Com. v. Maness, M. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARTY WILLIAM MANESS :
:
Appellant : No. 439 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 24, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-29-CR-0000143-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2022
Appellant, Marty William Maness, appeals from the February 24, 2022
order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel for Appellant, Mark F. Bayley,
Esquire (“Attorney Bayley”) filed a brief and a motion to withdraw as counsel
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and its progeny.1 We
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1 See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
Attorney Bayley’s appellate brief filed pursuant to Anders, supra, is
misplaced. A Turner/Finley no-merit letter or brief is required where counsel
seeks to withdraw within the context of PCRA litigation. See Commonwealth
v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1998). “Because an Anders brief provides
greater protection to [an appellant], this Court may accept an Anders brief in
lieu of a Turner/Finley [no-merit] letter.” Widgins, 29 A.3d at 817 n.2.
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affirm the order denying Appellant’s petition and grant Attorney Bayley’s
motion to withdraw.
The PCRA court set forth the procedural history as follows:
This case arises from an incident [that occurred] on March 30,
2016, where an individual suffered a fatal overdose at [Appellant’s
residence]. As a result, [Appellant] was charged with
[manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture
or deliver, a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(20),] and
drug delivery resulting in death[, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a),] on
June 23, 2016.
On December 20, 2016, [Appellant] filed an omnibus pre[-]trial
motion. He was represented by [] John J. Mooney[,] III[, Esquire
(“Attorney Mooney”)] at the time. A hearing was held on the
matter on February 14, 2017. [On] April 4, 2017, [the trial court]
denied [Appellant’s] omnibus [] motion.
After a two-day jury trial on October 5[, 2017, and October] 6,
2017, [Appellant] was convicted of [the aforementioned] charges.
[Appellant] was sentenced on October 31, 2017, to a term of 108[
to ]240 months' incarceration in a state correctional institution for
his conviction of drug delivery resulting in death[. H]is remaining
conviction merged for sentencing purposes.
On November 6, 2017, [Appellant] filed a motion for
post-sentence relief. Subsequently, [Appellant] applied for, and
was granted, the assistance of the public defender's office. Thus,
Attorney Mooney ceased his representation of [Appellant], and []
Philip Harper[, Esquire (“Attorney Harper”)] took over as counsel
for [Appellant].
[On] April 3, 2018, [the trial court] denied [Appellant’s]
post-sentence motion. [Appellant] timely appealed on May 2,
2018. On December 21, 2018, [this Court] affirmed [Appellant’s]
judgment of sentence. [See Commonwealth v. Maness, 2018
WL 6715297 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 21, 2018) (unpublished
memorandum). Appellant did not seek discretionary review by
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As such, we accept counsel’s Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley no-merit
letter and will consider it under the Turner/Finley standard.
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our Supreme Court. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on Tuesday, January 22, 2019.2]
On August 26, 2019, [Appellant] filed a pro se [PCRA] petition, in
which he indicated that he wished to proceed without an attorney.
On August 28, 2019, [the PCRA court] scheduled a hearing in
order to colloquy [Appellant] on the record about his right to
counsel. After [conducting a] hearing on October 15, 2019, [the
PCRA court] determined [Appellant] wished to have an attorney
represent him and directed the court administrator to appoint
counsel[. The PCRA court] also directed future counsel to review
the record and determine whether [amendment of Appellant’s pro
se] petition was necessary. On October 18, 2019, [] Bret
Beynon[, Esquire (“Attorney Beynon”) was appointed to represent
Appellant].
[Following the appointment of Attorney Beynon, no additional
filings were submitted on Appellant’s behalf. Accordingly, on
March 3, 2020, the PCRA court] entered an order [] directing
Attorney Beynon to file an amended petition or otherwise notify
the [PCRA] court that none was necessary. On March 17, 2020,
[Appellant] filed a counseled [amended PCRA] petition[.] On April
9, 2020, [the PCRA court] received the Commonwealth's answer
to [Appellant’s amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court] then
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on [Appellant’s] petition for June
16, 2020.
On June 16, 2020, after an on-the-record discussion, [the PCRA
court] vacated Attorney Beynon's appointment as counsel for
[Appellant] due to a conflict of interest and directed the court
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2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (stating, “[a] judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of the time for seeking the review”); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908
(stating, whenever the last day of any period of time referred to in a statute
“shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the
laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted
from the computation”); 5 U.S.C.A. § 6103(a) (listing the “Birthday of Martin
Luther King, Jr, the third Monday in January,” as a federal holiday). Pursuant
to these statutory provisions, we omitted Monday, January 21, 2019, from the
computation of the date on which Appellant’s judgment of sentence became
final.
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administrator to appoint new counsel as quickly as possible[. The
PCRA court] also directed future counsel [to] review the [amended
PCRA] petition submitted by Attorney Beynon and determine if
any motions must be filed [to prepare the matter] for a[n
evidentiary] hearing.
On June 23, 2020, [Attorney Mark F. Bayley (“Attorney Bayley”)]
was appointed to represent [Appellant]. Attorney Bayley
subsequently requested several transcripts and filed a motion for
leave to file [an] amended petition once all transcripts were
received[. The PCRA court subsequently] granted the motion. On
January 8, 2021, Attorney Bayley filed a motion [] to withdraw [as
Appellant’s counsel], along with a [Turner/Finley] no[-]merit
letter.
On January 28, 2021, [the PCRA court] entered an order
scheduling an evidentiary hearing on [Appellant’s] petition for
March 4, 2021. [The PCRA court] clarified that the hearing was []
limited to the issues concerning [District Attorney Travis Kendall’s]
potential conflict of interest [in prosecuting Appellant’s underlying
criminal matter] and the failure to call certain witnesses [at trial.
The PCRA court further] indicated that the issue regarding
[Attorney Mooney’s] failure to pursue certain suppression issues
would be decided without [an] evidentiary hearing. On February
16, 2021, [Appellant] filed a motion for [a] continuance and [a]
motion for [the evidentiary] hearing to be conducted via [an
Internet-based video conferencing application. The PCRA court]
granted the motion[s] and continued the hearing until May 6,
2021, [with the hearing] to take place [via a video conferencing
application]. On April 29, 2021, upon the [PCRA] court's own
motion, [the evidentiary hearing was] rescheduled [for] July 15,
2021[.]
