Com. v. Lawrence, Jr., A. ( 2015 )

J-S11005-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ALVIN EARL LAWRENCE JR.
Appellant No. 1462 MDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 8, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001818-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED APRIL 01, 2015
Appellant, Alvin Earl Lawrence, Jr., appeals from the order entered
August 8, 2014, by the Honorable James P. Cullen, Court of Common Pleas
of Lancaster County, which denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
On August 16, 2012, Lawrence entered a negotiated guilty plea to
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, firearms not to be carried
without a license, persons not to possess firearms, and driving while
operating privilege suspended or revoked. The trial court sentenced
Lawrence pursuant to the agreement to an aggregate term of 5-10 years’
____________________________________________
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S11005-15
imprisonment. Lawrence filed a direct appeal, but subsequently withdrew it
on December 13, 2012.
On August 6, 2013, Lawrence filed a PCRA petition. Lawrence alleged
in the petition that guilty plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately communicate with him prior to the plea, for encouraging him to
plead guilty, and for failing to file a suppression motion. The trial court
denied Lawrence’s petition following a hearing. This timely appeal followed.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). “[Our] scope of review
is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court
level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). “[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to
the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d
244, 259 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
-2-
J-S11005-15
We have reviewed Lawrence’s brief, the relevant law, the certified
record, and the well-written opinion of the Honorable James P. Cullen.
Having determined that the PCRA court’s opinion ably and comprehensively
disposes of Lawrence’s issues on appeal, with appropriate reference to the
record and without legal error, we will affirm based on that opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/1/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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OPINION AND ORDER co U>
BY CULLEN, J .. ;g
On August 16, 2012, Defendant, Alvin Earl Lawrence, Jr., pied guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement to one count of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer,1 one count
of firearms not to be carried without a license," one count of persons rrot to possess
tlrearms.! and one count of driving while his operating privileges were suspended.4 Under
the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months
incarceration, a fine of $50 and costs on the first count, 3% to 7 years incarceration, a fine
of $100 and costs on the second count, and 5 to 10 years incarceration, a fine of $100 and
costs on the third count. A $200 fine was imposed on the final count. 5 All sentences were
concurrent. (N.T., August 16, 2012, 21·22; N.T., January 9, 2014, Commw. Ex. 3).
On September 14, 2012, Defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court.
Defendant was directed to file a concise statement of errors complained. of on appeal
175
Pa. C.S. § 3733(a).
218 Pa. C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
318
.Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)(1 ).
475
Pa. C.S. § 1543(a).
6A
summary offense of driving vehicle at safe speed, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3361, was no/ prossed upon
payment of costs.
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pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), and on October 9, 2012,
counsel for Defendant fried a statement of intent to file an Anders!McC!endon brief in lieu
of a statement of errors complained of on appeal."
On December 13, 2012, Defendant withdrew his appeal in the Superior Court.
On August 1 O, 2013, Defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post Convlctlon
Relief Act.
A hearing on the petition was held on January 9, 2014. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court ordered the notes of testimony transcribed and established a briefing
schedule. For the reasons set out below, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed
to e·stablish that he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, the petition will be denied.
Discussion
In order to be eligible for relief under the Post Conviction Relief A_ct (the "Act"), a
defendant must satisfy the requirements of 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543 which provide in pertinent
part:
§ 9543. Eligibility for relief
(a) General rule.s-To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the
petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of
the following:
(1) Thatthe petitioner has been convicted ofa crime underthe
laws of the Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted:
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment,
probation, or parole for the crime;
6Pa. RAP. 1925(c)(4); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v, McC!endon,
495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981).
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(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more
of the following:
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudic~tion of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.
(4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during
trial, during unitary review or on direct appeal could not
have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical
decision by counsel.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a).
The defendant bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that his conviction resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors listed in the Act.
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Crawley, 541
Pa. 408, 412, 663.A.2d 676, 678 (1995).
Since Defendant's post conviction petition involves a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the following standards apply. Generally, counsel's performance is presumed
to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a
sufficient showing by the petitioner. Fears, 86 A.3d at 804 (citations omitted). To obtain
relief, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that
deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). A petitioner establishes prejudice when he demonstrates "that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at2068; Commonwealth
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v. Mallory, 596 Pa. 172, 201, 941 A.2d 686, 704 (2008). Applying the Strickland
performance and prejudice test, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that a
properly pied claim of ineffective assistance of counsel posits that:
(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed
for counsel's action or failure to act; and (3) [the petitionerJsuffered prejudice
as a result of counsel's error such that there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proC$edingwould have been different absent such error.
