In Re: B.M.F., a Minor, Appeal of: E.T.F., Father ( 2022 )

J-A28018-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: B.M.F., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: E.T.F., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 859 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 26, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 2097 of 2019
IN RE: L.S.F., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: E.T.F., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 860 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 26, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 2098 of 2019
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 19, 2022
Appellant E.T.F. (Father) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions
of Appellee the Lancaster County Children and Youth Service Agency (Agency)
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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to terminate his parental rights to B.M.F. and L.S.F. (collectively, Children)
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b).1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized its findings of fact as follows:
1. L.S.F. was born [in June 2017].
2. B.M.F. was born [in September 2012].
3. In the spring of 2018, the Lancaster County Drug Task Force
was engaged in surveillance of the home of Mother and Father
[(collectively, parents)].
4. The Agency, after being advised of the Drug Task Force
investigation, began an investigation into the safety of L.S.F.
5. At this time, B.M.F. was staying with a relative under an
informal arrangement and was not residing with Mother and
Father.
6. The Agency filed its petition for custody of L.S.F. on April 10,
2018.
7. At the adjudication disposition hearing held on April 26, 2018,
the parents were granted a child’s permanency plan [for L.S.F.].
The plan established a primary permanency goal of return to
parent and a concurrent permanency goal of placement for
adoption.
8. The child’s permanency plan for L.S.F. had the following
objectives for both parents: (a) to improve mental health
functioning to the extent that the parents can care for the child;
(b) to remain free from drugs and misuse of alcohol; (c) to learn
and use good parenting skills; (d) to be financially stable in order
to provide for themselves and the child; (e) to obtain and maintain
a home free and clear of hazards for themselves and the child;
and, (f) to maintain an ongoing commitment to the child. . . .
9. Approximately one month after L.S.F. came into the Agency’s
care, B.M.F.’s caregiver requested that B.M.F. be removed from
____________________________________________
1This Court consolidated Father’s appeals on July 9, 2021. We separately
consider the appeals of the Children’s mother, A.D.C. (Mother) at 793 and
794 MDA 2021 in J-A28017-21.
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her care and the Agency then filed a petition for custody of B.M.F.
[On August 2, 2018, the trial court adjudicated B.M.F. dependent.]
10. In respect to B.M.F., on August 2, 2018, the parents were
granted a child’s permanency plan with a primary permanency
goal of return to parent and a concurrent permanency goal of
adoption.
11. The child’s permanency plan for B.M.F. had the following
objectives for both parents: (a) to improve mental health
functioning to the extent that the parents can care for the child;
(b) to remain free from drugs and misuse of alcohol; (c) to learn
and use good parenting skills; (d) to be financially stable in order
to provide for themselves and the child; (e) to obtain and maintain
a home free and clear of hazards for themselves and the child; (f)
to maintain an ongoing commitment to the, child; and (g), to
develop an understanding of sexual victimization. . . .
12. The overriding concerns for both parents that necessitated
placement of the Children were mental health concerns affecting
the parents and substance abuse by the parents, along with
Mother’s involvement with the criminal justice system.
13. The parents made substantial progress on their . . .
permanency plan objectives between August of 2018 and
February of 2019. Consequently, the Agency recommended
release of physical custody of the Children to them, which the
court granted on February 7, 2019.
14. A family service plan was approved which required the parents
to continue to engage in drug and alcohol treatment, submit to
random drug screens, continue with the parent educator, and
ensure the safety of the Children. The parents were advised that
failure to abide by the family service plan would result in the
Children being re-placed into the care of the Agency.
15. On February 22, 2019, the Agency was notified that L.S.F. had
some type of seizure and had been admitted to Hershey Medical
Center.
16. The parent educator was present in the home when she
observed L.S.F. acting strangely; it was the parent educator who
insisted that L.S.F. be taken to Hershey Medical Center, not the
parents.
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17. L.S.F.[, who was less than two years old at the time,] ingested
some type of amphetamine that caused her to have a seizure.
18. Upon notification that L.S.F. was at Hershey Medical Center, a
drug screener was sent to the home of the parents. Mother tested
positive for cocaine and the Agency again filed for physical custody
of the Children. [The trial court granted the Agency temporary
custody of the Children on February 22, 2019, and entered a
shelter care order placing the Children in the Agency’s care on
March 6, 2019.]
