Com. v. Moskowitz, R. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S16037-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    ROCKY MOSKOWITZ                            :
    :      No. 1422 MDA 2017
    Appellant               :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 31, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-08-CR-0000107-2017
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 30, 2018
    Appellant, Rocky Moskowitz, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his entry of an open guilty plea to two counts each of simple
    assault and recklessly endangering another person.1 Appellant challenges the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
    The trial court aptly set forth the relevant background of this case as
    follows:
    [Appellant] was charged with (i) five counts of Aggravated
    Assault, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(8) and (9), each being
    felonies of the first or second degree, (ii) six counts of Simple
    Assault, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1), each being
    misdemeanors of the second degree, and (iii) six counts of
    Recklessly Endangering Another Person, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2705, each being misdemeanors of the second degree. The
    charges arose after police responded to a report from an
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1) and 2705, respectively.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S16037-18
    elementary school that one of their students disclosed being shot
    by [Appellant] with an air soft bb gun. The investigation soon
    revealed that five of the children in the home had allegedly been
    shot with the air soft gun at close range by [Appellant] or hit with
    the gun itself.
    On June 12, 2017, [Appellant] entered a guilty plea to two
    counts of Simple Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1), graded as
    misdemeanors of the first degree, with the understanding and
    agreement that a deadly weapons enhancement[2] would apply to
    one of the two counts. [Appellant] also pled guilty to two counts
    of Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705,
    both graded as misdemeanors of the second degree. As part of
    the plea agreement, “[Appellant] can argue based on health
    reasons for non-incarceration.” (N.T. Guilty Plea, 6/12/17, at 2-
    3). Counsel for both parties and [Appellant] understood and
    agreed that the deadly weapons enhancement would add six (6)
    months of incarceration to the recommended minimum sentence
    within the standard range. [Appellant] confirmed his intention to
    plead guilty after listening to a description of the potential
    penalties he faced for each count.
    After some discussion about the nature of the weapon used
    and whether it was a gun or a toy, [Appellant] and his counsel
    acknowledged that the “Airsoft gun” at issue was “like a BB gun,”
    and that such gun “could be a deadly weapon” in that it “shoots
    rubber BB’s.” (Id. at 12). While [Appellant] believed it was a
    “toy,” he acknowledged and agreed that the deadly weapon
    enhancement was going to apply to one of the counts. (Id. at 9;
    see 
    id. at 13-14).
    At the conclusion of the oral plea colloquy, [Appellant]
    having previously completed a written plea colloquy with his
    lawyer, the [trial court] accepted [Appellant’s] guilty plea as
    knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
    ____________________________________________
    2 “The deadly weapon enhancement provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines
    provide that an enhancement ‘shall apply to each conviction offense for which
    a deadly weapon is possessed or used.’ 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(4).”
    Commonwealth v. Tavarez, 
    174 A.3d 7
    , 10 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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    J-S16037-18
    At the sentencing hearing on August 31, 2017, [Appellant’s]
    counsel, as expected, argued against incarceration.
    Defense counsel submitted a letter from [Appellant’s doctor]
    that stated [Appellant] would have difficulty sleeping if
    incarcerated and that “[u]ndue discomfort is not advised.” (N.T.
    Sentencing, 8/31/17, at 15; see 
    id. at 10).
    [Appellant] also
    offered a mental health evaluation [stating that he] suffers from
    adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression.
    [Appellant] was given an opportunity to speak and confirmed that
    he has had health difficulties since 2014 when he was electrocuted
    at work, testifying that he has no function in three fingers, heart
    damage, and limited use of his left leg.         In fashioning an
    appropriate sentence, the [trial court] considered all information
    that was available, including that offered by [Appellant] and his
    counsel.
    The Probation Department, acknowledging this was
    [Appellant’s] first contact with the criminal justice system,
    recommended incarceration at the lowest end of the standard
    range of the sentencing guidelines for the simple assault
    conviction with the deadly weapon enhancement, and consecutive
    sentences of probation for the other three convictions. The
    guideline sentence form for simple assault with use of a deadly
    weapon provided a minimum sentence of incarceration of six (6)
    to nine (9) months within the standard range. There is no
    mitigated range identified on the guideline sentence form but the
    minimum in the aggravated range could be as much as twelve
    (12) months.
    The Commonwealth agreed with the recommendation of the
    Probation Department in the Pre-sentence Investigation report,
    noting that the affidavit of probable cause described [Appellant]
    as perpetrating “a series of cruel acts to the young children.” (Id.
    at 14). The Commonwealth also related that the “agreement was
    that the weapons enhancement would apply.” (Id.).
    The [trial court] imposed a sentence of total confinement
    and supervision such that [Appellant] would undergo an
    indeterminate period of incarceration for the conviction of simple
    assault with a deadly weapon, the minimum of which would be six
    (6) months, and the maximum of which would be twelve (12)
    months. [Appellant] received consecutive orders of probation for
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    J-S16037-18
    an aggregate of eighteen (18) months for the three other counts.
    The sentence was at the lowest end of the standard range.
