Jacobs, G. v. Stephens, T. ( 2022 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
GINA K. JACOBS, FORMERLY GINA K. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
STEPHENS : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 889 WDA 2020
TIMOTHY L. STEPHENS :
Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Civil Division at No(s):
872-2015
GINA K. JACOBS, FORMERLY GINA K. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
STEPHENS : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
TIMOTHY L. STEPHENS :
: No. 293 WDA 2021
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Civil Division at No(s):
872-2015
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: JANUARY 31, 2022
Gina Jacobs (Jacobs) and Timothy L. Stephens (Stephens) cross-appeal
from the order denying their post-trial motions and making final the trial
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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court’s judgment entered from a non-jury trial regarding land partition issues.1
We affirm.
Background
The history of this case begins with Stephens’ prior marriage to
an individual named Kim Schwab. In January 2001, Stephens and
Schwab held a wedding ceremony in Jamaica. At the time of their
wedding, Stephens believed that their marriage was legal. Later
that year, Stephens purchased a residential property at 174 Carey
Lane in Cranberry Township. Stephens paid for the property
entirely with his own money, and the deed did not list Schwab as
an owner due to her poor credit. Stephens and Schwab separated
in 2002, and there were no divorce proceedings. In 2005, Schwab
married another man.
Stephens and Jacobs met in July 2009, and they married on
September 11, 2009. Before they married, Stephens told Jacobs
that he previously had a wedding ceremony in Jamaica, but he
had consulted an attorney and did not believe that the Jamaican
marriage was valid.
On September 19, 2009, Stephens and Jacobs executed a deed
conveying the property at 174 Carey Lane from themselves, as
“husband and wife,” to themselves as “tenants by the entireties.”
On August 6, 2013, Stephens and Jacobs separated. On February
7, 2014, the trial court annulled their marriage, finding that
Stephens’ Jamaican marriage to Schwab was valid and that
Stephens had failed to divorce Schwab.
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1 The parties’ notices of appeal purport to appeal from the trial court’s July 24,
2020, order denying post-trial motions. However, “an appeal to this Court
can only lie from judgments entered subsequent to the trial court’s disposition
of any post-verdict motions, not from the order denying post-trial motions.”
Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa.
Super. 1995) (en banc). On October 26, 2020, this Court issued a Rule to
Show Cause directing Jacobs to praecipe the trial court Prothonotary to enter
judgment in this matter; Jacobs complied with our order on October 30, 2020.
Accordingly, we consider the appeal as taken from the entry of judgment. See
id. at 514-15 (stating appellate courts may “regard as done that which ought
to have been done”).
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On July 17, 2015, Jacobs filed a complaint seeking partition of the
Carey Lane property and an award of reasonable rental value of
the property from the date of separation onward. Stephens filed
a counterclaim seeking reimbursement for various expenditures
on the property, including repairs for the garage and kitchen,
payments on a roof loan, and payment of real estate taxes and
homeowner’s insurance premiums.
On October 16, 2017, following a non-jury trial, the trial court
entered an order finding that the parties held the property as
tenants in common. The court directed partition of the property.
Further, the court determined that Stephens had been in sole
possession of the property since the date of separation, the value
of the property was $145,000.00, and the value of each party’s
share was fifty percent of the total value, or $72,500.00. The
court credited Stephens with $44,773.77 in payments for repairs
to the premises, real estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance
premiums. After subtracting this credit from Jacobs’ one-half
share of the value of the premises, the court entered an order in
Jacobs’ favor in the amount of $27,726.23.
On October 19, 2017, Jacobs filed post-trial motions. Stephens
did not file post-trial motions. On October 30, 2017, Stephens
filed a motion to strike or dismiss Jacobs’ post-trial motions on the
ground that Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557 did not permit exceptions to an order
directing partition. On November 1, 2017, the trial court
dismissed Jacobs’ post-trial motions on the ground that she
“[could] not file a motion for post-trial relief in response to an
order directing partition.” Order, 11/1/17, at 1.
Jacobs v. Stephens, 204 A.3d 402, 404-05 (Pa. Super. 2019). Jacobs
appealed and Stephens cross-appealed.