19. The parents did not offer an explanation as to how [L.S.F.]
ingested the amphetamine.
20. After the re-placement of the Children, the parents were again
given child[ren’s] permanency plans for reunification with the
same objectives as were on the prior plans, with the exception
that the plan in respect to B.M.F. omitted the objective to develop
an understanding of sexual victimization which had been included
in the previous child’s permanency plan. [The Agency placed the
Children with their current resource parents in June 2019].
21. The parents had not completed the parenting objective at the
time of the re-placement.
22. Father lied to the caseworker on February 14, 20[19]; when
he indicated he was on vacation to be with the girls, when, in fact
he had been laid off from his employment.
23. By a month and a half after the Children’s re-placement,
Father was overwhelmed that the Children were again in the
physical custody of the Agency to the point that he was unable to
pursue his child’s permanency plan objectives.
* * *
25. Between February and June 2019, the parents avoided being
drug-screened.
26. The parents had undergone psychological evaluations at the
beginning of the case and the recommendations were for mental
health treatment, drug and alcohol evaluations, and medication
management. Also, for Father, couples counseling with Mother
was recommended.
27. The parents indicated that each of them is preventing the
other parent from being successful in completing their child
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permanency plan objectives. They have a co-dependent
relationship.
28. Mother and Father’s co-dependence has prevented them from
being able to parent the Children and the passage of time confirms
their co-dependence will continue.
* * *
36. The caseworker had extended discussions with Father in March
of 2019 to attempt to have him work on his plan because he was
quite despondent.
* * *
37. Father was unsuccessfully discharged from the Blueprints drug
and alcohol program on February 28, 2019, due to missed
appointments.
38. At that time, Father tested positive for Suboxone. Father did
not then have a prescription for Suboxone. He indicated he took
Suboxone because of his diseased kidneys.
39. Father indicated that he obtained the Suboxone from another
source and not from Mother[, who had a prescription for
Suboxone].
40. Father has polycystic kidney disease.
41. The caseworker advised Father to get medication
management in place for his pain and to look into a possible
kidney transplant. [On September 3, 2019, the Agency filed
petitions to terminate parents’ rights to the Children pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).2]
42. The parents briefly worked with a parent educator prior to the
re-placement of the Children, but due to their non-compliance
with the drug and alcohol and mental health objectives after the
Children came back into the Agency’s care, a parent educator had
not yet been re-assigned to them as of September 3, 2020.
____________________________________________
2 The trial court by order dated January 17, 2020, appointed Kathleen E.
Holmes, Esq. as the Children’s legal interest counsel. See generally In re
Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017). Gina M. Carnes, Esq.
appeared as the Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL).
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43. Father has no other children. Mother has two [other] older
children, one of whom was approximately 19 years old and a
younger [child] about 10 years of age as of September 3, 2020.
Mother’s younger child is being raised by his father.
* * *
46. Father and Mother have maintained employment through the
history of the case.
47. In general, Father and Mother’s visits with the [C]hildren have
gone well.
* * *
49. B.M.F. gets upset when Mother fails to appear for visits.
50. During visits, Mother and Father have an over-reliance on
phones and food to keep the Children engaged.
51. The parents have resided together for the duration of this
case.
52. The re[-]placement into the physical custody of the Agency
was devastating for the Children.
53. When B.M.F. was re-placed, she was picked up from school
and was devastated and hysterical.
54. B.M.F. is always concerned that her parents are happy and
does not want to say or do something that would upset them.
55. B.M.F. knows that she is not safe with her biological parents
because they use drugs.
56. In January 2020, both parents were attending counseling for
drug[s] and alcohol but not counseling for mental health.
57. The parents re-engaged with mental health counseling on
June 16, 2020.
58. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic which caused the
imposition of stay-at-home orders beginning in March 2020, the
Agency was unable to drug screen the parents again until July 21,
2020.
59. The results of the July 20, 2020, drug screen[s] were positive
for both parents. Father tested positive for Suboxone (for which
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by then had a valid prescription) and Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine.
60. In June of 2020, Father was on a waiting list for a kidney
transplant but continued to work part-time.
61. As of June 2020, the Children had been in the same resource
home for one year. The resource family was and remains a
permanent resource for the Children.
