Baron, S. v. Dunaja, J. ( 2022 )

J-S23044-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SHAWN C.H. & MELODY BARON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JASON W. & KAMELA J. DUNAJA : No. 216 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 10, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Civil Division at No(s): 2020-SU-000818
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 1, 2022
In this case about the scope and applicability of an easement as it
pertains to a stone structure and/or sign, Shawn C.H. and Melody Baron
(Appellants) appeal from the order that granted Jason W. and Kamela J.
Dunaja’s (Appellees) motion for summary judgment. In that order, the lower
court dismissed the Appellants’ complaint in trespass and further entered a
declaratory judgment in favor of the Appellees. On appeal, Appellants chiefly
contend that there has been a misinterpretation of the easement governing
Appellees’ use of the Appellants’ property. As such, granting Appellees’ motion
for summary judgment was in error. We affirm.
Stated succinctly,
[a]t some time, either in late 2017 or the middle of 2018, a stone
structure was erected on [Appellants’] property, at 14017
____________________________________________
 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Pleasant Valley Road, Glen Rock, PA 17327. [Appellants’] property
is subject to an [e]asement in favor of [Appellees’] property,
situated adjacent to [the Appellants], at the address of 14140
West Bricker Court, Glen Rock, PA 17327. That [e]asement exists
to allow [Appellees] to access their property[] and has been in
place between the properties for over 60 years. The structure is
roughly 10 feet tall[] and bears a sign indicating that at the end
of the road – which also occupies space in the easement and which
is undisputed – is the location of [Appellees’] property and
residence.
Lower Court Opinion, filed 1/10/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (citations to the
record omitted). In relevant part, the easement, drafted in 1959, establishes
in favor of the Appellees, as current property owners of the dominant estate:
[f]ull and free right and liberty for the [Grantees as well as all of
their heirs and assigns] and their tenants, servants, visitors and
licensees, in common with all other having the like right, including
the Grantors herein, their heirs and assigns, at all times hereafter,
with or without horses, cattle, or other animals, carts,
automobiles, trucks, farm equipment or other vehicles of any
description, for all purposes connected with the use and
enjoyment of the land of the Grantees herein for whatever
purpose the land may be from time to time lawfully used and
enjoyed, to pass and repass over and along a certain private lane
extending over and composed of the following [description of the
land in Shrewsbury Township, York County, Pennsylvania.]
Complaint, filed 3/11/20, Ex. C, Right-of-Way Grant. The easement also
requires the Appellees to maintain and assume safety-related responsibility of
a bridge adjacent to where the modern-day structure currently stands. See
id.
After the Appellants filed their complaint asserting a singular count in
trespass, the Appellees, following some level of discovery, filed an amended
motion for summary judgment. The corresponding order granting that motion
is the basis for the present appeal. Inter alia, the lower court concluded that
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the easement identified, supra, “permits the construction of a structure such
as the one here at issue, on the face of its text alone.” Lower Court Opinion,
filed 1/10/22, at 2 (unpaginated).
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s determination,
and the relevant parties have complied with their obligations under
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. Therefore, this matter is ripe
for review.
In their statement of questions involved, Appellants raise three
questions. In particular, one of those questions asks whether the lower court
erred “by determining that … Appellants were time-barred by a statute of
limitations for a permanent trespass and not a continuing trespass?”
Appellants’ Brief, at 6. However, the brief is devoid of any further reference
to the statute of limitations, explicitly or otherwise. In fact, Appellants’ brief
only contains one heading in the five-page argument section, asserting that
the trial court erred in its interpretation of the easement vis-à-vis the structure
on their property. See id., at 11. Consequently, Appellants have waived this
issue. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009)
(indicating that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a
claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any
other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived”).
We consider Appellants’ remaining two questions in tandem, as they
inherently implicate the same concerns: did the lower court rule incorrectly
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when it granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and, too, granted a
declaratory judgment in favor of the Appellees? See Appellant’s Brief, at 6.
Preliminarily, we note our well-settled standard of review of orders
granting summary judgment:
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court’s standard
of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. A trial
court should grant summary judgment only in cases where the
record contains no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party
has the burden to demonstrate the absence of any issue of
material fact, and the trial court must evaluate all the facts and
make reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. The trial court is further required to resolve any
doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
against the moving party and may grant summary judgment only
where the right to such a judgment is clear and free from doubt.
. . . An appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment
only if the trial court erred in its application of the law or abused
its discretion.
Bourgeois v. Snow Time, Inc., 242 A.3d 637, 649-50 (Pa. 2020) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Distilled down, Appellants’ sole argument is that the erection of a
permanent structure on their property surpasses anything permissible under
the easement’s language. That easement, as written, “was clearly designed
and in place to allow only ingress and egress to Appellees’ property.”