Fears, 86 A.3d at 804 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 15 A.3d 345 37-74 1
(2011) (citations omitted)).
In evaluating a properly presented claim of lneffectlve assistance of counsel, a
reviewing court will examine the basis for counsel's action only if it is first persuaded that
the course of action forgone had arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233,
255~56, 724 A.2d 293, 304 (1999). If the claim is without merit, the inquiry ends because
counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless, baseless or
frivolous claim. Commonwealth v. Reqe, 593 Pa. 659, 696, 933 A.2d 997,· 1019 (2007).
In evaluating the second prong of the standard which requires an examination of
counsel's conduct, the court must not employ a hindsight evaluation that examines whether
other actions were more reasonable. Commonwealth v. Zook, 585 Pa. 11, 26, 887 A.2d
1218, 1227 (2005). Rather, a court must deem counsel to have been effective so'long as
the course which counsel chose was not unreasonable in acting to effectuate his or her
client's interests. Id. Thus, a party must demonstrate that counsel's strategy was "so
unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have chosen that course of conduct."
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 614, 889 A.2d 501, 541 (2005) (citing
Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 29, 640 A.2d. 12~1, 1265 (1994)).
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The third prong of the standard is of greatest significance. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has consistently held that if the party asserting the claim has not
established the prejudice prong, ttie claim may be dismissed on that basis alone without
a determination of whether the party met the first two prongs of the standard. Chmiel, 585
Pa. at 613, 889 A.2d at 540; Commonwealth v. Brown, 582 Pa. 461, 481, 872 A.2d 1139,
1150 (2005); Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 118, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (1995).
This "prejudice inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the evidence."
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 582 Pa. 207, 228·n.15, 870A.2d 822, 835 n.15 (2005) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only
in the absol ute rarest of circumstances, those where counsel completely failed to oppose
the prosecutlon's case, for example, may prejudice-be presumed. Id. at 227, 870 A.2d at
834 (citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 179, 125 S. Ct. 551, 555 (2004); Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685, 696-97, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2002); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984)). The defendant must demonstrate that "there is
a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent
[counsel's] error." Lesko, 609 Pa. at 176, 15 A.3d at 373. That is, there must be a
"reasonable probability th at the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had
counsel not been ineffective in the relevant regard-i. e., that the defendant was prejudiced
as a result of counsel's act or omission." Commonwealth v. Dennis, 597 Pa. 1591 175, 950
A.2d 945, 954 (2008).
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"Failure to prove any prong of this test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim." Fears,
86 A.3d at 804 (citing Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744A.2d 717, 738 n. 2~
(2000)).:
A defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea process
as well as during trial. Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of a guilty plea
· will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v. Alien, 557 Pa. 135; 144, 732 A.2d 582,
587 (1999). To determine whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and intelligently,
a reviewing court must review all of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea.
. .
Id. "The law does not require that [a defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his
decision to enter a plea of guilty: 'All that is required is that [the defendant's] decision to
plead guilty be knowingly, voluntary, and.intelligently ':lade.'" Commonwealth v. Diez, 913
A.2d 871,.873 (Pa. Super, 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 500-01
(Pa. Super. 1998)).
As fact finder in a proceedlnq for post conviction relief that is based on a claim of
Ineffective assistance of counsel, the credibility of witnesses remains exclusively within the
province ofthe hearing court. Commonwealth v. Pate, 421 Pa. Super. 122, 132, 617 A.2d
754, 760 (1992) (citing Commonwealth v, Moore, 321 Pa. Super. 442, 450~51, 468 A.2d
791, 795 (1983)). An appellate court, therefore, "must give great weight to the findings of
a lower court concerning the credibility of witnesses in a post-conviction proceeding."
Commonwealth v. Duperi, 555 Pa. 547, 557, 725 A.2d 750, 755 (1999) (citing
Commonwealth v. Madison, 501 Pa. 485, 491, 462 A.2d 228, 231 (1983)).
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Defense counsel has a duty to adequately communicate with the client concerning
all important issues in his or her case. Commonwealth v. Brown! 18 A3d 1147, 1158 (Pa.
·super. 2011) (quoting Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S.175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 551 (2004). Included
in this duty is the duty to convey all plea bargains and to explain the advantages and
disadvantages of accepting the offer or going to trial. Commonwealth v. Merttnez, 777
A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Defendant claims guilty plea counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
communicate with him prior to the plea and for failing to file a suppression motion.