62. The bonding assessment concluded that Mother and Father
love the Children[,] but they have failed to do the needed things
to provide stability for the Children. The evaluator recommended
termination of the parental rights.
63. The evaluator noted that during the visit between the parents
and the Children that each parent took a child and did something
with that child; there was no indication of a sense of family or a
connection between the [Children].
64. During the visit between the . . . parents and the Children, the
evaluator noted that the parents used their phones as a distraction
instead of engaging with the Children.
65. The evaluator noted that B.M.F. is much more bonded to her
. . . parents than is L.S.F., as L.S.F. has spent practically her entire
life with the resource family.
66. The evaluator supports the Children having ongoing contact
with the . . . parents as long as the Children desire it.
67. B.M.F. is presently engaged in school-based counseling.
68. The resource parents had adopted another child with whom
the two girls have a close relationship.
69. The child preparation worker had worked with B.M.F. for four
rounds of ten one-hour sessions over a period of 18 months.
70. According to the child preparation worker, B.M.F. knows why
she was placed in the custody of the Agency and then re[-]placed
the second time.
71. The child preparation worker’s last session with B.M.F. was in
approximately October of 2020.
72. At that last session, B.M.F. indicated she loves her biological
parents as well as her resource parents but she is reluctant to
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state her love for the resource parents because that would hurt
her biological parent’s feelings.
73. At the time of the last permanency review hearing, the
Children had been in the care of the Agency for three years, less
the two weeks with the biological parents before being re-placed,
and the parents still had not completed their child permanency
plan objectives.
74. L.S.F. is adamant that she wants to live with the resource
parents.
75. B.M.F., in the five months prior to the April 9, 2021, hearing,
stated to [the GAL] that she wants to live with the resource
parents but would like to still see her . . . parents.
76. B.M.F. called her legal interest attorney on February 2, 2021,
and was very upset because she had a bad dream the night
before. In her dream, B.M.F. and L.S.F. were living with their . .
. parents and L.S.F. ate something bad and died.
77. B.M.F. told her legal interest attorney she wants to live with
the resource family but fears her . . . parents will be mad when
they hear that.
78. The [court appointed special advocate (CASA)] recommended
to the court that the parental rights should be terminated.
79. The Children’s [GAL] recommends termination of the parental
rights.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/10/21, at 31-43 (citations omitted). On May 26, 2021, the
trial court entered decrees terminating Father’s parental rights.
Father timely filed notices of appeals and statements of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The
trial court filed a responsive opinion.
Father presents the following issues for our review:
1. The [A]gency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(1) that Father evidenced a
settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to [the
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C]hildren or has refused or failed to perform his parental duties
for a period of six (6) months immediately preceding the filing of
the Petition when Father at all times desired to exercise his
parental claim to [the C]hildren and was never provided the
opportunity to perform his parental duties; the Trial Court also
erred in determining it would be in the [C]hildren’s best interest
to terminate Father’s parental rights.
2. The [A]gency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(2) that Father’s repeated and
continued incapacity has caused [the C]hildren to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for [the
C]hildren’s physical and mental well-being when Father was never
provided the opportunity to show the Agency that he did not have
an incapacity and that he could provide essential parental care,
control and subsistence necessary for the [Children’s] physical
and mental well-being.
3. The [A]gency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(5) that the conditions which led
to the initial removal or placement of the [C]hildren continued to
exist, Father cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a
reasonable period of time, the services and assistance reasonably
available to Father are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the [C]hildren within a
reasonable period of time, and that termination of Father’s
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
[C]hildren when the conditions that led to the initial placement of
the [C]hildren did not exist since the initial placement of the
[C]hildren, the Agency refused to provide the services and
assistance to Father to remedy the conditions, and that
termination of parental rights does not serve the best needs and
welfare of the [C]hildren.
4. The [A]gency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(8) that the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the [C]hildren continued to exist
and termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the [C]hildren when the conditions that led
to the removal or placement of the [C]hildren did not exist at the
time of the filing of the Petition nor at the time of the hearing and
that termination of Father’s parental rights would not serve the
needs and welfare of the [C]hild[ren].
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Father’s Brief at 4-5.
Initially, we note that the following principles govern our review.
