Com. v. Hunter, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A28031-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DARUS L. HUNTER,
    Appellant                      No. 2802 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order August 11, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0007187-2015
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY DUBOW, J.:                             FILED OCTOBER 19, 2017
    Appellant has appealed from the trial court’s August 11, 2016 Order,1
    denying in part Appellant’s pre-trial Motion to Dismiss the charges arguing the
    statute of limitations had expired.            Because the Order is a non-appealable
    interlocutory Order, we quash.
    The Commonwealth had charged Appellant with Forgery, Unsworn
    Falsification to Authorities, Tampering with Records or Identification, and
    Tampering with Public Records or Information in connection with his obtaining
    ____________________________________________
    1 We have changed the caption to specify that this is not an appeal from a
    Judgment of Sentence.
    J-A28031-17
    a state identification card in the name of “Conrad Lamar Williams” in 2012.2
    Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had
    expired on all of the offenses. The trial court held a hearing on August 11,
    2016, at which the Commonwealth conceded Appellant was entitled to relief
    on all charges except Forgery.            That same day, the trial court granted
    Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to all but the Forgery charge.
    On August 29, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se Notice of Appeal. In his
    docketing statement, Appellant alleged the court’s Order denying dismissal of
    the Forgery charge is appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 311 (Interlocutory Appeals
    as of Right).    See Docketing Statement, filed 9/16/16, at 2.      In his Brief,
    Appellant baldly asserts that the partial dismissal Order is a “final order” for
    which this court’s jurisdiction is proper under 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(4)
    (pertaining to jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court). Appellant’s Brief at
    1.
    Contrary to Appellant’s unsupported assertions, this is not a final Order,
    a collateral Order, or an interlocutory Order appealable as of right. Pursuant
    to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, this is an interlocutory Order
    not appealable by statute, rule or case law, and we are constrained to quash
    ____________________________________________
    218 Pa.C.S. § 4101; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4104; and 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 4911, respectively.
    -2-
    J-A28031-17
    Appellant’s appeal.      See Pa.R.A.P. 311, 312, 313, 341.3    Accordingly, the
    instant appeal is hereby QUASHED.
    Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/19/2017
    ____________________________________________
    3 There is a narrow exception to the general rule that appeals are not
    permitted from an interlocutory order where the defendant appeals an order
    denying a nonfrivolous Motion to Dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds.
    See Commonwealth v. States, 
    891 A.2d 737
    , 740-41 (Pa. Super. 2005)
    (recognizing this exception and describing how “[t]he basic purpose of the
    double jeopardy clause mandates that a defendant who has a meritorious
    claim have an effective procedural means of vindicating his constitutional right
    to be spared an unnecessary trial.”). Appellant’s claim was based on the
    applicable statute of limitations and, arguably, the sufficiency of the evidence,
    neither of which qualify under this or any other recognized exception.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2802 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 10/19/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2017