On July 15, 2021, [the PCRA court] held an evidentiary hearing
via [a video conferencing application], where [Appellant]
presented testimony from Attorney [] Harper and Attorney []
Mooney[. Appellant] also testified at the hearing. However, two
additional defense witnesses [(Randy Cubbage and Joshua
Sarver)] were unable to access the virtual hearing. Therefore,
[the PCRA court] scheduled a second evidentiary hearing for
September 20, 2021, to be held in[-]person.
The second evidentiary hearing was held on September 20, 2021,
at which time [Appellant] presented testimony from [] Cubbage.
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[Appellant’s] remaining witness, [] Sarver, [] failed to appear.
Therefore, yet another [evidentiary] hearing was scheduled.
On February 2, 2022, despite personal service by [the] deputy
sheriff, [of a subpoena to appear and offer testimony at the
evidentiary hearing,] Sarver again failed to appear [at the]
evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5904(d),
[Appellant] requested that a bench warrant be issued for []
Sarver. For the reasons set forth in [the] order [filed on] February
17, 2022, [the PCRA court] declined to issue a bench warrant.
[Thereafter, the PCRA court closed the evidentiary hearing record,
and no further testimony or evidence was presented.]
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/24/22, 1-4 (extraneous capitalization omitted). On
February 24, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition.3 On March 11,
2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.4 On June 8, 2022, Attorney Bayley
filed an Anders brief, as discussed supra, and a motion to withdraw as
court-appointed counsel with this Court.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. [Did] the [PCRA] court err[] in denying [] Appellant's [PCRA]
petition [] where [Attorney Harper and Attorney Mooney]
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
formally object to District Attorney [] Kendall prosecuting
the case[?]
2. [Did] the [PCRA] court err[] in denying [] Appellant's [PCRA]
petition [] where [Attorney] Mooney[] provided ineffective
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3 In the February 24, 2022 order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition, the PCRA
court informed Appellant of his right to appeal the denial of his petition and
that Attorney Bayley “shall continue to serve as court-appointed counsel.”
PCRA Court Order, 2/24/22. As such, by inference, the PCRA court denied
Attorney Bayley’s petition to withdraw as counsel.
4On April 4, 2022, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court subsequently filed
a Rule 1925(a) opinion relying on its February 24, 2022 opinion.
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assistance of counsel by failing to call [] Sarver [as a
witness] at trial[?]
3. [Did] the [PCRA] court err[] in denying [] Appellant's [PCRA]
petition [] where [Attorney] Mooney[] provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to call [] Cubbage [as a
witness] at trial[?]
4. [Did] the [PCRA] court err[] in denying [] Appellant's [PCRA]
petition [] where [Attorney] Mooney[] provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to call [] Karen Amos [as a
witness] at trial[?]
5. [Did] the [PCRA] court err[] in denying [] Appellant's [PCRA]
petition [] where [Attorney] Harper[] provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to argue the facts and case
law in his brief submitted to the trial court on March 15,
2018, and during his [direct] appeal to [this Court?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
Preliminarily, we must address Attorney Bayley’s motion to withdraw as
counsel before addressing the merits of the claims raised on appeal. As
discussed supra, because this appeal is from the denial of collateral relief
under the PCRA, a Turner/Finley no-merit letter or brief is the appropriate
filing. Although we accepted Attorney Bayley’s Anders brief in lieu of a
Turner/Finley brief, counsel is still required to adhere to all of the
Turner/Finley requirements, stated as follows:
Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
proceed under Turner, supra[,] and Finley, supra[,] and must
review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then
submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to
this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's diligent
review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to
have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit,
and requesting permission to withdraw.
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Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the
“no[-]merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to
withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to
proceed pro se or by new counsel.
Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that satisfy
the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court – [PCRA]
court or this Court - must then conduct its own review of the
merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims
are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and
deny relief.
Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) (original
brackets and ellipses omitted), quoting Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931
A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Instantly, Attorney Bayley satisfied the technical requirements of
Turner/Finley. In his appellate brief, counsel raised five issues for our review
and explained how and why those issues are each without merit. Appellant’s
Brief at 7-8, 11-26. Counsel also filed a motion to withdraw with this Court
on June 8, 2022. As an exhibit to his motion, counsel attached a letter to
Appellant that enclosed a copy of counsel’s no-merit brief, included a copy of
counsel’s motion to withdraw, and advised Appellant of his right to proceed
pro se or retain new counsel. Appellant has not filed a response to counsel’s
letter, the appellate brief, or the motion to withdraw. Accordingly, we proceed
to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if the appeal
lacks merit.
In addressing Appellant’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled
standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper
appellate review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition is limited to the
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examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the
record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,
992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not
be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,
and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support
a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140
(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s
legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20
(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).
Appellant’s issues, in tantum, raise claims alleging that that trial counsel
and direct appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance. Appellant’s Brief at
7-8. “It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective[.]”
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984). To plead and prove a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the
underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an objective
reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from counsel's act or
failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super.
2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014). “A claim of
ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to meet any of
these prongs.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). “In
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determining whether counsel's action was reasonable, we do not question
whether there were other more logical courses of action which counsel could
have pursued; rather, we must examine whether counsel's decisions had any
reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa.
2007).
Our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed
constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the
particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis
designed to effectuate his[, or her,] client's interests. The test is
not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing
a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the
alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of
effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel's
decision had any reasonable basis.
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). A petitioner
establishes prejudice when he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's [acts or omissions], the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966
A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).
Appellant’s first issue alleges that both trial counsel and direct appeal
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge District Attorney
Kendall’s prosecution of Appellant’s case. Appellant’s Brief at 11-18.
Appellant asserts that,
Prior to serving as the Fulton County District Attorney, Attorney
Kendall represented [Appellant] in a substantially similar case in
or around 2005. [Appellant] asserts that [District] Attorney
Kendall should have [] recognized his conflict of interest in
prosecuting the current case, because of how similar the 2005
case was[.]
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Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 3/17/20, at ¶22.5 Appellant contends
that “District Attorney Kendall made mention of the 2005 case, which was
dismissed, during arguments made to the [trial] court [regarding the]
reduction of [Appellant’s] bail, and [at the sentencing hearing] to justify the
Commonwealth’s [sentencing request.]” Id. at ¶23.