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. [In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010)]. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision
may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where
the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist
the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own
credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer
to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by
the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of
an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations
omitted); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123-24 (Pa. 2021)
(emphasizing that “[w]hen a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive
case . . . the appellate court should not search the record for contrary
conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court”)
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The burden is on the petitioner “to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) . . . .
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). This
Court “may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of
parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a).” In re
M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1179 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).
Involuntary Termination Under Section 2511(a)(2)
We first address the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(2). See id. Father claims that the trial court erred in
terminating his parental rights because he substantially complied with the
Children’s permanency plans and demonstrated a commitment to the
Children. Father’s Brief at 26-27. Father contends that when the Agency
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removed the Children for the second time in March 2019, he “became
extremely upset and overwhelmed.” Id. at 12. He asserts that he overcame
his difficulties by the time the trial court terminated his parental rights and
that the trial concerns focused unfairly on the timeliness of achieving his
objectives. Id. at 18.
Father specifically claims that the trial court erred in finding parental
incapacity when he “overcame his substance abuse” and because he believed
his drug and alcohol counseling satisfied his mental health counseling because
“he got so much out of it.” Id. at 29. He contends that he completed mental
health counseling, but that it was less beneficial than his drug and alcohol
counseling. Id.
Father asserts that the trial court erred in emphasizing his co-
dependency to Mother and contends that he “is not mentally unstable as the
court suggests, nor is he a drug addict.” Id. Further, Father notes that the
trial court’s finding that he failed to complete parenting classes, but he argues
that the Agency failed to make referrals for parenting classes until January
2021. Id. at 29-30.
The Agency, the GAL, and the Children’s legal counsel (collectively
Appellees) respond that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence
to terminate Father’s parental rights. Agency’s Brief at 15-16; GAL’s Brief at
18-19; Legal Interest Counsel’s Brief at 4. The Agency contends that
“[u]ltimately, the trial court found that due to the long history of mental
instability and history of substance abuse, the parents were not in a position
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to provide a safe home, parental care and stability for the Children.” Agency’s
Brief at 22. Appellees further counter that the trial court properly concluded
that Father knew about his objectives, including his mental health goals, and
the GAL, for example, asserts that Father made excuses or his lack of
progress, and feigned confusion, but “squandered time.” GAL’s Brief at 19,
21; see also Agency’s Brief at 11.
Section 2511(a)(2) states:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
This Court has addressed the incapacity to parent under Section
2511(a)(2) as follows:
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made lightly
or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can seldom be
more difficult than when termination is based upon parental
incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 1970
Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who
refuses to perform the duties.
S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (citations omitted). This Court has noted that “a child’s
life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
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necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of
R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Instantly, the trial court concluded that the termination of Father’s
parental rights was proper pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The trial court
reasoned:
Due to the co-dependent nature of Mother and Father’s
relationship, if Mother were to succumb to using drugs again,
Father’s ability to parent would be adversely impacted and the
Children would be at risk. Father remains trapped in his co-
dependency and devotion to Mother which makes him unable to
parent the Children. The parent’s plan objective in respect to
parenting skills was not completed. Father has chosen Mother
over the Children. Mother and Father’s mental stability and
history of substance abuse casts a huge shadow over their ability
to provide a safe home, parental care, and stability for the
Children. Mother and Father’s refusal to address those risks
render them incapable of providing the essential care the Children
need to flourish. As such, it is appropriate that Mother and
Father’s parental rights should be terminated.
Trial Ct. Op. at 26.
Our review of the record reveals the following. The bonding evaluator,
Diane Edmonds, M.S., testified that Mother and Father were “entrenched in
unhealthy patterns of addictions, deceit and codependency.” N.T., 3/11/21,
at 20. Ms. Edmonds noted that the Agency recommended that Father leave
Mother and attempt to reunify with the Children by himself, that Father stated
he would do so, but that he did not separate from Mother. Id. at 21. Ms.
Edmonds stated that Father, when he was with Mother, showed a pattern “at
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times” of not being “forthright about what was actually going on with
[Mother].” Id. at 19.