Defendant further argues that guilty plea counsel "encouraged" him to plead guilty despite
his knowledge that Defendant had been assaulted while at Lancaster County Prison and
that he had stopped taking.his medication for a mental health condition prior to the entry
of his guilty plea. As a result, Defendant claims his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent1
and voluntary.
Guilty plea counsel testified at the hearing on Defendant's petition that he met with
Defendant five times between the date of Defendant's arrest and the date of his guilty plea.
(N.T., January 9, 2014, 53-54). The first meeting occurred March 4, 2~12, at Lancaster
County Prison, where they discussed counsel's fees, the charging documents and court
procedures. (Id. at 26, 47-48). Defendant and guilty plea counsel met again at the
preliminary hearing on April 4, 2012. (Id. at 27, 48). At that time, Defendant agreed to
waive his preliminary hearing and accept a negotiated guilty plea for 5 to 1 O years
incarceration in exchange for the Commonwealth withdrawing a felony charge on another
docket number. (Id. at 49). The terms of the offer required that Defendant plead guilty
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within 30 days of his arraignment and that if Defendant did not plead guilty, the
Commonwealth could reinstate the withdrawn felony charge. (Id. at 49-50, Commw. Ex.
6).7
On July 15, 2012, guilty plea counsel again visited Defendant at Lancaster County
Prison to discuss the plea bargain and review discovery. (Id. at 27, 51, 67). The last time
guilty plea counsel met with Defendant at Lancaster County Prison was the day before the
guilty plea, August 15, 201·2. (Id. at 29-29, 52). At this meeting, Defendant maintains he
told guilty plea counsel he did not want to accept the plea agreement and he and his
counsel argued about It, but counsel kept pressuring him. (Id. at 28-29).
The day of the guilty plea, Defendant asserts that guilty plea counsel tried to work
out a different agreement with the assistant district attorney, but was unsuccessful. (Id. at
29-30). He further contends guilty pleacounsel told him that if he did not take the plea
agreement, the Commonwealth would rescind the offer and Defendant would face trial,
where he would likely be unsuccessful. (Id. at 30). Defendant ultimately chose to plead
guilty. (Id. at 36-37).
Defendant claims he requested to meet with guilty plea counsel on at least one
other occasion after his. preliminary hearing, but guilty plea counsel informed Defendant
he was not available. (Id. at 28). A review of the record indicates this request was
expressed in a letter sent by Defendant to his attorney on April 231 2012, in which
7A
stolen firearm was recovered during a search of Defendant's vehicle. (Def. Ex. 3). As a result,
Defendant was charged with one count of receiving stolen property graded as a felony of the second
degree. (Commw. Ex. 6; Def. Exs. 3-4). As part of the plea agreement, the Commonwealth withdrew the
receiving stolen property charge. (Commw. Ex. 6).
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Defendant requested his discovery and indicated that he would be willing to plead guilty
after discussing his options with counsel. (Commw. Ex. 4). Guilty plea counsel responded
to Defendant's letter on May 4, 2012, and informed Defendant that he would forward a
copy of the discovery to Defendant once it was received and that the appropriate time to
discuss Defendant's options would be some time after arraignment, or May 30, 2012. (Id.).
Counsel did forward a copy of the discovery to Defendant and did discuss it with him at
their. meeting on July 15, 2012.
Defendant admitted at the PCRA hearing that when he met with guilty plea counsel
they discussed a possible suppression issue, the possibility of going to trial, the possibility
of entering a guUty plea and reviewedall of the discovery in the case. (N.T., January 9,
2014, 33). Defendant also admitted that he was·aware of the conversations they were
having and was a meaningful participant in the meetings. (Id. at 39). Guilty plea counsel
also testified that Defendant was an active participant in all of their discussions and asked
coherent and intelligent questions whenever he had a concern. (Id. at 72). Guilty plea
counsel addressed Defendant's options with him regarding proceeding to trial or pleading
guilty. (Id. at 73). The record is devoid of any evidence that guilty plea counsel did not
adequately communicate with Defendant regarding his case. Therefore, Defendant's
argument to the contrary is without merit.