A prosecution is barred when an actual conflict of interest affecting
the prosecutor exists in the case[. U]nder such circumstances a
defendant need not prove actual prejudice in order to require that
the conflict be removed. Mere allegations of a conflict of interest,
however, are insufficient to require replacement of a district
attorney.
Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and
quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014).
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, which defines the term
“conflict of interest” within the practice of law, states, in pertinent part, as
follows:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client gives informed consent.
Pa.R.P.C. 1.9(a).
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5In his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant asserted that because District Attorney
Kendall previously represented Appellant in private practice, District Attorney
Kendall “[knew] everything about [Appellant]” which gave the Commonwealth
a “gain” in convicting Appellant of the criminal charges in the case sub judice.
Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 8/26/19, at 4.
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For purposes of Rule 1.9, matters are “substantially related” if
they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there
otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information
as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation
would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent
matter.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 122 A.3d 414, 416 (Pa. Super. 2015), relying on
Rule 1.9, Official Comment.
Here, the PCRA court summarized District Attorney Kendall’s prior
involvement as Appellant’s privately-retained counsel as follows:
A [criminal] complaint was filed against [Appellant] on July 6,
2005, charging him with two counts of intentional possession of
[a] controlled substance by person not registered, [35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(16),] and two counts of use/possession of drug
paraphernalia[, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32)]. The affidavit of
probable cause explained that [police officers] responded to
[Appellant’s residence] in Needmore, Fulton County, upon report
of an unconscious female. The victim was deceased by the time
the police [officers] arrived. The Fulton County coroner was called
to investigate and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in the
room where the woman died. The [police officers] recovered small
vials of heroin and marijuana plants [from] around the room, as
well as several items associated with drug use, including a metal
spoon and metal smoking device, each containing residue[. A
police] officer collected these items and sent them for testing.
Testing confirmed that all [items seized in Appellant’s residence
contained the residue of] controlled substances. During the
investigation into the woman's death, [Appellant] provided a
statement to [the police officers] admitting ownership of the
recovered drugs.
...
On June 6, 2006, Attorney Kendall filed omnibus pre-trial motions
on behalf of [Appellant], alleging that the drug paraphernalia was
discovered during an illegal, warrantless[] search of [Appellant’s]
property[. Attorney Kendall] also argued [that Appellant’s]
statements to [the] police [officers] should be suppressed as fruit
of the illegal search. The [trial] court issued an opinion and order
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on September 25, 2006, granting [Appellant’s] motion as to the
heroin, marijuana, needles, glass vials, rolling papers, and metal
smoking device[. T]he motion was denied as to the rubber tubing
and metal spoon.
On April 17, 2007, the Commonwealth nolle prossed all charges
against [Appellant.]
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/24/22, at 6-7.
At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Attorney Mooney recalled that, at the
time of trial, he was aware District Attorney Kendall previously served as
Appellant privately-retained defense counsel during an earlier criminal
prosecution. In fact, Attorney Mooney discussed the matter with Appellant.
N.T., 7/15/21, at 12-13 (stating that, Appellant raised the issue of District
Attorney Kendall’s prior representation). In these discussions, Attorney
Mooney informed Appellant that if he successfully challenged the local district
attorney’s fitness to prosecute the pending criminal charges, the Attorney
General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would take over prosecution
of the criminal case. Id. at 12. Attorney Mooney stated that both he and
Appellant “thought [Appellant] may be better off with local [d]istrict [a]ttorney
presence rather than the Attorney General’s office.” Id. at 12-13. Attorney
Mooney testified that, ultimately, Appellant decided not to pursue
disqualification of District Attorney Kendall or his office from prosecution of
Appellant’s pending criminal case. Id. at 13-14.
Appellant testified that he initially raised District Attorney Kendall’s prior
representation with Attorney Harper, who at that point had been appointed to
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represent Appellant at trial.6 Id. at 34. Appellant stated he did not ask
Attorney Harper to raise the issue because Appellant hired Attorney Mooney
to represent him. Id. Appellant recalled discussing “the pros and cons of
[District] Attorney Kendall continuing on as prosecutor in [the instant] case”
with Attorney Mooney. Id. at 36. At the evidentiary hearing, Appellant was
asked what confidential information he provided to Attorney Kendall during
the prior case that could have been used against him in the case sub judice.
Appellant responded,
That we [(Appellant and the victim in the prior criminal case)]
were injecting each other back then, you know, and it could be
used against me so [District Attorney Kendall] could sit there and
bring up the other cases back then that, you know, we injected
each other. So it could have put me as I killed her and stuff but I
didn’t inject her at that time.
Id. at 42.
Based upon a review of the record before us, we discern no error of law
or abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s ineffectiveness
claim challenging trial counsel’s failure to seek disqualification of District
Attorney Kendall and his office from prosecution in the underlying criminal
case. Appellant failed to establish that trial counsel’s actions lacked an
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6 For clarification, Attorney Harper was originally appointed to represent
Appellant at trial. Appellant subsequently retained Attorney Mooney as
privately-retained defense counsel for purposes of trial. After Appellant was
convicted and sentenced, as discussed supra, Attorney Harper was appointed
to represent Appellant in the post-sentence motion and direct appeal phases
of the case.
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objective reasonable basis. Both Appellant and Attorney Mooney testified that
they discussed Attorney Kendall’s prior representation. As part of their “pros
and cons” discussion, Attorney Mooney explained the consequences of District
Attorney Kendall’s disqualification, including the likelihood that Appellant’s
case would be prosecuted by the Pennsylvania Attorney General. Attorney
Mooney believed, and Appellant agreed, that it was in Appellant’s best interest
to have the case prosecuted by the local district attorney. Ultimately, since
Appellant chose to forgo disqualification of District Attorney Kendall to avoid
potentially adverse consequences, we agree that trial counsel was not
ineffective.
Because Appellant elected not to object to District Attorney Kendall’s
prosecution of the criminal case, no meritorious claim could have been raised
for the first time on direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i]ssues
not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal”). Therefore, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lodged against direct
appeal counsel is also without reasonable merit. Moreover, the allegation that
direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue in a
post-sentence motion is also without merit. As discussed supra, trial counsel
had a reasonable basis for declining to object to District Attorney Kendall’s
prosecution of the case and direct appeal counsel cannot be ineffective for
failing to raise an unpreserved claim that lacked merit. Commonwealth v.
