E5 Solutions v. Grotenhuis, K. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S13031-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    E5 SOLUTIONS GROUP, LLC                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    KURT GROTENHUIS,
    Appellant                No. 2754 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 12, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division
    at No(s): 2010-31397
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                     FILED DECEMBER 15, 2017
    Appellant, Kurt Grotenhuis (“Appellant”), appeals from the judgment of
    the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”) ruling in favor
    of Appellee, e5 Solutions Group, LLC (“the Company”), on Count III of its
    amended complaint and granting attorney fees and costs to the Company in
    the amount of $466,294.00. We vacate this judgment, reverse the award of
    attorney fees and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this
    memorandum.
    This matter has a tangled procedural history due to overlapping
    proceedings before the trial court and the arbitrator.         We begin with an
    overview of the parties and their agreement.
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S13031-17
    The Company is a Pennsylvania limited liability company that performs
    consulting and design services for SAP Treasury Software.            R.R. 42a.1
    Appellant is a former member and owner of an eight percent interest in the
    Company. Id. at 48a.
    On January 15, 2010, Appellant signed an operating agreement
    (“Agreement”) defining the terms of his membership with the Company. The
    terms relevant to this appeal are as follows. First, in Article XV, section 15.2,
    Appellant agreed not to disclose confidential information concerning the
    Company’s business to any third party during or after his membership in the
    Company (“the non-disclosure clause”). Id. at 93a. Second, in Article XV,
    section 15.5, Appellant agreed that during the period in which he held an
    interest in the Company, and for two years thereafter, he would not attempt
    to interfere with the Company’s business relationships (“the non-solicitation
    clause”). Id.
    Third, Article XV, section 15.7, entitled “Injunctive Relief,” provides:
    Recognizing the irreparable nature of the injury that could
    be caused by the Member’s violation of the covenants
    contained in this Article XV, and that monetary damages
    would be inadequate compensation to the Company, it is
    agreed that any violation of this Article XV by a Member
    constitutes a proper subject for immediate injunctive relief,
    specific performance and other equitable relief to the
    Company without the need to post a bond. The prevailing
    party shall be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and
    litigation costs. The Members consent to the jurisdiction of
    1 For the parties’ convenience, we cite to the reproduced record whenever
    possible.
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    the Court of Common Pleas in the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania.
    Id. at 94a.
    Fourth, Article XV, section 15.8, entitled “Purchase of Interest,”
    provides:
    If any Member whose Interest has been purchased and
    payment therefore has not been paid in full violates the
    nondisclosure or non-piracy/noncompetition provisions of
    this Article XV, the Company or purchasing Members, as the
    case may be, shall have the right to suspend payment. If
    the violation continues for thirty (30) days beyond
    notification to the Member of such violation, the Company
    or other Members shall have the right to acquire (or reduce
    the Purchase Price to have otherwise been paid) the
    Member’s entire Interest for such Member's Capital Account
    balance. To the extent the breaching person is a former
    Member who has sold his Interest to the Company or
    Member, if such former Member has received any payments
    in excess of the above amount, the Member shall
    immediately repay such excess to the Company or the
    purchasing Members upon written demand and full title to
    the Interest shall be vested in the purchasing Company or
    Members without any further payment.
    Id.
    Fifth, Article XVIII, section 18.1 provides in relevant part:
    Except with disputes involving injunctive or other equitable
    relief, resolution of any and all disputes arising from or in
    connection with this Agreement, whether based on contract,
    tort, or otherwise, shall be exclusively governed by and
    settled in accordance with [arbitration in accordance with
    American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules] . . .
    Id. at 96a.
    Finally, Article XVIII, section 18.2(ii) provides in relevant part:
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    The prevailing party [in AAA arbitration] shall be awarded
    reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. The arbitration award
    shall be final and binding upon the parties. Judgment on
    the arbitration award may be entered in any court having
    jurisdiction thereof. The prevailing party shall be awarded
    all costs and expenses of litigation, including reasonable
    attorneys’ fees and expenses . . .
    Id. at 97a.
    In June 2010, Appellant left the Company and sold his interest to other
    members of the Company in a purchase agreement, which called for monthly
    payments to Appellant for a five-year period.     On October 26, 2010, the
    Company filed a complaint against Appellant in the trial court at No. 2010-
    31397 (“Case I”), claiming that Appellant violated the non-disclosure and non-
    interference clauses of the Agreement, before and after he left the Company,
    by misappropriating confidential information that belonged to the Company
    and interfering with the Company’s relationships with existing clients.    On
    November 22, 2010, the Company filed a three-count amended complaint
    against Appellant.   Id. at 39a-62a. Counts I and II requested injunctions
    against further violations of the non-interference clause and non-disclosure
    clause, respectively.   Id. at 55a-59a.   Count III requested a declaratory
    judgment action that Appellant’s violation of the non-disclosure and non-
    interference clauses entitled the Company to withhold further payments to
    Appellant under the June 2010 purchase agreement. Id. at 59a-62a.