Defendant next argues that guilty plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
suppression motion. In order to show counsel was ineffective, Defendant must show that
counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to challenge the evidence, that counsel did
not have a tactical reason for failing to file the motion and that the motion to suppress
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would likely have been successful. See Commonwealth v. Arch, 439 Pa. Super. 606, 614,
654 A.2d 1141, 1145 (1995), Commonwealth v. Schroth, 495 Pa. 561, 568, 435 A.2d 148,
·151 (1981), Commonwealth v. Miller, 495 Pa. 177, 181-82, 433A.2d 1, 3 (1981).
Defendant testified at the PCRA hearing that when he met with guilty plea counsel
on August 15, 2012, he informed guilty plea counsel that he did not want to take the plea
agreement and wanted to move ahead with a suppression motion. (N.T., January 9, 2014,
28-29). Defendant testified that guilty plea counsel informec him that it was too late to file
such a motion and that there was no valid basis to suppress the evidence. (Id. at 29).
Guilty plea counsel testified at the hearing that either Defendant or Karina
Personette, Defendant's girlfriend, asked him about the appropriateness of the stop of
Defendant's vehicle, but he did not recall Defendant specifically asking him to file a
suppression motion. (Id. at 56). Guilty plea counsel further stated that after reviewing the
discovery and performing any necessary research, he did not feel a suppression motion
would have been meritorious. (Id. at 56-57).
I believe that the stop in Mr. Lawrence's case was appropriate. I believe the
suppression motion would not have been meritorious'. In addition, had we
flied it and it was not meritorious, Mr. Lawrence was advised on a number of
occasions, including the morning of April 4th, that if that was the 'case, the
plea agreement, which included the withdraw of a felony of the second
degree and concurrency on all of the other charges on the case that did
come in, would have been negated and his time of incarceration, if he lost,
would have been significant, so that was a major factor, in addition to the fact
that he told me on several occasions that he was speeding and that he had
a gun in the vehicle.
(Id. at 58-59).
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Defendant maintains that a suppression motion may have been meritorious, relying
on Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 (Pa. Super. 2010), in which the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that police must have probable cause to stop a vehicle for an alleged
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Defendant maintains that because police did not time
his speed for the required three-tenths of a mile, 75 Pa. C.S. section 3368, the stop was
not supported by probable cause and, therefore, a suppression motion was warranted.
The record reflects that Defendant was initially stopped for going between 50 and
60 miles per hour in-a 25 mile per hour zone in the City of Lancaster, and Defendant told
the police he was going "about sixty-something." (N. T., January 9, 2014, ~4, 40; Commw.
Ex. 1, Def. Ex. 3). Defendant was not charged with driving above the maximum speed
limit, 75 Pa. C.S. section 3362, but driving vehicle at safe speed, 75 Pa. C.S. section 3361.
The stop occurred at approximately 11 :55 a.m. (Def. Ex. 3). The time of day, the area in
which he was stopped, and the officer's estimation of Defendant's speed are all relevant
in determining whether officers had probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle for a
violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3361 (driving vehicle at safe speed). In this case, Defendant was
going at least twice the speed limit on a city street. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 982 A.2d
1009, 1012-13(Pa. Super.2009), Commonwealthv. Minnich, 874A.2d 1234, 1237w38(Pa.
Super. 2005) (stating that weather conditions, the time of day, and the location where the
defendant was stopped, in conjunction with the officer'.sestimation that the defendant was
traveling at least 15 miles per hour above the posted speed limit, are sufficient to constitute
probable cause to stop the defendant for driVing vehicle at safe speed).
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Assuming, arguendo, Defendant did ask guilty plea counsel to file a suppression
motion on August 15, 2012, guilty plea counsel had a reasonable basis for not doing so.
At that point, the deadline for filing pretrial motions had passed and any motion could be
denied as untimely. Pa. R.Cr.P. 579(A), 581 (8). Had Defendant fried a motion to
suppress, the negotiated plea agreement would have been withdrawn and Defendant
would have faced another felony charge and the possibility of substantially more time in
prison than the 5 to 10 years to which he agreed.
Based upon his conversations with Defendant regarding Defendant's motivation for
his conduct, Defendant's prior record and the nature of the charges against him, in addition
to counsel's well considered ·opinionthat a suppression motion lacked merit, guilty plea
counsel .had a reasonable basis for not filing a motion to suppress the evidence and guilty
plea counsel acted to effectuate Defendant's interests.
Defendant argues that guilty plea counsel "encouraged" him to plead guilty despite
his knowledge that Defendant was assaulted while at Lancaster County Prison and that he
. .
was no longer being given medication for his mental health condition. Defendant also
asserted that guilty plea counsel told him that pleading guilty would be "the fastest way out
of Lancaster County Prison." (Def.'s Poet-Conviotion Mot., ,r 26(c)).