Rivera, 199 A.3d 365, 374 (Pa. 2018) (stating that, if the underlying claim is
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without merit, counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless claim).
Appellant’s next three issues allege that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to call, at trial, three potential witnesses, namely Sarver, Cubbage, and
Amos. Appellant’s Brief at 18-24.
To reiterate, the three prongs of an ineffectiveness claim are: (1)
arguable merit, (2) lack of reasonable basis or strategy, and (3) prejudice.
Stewart, 84 A.3d at 706. To establish the arguable merit prong of the
three-prong ineffectiveness test based on a failure to call a potential witness
to testify at trial, the petitioner must prove that:
(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
trial.
Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810-811 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 74 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2013). In this context,
to establish prejudice, the petitioner "must show how the [potential witness's]
testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case"
and "helpful to the defense" such that the absence of the testimony denied
the petitioner a fair trial. Id. at 811 (citation omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 546 (Pa. 2005) (holding, "[t]rial
counsel's failure to call a [potential witness] does not constitute ineffective
assistance without some showing that the [potential] witness'[s] testimony
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would have been beneficial or helpful in establishing the asserted defense"),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 848 (2006).
In addition to establishing arguable merit, a petitioner must also
demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for failing to call a potential
witness and that the failure to call a potential witness prejudiced the petitioner
such that there was a reasonable probability that the witness’s testimony
would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Stewart, 84 A.3d at 706;
see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 278 A.3d 336, 345-349 (Pa. Super.
2022).
Regarding the aforementioned three potential witnesses, the PCRA court
found that Attorney Mooney had a reasonable basis for not calling each of the
potential witnesses at trial. Appellant’s Brief at 16, 19-20. In the case of
Amos, the PCRA court stated,
Attorney Mooney explained that in his opinion, not much of Amos'
potential testimony would be useful. In fact, the most useful thing
Amos could say was that [Appellant] was not the drug kingpin,
but was just "part of the party." Significantly, according to
Attorney Mooney, Amos was not convinced that [Appellant] had
not supplied the victim with heroin on the day he died. Further,
both of the other individuals with [Appellant] and [the victim on
the day of the incident] admitted at trial that they were drug users
or [drug] dealers in their own right; one even admitted to having
previously been arrested in a drug deal. In [Attorney Mooney’s]
view, having Amos testify would not have been favorable to the
defense, especially in light of the Commonwealth's ability to then
cross-examine her. Specifically, Attorney Mooney felt it was best
not to have Amos testify because doing so would have opened the
door for the Commonwealth to introduce information about
damaging phone calls between [Appellant] and Amos. . . . While
Attorney Mooney discussed the positives and negatives of calling
Amos at trial, it was [Appellant] who ultimately decided not to.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 2/24/22, at 15-16 (paragraph formatting modified).
Concerning Cubbage, the PCRA court stated,
[Attorney Mooney] testified that the purpose of calling Cubbage
would have been to attack the other two individuals[, who were
with Appellant and the victim on the day of the incident,7] as being
drug users or drug dealers themselves. According to Attorney
Mooney, once [the two individuals] admitted as much during trial,
it took a lot of impetus out of the usefulness of Cubbage's
testimony. Attorney Mooney testified that, at that point, bringing
in more drug users would paint an even worse picture of
[Appellant]. Lastly, Attorney Mooney testified that [Appellant]
was involved in the decision not to call more drug users[ or drug
]dealers to the stand.
...
Cubbage's testimony at the [evidentiary] hearing, while providing
basic background information, was unclear with respect to what
he would have testified about had he been called as a witness at
[Appellant’s] trial. Without any information [concerning] the
testimony he would have given, we cannot [] begin to speculate
as to whether that testimony would have been favorable to the
defense.
In addition, Attorney Mooney made a strategic decision not to
offer Cubbage's testimony, as doing so would have allowed the
[Commonwealth] to extract damaging information from him
regarding [Appellant’s] various drug activities. This was a prudent
and reasonable decision. Moreover, to the extent Cubbage's
testimony would have been beneficial in showing that the other
two individuals with [the victim] and [Appellant on the day of the
incident] were also involved with drugs, such usefulness was
diminished when that information came out during trial [without
Cubbage’s testimony]. At trial, [the two individuals with Appellant
and the victim on the day of the incident] both testified that they,
along with [the victim], were heroin addicts who frequently sold
heroin for [Appellant] in exchange for a small amount of heroin
they could keep for personal use. They also testified that on the
day in question, they, along with [the victim], were experiencing
____________________________________________
7 Cubbage was not present at Appellant’s residence on the day of the incident.
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heroin withdrawal and went to [Appellant’s] house to obtain and
use heroin.
Id. at 18-19 (record citations omitted).
Finally, with regard to Sarver, the PCRA court stated,
Attorney Mooney testified that the purpose of calling Sarver would
have been to attack the other two individuals[, who were with the
victim and Appellant on the day of the incident, 8] as being drug
users or drug dealers themselves[. H]owever, once [the two
individuals] admitted as much during trial, it took a lot of the
usefulness out of Sarver's testimony. Again, Attorney Mooney
testified that, at that point, bringing even more drug users before
the jury painted an even worse picture for [Appellant]. Lastly,
Attorney Mooney testified that [Appellant] was involved in the
decision not to call more drug users[ or drug ]dealers to the stand.
Id. at 20. Moreover, the PCRA court found that,
Sarver's testimony at trial would likely not have survived a
relevance [or] speculation objection raised by the
[Commonwealth]. There is no evidence in the record that Sarver
was present at [Appellant’s] home on the day in question. What
Sarver may have observed on other days about [Appellant’s]
drug-sharing activities is [] likely not relevant to what happened
on the day [the victim] died in [Appellant’s] home. In addition,
any suggestion by Sarver that [Appellant] and [the victim]
engaged in similar drug-sharing behavior on the day in question
would be no more than rank speculation.
Id., citing PCRA Court Order, 2/17/22, at 4.