Appellant’s Brief, at 12. To the Appellants, the easement’s “references to
allowing various types of items or vehicles to traverse [their] property is
demonstrative of the original Grantors[‘] intention to allow ingress and egress,
not for the then-Grantee to build and install anything on the original
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Grantors[‘] land unrelated to ingress and egress.” Id. The Appellants then
concede, however, that the structure, itself, identifies the Appellees’ property,
but stresses that such an indicator “could be accomplished with a traditional
mailbox.” Id.An easement is to be interpreted in the same manner as one would
construe a contract. “In ascertaining the scope of an easement, the intention
of the parties must be advanced. Such intention of the parties is determined
by a fair interpretation and construction of the grant and may be shown by
the words employed construed with reference to the attending circumstances
known to the parties at the time the grant was made.” McNaughton
Properties, LP v. Barr, 981 A.2d 222, 227 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation and
brackets omitted). “[I]f an easement is used for any purpose inconsistent with
that for which it was granted, the grantee becomes a trespasser to the extent
of the unauthorized use.” Smith v. Fulkroad, 451 A.2d 738, 740-41 (Pa.
Super. 1982) (citation omitted).
With Appellants being the non-moving party, they believe that the
easement’s lack of reference to the Appellees’ ability to install a structure “not
connected to ingress and egress within the easement area,” Appellant’s Brief,
at 15, at a minimum, is a dispute inappropriate for a determination on
summary judgment. Moreover, “Appellees’ structure is entirely unnecessary
in relation to Appellee[]s[‘] use and enjoyment of their land. If Appellees[]
need to identify their property for whatever reason or reasons, such
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identification can be made in a much less intrusive manner.” Id.The court, in its interpretation, concluded that the structure built on the
Appellants’ property fit within the easement’s language. See Lower Court
Opinion, filed 1/10/22, at 4 (unpaginated). It noted that the easement
contemplates “all purposes connected with the use and enjoyment of the
land[.]” Lower Court 1925(a) Opinion, filed 3/15/22, at 2-3. In dicta, the court
identified “numerous reasons why a sign posting the location of a given
address is necessary to achieve the goals of the [e]asement, both in terms of
facilitating the ingress and egress needs the [e]asement serves, but also in
facilitating the safety and responsibility goals of the [e]asement itself.” Lower
Court Opinion, filed 1/10/22, at 4 (unpaginated) (acknowledging several of
the arguments raised by Appellees, but “not explicitly rel[ying] on [those
arguments] as a factual basis for [its] opinion”). The court further wrote that
the structure “is an architecturally appropriate marker, styled after the bridge
previously existing. It is close to the driveway to as not [to] unnecessarily
intrude on [Appellants’] land. It provides an appropriate indication of the
address and occupants.” Lower Court 1925(a) Opinion, filed 3/15/22, at 3.
The Appellants acknowledge that Appellees must be provided some
ability to identify their property number, which, given the spatial orientation
of the properties, necessarily implicates the land governed by the easement.
Although not relied upon by the lower court, Shrewsbury Township’s
ordinances require dwellings that are more than fifty feet from a public road,
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such as the Appellees’ property here, to have a sign “in a conspicuous location
near to the juncture of the driveway providing vehicular access to [the]
dwelling … and the public road.” Shrewsbury Township Ordinance, § 4-105. If
one fails to maintain a street numbering sign, it is considered an unlawful act.
See id., at § 4-102.
We agree with the lower court’s finding that the Appellees placing a sign
designating the name and number of their residence clearly falls under the
auspice of the Appellees’ use and enjoyment of their land. Such an action is
allowed without limitation under the easement’s plain language, provided that
there is a nexus to the land that has been precisely defined, and Appellants
have presented nothing that could result in a conclusion to the contrary. Here,
it is not in dispute as to whether the sign was placed on land governed by the
easement.
The Appellants’ apparent concession that a smaller address-designating
sign or mailbox would be permitted further undercuts their contention that the
current structure is not permitted. In addition, when juxtaposed against the
aforementioned local ordinance, the Appellees must have some property
identifier that happens to be on land covered by the easement.
Despite Appellants’ vehement protestations to the present structure’s
very existence, they have provided no authority to demonstrate that its
presence is unlawfully large or illegally intrudes upon their own ability to enjoy
or maintain their land. Moreover, Appellants’ desire to have the Appellees
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identify their property, if necessary, in “a much less intrusive manner,”
Appellant’s Brief, at 15, is, simply put, either a completely bald assertion or
predicated on some nebulous conception of what constitutes an appropriately-
sized structure. To that point, advancing such an argument necessarily implies
that the Appellants would be content, or at least less hostile, towards
something with a smaller physical footprint. Without anything to distinguish
the appropriateness of the sign’s size, we are left to rely on the lower court’s
determination, which found the sign’s erection to not only be permitted under
the express language of the easement, but completely necessary for the full
use and enjoyment of the Appellees’ land.
Even through resolving all inferences in favor of the Appellants, they
have provided no basis to conclude that the Appellees have exceeded the
authority given to them by the easement. As such, because it was not in error
or an abuse of discretion for the lower court to grant Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment and further grant a declaratory judgment in their favor,
we affirm the lower court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.
Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/01/2022
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