Com. v. Beamer, J. ( 2015 )

J-A34042-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON EDWARD BEAMER
Appellant No. 608 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Criminal Division at No: CP-41-CR-0000854-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2015
Appellant, Jason Edward Beamer, appeals from the trial court’s March
21, 2014 judgment of sentence imposing six months of intermediate
punishment for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). We affirm.
A police officer investigating a motor vehicle accident traversed a
portion of Appellant’s driveway and, from that vantage point, observed
Appellant standing on his unenclosed concrete slab back porch. The police
officer initiated a conversation with Appellant, and Appellant agreed to
undergo field sobriety testing, which took place in his driveway. The police
officer never left Appellant’s driveway. Appellant was apprehended after he
failed the field sobriety tests. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress
evidence, arguing the officer invaded the curtilage of his property without a
J-A34042-14
warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances. The sole issue on
appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s suppression
motion.
The trial court’s October 30, 2013 opinion offers a detailed recitation of
the pertinent facts:
On April 4, 2013 at 6:39 PM, Corporal Morris Sponhouse
(Sponhouse) of the Old Lycoming Township Police Department
was dispatched to the area of 2400 Northway Road Ext for a
motor vehicle accident. Approximately five (5) minutes later,
Sponhouse arrived at the scene and observed two individuals
standing next to an operable but damaged motorcycle on the
side of the road. The driver and passenger of the motorcycle
stated that they were following a white dump truck and as they
started to pass the truck in a passing zone they were cut off.
The driver and passenger stated that the dump truck did not
have working taillights or use a turn signal when it turned onto a
driveway at 2400 Northway Road Ext. The passenger from the
motorcycle pointed to the dump truck, which was visible from
the road, and stated that a white male exited the truck, did not
respond to requests to come to the location of the motorcycle,
and walked behind a house next to the driveway. While
Sponhouse talked to the driver and passenger a white female
from the house walked to the location of the motorcycle and
indicated she wanted to talk. Sponhouse told her he would talk
to her after he finished with the motorcycle occupants but she
walked away.
Sponhouse parked his unmarked vehicle halfway down the
driveway and walked towards the end of the driveway where the
dump truck was located. The driveway extended past both the
back of the house and the attached porch. Based on a drawing
that Sponhouse drew during his testimony, he never went
beyond the area of the driveway or the side of the house/porch.
Once Sponhouse got near the dump truck on the driveway he
saw [Appellant] grilling chicken under the porch. Specifically,
[Appellant] was located on a concrete slab that had a roof above
it. The roof did not have enclosed walls and was open to the
outside other than the section that connected to the house.
-2-
J-A34042-14
Sponhouse asked [Appellant] what happened while he was
standing on the driveway and [Appellant] stated that the
motorcycle must have lost control while he turned into the
driveway. After informing [Appellant] that the driver and
passenger of the motorcycle said the dump truck did not have
working taillights or use a turn signal, [Appellant] agreed to
have the lights of his truck checked. None of [Appellant’s] lights
worked except for one on the front passenger side of the dump
truck.
While [Appellant] walked to the dump truck to check the
truck’s lights, Sponhouse observed that [Appellant] did not have
proper balance. While continuing to communicate with
[Appellant] about the vehicle’s lights he further noticed that
[Appellant] had slurred speech, red eyes, and that he smelled of
alcohol. [Appellant] agreed to conduct field sobriety exercises
on the driveway. As a result, [Appellant] was charged with one
count of Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled
Substance.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13, at 1-2.
After the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion, the case
proceeded to a January 15, 2014 bench trial, at the conclusion of which the
trial court found Appellant guilty of violating § 3802(a)(1). This timely
appeal followed. Appellant argues, based on Corporal Sponhouse’s allegedly
unlawful entry into the curtilage of Appellant’s home, that the trial court
should have suppressed all evidence Corporal Sponhouse gathered during
that encounter. That evidence consists of Corporal Sponhouse’s
observations of Appellant, the field sobriety test results, and Appellant’s
eventual refusal to submit to a blood test after the allegedly unlawful arrest.
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
-3-
J-A34042-14
drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d
443, 455 (Pa. Super. 2014).
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based
upon the facts
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc)). “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as
factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373,
378 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless
searches of a private home violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 815 (Pa. Super. 2012). The
constitutional protection against warrantless searches extends to the
curtilage surrounding the home. Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 706
A.2d 1216, 1219-20 (Pa. Super. 1997), affirmed, 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999),
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 915 (2001). “The curtilage area surrounding a
private house is entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment as a
place where the occupants have a reasonable expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to accept.” Id. Courts define curtilage “by reference to
the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that
-4-
J-A34042-14
an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.” Id. (quoting
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
Entry upon private property, however, is not strictly forbidden.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
A license may be implied from the habits of the country,
notwithstanding the strict rule of the English common law as to
entry upon a close. We have accordingly recognized that the
knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to
attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors,
hawkers and peddlers of all kinds. This implicit license typically
permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path,
knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent
invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of
that traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal
knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by the
Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police
officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home
and knock, precisely because that is no more than any
private citizen might do.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (citations and
quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).
In denying Appellant’s motion, the trial court relied on Simmen.
