In Re: T.P., a minor, Appeal of: T.P. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S63015-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: T.P., A MINOR              IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: T.P., A MINOR
    No. 632 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-JV-0000404-2017
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED OCTOBER 17, 2017
    T.P. appeals from the March 17, 2017 order imposing restitution in this
    matter. We affirm.
    Appellant was charged with being delinquent for committing acts that
    constituted conspiracy to possess heroin and possession of marijuana. The
    facts underlying the allegations were as follows.    On February 13, 2017,
    after a firearm was pointed at a male, Pittsburgh Police were called to a high
    school on Murray Avenue in Pittsburgh.          Police were told that the
    perpetrators fled in a silver Ford Explorer, and they were given a partial
    license plate number, which matched the license plate of a vehicle reported
    as stolen.
    J-S63015-17
    Police spotted the vehicle, which had four occupants, confirmed that it
    was stolen, and attempted to stop it by activating their lights and siren. The
    Explorer went through a red light, struck another vehicle, and came to a
    rest. Appellant, who was the front seat passenger, was apprehended as he
    attempted to flee.     Appellant had a bag of marijuana on his person, and
    heroin was recovered both from the occupants and within the stolen Ford.
    Appellant was adjudicated delinquent based upon the allegations contained
    in the petition for delinquency.
    On March 17, 2017, the juvenile court ordered Appellant to pay
    restitution totaling $1,769.36 for the damage caused to the two vehicles
    involved in the accident, the stolen Ford, and the other vehicle involved in
    the wreck.    Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the
    sentence of restitution.    He averred that the acts that he admitted to
    committing and that supported the adjudication of delinquency were drug-
    related, and those acts did not pertain, to any extent, to the damage to the
    two vehicles. Appellant complained that the court abused its discretion and
    did not have the authority to impose restitution for damages that his actions
    played no part in causing.    The motion for reconsideration was denied on
    March 28, 2017, and Appellant filed the present appeal on April 26, 2017.
    On appeal, Appellant maintains that restitution for the damage to the
    vehicles involved in the accident should not have been imposed on him. He
    raises these issues:
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    [1.] Did [the] Trial Court issue an illegal sentence when it
    ordered [Appellant] to pay restitution without any causal
    connection between the charge at trial and the damages?
    [2.] Did [the] Trial Court abuse its discretion by ordering
    restitution without giving due consideration to the unique factors
    of the juvenile before it?
    Appellant’s brief at 3.
    Since “the Juvenile Act grants to the court broad discretion in
    disposition,” we review a dispositional order for an abuse of discretion.
    Commonwealth v. K.M.-F., 
    117 A.3d 346
    , 350 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
    In the Interest of A.D., 
    771 A.2d 45
    , 53 (Pa.Super. 2001) (en banc).
    Restitution in the juvenile setting is authorized by a statute providing that,
    once a child is adjudicated delinquent,
    the court may make any of the following orders of disposition
    determined to be consistent with the protection of the public
    interest and best suited to the child's treatment, supervision,
    rehabilitation and welfare, which disposition shall, as appropriate
    to the individual circumstances of the child's case, provide
    balanced attention to the protection of the community, the
    imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the
    development of competencies to enable the child to become a
    responsible and productive member of the community:
    ....
    [o]rdering payment by the child of reasonable amounts of
    money as fines, costs, fees or restitution as deemed appropriate
    as part of the plan of rehabilitation considering the nature of the
    acts committed and the earning capacity of the child, including a
    contribution to a restitution fund.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a)(5).
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    Our Supreme Court considered the juvenile court’s authority to award
    restitution under § 6352(a)(5) in In re M.W., 
    725 A.2d 729
     (Pa. 1999).
    Our High Court observed that, in an adult criminal proceeding, “restitution
    may be imposed either as a direct sentence, or as a condition of probation.
    When imposed as a sentence, the injury to property or person for which
    restitution is ordered must directly result from the crime.     However, when
    restitution is ordered as a condition of probation, the sentencing court is
    accorded the latitude to fashion probationary conditions designed to
    rehabilitate the defendant and provide some measure of redress to the
    victim.” Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
    Thus, when restitution is imposed as a condition of probation, the trial
    court is granted “the flexibility to determine all the direct and indirect
    damages caused by a defendant and then permit the court to order
    restitution so that the defendant will understand the egregiousness of his
    conduct, be deterred from repeating this conduct, and be encouraged to live
    in a responsible way.”      Id.   Simply put, “the requirement of a nexus
    between the damage and the offense is relaxed where restitution is ordered
    as a condition of probation.” Id.