    Appellant filed preliminary objections to the amended complaint,
    asserting, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Count III
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    because it was an equitable claim for relief and should proceed to arbitration.
    The trial court overruled Appellant’s preliminary objections.
    In 2012, Appellant commenced an action in the trial court at No. 2012-
    13005 (“Case II”) alleging various claims against the Company for monetary
    damages. Id. at 670a. Subsequently, the Company filed a motion to compel
    Appellant to arbitrate Case II in accordance with Article XVIII, section 18.1 of
    the Agreement. Id.
    On October 3, 2012, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment in
    Case I, arguing that Counts I and II of the amended complaint were moot due
    to expiration of the two-year restrictive covenant in the non-interference
    clause. Id. at 208a-388a. Appellant also argued that the Company’s action
    for declaratory judgment in Count III failed for lack of sufficient evidence. Id.
    On November 2, 2012, the trial court ordered Appellant to prosecute his
    claims in Case II in AAA arbitration. Id. at 670a. In 2013, Appellant filed an
    AAA action against the Company in Case II seeking monetary damages for (1)
    breach of contract for failure to pay monies due and owing under the
    Agreement (the “Non-Payment Of Purchase Price Claim”); (2) breach of
    contract for failure to pay sums due in addition to the Agreement; and (3) and
    two claims of breach of fiduciary duty.2 Id. at 1015a-1024a.
    2 Appellant filed other claims against the Company but withdrew them prior to
    the arbitration hearing.
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    The Company filed counterclaims in the Case II arbitration seeking
    declaratory and monetary relief for violation of the non-disclosure and non-
    competition clauses of the Agreement. Id. at 674a. In particular, as it did in
    Case I, the Company sought a declaration that it was entitled to suspend all
    payments due to Appellant under the Agreement due to his breach of the non-
    solicitation and non-interference clauses. Id.
    On April 7, 2014, the arbitrator ruled that he would decide the
    Company’s counterclaims if it obtained a stay of proceedings in Case I. On
    April 14, 2014, the Company filed a petition for stay in the trial court in Case
    I, asserting that its counterclaims in Case II were within the arbitrator’s
    jurisdiction. The Company stated in relevant part:
    3. In an arbitration commenced by [Appellant] now pending
    before the [AAA], the Arbitrator has determined that [the
    Company] may proceed with counterclaims which are
    essentially identical (except for damages relief) to [the
    Company’s] remaining claims in this case and directed [the
    Company] to pursue this stay.
    *     *     *
    6. In this case, [Appellant has] admitted that the remaining
    claims by [the Company] are within the scope of a valid
    arbitration agreement between the parties. Therefore, this
    case must be stayed pending arbitration.
    *     *     *
    17. As Respondents, [the Company] and its individual
    members asserted counterclaims, including a counterclaim
    for breach of Sections 15.3 and 15.5 of the . . . Agreement,
    invoking the remedy provided in Section 15.8 and seeking
    money damages (the “Article XV Counterclaim”). The only
    difference between the Article XV Counterclaim in the AAA
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    Arbitration and Count III of the Amended Complaint in this
    action is that [the Company] and its members in the AAA
    Case Article XV Counterclaim seek an award of money
    damages which they cannot get in this Court because the
    exceptions to ADR in the Operating Agreement only allow
    pursuit in court of equitable relief.
    Company’s Pet. For Stay, 4/14/14, at ¶¶ 3, 6, 17.
    On July 14, 2014, the Company filed a supplemental response to
    Appellant’s pending motion for summary judgment in Case I. Therein, the
    Company admitted:
    Given that the request for an injunction in Count I is now
    moot, [the Company’s] remaining claim for a declaratory
    judgment [in] Count III of the amended complaint . . . is
    subsumed in [the Company’s] counterclaim for damages in
    the [a]rbitration in the form of the remedy provided for in
    section 15.8 of the [Agreement].