Ms. Edmonds’ initial report dated January 9, 2020 further stated:
[T]here is a bond but we cannot ignore the original risk factors
associated with [Father] and [Mother] that have still not been
addressed. Additionally, we cannot trust that mere words within
this family matter. We can only trust patterns of behavior. The
pattern is that while [Father] says he will pick [the Children] over
[Mother] if needed, he has not done so. In fact, the pattern is
that he continues to cover for her. [W]hen [Father] met with the
evaluator for his interview he knew that [Mother] was in jail and
never mentioned it to the evaluator and did not mention it to [the
caseworker]. The pattern is that [Mother] has said she is sober
but avoids probation. Minutes after she told the evaluator she
was not longer using drugs, she never came back from her
cigarette break to do a urine screen. The evaluator . . . sees that
[Father] and [Mother] are likeable people that love [the Children]
but they have also failed to do the things needed to show that
they are stable to take care of [the Children].
* * *
. . . As noted above the risk factors of the [parents’] home have
not been resolved and there is no confidence that any additional
time for the family to make changes is going to change this status.
The . . . parents are entrenched in unhealthy patterns of addiction,
deceit and codependency. To continue to have [the Children] in
a waiting game for their parents to finally make meaningful
change is only delaying their access to a permanent home.
Agency’s Ex. 2, Bonding Evaluation, 1/9/20, at 20, 22.
The record indicates that the trial court credited Ms. Edmonds’ opinions
concerning Father’s co-dependency to Mother and the risks that this behavior
posed to Father’s ability to provide safety and stability for the Children. See
Trial Ct. Op. at 26; N.T., 3/11/21, at 20; Agency’s Ex. 2 at 20, 22. The record
further confirmed that while Father stated his intent to seek reunification with
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the Children without Mother, he did not do so. See N.T., 3/11/21 at 21, 103
(indicating that Mother and Father lived at the same residence for fourteen
months). Further, Father blames the Agency for the delays in his attempts to
complete his objectives, but he fails to acknowledge that his own conduct,
including his failure to engage in the recommended mental health treatment
in a timely manner, prevented referrals for parenting classes. See id. at 64-
66; see also N.T. 9/3/20 at 85.
Moreover, although Father’s asserts that he overcame his addictions and
mental health issues, the record indicates that throughout the history of the
case Father demonstrated his inconsistent compliance and lack of candor with
the Agency. In one instance, following the Children’s second removal from
parents’ home in February 2019, Father refused drug screens and began
taking Suboxone without a prescription. See Trial Ct. Op. at 35, 37; N.T.,
9/3/20, at 15, 25. Further, around the time L.S.F. ingested amphetamines,
Father told the Agency that he was on vacation from work when in fact he lost
his job. See Trial Ct. Op. at 11; N.T., 9/3/20 at 13.
Accordingly, there is support in the record for the trial court’s findings
and conclusions that Father’s co-dependency to Mother, Father and Mother’s
mental stability, and their history of substance abuse “casts a huge shadow”
over Father’s ability to provide a safe home, parental care, and stability for
the Children. See Trial Ct. Op. at 26. Further, we find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s determination that Father failed to complete the
permanency plan objectives and did not address the safety risks to Children
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which rendered both parents “incapable of providing the essential care the
Children needed to flourish.” See id. at 26. Accordingly, as the record
supports the trial court’s analysis, we discern no basis to disturb the trial
court’s finding that Father did not remedy the conditions that led to the
Children’s placement. For these reasons, while we acknowledge Father’s
recent progress, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred or abused its
discretion when terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2) in that the trial court’s conclusions are supported by clear and
convincing evidence in the record. See S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24; S.P.,
47 A.3d at 826-27.
Section 2511 (b) Determinations
We next review the trial court’s conclusion that the involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights best serves the Children’s
developmental, emotional, and physical needs pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Father emphasizes that there is sufficient evidence of his strong bond with
B.S.F., that the severance of the bond would be traumatic to B.S.F., and that
Ms. Edmonds recommended that B.S.F. could have continued contact with
both parents. Father’s Brief at 35. Father contends that the lack of contact
during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the Agency’s refusals to allow
additional holiday and birthday visits, impeded his ability to maintain a close
relationship with the Children. Id. at 36. According to Father, the reports
that B.S.F. wished to stay with resource parents by the final hearing on the
termination of his parental rights were unreliable. Id. at 37. Father asserts
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that the Children need permanency with him, and that the evidence
established that he acted appropriately and cared for the Children. Id. at 38-
39.