    Our High Court in In re M.W. ruled that the principles applicable to
    restitution imposed as a condition of probation rather than as a direct
    sentence were applicable to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a)(5). It reasoned that
    the rehabilitative policy of the Juvenile Act's restitution provision
    corresponds to that which supports the imposition of restitution
    -4-
    J-S63015-17
    as a condition of probation in a criminal case. Section 6352,
    unlike the provision of the Crimes Code providing for restitution
    as a condition of sentence, does not contain language
    specifically requiring that the loss or injury be a direct
    result of the juvenile's wrongful conduct. Consistent with
    the protection of the public interest and the community, the
    rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile Act is attained through
    accountability and the development of personal qualities that will
    enable the juvenile offender to become a responsible and
    productive member of the community. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
    6301(b)(2). Thus, the policies underlying the Juvenile Act and its
    restitution provision, as well as the plain language of Section
    6352, serve to invest the juvenile court with a broad measure of
    discretion to apportion responsibility for damages based upon
    the nature of the delinquent act and the earning capacity of the
    juvenile.
    Id. at 732-33 (emphases added).
    Herein, the juvenile court observed that Appellant was part of a group
    of people who pointed a gun at a male, were located in a stolen vehicle,
    possessed heroin and drugs in the vehicle and on their person, and led
    police on a high speed chase, resulting in a car accident. The juvenile court
    justified its imposition of restitution as follows:
    The appellant was one of four juveniles involved in a high speed
    chase in which one victim suffered both physical and monetary
    losses and the second victim, substantial monetary losses. As
    demonstrated by his response to the Court at the time of
    adjudication, the appellant had knowledge that he was in a
    stolen vehicle. While he was not the driver, he was a participant
    in an incident which resulted in injuries and loss of property for
    two innocent individuals. This appellant has been involved in the
    juvenile system previously and had only been off of probation for
    a few weeks before knowingly engaging in criminal behavior. In
    the instant matter, an imposition of $1,769,36 in restitution is
    not excessive. Imposition of restitution in this matter serves to
    hold the appellant accountable for his participation, regardless of
    whether he was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The
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    victim most significantly impacted by this incident was a
    pregnant woman. The owner of the stolen vehicle had no vehicle
    to aid in his support of his three children. The conduct of the
    appellant's, as well as the co-defendant's actions, could have
    been devastating. The decision to engage in the operation of a
    stolen vehicle could have had much more dire consequences if
    someone been seriously hurt or killed. The appellant is a fifteen
    year old, healthy, young man who has the earning capacity to
    pay the restitution in this matter. The appellant along with his
    co-defendants should be held responsible for making the victims
    whole financially.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/17, at 5-6.
    Appellant’s first contention is that the award of restitution was not
    authorized by § 6352(a)(5) because there was no connection between the
    actions that he committed and the restitution damages. Appellant relies on
    In Interest of Dublinski, 
    695 A.2d 827
     (Pa.Super. 1997), a case decided
    by this Court prior to our Supreme Court’s pronouncement in In re M.W.
    Appellant’s brief at 11-12. In that decision, we indicated that a restitution
    award must be linked to the amount of loss or damage actually caused by
    the juvenile’s actions.   Dublinski’s holding can no longer be considered
    viable in light of our Supreme Court’s determination in In re M.W. that such
    a nexus is not required. Thus, we reject Appellant’s position that there must
    be a direct causal connection between his conduct and the damages in order
    for a restitution award to stand.
    Appellant’s second averment on appeal is that, even if the restitution
    award was authorized under § 6352(a)(5), the court abused its discretion in
    imposing it. As outlined, supra, the juvenile court clearly delineated why it
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    J-S63015-17
    considered an award an appropriate rehabilitative tool in light of Appellant’s
    behavior and as a means to rehabilitate Appellant by causing him to realize
    the seriousness of his actions. The juvenile court’s reasoning dispels any
    argument that it committed an abuse of discretion, and we reject Appellant’s
    second argument.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/17/2017
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 632 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 10/17/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021