    R.R. 674a. In a footnote, the Company explained that its claims for injunctive
    relief in Counts I and II of the amended complaint were moot:
    Discovery after [the Company’s] initial response to the
    summary judgment motion has not revealed any further
    non-disclosure violations by [Appellant] beyond those
    identified in [the Company’s] initial memorandum[,] and
    herein, the violations do not involve any continuing use of
    confidential information[,] and [Appellant] claim[s] that
    [he] took no other confidential information . . . Thus, there
    is no present need for injunctive relief under Count II of the
    amended complaint[,] and the fact of the violation of the
    non-disclosure provision can be resolved by arbitration.
    Id.
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    In an order dated July 22, 2014, the trial court dismissed Counts I and
    II in Case I as moot “by agreement of the parties.”3 Id. at 1003a. The trial
    court denied summary judgment to Appellant in the declaratory judgment
    action in Count III. Id.
    On August 1, 2014, the trial court granted the Company’s motion for
    stay of proceedings in Case I. Id. at 13a.
    On April 24, 2015, following an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator
    entered a partial final award in Case II against Appellant on all of his claims.4
    Id. at 1013a-1030a.      The arbitrator found in favor of the Company on its
    counterclaim for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of its right to
    3   The Company did not appeal the dismissal of Counts I and II.
    4 In Section III of his opinion, the arbitrator rejected Appellant’s Non-Payment
    Of Purchase Price Claim on the ground that Appellant forfeited this payment
    by violating the non-interference clause. Id. at 1015a-1020a. In Section IV,
    the arbitrator denied Appellant’s claims for monies due in addition to the
    purchase agreement on the ground that the Agreement did not contemplate
    payments in addition to the purchase price. Id. at 1020a-1023a. In Section
    V, the arbitrator concluded that the Company did not breach its fiduciary duty
    to Appellant by declining to give him a subcontract to complete a project for
    one of the Company’s clients, because (1) the Company was not under any
    obligation to offer Appellant a subcontract; (2) any breach of such obligation
    would be a breach of contract, not a breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) a
    subcontract would not have been in the Company’s best interests due to the
    parties’ strained relationship. Moreover, the arbitrator determined that the
    Company did not breach its fiduciary duty in connection with preparation of a
    notice of sale of Section 751 property accompanying Appellant’s 2010 Form
    K-1, because (1) the Company’s accountants prepared this notice instead of
    the Company itself, and (2) Appellant was not bound by this notice and was
    free to take a different position with the IRS. Id. at 1023a-1024a.
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    suspend the remainder of the purchase price. Id. at 1024a. The arbitrator
    granted this counterclaim “for reasons discussed in Section III,”5 the section
    that rejected Appellant’s Non-Payment Of Purchase Price Claim.6            The
    arbitrator determined that the Company was the prevailing party in the
    arbitration because it prevailed on all of Appellant’s claims and one of its
    counterclaims. Id. at 1027a. Accordingly, the arbitrator directed Appellant
    to pay all of the Company’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the
    arbitration. Id.
    On June 22, 2015, the arbitrator entered a final award in Case II
    granting the Company $344,120.86 in attorney fees and costs. Id. at 1033a-
    1034a. On July 23, 2015, the Company filed a petition in the trial court to
    enter judgment on the arbitration award in Case II. On October 6, 2015, the
    trial court granted this petition, stating: “[The Company’s] counterclaim for a
    declaration entitling them to suspend all further payments under the . . .
    Agreement is granted.” Id. at 1166a. The trial court entered judgment in
    favor of the Company and against Appellant in the amount of $344,120.86 “in
    accordance with the final award of [the] arbitrator allowing [the Company] to
    recover attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1167a. Appellant did not appeal
    the judgment in Case II.
    5   See supra note 4.
    6   The arbitrator denied the Company’s two other counterclaims.
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    On September 9, 2015, the Company filed a petition in Case I to enter
    judgment on the arbitration award in favor of the Company and against
    Appellant on Count III of the amended complaint. Id. at 1152a-1159a. The
    trial court granted the Company’s petition and scheduled a hearing to
    determine reasonable attorney fees and costs.             The Company filed a
    verification seeking attorney fees and costs in the amount of $466,294.00 in
    attorney fees and costs. Id. at 1307a-1322a.
    On June 30, 2016, following a hearing, the trial court awarded the
    Company $66,111.13 in Case I for fees and costs that the Company spent in
    the trial court litigating its claims for equitable relief in Counts I and II of its
    amended complaint. Id. at 1442a. On July 15, 2016, the Company filed a
    motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Agreement required Appellant to
    pay fees for “any claims brought, whether in arbitration . . . or in [the trial]
    court.” Id. at 1450a.