There, the homeowner heard a crash, went outside and observed damage to
a retaining wall, a stair rail, and his mailbox. Simmen, 58 A.3d at 813. The
defendant’s bumper was torn from the car and remained in the homeowner’s
driveway. Id. The investigating police officers followed a trail of fluid to the
defendant’s home. Id. A vehicle was parked in the defendant’s driveway
leaking fluid and missing its front bumper. Id. Police knocked on the front
door and spoke to the defendant’s wife, who permitted them to enter the
-5-
J-A34042-14
home and speak to the defendant. Id. at 814. The defendant was arrested
for drunk driving. Id.
We concluded police did not invade the curtilage of the defendant’s
home by walking on the driveway, as the driveway was accessible by the
general public:
Based on the description of the driveway, and the location
of the car on it, there was no evidence presented at the time of
the suppression hearing to support an assertion that there was
any expectation of privacy in the area. The driveway was in the
front of the house, leading from the street to the garage
contained within the actual residence. The car was parked in
plain view of the street on the driveway, within twenty (20) feet
of the road. There was no evidence of signs warning against
trespass on the driveway or that the driveway was gated or
fenced or shielded from the view of the street in any way. In
fact, it appears from the description of the house that access to
the front door of the residence was made via the driveway.
These facts certainly suggest that there could be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area of the driveway.
Id. at 815-16 (quoting the trial court’s opinion with approval). Since the
driveway was accessible to the public, this Court concluded the driveway
was a lawful vantage point from which police could observe the defendant’s
damaged vehicle. Id. at 816.
Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super.
2009), in support of his argument that Corporal Sponhouse violated the
Fourth Amendment because he invaded the curtilage of Appellant’s home.1
____________________________________________
1
We note that no issue of exigent circumstances exists in this case. The
Commonwealth has not filed a brief, choosing instead to rely on the trial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-6-
J-A34042-14
In Lee, a homeowner heard a crash and observed a pickup truck speed
away. Id. at 2. The defendant destroyed the homeowner’s mailbox and a
tree in her yard. Id. A police officer followed a trail of antifreeze from the
site of the crash to the defendant’s home. Id. The officer parked his car in
front of the defendant’s home, walked down the defendant’s driveway and
observed the rear end of a pickup truck parked behind the defendant’s
home. Id. The officer continued behind the defendant’s home and observed
severe damage to the front end of the truck. Id. The defendant’s wife
brought him outside to talk to the police, and he was arrested for drunk
driving. Id. On appeal, this Court concluded the search was illegal. Id. at
5. The Commonwealth did not dispute the defendant’s privacy interest in
the area behind his home where the investigating officer observed the
damage to front end of the truck. Id. at 4. Rather, the parties in Lee
disputed the existence of exigent circumstances.
Lee is legally and factually inapposite. Legally it is inapposite because
the Commonwealth did not contest that the officer’s investigation invaded
the curtilage of the defendant’s home and therefore implicated his Fourth
Amendment rights. Rather, the parties disputed the existence of exigent
circumstances. Factually, Lee is inapposite because the investigating officer
went behind the defendant’s home. Here, Corporal Sponhouse traversed
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
court’s opinion. The trial court did not rely on exigent circumstances to
support its denial of Appellant’s suppression motion.
-7-
J-A34042-14
Appellant’s driveway until he observed Appellant standing outside on a
porch. N.T. Hearing, 9/20/13, at 6. From his vantage point on the driveway
alongside Appellant’s house, Corporal Sponhouse observed Appellant grilling
chicken on an unenclosed concrete slab porch. Id. at 6-7. Corporal
Sponhouse initiated conversation, and Appellant walked to Corporal
Sponhouse and agreed to allow an inspection of the truck’s lights. Id. at 7.
Corporal Sponhouse did not follow Appellant into the house when Appellant
went inside to retrieve his driver’s license. Id. at 9. Corporal Sponhouse
waited until Appellant came back outside and then administered field
sobriety tests in the driveway. Id. In summary, Corporal Sponhouse did
not proceed behind Appellant’s home to collect evidence that otherwise
would have been hidden from view. In traversing the driveway, Corporal
Sponhouse presumably used the same route taken by any visitor to
Appellant’s home, such as the trick-or-treaters or girl scouts mentioned in
Jardines.
The trial court summarized the evidence as follows:
Here, the dump truck that was in question was visible not
only from the road but also from the location of the vehicle
accident. Sponhouse testified that he did not see a fence or any
signs warning against trespass. The driveway led from the road
to the side of [Appellant’s] house. Based on Sponhouse’s
testimony, he never went beyond the side of the house/porch or
the outside of the driveway prior to [Appellant’s] consent to
check the lights on the truck. Unlike Lee, Sponhouse did not
leave the driveway. Therefore, based on the characteristics of
the driveway, this Court finds that [Appellant] did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy to the driveway and that
Sponhouse was permitted to enter the driveway to investigate.
-8-
J-A34042-14
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
We discern no abuse of discretion or legal error in the trial court’s
ruling, and the record supports the court’s recitation of the facts. The
Simmen Court held that a defendant does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a driveway that is open to the general public.
Simmen, 58 A.3d at 816. Likewise, a driveway open to the public is a
lawful vantage point from which a police officer can make observations not
subject to suppression. Id. Appellant’s argument rests entirely on his
assertion that Corporal Sponhouse invaded the curtilage of Appellant’s home
before he observed and interacted with Appellant. The record, as
summarized above, supports the trial court’s finding that the driveway was
open to the public and that Corporal Sponhouse never left the driveway
during his investigation. Based on all of the foregoing analysis, we conclude
Appellant’s argument lacks merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/24/2015
-9-