At the criminal trial, Attorney Mooney summarized Appellant’s defense
as follows,
[T]here is no credible evidence that [Appellant] distributed,
handled, injected, administered, dispensed, [or] sold [] controlled
____________________________________________
8 Sarver was not present at Appellant’s residence on the day of the incident.
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substances to [the victim]. A more logical explanation [of the
events on the day of the incident] is [Appellant’s residence] was
[the chosen destination of the victim and the other two
individuals. They] brought [their] kits [for using drugs. They]
sold some packs [of drugs] earlier in the day. [It was] time for
[them] to feel good again.
N.T., 10/6/17, at 41. At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Attorney Mooney
testified that, in his discussions with Appellant about the pros and cons of
calling any of these three potential witnesses at trial, he expressed that
presenting more witnesses who were within Appellant’s circle of drug users
and drug dealers “was painting a worse picture” for the defense. N.T.,
7/15/21, at 26. Ultimately, Appellant decided not to call the three individuals
as potential witnesses at trial. Id. at 22, 26. Attorney Mooney stated that
the most useful testimony Amos could have offered was to state that Appellant
was not a “drug king pin” but, rather, simply part of a group of people who
partied and used drugs. Id. at 17. This testimony, Attorney Mooney
explained, was not, in his opinion, helpful and would only subject Amos to
cross-examination by the Commonwealth. Id. at 15, 17. Attorney Mooney
recalled that calling Amos risked introduction of “hours and hours” of
telephone conversations between Amos and Appellant in which Appellant
directed Amos to “collect money that they were owed by people to whom
[Appellant] had sold drugs.”9 Id. at 23 (describing the taped conversations
as “the worst conversations I have heard in 37 years of being a criminal
____________________________________________
9At trial, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence three portions of taped
conversations between Appellant and Amos, which were played for the jury.
N.T., 10/5/17, at 154-163; see also N.T., 10/6/17, at 3-5.
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defense” attorney). At trial, the audio evidence of Appellant’s conversations
with Amos was redacted to three small portions as a result of Attorney
Mooney’s hearsay objections. N.T., 10/5/17, at 154-163 (admitting those
portions of the conversation in which Amos’ comments were “purely
incidental” and “not testimonial”). Attorney Mooney was concerned that if
Amos testified at trial, the Commonwealth would be able to introduce
additional portions of her telephone conversations with Appellant. N.T.,
7/15/21, at 24. Attorney Mooney stated that having more of the conversation
presented to the jury would outweigh any useful testimony Amos may have
offered. Id. (stating, “[i]t was mountains of more bad information that the
jury would have heard”).
Concerning Cubbage and Sarver, Attorney Mooney agreed that one
reason to call those witnesses was to attack or discredit the two individuals
who were with Appellant and the victim the day of the incident “as being drug
users and drug dealers themselves.” Id. at 25. Both Cubbage and Sarver
purchased drugs from the two individuals at some point prior to the incident.
Id. The importance of Cubbage’s or Sarver’s testimony was greatly
diminished, however, once the two individuals admitted, at trial, that they
were drug dealers. Id. Attorney Mooney reiterated that, at this point, calling
either Cubbage or Sarver as a witness was “bringing more druggies into the
circle [] of people who used drugs and brought drugs and sold drugs [] with
[Appellant and that] was not making it better” for Appellant’s case. Id. at 26.
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Upon review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the
PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims challenging trial
counsel’s failure to call Amos, Cubbage, or Sarver as potential witnesses at
trial. The PCRA court found, and the record supports, that trial counsel offered
reasonable explanations for not calling these potential witnesses. As such,
Appellant’s issues are without merit.
In his final issue, Appellant alleges that direct appeal counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge, within the context of a post-sentence
motion or on direct appeal, the trial court’s denial of his omnibus motion which
sought to suppress certain evidence seized from Appellant’s residence, as well
as his cellular telephone and statements Appellant made to law enforcement
officials on the day of the incident. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8, 24-26.
In order to establish this ineffectiveness claim, Appellant must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, inter alia, his underlying
suppression claims possessed arguable merit. Stewart, 84 A.3d at 706.
To address Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, we briefly discuss the
procedural history pertinent to the underlying suppression motion. On
December 20, 2016, Attorney Mooney filed an omnibus motion seeking to
suppress certain evidence seized on the day of the incident, namely evidence
taken from Appellant’s residence, Appellant’s cellular telephone, and
statements Appellant made to law enforcement at his residence. Omnibus
Pre-Trial Motion, 12/20/16. The trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s
omnibus motion on February 14, 2017, and subsequently directed counsel and
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the Commonwealth to file written arguments on the issues presented no later
than March 7, 2017. Trial Court Order, 2/16/17. The Commonwealth filed a
brief in opposition to Appellant’s omnibus motion on March 6, 2017. Attorney
Mooney filed a brief in support of the omnibus motion on March 8, 2017, which
the trial court accepted as timely. On April 4, 2017, the trial court denied
Appellant’s omnibus motion. Trial Court Order, 4/4/17; see also Trial Court
Opinion, 4/4/17.
After Appellant was convicted of the aforementioned crimes and the trial
court imposed its sentence, as discussed supra, Attorney Mooney filed a
post-sentence motion on November 5, 2017. On February 8, 2018, Attorney
Harper represented to the trial court that Appellant sought the services of the
public defender’s office and that Attorney Mooney no longer represented
Appellant. Appellant’s Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Written
Argument in Support of Post-Sentence Motion, 2/8/18, at ¶¶5-6; see also
Attorney Mooney’s Praecipe for Withdrawal of Appearance, 2/16/18. On
March 12, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to Appellant’s
post-sentence motion. On March 15, 2018, Attorney Harper filed a brief in
support of Appellant’s post-sentence motion.10 The trial court denied the
____________________________________________
10 In the brief, Attorney Harper stated,
[Appellant] raises a request for [a] new trial based upon the [trial
court’s error in refusing] to suppress evidence of [cellular
telephones] obtained at the scene of the alleged crime and
evidence of telephone calls between [Appellant] and [Amos] while
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post-sentence motion on April 3, 2018. On direct appeal, Attorney Harper
raised claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the weight of the
evidence, and the excessive nature of Appellant’s sentence. Maness, 2018
WL 6715297, at *1. Attorney Harper did not raise a claim challenging the trial
court’s denial of the omnibus motion. Id.; see also Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
Concise Statement, 5/29/18.