Appellees respond that the trial court appropriately considered Section
2511(b). They note, in part, that (1) the three year separation from parents
“deeply hurt” B.M.F., GAL’s Brief at 25; (2) the bond between L.S.F. and
Father was not “particularly strong” and that B.M.F. realized that she was not
safe with the parents, Legal Interest Counsel’s Brief at 7; and (3) “the record
demonstrated that Father had been unable to break the cycle of co-
dependency he had with Mother and all the destructive behavior that went
along with it thereby jeopardizing the well-being of [the Children,]” Agency’s
Brief at 27.
Section 2511(b) provides as follows:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
It is well settled that
[t]he emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly
interpreted to include “intangibles such as love, comfort, security,
and stability.” . . . [T]his Court held that the determination of the
child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
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should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently
severing the parental bond.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), the
T.S.M. Court explained, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a
child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination
petition.” Id. “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination
must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and
whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation
omitted). Moreover, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section
2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.
Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to
see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all
too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. at 269.
Instantly, the trial court explained that its conclusion that termination
of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests as follows:
Here, the court had the benefit of an expert evaluator’s
assessment of the bond between the Children and the parents.
The expert evaluator opined that there is a bond between Mother
and Father and the Children and that the parental bond is
particularly strong with B.M.F. and but not with L.S.F. However,
the risks that caused the placement of the Children in the first
place continue to exist. The evaluator concluded that termination
of the parental rights is in the best interest of the Children. Mother
and Father are not capable of providing the stability and security
the Children need to flourish. It would be unconscionable to return
the Children to an unsafe environment with incumbent risks of
further trauma. It is apparent B.M.F. is very close to Mother and
Father. This child has nevertheless come to a realization that she
may not be able to return to . . . [the] parents and she is
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comfortable with the concept of remaining with the resource
family as her forever family.
The [GAL] and the Children’s legal interest attorney, as well as the
Children’s [CASA], support termination of the parental rights. The
court agrees. The Children deserve permanency and permanency
will be achieved only by the termination of Mother and Father’s
parental rights.
Trial Ct. Op. at 53.
Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the trial
court’s determinations. As the trial court acknowledged, there was a bond
between the parents and the Children, in particular, B.M.F., who was nearly
six years old when the trial court adjudicated her dependent.3 Although the
trial court considered Father’s bond with B.M.F. and his recent progress, the
trial court credited Ms. Edmond’s opinions that the Children’s need for
permanency and stability outweighed the Children’s bonds with Father in
addition to the totality of the evidence and circumstances considered
throughout the history of this case. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267-68; see also
S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123-24; S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Further,
although Ms. Edmonds’ stated that it would be optimal for the Children to have
____________________________________________
3 As noted above, B.M.F. was living with a relative at the time of her
adjudication of dependency. Further, the record shows that at the time when
the Agency first removed L.S.F. from her home in 2018, she was less than a
year old. Although there was evidence of a bond between L.S.F. and her
parents, there was no evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights
would impact L.S.F. negatively because of her bonds to the resource parents,
her age, and the time spent in the Agency’s care.
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contact with Father and Mother, the child preparation worker, Kelly Campbell,4
testified that B.M.F. understood the situations that caused her removal from
the parents’ care, has seen a school counselor and Ms. Campbell in
anticipation of the termination of the parents’ rights, and expressed love for
the resource family. See N.T., 4/9/21 at 64-67; N.T., 9/3/20, at 75. Further,
the record supports the trial court’s Section 2511(b) determinations in light of
Father’s inability to maintain consistency, complete his permanency plan
objectives, and the concerns regarding his co-dependency to Mother. See
N.T., 3/11/21, at 49; see also Agency’s Ex. 2 at 22. Accordingly, we discern
no merit to Father’s argument that the trial court erred or abused its discretion
in rejecting his argument that he could best serve the Children’s best interest,
and we affirm the trial court’s ruling pursuant to Section 2511(b). See
S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24; S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s decisions pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b) were proper, and we affirm the decrees
terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.
Decrees affirmed.
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4Ms. Campbell testified at the April 9, 2021 hearing and stated that her job
was to “answer questions that [a child] has and deal with the very heavy
emotions that they may be feeling during that time.” N.T. 4/9/21, at 60. She
noted that her sessions with children were not therapy. Id. at 61.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/19/2022
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