In that appeal, Jacobs raised four questions:
1. Did the trial court err in giving [Stephens] credit for the
payment of real estate taxes in the sum of $8,352.39 and
credit for the payment of homeowners’ insurance premiums in
the amount of $3,779.48?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion
in failing and/or refusing to award [Jacobs] for her fair and
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reasonable rental value claim, in the amount of $325.00 per
month, plus utilities from August 6, 2013 through October 16,
2017 and monthly thereafter, when the evidence was clear and
uncontroverted that [Jacobs] was not in possession of the
premises and [Stephens] enjoyed exclusive possession of the
subject premises at all times relevant to the claim?
3. Did the trial court err in its November 1, 2017 [order] in
granting [Stephens’] motion to strike/dismiss [Jacobs’] motion
for post-trial relief without conducting a hearing on [Jacobs’]
motion?
4. Did [Stephens’] failure to file a post-trial motion for relief
constitute a waiver of all of the issues in his cross-appeal?
Id. at 405. Stephens raised three issues in his cross-appeal:
1. Given that the sole reason for the transfer of the subject
property from [ ] Stephens to [ ] Stephens and [ ] Jacobs was
the erroneous belief that the [p]arties were legally married, did
the trial court err when it failed to find said transfer was void
under the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, conditional
gift, [or] gift made in reliance on a relation?
2. Did the trial court err when it failed to credit [ ] Stephens, as
an offset to partition, the amount expended by him for the
initial purchase price of the subject property?
3. Did the trial court err when it failed to credit [ ] Stephens, as
an offset to partition, the value of the labor expended by him
for the necessary repairs, maintenance and preservation of the
subject property?
Id. at 405-06.
This Court affirmed the portion of the order finding that the parties
owned the property as tenants in common and directing partition of the
property in equal shares. However, relying on our recent decision in Kapcsos
v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), we vacated the order
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in all other respects because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide those
issues.
In Kapcsos, this Court mandated that partition actions be divided into
two distinct parts, each with its own appealable order.
The first order, under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557, directs partition of the
parties’ legal interests into severalty ...
The second order, under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1570, does one of three
things. A Rule 1570 order may (1) divide the partitioned property
among the parties, (2) force one or more of the parties to sell
their interest in the land to one or more of the parties, or (3) sell
the land to the general public and distribute the proceeds among
the parties.
In Part 1, the court must determine whether the property is
partitionable under law. In other words, Part 1 is to ascertain:
I. Do the parties jointly own the real estate in
question?
II. If so, what fractional legal interests in the
property does each party hold?
...
After a Part 1 order of partition becomes final (either because no
one appeals or an appellate court affirms it), only then may parties
proceed to Part 2, where the actual division, award, or sale of the
partitioned property occurs ....
Therefore, the entry and recording of a Part 1 order directing
partition is essential to terminate a joint tenancy. Following that,
Part 2 is purely an equitable proceeding where the trial judge or
master balances the equities to decide what form the partitioning
will take. If the property were a pie, the trial court must decide
how best to serve it to the parties.
Id. at 141-43.
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Constrained by Kapcsos, this Court concluded the trial court erred
combining Part I and Part II rulings into a single order. Jacobs, 204 A.3d at
409. Accordingly, we affirmed the order insomuch as it determined the parties
owned the property as tenants in common and directing partition of the
property in equal shares. Id. at 411. However, we vacated the portion of the
order with respect to the precise division of the property and directed the trial
court to retry the Part II issues de novo. Id.
Procedural History After Remand
On remand, Stephens filed a motion for status conference, which the
trial court held on December 3, 2019. Following the conference, the parties
stipulated the de novo proceeding would be conducted on the transcript of the
prior proceeding without further testimony or evidence. On December 10,
2019, the trial court entered a final order with respect to Part I of the partition
and the parties jointly filed a waiver of appeal rights.
On April 17, 2020, the trial court issued an order and opinion addressing
Part II of the partition. The trial court found:
(1) [Stephens] has been in sole actual physical possession of
the property since the parties separated on August 6, 2013.
[Stephens] has paid all costs associated with the
acquisition, care, and maintenance of the property since he
purchased it on February 28, 2001. [Jacobs] made no
financial contributions to the property whatsoever.
(2) The purchase price paid by [Stephens] for the property on
February 28, 2001 was $140,000,00, as set forth on the
deed issued on that date.