In the instant appeal, Appellant now claims that direct appeal counsel
was ineffective for failing to challenge the denial of his omnibus motion in the
post-sentence motion or on direct appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 24-26. To
review Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, we must first review the underlying
claim to assess whether underlying suppression issues have merit. See
Rivera, 199 A.3d at 374.
In his omnibus motion, Appellant conceded that Trooper Bradley Huff
(“Trooper Huff”) was lawfully present in the residence because he was
responding to a 911 emergency services request regarding the victim’s
possible overdose. Omnibus Motion, 12/20/16, at ¶11. Appellant asserted,
____________________________________________
[Appellant] was incarcerated. On review of the record in this case
and the trial transcripts, in particular, [pages 108 to 121 of the
notes of testimony dated October 5, 2017,] the undersigned
[(Attorney Harper)], without further information, is unable to
support the validity of this claim given the agreements and
stipulations of [trial] counsel, the [d]istrict [a]ttorney[,] and
in[-]camera testimony of witnesses. Therefore[,] it is requested
to raise this issue on further appeal, if necessary.
Appellant’s Argument in Support of Post-Sentence Motions, 3/15/18, at
unpaginated page 2.
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however, that “no other exception to the warrant requirement is present to
justify the warrantless search of [Appellant’s residence].” Id. Specifically,
Appellant argued that the evidence cited in the affidavit of probable cause and
offered in support of the search warrant – namely a bag of short cut straws
discovered in a flowerpot, an uncapped hypodermic needle located behind a
picture frame, and a hypodermic needle and caps recovered from a trash
can - was unlawfully seized by Trooper Huff because it was not in plain view,
and no other exception applied.11 Id. at ¶¶12, 16. Appellant further asserted
that there were no exigent circumstances which justified Trooper Huff’s
seizure of Appellant’s cellular telephone before obtaining a warrant. Id. at
¶¶12-14, 17, 19-28. Finally, Appellant argued that statements he made to
Trooper Huff while at the residence were illegally obtained because they were
made while Appellant was in custodial detention and without issuance of
Miranda warnings.12 Id. at 29-36.
In denying Appellant’s omnibus motion, the trial court found,
[Trooper Huff13] was dispatched to [Appellant’s] residence in
response to a 911 [emergency services] call for an unresponsive
____________________________________________
11 In his omnibus motion, Appellant asserted that the items seized from his
residence included: (1) “a bundle of short cut straws in a potted plant in a
living room,” (2) “an uncapped hypodermic needle behind a picture frame on
a table,” and (3) “a hypodermic needle and caps in the trash can underneath
paper towels with possibly fresh blood.” Omnibus Motion, 12/20/16, at ¶12.
12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13Trooper Huff, at that time, was “an eight-year veteran of the Pennsylvania
State Police.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/17, at 1.
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individual. When he entered the [residence], he observed [the
victim] lying on the living room floor and being attended to by
[emergency medical services (“EMS”)] personnel. He also
observed the hypodermic needle and the cut straw pieces in plain
view, without conducting any kind of search of the home. The
photographs introduced as Commonwealth’s exhibits 1 through 5
capture the scene as Trooper Huff viewed it upon his entry. The
location of the orange-capped hypodermic needle on the table
behind the framed photograph and the [flowerpot] containing the
plastic bag of straw pieces are clearly within just a few feet of [the
victim’s] body. The items were not obscured and were capable of
being plainly seen from the trooper’s location. Further, given [the
victim’s] apparent drug overdose and Trooper Huff’s training and
experience, the incriminating nature of the items was immediately
apparent. Finally, Trooper Huff did not actually seize the property
until after he obtained a warrant to search the residence.
...
Trooper Huff, at the suggestion of another trooper arriving at the
scene, took [Appellant’s cellular telephone] and secured it in his
patrol vehicle to prevent the individuals involved from using their
[cellular telephones] to collaborate and align their version[s] of
events, as well as to preserve any evidence that may be on the
[cellular telephones.] Certainly [Appellant] understood at the
time that Trooper Huff believed [the victim] to have expired after
a drug (possibly heroin) overdose, based on the questions Trooper
Huff asked [Appellant] during the conversation which had taken
place just prior to Trooper Huff collecting the [cellular telephones].
Trooper Huff was aware that illegal drug transactions are often set
up through the use of a [cellular telephone]. Trooper Huff was
concerned that evidence on the [cellular telephones] could be
remotely accessed and deleted – either intentionally or
unintentionally through the normal course of use. [Appellant’s
cellular telephone] was placed in airplane mode, indicating that
[the cellular telephone] would not have been receiving new calls
or [text] messages viewable by the police in the time [the cellular
telephone] was in police custody and prior to the issuance of a
warrant. Once it was secured, the contents and data on
[Appellant’s cellular telephone were] not searched or accessed
until the warrant was obtained. The warrant was obtained without
delay and within a very short time of Trooper Huff securing the
[cellular telephone.]
...
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[The trial court] cannot find that [Appellant] was subjected to a
custodial interrogation with attendant conditions so coercive as to
constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. However, it is
also not consistent with the totality of the circumstances to
suggest that [Appellant’s] interaction with Trooper Huff was no
more than a mere encounter. Rather, the totality of the
circumstances support a finding that [Appellant] was subjected to
an investigative detention which must be supported by reasonable
suspicion.[FN9]
[Footnote 9] There does not seem to be any suggestion that
Trooper Huff would not have possessed reasonable
suspicion to detain [Appellant]. After all, [the victim] was
lying on [Appellant’s] living room floor, dead of an apparent
drug overdose.
Looking more closely at the evidence, the interaction took place
on the porch of [Appellant’s residence] after [Appellant] called 911
and personally summoned emergency assistance, which included
the police, to his home. Trooper Huff responded to the scene,
observed the unsuccessful efforts to revive [the victim], and
began questioning all individuals present, including [Appellant]
about what happened to [the victim. Appellant] was not
handcuffed or otherwise restrained during the brief conversation.
