created a kidnapping and ransom scenario to mislead
and divert attention from yourself.
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This is not the behavior that this [c]ourt would expect from
someone who blacked out, lost their senses and perspective.
These actions were designed to hide the offense, mislead, and
misdirect the family, the authorities, and the public. The actions
that we heard today that occurred following the death of your
wife clearly indicate to this [c]ourt that you had no remorse for
killing her. Had you immediately called for help after the
incident and attempted in any way to save Kelley’s life, this
[c]ourt may have looked at your situation differently. You
choked the life out of your wife with your bare hands as you
straddled her. You watched her die. You did nothing to save
her.
After you took your wife’s life, you then continued your criminal
behavior by hiding the body and fabricating story after story
regarding her disappearance. We are here today because you
could not control your temper. It’s as simple as that. Because
of your anger and your inability to control your temper, children
no longer have a mother, parents no longer have a daughter,
siblings no longer have a sister, and a community after a week
of pure suffering and torture because of your lies, no longer
ha[s] a friend.
For the reasons discussed, the [c]ourt makes the finding that a
sentence of probation or partial confinement is not appropriate.
The [c]ourt determines that total confinement is necessary under
the circumstances discussed. Any lesser sentence depreciates
the seriousness of your actions. The [c]ourt believes that you
are in need of an extended period of incarceration as an object
lesson and to undergo extensive rehabilitation regarding your
propensity toward violence. The [c]ourt will honor the
agreement of the Commonwealth and [Appellant] will enter the
following sentencing [o]rder.
Id. at 49-52. The court then imposed the sentence set forth previously,
including consecutive terms of imprisonment for third degree murder and
abuse of corpse. The trial court did not offer a separate explanation for the
decision to impose those sentences consecutively.
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Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the
maximum sentence possible under the terms of the plea agreement because
“this sentence left no room for consideration of any other mitigating factors
and evidence presented at sentence,” resulting in a “manifestly excessive
and unreasonable sentence.” Appellant’s Brief at 14-15. We cannot agree.
It is clear the trial court specifically considered the “mitigating factors”
Appellant believes commanded a lesser sentence. Clearly, also, the trial
court considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, commenting that the
sentence imposed “was intended to give [Appellant] sufficient time to work
on his anxiety and anger since he has demonstrated in the past that he was
not willing to do so on his own.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/16, at 5
(unnumbered). As required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), the trial court
considered the protection of the pubic, the gravity of the offenses in relation
to the impact on victim and community, Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, and
the sentencing guidelines. See N.T., Sentencing, 10/7/16, at 45-52; Fullin,
supra, 892 A.2d at 847-48. Appellant received a sentence in accordance
with his plea agreement and within the standard range. Because the trial
court did not ignore or misapply the law, exercise its judgment for reasons
of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrive at a manifestly unreasonable
sentence, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
Appellant’s sentence.
Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/27/2017
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