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(3) [Stephens] has made the following necessary expenditures
to preserve and maintain the property:
a. Garage repair materials: $14,822.31
b. Kitchen repair materials: $8,400.00
c. Roof repair materials: $8,019.52
d. Barn repair materials: $1,400.00
e. Real estate taxes: $8,352.39
f. Homeowner’s insurance: $3,779.48
(4) The fair market rental value of the property is $650.00 per
month.
We allocate the credits between the parties as follows:
(1) [Stephens] is entitled to a credit for his payment of the full
purchase price of the property, reduced by one-half to
reconcile this amount with [Stephens’] one-half interest in
the property. The total credit to which [Stephens] is entitled
for payment of the purchase price is $70,000.
(2) [Stephens] is entitled to credits for materials purchased to
preserve and maintain the property, reduced by one-half to
reconcile this amount with [Stephens’] one-half interest in
the property. [Stephens] is also entitled to a credit of one-
half of the amount of the insurance payments. However,
the Superior Court’s holding in Bednar precludes a credit
for the payment of property taxes. The total credit to which
[Stephens] is entitled for these expenditures is
$18,210.69.[FN] 6
The Court calculated this as follows: $14,822.37
[FN] 6
÷ 2 = $7,411.19; $8,400.00 ÷ 2 = $4,200.00;
$8,019.52 ÷ 2 = $4,009.76; $1,400.00 ÷ 2 =
$700.00; $3,779.48 ÷ 2 = $1,889.74.
The sum of these totals is as follows: $7,411.19 +
$4,200.00 + $4,009.76 + $700.00 + $1,889.74 =
$18,210.69.
(3) [Jacobs] is entitled to a credit in the amount of one-half of
the fair rental value for the time period commencing with
the parties’ separation and her departure from the property
on August 6, 2013 and concluding on October 16, 2017. For
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this period of 50 months and 10 days, [Jacobs] is entitled to
a credit in the amount of $16,356.85.
As discussed above, [Stephens] will retain possession and sole
title to the property and he will pay [Jacobs] an amount equal to
the value of her one-half share of the property, adjusted by the
credits awarded to each party. The calculation of [Stephens’]
payment to [Jacobs] for her share is as follows: $88,856.85 (the
value of [Jacobs’] one-half share plus her credit for the fair rental
value) - $88,210.69 (the value of [Stephens’] credits for the
acquisition and necessary maintenance costs) = $646.16.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/20, at 7-9 (some footnotes and citations omitted).
On April 27, 2020, Jacobs filed a timely motion for post-trial relief and
Stephens filed his post-trial motion on May 13, 2020, which the court treated
as timely filed.2 On July 24, 2020, the trial court denied both motions. Jacobs
timely appealed and Stephens cross-appealed.3
Issues
On appeal, Jacobs raises three issues:
1. Did the Trial Court err in granting [Stephens] credits totaling
$18,120.69 as credits for materials purchased to repair the
garage, the kitchen, roof, and barn?
2. Did the Trial Court err in granting [Stephens] the entire value
of [Jacobs’] one-half share, to-wit, the sum of $72,500.00?
3. Did the Trial Court fail to award [Jacobs] a monthly fair rental
value claim of $325.00 per month for the entire time frame
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2Jacobs failed to properly serve Stephens with her motion for post-trial relief.
Stephens first received actual notice of the motion during a conversation with
Jacobs’ counsel on May 6, 2020.
3 Jacobs, Stephens, and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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from the date of the Trial Court decision, August 6, 2013
through August 17, 2020, a period of 80 months and 10 days?
Jacobs’ Brief at x.
In his cross-appeal, Stephens raises one issue for our review:
1. Did the Trial Court err when it failed to award credit to
[Stephens] for real estate taxes paid by him, pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 1570(a)(5)?
Stephens’ Brief at 40.
Jacobs’ Claims4
Preliminarily, we note “[t]he purpose of partition is to afford those
individuals who no longer wish to be owners the opportunity to divest
themselves for a fair consideration.” Beall v. Hare, 174 A.2d 847, 849 (Pa.
1961). An action seeking partition of property is an equitable proceeding.
Appeal of Kelsey, 5 A. 447, 449 (Pa. 1886), aff’d sub. nom. Church v.
