Com. v. Walk, C. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S11006-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CURTIS ADRIAN WALK
    Appellant                No. 1202 WDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-07-CR-0001314-2008
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED: May 26, 2021
    Appellant Curtis Adrian Walk pro se appeals from the July 11, 2019 order
    of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County (“PCRA court”), which dismissed
    for want of jurisdiction his self-styled “Application to Suspend Act 84
    Deductions During Litigation of PCRA Petition Due to Material Change in
    Defendant’s Financial Circumstances Since Sentencing” (the “Petition”). Upon
    review, we vacate and remand with instructions.
    The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly,
    while imprisoned for sexually abusing a minor and committing multiple drug
    offenses, Appellant, on March 27, 2019, pro se filed the Petition in the trial
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S11006-21
    court, requesting the cessation of Act 841 deductions by the DOC based on an
    alleged material change in his financial condition. On July 11, 2019, the trial
    court denied the Petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction and that
    jurisdiction exclusively was vested in the Commonwealth Court. Appellant pro
    se appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    On appeal, Appellant presents three issues for our review.
    I.     Does this Honorable Court have jurisdiction over this
    appeal?
    II.    Did the lower court have jurisdiction to entertain a request
    to stay collection of fines and costs it had ordered in one
    case where those deductions are now adversely affecting
    and substantially impeding the indigent prisoner’s ability to
    litigate his PCRA petition pro se and present the merits of
    his claims to the lower court in another?
    III.   Should the lower court hold a hearing to determine whether
    there has in fact been a material change in the pro se PCRA
    petitioner’s financial condition since sentencing in this
    matter?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted).
    The crux of this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over
    the Petition.2 This Court addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction as
    raised here in Commonwealth v. Danysh, 
    833 A.2d 151
     (Pa. Super. 2003).
    There, the trial court denied an inmate’s petition to cease Act 84 deductions
    ____________________________________________
    1 “Act 84 deductions” refers to those made by the Department of Corrections
    (the “DOC”) pursuant to Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.
    C.S.A. § 9728(b)(5).
    2Given our disposition below, we need not address Appellant’s specific issues
    on appeal.
    -2-
    J-S11006-21
    from his inmate account, finding the 20% deduction a “reasonable amount.”
    Id. at 152. On appeal, we raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
    sponte, recognizing that the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction
    over various classes of cases, including civil suits against government actors.
    Id.    Danysh’s action was a civil action “against the Commonwealth
    government, as DOC falls within the jurisdictional statute’s definition of that
    term.” Id. at 153 (citation omitted). Therefore, “Danysh should have brought
    his petition as a petition for review of a governmental determination under
    the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.”         Id. (citation omitted).
    “Because Commonwealth Court had exclusive original jurisdiction, the court
    of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its order was void.”
    Id. at 154. See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    858 A.2d 627
     (Pa. Super.
    2004) (en banc) (trial court properly determined it lacked jurisdiction over a
    prisoner’s petition to stop Act 84 deductions). Thus, we agree with the trial
    court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the Petition.3
    ____________________________________________
    3We agree with Appellant that we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.
    As we explained in Danysh,
    Although the court of common pleas lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction since this is an appeal
    from a final order. Our appellate jurisdiction is properly from final
    orders, see Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), and even though the common pleas
    court lacked jurisdiction, its order was still final because it
    “dispose[d] of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
    
    Id.
     at 152 n.1.
    -3-
    J-S11006-21
    Despite our conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we still are
    constrained to vacate its order because it failed to transfer the Petition to the
    Commonwealth Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter raised
    in the Petition.4 Section 5103 of the Judicial Code provides in pertinent part:
    (a) General rule.--If an appeal or other matter is taken to or
    brought in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth
    which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the
    court or magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or
    dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the
    proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other
    matter shall be treated as if originally filed in the transferee
    tribunal on the date when the appeal or other matter was first
    filed in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth. A
    matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or
    magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth but which is
    commenced in any other tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be
    transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court or
    magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be treated
    as if originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial district
    of this Commonwealth on the date when first filed in the other
    tribunal.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) (emphasis added). In McNair v. Owens, 
    576 A.2d 95
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990),5 the Commonwealth Court held that where a prisoner
    seeks relief for a claim of incorrect calculation by the DOC, it is an action in
    the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and thus, the trial court should
    not have dismissed the petition, but rather transferred the matter to the
    ____________________________________________
    4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a) (granting the Commonwealth Court original
    jurisdiction over civil suits against statewide government actors).
    5We are not bound by the decisions of our sister Commonwealth Court, but
    such decisions may furnish persuasive authority. Petow v. Warehime, 
    996 A.2d 1083
    , 1088 n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    -4-
    J-S11006-21
    Commonwealth Court. McNair, 576 A.2d at 98. Accordingly, we vacate the
    trial court’s order and remand the matter to the trial court with instruction to
    transfer the Petition to the Commonwealth Court.
    Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/26/2021
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1202 WDA 2019

Filed Date: 5/26/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2021