    (Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/17, at unnumbered pages 1-3) (citation formatting
    provided; some record citations omitted). This timely appeal followed.3
    Appellant raises one issue for our review: “[Whether] [t]he [trial] [c]ourt
    erred in not considering Appellant’s health issues when imposing the deadly
    weapons enhancement[] [b]ecause it believed that there was no mitigated
    sentence or departure allowed under enhancement sentence[?]” (Appellant’s
    Brief, at VI).   He argues that the trial court “appeared confused as to the
    application of the enhancement” and believed that it was required to sentence
    him without taking into consideration the mitigating factors of his electrocution
    and the resultant injuries and pain. (Id. at 10; see 
    id. at 7-8).
    Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
    entitle an appellant to review as of right. Rather, Appellant must
    first meet his burden of satisfying the following four elements
    before we will review the discretionary aspect of a sentence:
    (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice
    of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
    the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in
    a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a
    fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there
    is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
    from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code,
    42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 9781(b).
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant filed a timely, court-ordered concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal on September 27, 2017. The trial court entered its
    opinion on November 30, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -4-
    J-S16037-18
    Commonwealth v. Johnson-Daniels, 
    167 A.3d 17
    , 27 (Pa. Super. 2017),
    appeal denied, 
    174 A.3d 1029
    (Pa. 2017) (case citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    In the instant case, Appellant met the first three elements by filing a
    timely notice of appeal, preserving his issue at sentencing, and including a
    Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Because “[o]ur case law has established
    that application of the deadly weapons enhancement presents a substantial
    question[,]” we will review the merits of his claim. Commonwealth v. Shull,
    
    148 A.3d 820
    , 831 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).
    Our standard of review is as follows:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Johnson-Daniels, supra at 28 (citation omitted).
    We begin by noting that where “the trial court has the benefit of a pre-
    sentence report [PSI], we presume that the court was aware of relevant
    information   regarding   the   defendant’s   character   and   weighed    those
    considerations along with any mitigating factors.”        Commonwealth v.
    Johnson, 
    125 A.3d 822
    , 827 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). We further
    note that the sentencing guidelines are not mandatory, and sentencing courts
    retain broad discretion in sentencing matters.      See Commonwealth v.
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    J-S16037-18
    Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 760 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 
    95 A.3d 275
    (Pa. 2014). Likewise, “[[a]lthough] [t]he trial court lacks the discretion to
    refuse to apply the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement, [t]he court’s
    discretion comes into play when it is time to impose a sentence, once the court
    determines the adjusted sentencing guideline ranges.” Commonwealth v.
    Kneller, 
    999 A.2d 608
    , 614 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 
    20 A.3d 485
    (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
    Here, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from defense
    counsel and Appellant regarding his numerous health ailments and financial
    problems stemming from his work-related electrocution in 2014. (See N.T.
    Sentencing, at 10-14). The Commonwealth noted that Appellant’s offenses
    involved a series of cruel acts against children, and that the plea agreement
    contemplated application of the weapons enhancement. (See 
    id. at 14).
    The
    trial court noted that it had reviewed the PSI, and explained its rationale for
    the sentence as follows:
    . . . [T]he Commonwealth was apparently insistent that . . .
    in order to reach the plea agreement, that one of the counts would
    have a deadly weapon enhancement. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have
    been there. The fact that it’s there, and now it’s just being asked
    to be essentially ignored, by [Appellant], I think is really not giving
    . . . it’s really not honoring the agreement that was reached. . . .
    The health concerns of [Appellant], I understand those. The
    doctor suggests that you are going to have difficulty sleeping on
    a mattress. Undue discomfort is not advised. Being in jail is not
    a comfort to anybody, you know.           And so, certainly I am
    sympathetic to your health concerns but these are pretty serious
    charges[.] . . . I agree with the probation department that
    because of your history, because of your health situation, you
    don’t deserve anything above what would be the standard, the
    -6-
    J-S16037-18
    lowest end of the standard range and that would be in each of the
    other counts, probation. But with the one count that was, that
    has the deadly weapon enhancement I think you need the six
    months. I mean that’s what everybody contemplated, that’s what
    was expected, based on what everybody knew about the case. So
    I think that is what is appropriate and that’s what I’m going to
    impose today. . . .
    (Id. at 14-16; see 
    id. at 1).
    Following imposition of the sentence, defense counsel asked for
    clarification and the following exchange took place:
    [Defense counsel]: [Is] the court under the belief that it has no
    authority to override the sentence as it pertains to him?
    [Trial court]: No. I’m not under that impression. The guidelines
    are simply guidelines. They are advisory.
    [Defense counsel]:    And the enhancement is not a mandatory
    sentence.
    [Trial court]: I understand that as well. . . .
    (Id. at 19).
    In its opinion, the trial court further explained that, in formulating an
    appropriate sentence for Appellant, it took into consideration his health
    difficulties, history, character, and rehabilitative needs; the nature and
    circumstances of the crime, which involved violent acts against young
    children; the impact on the multiple victims; the need to protect the
    community; and the sentencing guidelines. (See Trial Ct. Op., at unnumbered
    pages 3-4).    Thus, the record reflects that the court was not confused
    regarding application of the deadly weapons enhancement, and that it
    thoroughly considered Appellant’s background, including his health issues,
    -7-
    J-S16037-18
    and the circumstances of the offense, and sentenced him accordingly.
    Because we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s imposition of
    Appellant’s sentence, his issue on appeal merits no relief.   See Johnson-
    Daniels, supra at 28. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 04/30/2018
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1422 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 4/30/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/30/2018