Kelsey, 136 U.S. 633 (1890). When considering such a decision, our review
is guided by the following:
[T]he scope of appellate review of a decree in equity is particularly
limited, and ... the findings of the [trial court] will not be reversed
unless it appears that the [court] clearly committed an abuse of
discretion or an error of law. Where credibility of witnesses is
important to a determination, the findings of the [trial court] are
entitled to particular weight because the [court] has the
opportunity to observe their demeanor.
We can review freely conclusions of law or factual determinations
that merely are derived from facts supported by the evidence.
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4 In the argument section of her brief, Jacobs reordered her issues on appeal.
For consistency, we will address Jacobs’ issues as they were presented in her
statement of questions presented.
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Thus, we are limited to a determination of whether there was an
error of law, and the trial court’s conclusions will not be disturbed
unless they are not supported by the evidence or unless the court
clearly abused its discretion.
Marchetti v. Karpowich, 667 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations
omitted).
In her first claim, Jacobs contends the trial court erred when it awarded
owelty to Stephens for repairs he made to the property during his time of
exclusive possession. Jacobs’ Brief at 4. Specifically, Jacobs asserts Stephens
failed to establish the repairs “[m]aterially enhance[d] the value of the
common property.” Id. at 2. In support, Jacobs notes Stephens purchased
the property for $140,000 in 2001 and it had an appraised value of $145,000
in 2017. Jacobs thus contends it “defies logic” to conclude $36,421.31 in
repairs only resulted in a $5,000 appreciation value. Id. at 2-3.
This Court has explained:
“As a general rule, where a cotenant places improvements on the
common property, equity will take this fact into consideration on
partition and will in some way compensate him for such
improvements, provided they are made in good faith and are of a
necessary and substantial nature, materially enhancing the value
of the common property.” 68 C.J.S. Partition, § 139(a), see also
Weiskircher v. Connelly, 248 Pa. 327, 93 A. 1068 (1915)
(contribution allowed in partition action where “it was necessary
to remodel, improve and alter the building erected upon the land
so conveyed to [the parties].”); and Appeal of Kelsey, 113 Pa.
119, 125, 5 A. 447, 449 (1886) (“[A] tenant in common is liable
to his co-tenant for repairs absolutely necessary[.]) (emphasis
added).
Bednar v. Bednar, 688 A.2d 1200, 1205 (Pa. Super. 1997).
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In Bednar, this Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which
declined to give co-tenants credit for certain improvements they made to the
residence. See id. at 1204-06. We concluded the claim failed for several
reasons: (1) the co-tenants’ counterclaim did not include a demand for
improvements; (2) the co-tenants failed to prove the improvements were
made within the statute of limitations; and (3) the co-tenants “failed to
provide any evidence concerning the degree to which the improvements
enhanced the property value.” Id.Conversely, in the present case, the trial court, sitting as fact finder,
determined Stephens was entitled to credit for certain improvements he
made, which “were necessary to preserve the property,” including repairs to
the garage, kitchen and barn, and a new roof. Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20,
at 15. The trial court’s finding is supported by the record. Stephens testified
regarding the necessity of these repairs and provided detailed documentation
of the costs. See generally N.T., 12/13/16, at 50-91, 96-127. We detect no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in crediting Stephens’
testimony, and finding these repairs were made in good faith, and were
necessary to preserve the value of the property.5 See Bednar, 688 A.2d at
1205.
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5 In fact, the record reflects that Stephens also requested credit for lawn
maintenance, chimney cleaning, pest control, and snow removal, but the trial
court declined his request. See generally Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20, at
15 n.19.
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In her second issue, Jacobs argues the trial court erred in crediting
Stephens “for his payment of the full purchase price of the property, reduced
by one-half to reconcile this amount with Stephens’ one-half interest in the
property.” Jacobs’ Brief at 10 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/20, at 11).
Jacobs contends a “property must be partitioned between the parties without
regard to their respective contributions towards its acquisition.” Jacobs’ Brief
at 16. She suggests any contribution made by Stephens for the purchase of
the property was a “gift” given without expectation of future compensation.
Id. at 14-16.