Finally, [Appellant] agreed to come to the [state police] barracks,
on his own, for a more formal interview. As we cannot find that
[Appellant] was in custody during the time he spoke to Trooper
Huff, Miranda warnings were not required.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/17, at 6-12 (record citation omitted). For the reasons
that follow, we agree with the trial court that the items relied upon in support
of the affidavit of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant,
Appellant’s cellular telephone, and statements Appellant made while at his
residence were lawfully obtained.
It is well-settled that,
[a] search conducted without a warrant is deemed to be
unreasonable and[,] therefore[,] constitutionally impermissible,
unless an established exception applies. Exceptions to the
warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view
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exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent
circumstances exception, the automobile exception[,] the stop
and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.
Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 33 (Pa.
2017). As noted, one exception to the need to obtain a search warrant is the
plain-view doctrine.
The plain-view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of an
object when: (1) [a police] officer views the object from a lawful
vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to [the police officer]
that the object is incriminating; and (3) the [police] officer has a
lawful right of access to the object. There can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in an object that is in plain view. To judge
whether the incriminating nature of an object was immediately
apparent to the police officer, reviewing courts must consider the
totality of the circumstances. In viewing the totality of the
circumstances, the [police] officer's training and experience
should be considered.
Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10, 20 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 239 A.3d 20 (Pa.
2020).
With regard to cellular telephones, law enforcement officers are
constitutionally permitted “to seize and secure [but not access cellular
telephones] in order to prevent the destruction of evidence during the time it
takes to obtain a valid search warrant.” Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d
407, 411 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that, “once law enforcement officers have
secured a cell[ular] telephone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee []
will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone”), relying on Riley v.
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California, 573 U.S. 373, 388 (2014); see also Commonwealth v.
Goldstein, 2020 WL 3172663, at *6 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished
memorandum) (noting that, exigent circumstances must justify the seizure of
the cellular telephone and a valid search warrant must be obtained within a
reasonable amount of time); Commonwealth v. Trahey, 228 A.3d 520, 530
(Pa. 2020) (stating that, “[a]lthough an exigency may present itself in a
variety of contexts, its defining trait is a compelling need for official action [to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence] and no time to secure a
warrant” (citations and original quotation marks omitted)). In order to access
information stored on a cellular telephone, however, law enforcement officers
must first obtain a warrant, absent “case-specific exceptions” such as consent
or exigent circumstances. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 487
and n.18 (Pa. 2018) (explaining that, law enforcement accesses or searches
a cellular telephone when, inter alia, the police officer powers on the device,
obtains the phone number of the device by navigating the device’s menu, or
monitors incoming calls and textual messages).
Concerning statements made by a defendant, “Miranda warnings are
only required when a defendant is subject to a custodial interrogation.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5, 18 (Pa. 2003). “A person is in
custody for purposes of Miranda only when the objective circumstances
suggest that [he or] she was physically deprived of [his or] her freedom or
was in a situation where [he or] she reasonably could have believed that [his
or] her freedom of movement was being restricted.” Id. In contrast, “the
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dictates of Miranda do not attach during an investigatory detention.”
Commonwealth v. Murray, 936 A.2d 76, 81 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that,
“under limited circumstances police are justified in investigating a situation,
so long as the police officers reasonably believe that criminal activity is
afoot”). “Statements not made in response to custodial interrogation are
classified as gratuitous and not subject to suppression for lack of Miranda
warnings.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 204 A.3d 1003, 1008 (Pa. Super.
2019), appeal denied, 217 A.3d 205 (Pa. 2019).
Upon review, we discern no error in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
omnibus motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, his cellular
telephone, or statements made at his residence on the day of the incident. At
the suppression hearing, Trooper Huff testified that, upon entering the room
where a drug-overdose victim was being treated by EMS workers, he
immediately noticed drug paraphernalia to be in plain view, which in his
experience he knew to be used in drug packaging for distribution. N.T.,
2/14/17, at 8-11. Specifically, Trooper Huff noted a bundle of red and white
short cut straws in a flowerpot and an uncapped hypodermic needle behind a
picture frame on a table.14 Id.; see also Commonwealth Exhibits 1-5.
____________________________________________
14 To understand the significance of “short cut straws,” our inquiry
demonstrates that one method of using heroin involves “smoking” heroin,
which may be achieved by inhaling the smoke and steam as it wafts off the
liquified heroin through use of a short cut straw. Another common form of
heroin use is through injection via a hypodermic needle. See
https://americanaddictioncenters.org/heroin-treatment/identifying-parapher
nalia (last visited 10/13/22).
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Trooper Huff stated that, upon seeing the aforementioned items in plain view,
he did not manipulate the items prior to obtaining a search warrant. N.T.,
2/14/17, at 8, 31-32. We concur with the trial court, and the record supports,
that items which formed the grounds for issuance of the search warrant were
located in Trooper Huff’s plain-view from a lawful vantage point and, based
upon his training and experience, as well as the victim’s apparent drug
overdose, the incriminating nature of the items was apparent. Moreover,
having been summoned to Appellant’s residence to furnish emergency
assistance, Trooper Huff possessed lawful access to the unconcealed drug
paraphernalia maintained in Appellant’s home. Therefore, we discern no error
in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s omnibus motion on this ground.15
____________________________________________
15 To the extent that Appellant challenged the hypodermic needle and caps
located in a trash can in his omnibus motion, a review of the suppression
hearing transcript demonstrates that the details of Trooper Huff’s observation
of this item were not tested on cross-examination. N.T., 2/14/17, at 1-45.
Nonetheless, Appellant’s argument concerning this item pertains to its use as
support for the issuance of a search warrant. Omnibus Motion, 12/20/16, at
¶12.
“In order to obtain a valid search warrant, the affiant must establish probable
cause to believe that execution of the warrant will lead to the recovery of
contraband or evidence of a crime.” Commonwealth v. Caple, 121 A.3d
511, 520 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 179 A.3d 7 (Pa.
2018).
