Com. v. Stokes, T. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
TYON STOKES, : No. 2655 EDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, July 26, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0006083-2009
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 09, 2017
Tyon Stokes appeals pro se from the July 26, 2016 order entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which dismissed, without
a hearing, his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual history:
On March 15, 2003, [appellant] and
Phillip Sheridan got into an argument over drug
territory in West Philadelphia. [Appellant] observed
Sheridan selling drugs on Chester Avenue between
55th and 56th Streets. [Appellant] approached
Sheridan, warning him that [appellant] would kill him
if Sheridan made another sale on the block.
Sheridan failed to comply with [appellant’s] request
and made another sale. [Appellant] again told
Sheridan he would kill him. Sheridan then began to
approach [appellant], taunting [appellant].
[Appellant] told Sheridan they don’t fight out there
and showed Sheridan his firearm. Sheridan
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continued walking towards [appellant], who pulled
out his gun and fired several shots at Sheridan,
striking him in the head, arm, leg, and abdomen,
killing him.
Trial court opinion, 11/14/16 at 2-3.
The trial court set forth the following procedural history:
[Appellant] was convicted [in a jury trial] [1] of first
degree murder and possessing [an] instrument of []
crime.[2] [Appellant] was subsequently sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole for the homicide
bill, with no further penalty for possessing an
instrument of a crime.
A timely appeal was filed with the Superior
Court, which affirmed the judgment of sentence on
March 6, 2014. [Appellant’s] petition for allowance
of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court on
September 17, 2014. [Appellant] filed his [PCRA
petition] on February 13, 2015. New counsel was
appointed who filed a Finley[Footnote 1] letter and
motion to withdraw as counsel on May 19, 2016.
Despite [appellant] filing a pro se response to the
Rule 907 dismissal notice, the petition was dismissed
on July 26, 2016. [Appellant] filed a pro se notice
of appeal on August 19, 2016, and a pro se
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on
September 23, 2016.
[Footnote 1] Commonwealth v.
Finley, [] 550 A.2d 213 ([Pa.Super.]
1988) [(en banc]).
Id. at 1-2.
1
The record reflects that appellant committed his crimes on March 15, 2003,
but was not arrested until November 15, 2008. The trial court appointed
defense counsel and granted various continuances. Prior to trial and as a
result of a conflict of interest, new counsel was appointed. The case was
then relisted for a jury trial.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 907(a), respectively.
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Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
I. Did the PCRA court err in considering
appellant’s 4th Amendment violation claim
without merit, wherein appellant argued:
counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the
alleged authorization employed to seize
[appellant’s] outgoing mail and for failing to
motion for suppression of letters seized as a
result[?]
II. Was PCRA counsel ineffective in failing to
argue the merits of trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance for a) stipulating to the truth of the
means by which the appellant’s outgoing mail
was seized and b) failing to preserve the
violation of U.S. [Constitutional] Amendment
IV that resulted?
Appellant’s brief at vii (full capitalization omitted).
We limit our review of a PCRA court’s decision to examining whether
the record supports the PCRA court’s findings of fact and whether its
conclusions of law are free from legal error. Commonwealth v. Mason,
130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). We view the PCRA court’s
findings and the evidence of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing
party. Id.
To be entitled to PCRA relief, the defendant bears the burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2), which include ineffectiveness of counsel that “so
undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
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guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i)
and (ii); see also Mason, 130 A.3d at 618 (citations omitted).
Here, appellant’s claims assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel
and PCRA counsel.
Counsel is presumed effective, and in order to
overcome that presumption a PCRA petitioner must
plead and prove that: (1) the legal claim underlying
the ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit;
(2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any
reasonable basis designed to effectuate petitioner’s
interest; and (3) counsel’s action or inaction resulted
in prejudice to petitioner. With regard to reasonable
basis, the PCRA court does not question whether
there were other more logical courses of action
which counsel could have pursued; rather, [the
court] must examine whether counsel’s decisions
had any reasonable basis. Where matters of
strategy and tactics are concerned, [a] finding that a
chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not
warranted unless it can be concluded that an
alternative not chosen offered a potential for success
substantially greater than the course actually
pursued. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner
must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s actions or inactions, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Failure
to establish any prong of the [] test will defeat an
ineffectiveness claim.
Mason, 130 A.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Appellant complains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
move to suppress prison correspondence from appellant to an inmate
housed at another state correctional institution (“SCI”) and for entering into
a stipulation at trial with respect to the outgoing-mail procedure followed at
SCI Fayette and that SCI Fayette intercepted four outgoing incriminating
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letters written by appellant because seizure of the letters violated his
constitutional rights. Appellant further complains that PCRA counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in this regard.
Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit.
In Commonwealth v. Moore, 928 A.2d 1092 (Pa.Super. 2007), this
court addressed the issue of whether a prisoner has a constitutional right to
privacy in his non-privileged prison mail under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, recognizing that:
[a]lthough prison walls do not separate inmates from
their constitutional rights, because of the unique
nature and requirements of the prison setting,
imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or
loss of many significant rights . . . to accommodate a
myriad of institutional needs . . . chief among which
is internal security. Prisoners have used the mail to
transport contraband into and out of prison, to
discuss and participate in ongoing criminal activity,
and to coordinate escape plans. An unrestricted
privacy interest in non-privileged mail would assist
criminal objectives by facilitating the transmission of
information. On the other hand, prisoners must
appreciate the inherent loss of privacy in a prison,
where security and surveillance obviate any
legitimate expectation of privacy.
Id. at 1102 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). This court
then held that a “[prisoner] has no constitutional right to privacy in his
non-privileged mail.” Id. Therefore, appellant’s claim that he had a
constitutional right to privacy in his non-privileged prison correspondence
lacks arguable merit.
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Order affirmed.3
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/9/2017
3
Appellant filed a reply brief in this matter wherein he requested that this
court “consider the [Commonwealth’s] brief barred from consideration, as it
is untimely filed.” (Appellant’s reply to Commonwealth’s brief as appellee,
6/13/17 at 2.) This court, however, entered an order on June 7, 2017 that
granted the Commonwealth’s third application for an extension of time to file
its brief and accepted the Commonwealth’s brief filed May 31, 2017 as
timely filed. (Order of court, 6/7/17.) Therefore, we deny appellant’s
request.
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