This claim is waived because Jacobs failed to preserve the issue in her
post-trial motion. It is well-established that Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 “requires parties
to file post-trial motions in order to preserve issues for appeal,” and “[i]f an
issue has not been raised in a post-trial motion, it is waived for appeal
purposes.” Board of Supervisors of Willistown Twp. v. Main Line
Gardens, Inc., 155 A.3d 39, 44 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Lane Enterprises, Inc.
v. L.B. Foster Co., 710 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1998)).
Rule 227.1(b)(2) provides that the grounds for post-trial relief
must be “specified in the motion,” and that any grounds not so
specified are deemed waived unless leave is subsequently granted
upon cause shown to specify additional grounds. Pa.R.C.P.
227.1(b)(2). The Explanatory Comment to Rule 227.1(b)(2)
makes clear that specification of the grounds for relief requires
more than mere “boilerplate” language, and that the motion must
instead provide the theories in support “so that the lower court
will know what it is being asked to decide.” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2)
(Explanatory Comment–1983) (quoting Frank v. Peckich, 257
Pa. Super. 561, 391 A.2d 624, 632–33 (1978)).
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Main Line Gardens, Inc., 155 A.3d at 44.
In this case, our careful review of the record reveals that Jacobs made
no attempt to preserve this claim in her post-trial motion. See Jacobs’ Motion
for Post-Trial Relief, 4/27/20, at 4-7. Rather, she raised this issue for the first
time in her statement of matters complained of on appeal. Accordingly, this
claim is waived.6 See Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1)-(2).
In her final issue, Jacobs asserts the trial court erred in limiting its award
of fair market rental value from the date of the parties’ separation (August 6,
2013) through the date of the trial court’s initial partition order (October 16,
2017). Jacobs’ Brief at 4. Notably, Jacobs does not dispute the monthly rental
value assigned by the trial court. Rather, she contends the trial court should
have awarded fair market rental value of the property through the date of the
trial court’s Part II order (April 17, 2020), which the trial court entered
following remand from this Court. Jacobs argues she is entitled credit for this
additional period of 30 months and 1 day because, beyond the parties’
stipulation that the trial court should rely on the prior record in making its Part
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6 In the absence of waiver, Jacobs’ claim lacks merit. Upon partition, a tenant
in common is entitled to a credit for half of their share of the costs paid to
acquire the subject property. See Weiskircher v. Connelly, 93 A. 1068 (Pa.
1915) (awarding a co-tenant in a partition action credit for “one-half of the
aggregate sum … paid by said [co-tenant] on account of the purchase of the
property, costs, and interest”); see also Thierry v. Yamulla, 523 EDA 2021,
at 10 (Pa. Super. Jan. 14, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (“The court
calculates owelty based on the equities of what each person invested in the
subject real property.”).
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II decision, “there is no evidence explicit, or implicit that [she] agreed to
forego her stated claim for the rental value limited to the date of the vacated
Part 2 Order.” Id. at 8.
Conversely, Stephens asserts:
[Jacobs] has submitted no legal authority for her proposition that
credit should have been given [to] her for the time-period
between the trial . . . through her first Appeal to Superior Court,
through the subsequent remanding of the case on February 8,
2019, through the period of time in which no activity occurred on
the docket, through the Status Conference held on December 3,
2019, through the entering of the Lower Court’s Part 2 Order on
April 17, 2020.
Stephens’ Brief at 34. Stephens emphasizes that Jacobs, the moving party,
allowed the case to languish for over eight months following remand from this
Court7 but now seeks the fair market rental value for this period of time. Id.
at 34-35. Moreover, Stephens notes that at the status conference, Jacobs
“entered into an agreement to not pursue a de novo hearing, but instead
stipulated that the case would be decided on the evidence” previously
admitted. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). Stephens argues Jacobs is bound
by her prior agreement and cannot now seek credit for additional time. Id.
Pursuant to 68 P.S. § 101, a co-tenant not in possession is granted a
cause of action against a co-tenant in possession to recover “his or their
proportionate part of the rental value of said real estate for the time such real
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7 Stephens eventually petitioned the trial court for a status conference after
Jacobs delayed in acting.
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estate shall have been in possession” of the co-tenant. 68 P.S. § 101.
Accordingly,
[t]wo requirements must be satisfied before recovery of the fair
rental value of the premises will be permitted: (1) the complaining
party must show he is not in possession of the premises; and (2)
it must be shown that the remaining tenant in common occupies
exclusive possession of the premises.