[T]he task of an issuing authority is simply to make a practical,
commonsense decision whether, given all of the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, [or her,] including the veracity
and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
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Regarding the taking and securing of Appellant’s cellular telephone by
Trooper Huff prior to his obtaining a search warrant, we find no error in the
trial court’s denial of Appellant’s omnibus motion on this ground. At the
suppression hearing, Trooper Huff stated that in his experience, drug deals
were typically communicated by using cellular telephone text messaging and
telephone calls. N.T., 2/14/17, at 24. As such, cellular telephones were
known to contain information that aided law enforcement in its investigation
into drug activity, such as the investigation into the victim’s cause of death in
the case sub judice. Id. at 24-25. While at the scene of the incident, Trooper
Huff observed Appellant and the other individuals present at the time of the
____________________________________________
will be found in a particular place. It is the duty of a court
reviewing an issuing authority's probable cause determination to
ensure that the [issuing authority] had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.
Caple, 121 A.3d at 520 (citation and ellipsis omitted).
Here, Appellant asserts that the affidavit of probable cause to support the
issuance of the search warrant relied on Trooper Huff’s discovery of a bundle
of short cut straws observed in a flowerpot, an uncapped hypodermic needle
located behind a picture frame, and a hypodermic needle and caps in a trash
can. Omnibus Motion, 12/20/16, at ¶16. Although we are unable to review,
based upon the record before us, the validity of Appellant’s suppression
challenge as it pertains to the hypodermic needle and caps located in the trash
can, Appellant failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the failure to
suppress those items. The lawful observation of the hypodermic needle
located behind the picture frame and the bundle of short cut straws found in
the flowerpot, as discussed supra, when viewed with the other evidence of
record, namely that the victim died of an apparent overdose, gave rise to a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed in support of the
search warrant absent consideration of the hypodermic needle and caps
located in the trach can.
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victim’s death using their cellular telephones. Id. at 22. Trooper Huff believed
that Appellant and the other individuals were not truthful regarding the events
giving rise to the victim’s death and that the individuals, including Appellant,
may be communicating via their cellular telephones with each other to “get
their stories straight” about the events leading to the victim’s death. Id. at
24. Moreover, Trooper Huff believed, based upon his experience and training,
that the cellular telephones may contain incriminating information pertaining
to the cause of the victim’s death and that Appellant and the other individuals
may attempt to remove this information from their cellular telephones prior
to discovery by law enforcement. Id. To preserve the potentially
incriminating information and prevent Appellant and the other parties from
communicating about the events leading to the victim’s death, Trooper Huff
collected Appellant’s cellular telephone, placed it in airplane mode, and
secured the cellular telephone in his police vehicle.16 Id. at 22-23, 38-40.
Trooper Huff testified that he did not view the digital content of Appellant’s
____________________________________________
16 Trooper Huff described “airplane mode” as the function of turning off cellular
telephone service to a device to prevent in-coming and out-going telephone
calls and textual messages and to prevent the cellular telephone from being
accessed remotely. N.T., 2/14/17, at 23; see also Commonwealth v.
Bowens, 265 A.3d 730 758 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting that, placing a cellular
telephone in “airplane mode” prevents the contents of the cellular telephone
from being added to or deleted and preserves the contents from changing or
becoming stale), appeal denied, 279 A.3d 508 (Pa. 2022). Trooper Huff stated
that a cellular telephone can be placed in “airplane mode” by “swip[ing]
down[ward] from the very top of the [cellular telephone’s] scene” without
accessing the information on the cellular telephone or viewing a person’s
information contained on the cellular telephone. N.T., 2/14/17, at 23.
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cellular telephone until he obtained a search warrant. Id. at 25. We concur
with the trial court, and the record supports, that without searching or viewing
the information contained on Appellant’s cellular telephone, Trooper Huff
disabled the device’s cellular service and placed the device in his police vehicle
in order to preserve the cellular telephone and its contents until a search
warrant could be obtained. Under these circumstances, we discern no error
in the trial court’s denial of the omnibus motion on this ground. See Stem,
96 A.3d at 411.
Finally, Appellant asserted that his statements made to Trooper Huff
while at the residence should have been suppressed because they were made
while Appellant was subjected to custodial detention and interrogation and
without first being provided his Miranda warnings. We disagree.
At the evidentiary hearing, Trooper Huff testified that, at some point
shortly after arriving at the scene of the incident, he “asked if [he] could get
a statement from each of the people there for [his police] report to find out
what happened [since] a dead person [was] laying on the floor [and he]
need[ed] to know what happened[.]” N.T., 2/14/17, at 13. Trooper Huff
explained that Appellant voluntarily came outside the residence to speak with
him privately about the incident and that during their conversation, he did not
inform Appellant that he was under arrest, Appellant was not handcuffed or
otherwise detained, and prior to and after the conversation, Appellant’s
movements about the residence were not restricted. Id. at 17-18. After
Appellant made his initial statements concerning the incident to Trooper Huff
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and Trooper Huff completed his interviews of the remaining persons present,
Trooper Huff asked Appellant and the others if they were willing to come to
the police station to give a formal, written statement. Id. at 25. Upon
agreeing to provide formal written statements, Appellant and the others
transported themselves to the police station in their own vehicle, and even
stopped at a grocery store for cigarettes. Id. at 25, 37.
An objective review of the circumstances under which Appellant made
his statements to Trooper Huff at the residence did not give rise to a custodial
detention or interrogation requiring Trooper Huff to provide Appellant with
Miranda warnings before speaking with him. In particular, Trooper Huff
asked Appellant to voluntarily provide a statement of events, and Appellant
complied without restriction to his movements or being subjected to
detention. Moreover, after speaking with Appellant, Trooper Huff permitted
Appellant to continue to move freely about the residence until Appellant drove
himself to the police station to provide a formal written statement. As such,
we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s omnibus motion on
this ground.17
In toto, Appellant’s underlying claim challenging the trial court’s denial
of his omnibus motion is without merit for the reasons discussed supra. As
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17 Furthermore, Appellant concedes in his omnibus motion that at the time his
cellular telephone was “seized” by Trooper Huff, which occurred after
Appellant made his statements to Trooper Huff, “no arrests [had been] made”
of Appellant. Omnibus Motion, 12/20/17, at ¶24.
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such, direct appeal counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a frivolous
claim in a post-sentence motion or on direct appeal. Rivera, 199 A.3d at 374.
Consequently, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim on this ground cannot be the
basis for collateral relief.
Upon a review of the record, we conclude it supports Attorney Bayley’s
assessment that Appellant’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Moreover, our
independent review of the record reveals no additional, non-frivolous claims.
Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order
denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/30/2022
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