Guilty plea counsel completed a written colloquy with Defendant on August 16,
2012, and reviewed Defendant's answers with him before having him sign it (N.T.,
January 9, 2014, 70, Commw. Ex. 2). Guilty plea counsel stated that while Defendant told
him he "needed to get out of Lancaster County Prison," he did not encourage or advise
Defendant to accept the guilty plea and told Defendant that he could not make that
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decision for him. (N.T., January 9, 2014, 55-56,.73, Commw. Ex. 5). During the course
of guilty plea counsel's representation, Defendant maintained that he wanted to take
responsibility for his actions and plead guilty. (N.T., January 9, 2014, 74, Commw. Ex. 5).
Defendant did not inform guilty plea counsel of any mental health issues at any of
their meetings or on the date of the guilty plea.· (N.T., January 9, 2014, 72). Guilty plea
counsel further testified that he was not aware of an altercation in which Defendant was
involved or that Defendant was taking medication, and that if he had been made aware of
it on August 16, he would have informed the assistant district attorney. (Id. at 73, 76).
Both Defendant and Ms. Personette stated they informed guilty plea counsel about the
incident at Lancaster County Prison in June, 2012,·in which Defendant was injured, and
that Defendant was on medication. (Id. at 10-12, 30-31, Commw. Ex. 4, Def. Ex. 1).a
Guilty plea counsel stated that he noticed no change in Defendant's. demeanor in the
course of the five months of counsel's representation, and that whatever Defendant may
have experienced in prison "had no effect on [their] discussions at any level." (N.T.,
January 9, 2014, 76).
A defendant who chooses to plead guilty has a duty to answer questions truthfully
during the colloquy and will be bo~nd by those answers. Commonwealth v. Stork, 737
A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 374 Pa. Super. 219, 222,
542 A.2d 575, 577 (1988). The defendant cannot assert grounds for withdrawing his guilty
6Commonwealth's
Exhibit 4 and Defendant's Exhibit 1, Defendant's medical records, indicate
Defendant was on medication for a mental health issue from June 27, 2012, until July 11, 2012. On July
12, 2012, Defendant met with a counselor and stated he was doing well on the medication, and she noted
that "he appeared to understand that [the medication] was given on a temporary basis." (Commw. Ex. 4,
p. 52).
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plea that contradict the statements he made during the guilty plea colloquy. Stork, 737
A.2d at 790-91.
The Court conducted a thorough oral colloquy on the record with Defendant. During
this colloquy, Defendant said he had never been treated for any mental health conditions.
(N.T., August 16, 2012, 5). Defendant also stated that he understood that by pleading
guilty, he was giving up his right to file any pretrial motions and the right to challenge the
legality of the vehicle stop. (Id. at 12, 14). At the PCRA hearing, Defendant reiterated that·
he understood what he was doing by entering a plea of guilty and understood the sentence
he was facing. (N.T., January 9, 20141 23).
Defendant also stated both on the written guilty plea colloquy and during the oral
colloquy that he had not been threatened or forced to plead guilty and that he made the
decision to plead guilty of his own free will. (Guilty Plea Colloquy, 1lil 81 11-14;· N.T.,
August 16, 2012, 14~15). He stated that he had sufficient time to speak with guilty plea
counsel, that he was satisfied with guilty plea counsel's work on his behalf and had no
complaints about what guilty plea counsel did or did not do on his behalf. (N.T., August
16, 2012, 15-16).
After Defendant returned to Lancaster County Prison the day of the guilty plea, he
spoke with a counselor and told her that while the sentence was what he expected, he was
hoping for leniency and planned to appeal. (N.T., January 9, 2014, 38, Commw. Ex. 4, p.
53). Defendant also told the counselor he was not experiencing any emotional issues.
(Id.). Based on the demeanor of the witness, the consistency of the testimony and the
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interest of the parties, the Court does not find Defendant's assertion that he was
threatened or pressured by guilty plea counsel to plead guilty to be credible.
The law does not require Defendant be happy with his sentence; only that his guilty
plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Defendant has failed to meet his
burden of showing his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
Therefore, Defendant's contention that he was coerced into pleading guilty due to
counsel's ineffectiveness is without merit, and Defendant is not entitled to relief.
Accordingly, the Court enters the following:
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