Sciotto v. Sciotto, 288 A.2d 822, 823–24 (Pa. 1972).
In denying Jacobs additional credit for the fair market rental value of
the property, the trial court reasoned:
As discussed above, at the December 3, 2019 status conference
following remand from the first appeal, the parties stipulated that
the de novo proceeding would be conducted on the record of the
prior proceedings. Put differently, the Court would confine its
analysis to the record as it existed at the time of the prior order,
which was entered October 16, 2017. [Jacobs] would have the
Court depart from that solely to adjust the end-date for calculation
of [Jacobs’] rental value credit.
Pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation, the Court disregarded
any material offered by either party relating to events after the
October 16, 2017 order, which included, among other things,
evidence of additional expenses incurred by [Stephens]. Part 2
partition proceedings are, as the Superior Court articulated in
Kapcsos, “purely an equitable proceeding where the trial judge
or master balances the equities” to reach an equitable result given
the circumstances. 194 A.3d at 142-43. To allow [Jacobs] the
benefit of a credit for an additional 30 months and 1 day worth of
rental value – which would result in an increase of $9,653.84,
totaling $26,010.69 – while simultaneously denying [Stephens]
the opportunity to introduce further evidence or make any
argument with regard to the same would be patently inequitable.
Furthermore, in order to achieve equity, the Court included in its
calculation periods when the evidence indicated that the
property’s state of relative disrepair could have rendered it
unrentable altogether.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20, at 16-17 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court. At the December
3, 2019, status conference hearing, Jacobs represented that she saw “no
reason to have another hearing[,]” and wished for the court to issue its Part
II order based on the transcript (and evidence presented) from the prior
hearing. N.T., 12/3/19, at 3. Based on the stipulation, the parties presented
no evidence regarding the fair market rental value of the property from
October 16, 2017 through April 17, 2020. Consequently, there is no record
support for an award of fair market value during that time period. See
Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d 995, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding “in a
hearing de novo, the complainant has the initial burden of going forward with
the evidence, as he must prove his case as if for the first time”). Accordingly,
because the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, Jacobs’ final
claim fails.
Stephens’ Claims
In his cross-appeal, Stephens argues “he be given credit for real estate
taxes paid by him in the amount of $4,176.19, which represents one-half of
the taxes paid by him to preserve the property.” Stephens’ Brief at 46.
Stephens acknowledges Bednar is dispositive of his claim, but nonetheless
asks this Court to revisit its holding in Bednar decision. Id.In Bednar, this Court initially explained, “[t]o entitle one to contribution
[for amounts paid toward real estate taxes], the payment must be compulsory
in the sense that the party paying was under legal obligation to pay.” Bednar,
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688 A.2d at 1203 (citation omitted). The appellants claimed the proportionate
real estate tax obligations that they had paid on behalf of their fellow joint
tenant constituted a legal obligation, in that the parties were required under
the mortgage to pay the full amount of real estate taxes on the property. Id.at 1203–04. This Court disagreed, determining the mortgage did not
constitute a legal obligation to pay real estate taxes. Id. at 1204. The Court
went on to hold that “a cotenant who assumes the tax obligations of his fellow
tenant does so as a volunteer. [S]uch a volunteer is not entitled to
contribution.” Id. (citing 72 P.S. § 5511.12 (provision of Pennsylvania’s Local
Tax Collection Law providing that a joint tenant is only responsible for his or
her proportionate share of real estate taxes due on a property)).
Upon review, we conclude Bednar is on point and controlling, and the
trial court properly applied it to this case. In both Bednar and the instant
case, the parties claiming contribution for paying the proportionate real estate
tax obligations of their fellow joint tenant were under no legal obligation to do
so, and were thus not entitled to contribution for those payments. See
Bednar, 688 A.2d at 1204. Further, we have long held that “as long as [a]
decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court, a decision by our
Court remains binding precedent.” Marks v. Nationwide Ins., 762 A.2d
1098, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2000); see also Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 A.3d
656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013) (acknowledging that a three-judge panel of the
Superior Court “is not empowered to overrule another panel of the Superior
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Court” where the facts of the two cases are indistinguishable). Thus, even
assuming arguendo we were inclined to agree with Stephens’ position, we
nevertheless must affirm the order on the basis of Bednar, supra.Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/31/2022
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