    On July 26, 2016, the trial court granted the Company’s motion for
    reconsideration in Case I and awarded the Company $466,294.00 in fees and
    costs.     Id. at 1601a-1602a.     On August 12, 2016, the Company entered
    judgment in this amount. Id. at 1603a-1605a. Appellant filed a timely notice
    of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises three issues in this appeal:
    1. Whether the [trial] court erred in failing to sustain
    Appellant’s preliminary objection to count III of [the
    Company’s] amended complaint seeking a declaratory
    judgment[in Case I,] where the agreement at issue provides
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    that only claims seeking equitable relief may be pursued in
    the court of common pleas?
    2. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying summary
    judgment on count III of [the Company’s] amended
    complaint seeking declaratory judgment[in Case I,] as the
    relief sought was not an action in equity[,] thus depriving
    the court of jurisdiction pursuant to the agreement at
    issue[,] and where the arbitrator had directed [the
    Company] to withdraw the claim in the court of common
    pleas?
    3. Whether the [trial] court erred in granting reconsideration
    of its June 30, 2016[] order[in Case I,] as no new evidence
    or legal theory was advanced and the court was not bound
    by the prior rulings of a judge sitting in a coordinate
    jurisdiction as the prior ruling was in error.
    Appellant’s Brief at 1.
    This appeal boils down to one question: having obtained a judgment in
    Case II for $344,120.86 in attorney fees and costs, can the Company recover
    additional attorney fees based on the judgment in its favor on Count III in
    Case I? Appellant suggests that the Company is not entitled to any more fees
    and costs in Case I because it won all of its fees and costs in Case II. See
    Appellant’s Brief at 17. We conclude that it might be possible for the Company
    to obtain additional fees in Case I, but perhaps considerably less than the trial
    court awarded.
    “Under the American Rule, applicable in Pennsylvania, a litigant cannot
    recover counsel fees from an adverse party unless there is express statutory
    authorization, a clear agreement of the parties, or some other established
    exception.” Trizechahn Gateway, LLC v. Titus, 
    976 A.2d 474
    , 482-83 (Pa.
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    2009) (citation omitted). We review orders granting attorney fees and costs
    for abuse of discretion. See Boehm v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., 
    117 A.3d 308
    , 335 (Pa. Super. 2015).
    Here, section 15.7 of the Agreement provides that the “prevailing party”
    in any action for injunctive relief in the trial court shall receive attorney fees,
    and section 18.2(ii) provides the same relief to the “prevailing party” in an
    arbitration of contract or tort claims. In short, the Agreement provided that
    the parties would litigate all injunction and equity disputes in the trial court
    and all other disputes in AAA arbitration, but no matter where the parties
    chose to litigate, the prevailing party had the right to obtain attorney fees and
    expenses from the losing party.      Thus, there is a “clear agreement of the
    parties” relating to recovery of attorney fees. Trizechahn Gateway, 
    976 A.2d at 482-83
    .
    At first, the trial court awarded $66,111.13 in fees and costs to the
    Company in Case I. The trial court later explained that this award represented
    the fees that the Company spent on Counts I and II of its three-count
    amended complaint in Case I. Trial Ct. Op., 10/27/16, at 3. Subsequently,
    the trial court granted the Company’s motion for reconsideration and awarded
    $466,294.00 in fees and costs, seven times more than its original award. The
    court explained that the jump from $66,111.13 to $466,294.00 represented
    the fees spent in prosecuting Count III, the action for declaratory judgment
    in Case I.
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    We have several concerns with the trial court’s reasoning that
    necessitate a remand for further proceedings. To begin with, the Company is
    not the prevailing party on Counts I and II, and cannot recover fees and costs
    on these counts, because the trial court dismissed them as moot. See Profit
    Wize Marketing v. Wiest, 
    812 A.2d 1270
    , 1275 (Pa. Super. 2002) (plain
    and unambiguous meaning of “prevail” requires plaintiff to “triumph” or
    “win[;]” thus, plaintiff did not prevail where trial court never reached merits
    of case or vindicated plaintiff’s position).
    The Company did prevail in its declaratory judgment in Count III
    because the trial court entered judgment in its favor on this count. Even so,
    it is important to remember that (1) the Company admitted that Count III was
    “subsumed” in its declaratory judgment claim in Case II, and (2) the Company
    has already prevailed in Case II and has been awarded attorney fees and costs
    in that case.    Consequently, the Company cannot obtain fees and costs
    relating to Count III that duplicate fees and costs that it won in Case II. We
    leave it to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether any fees
    or costs related to Count III are different from fees and costs that the
    Company won in Case II.
    Judgment vacated.       Case remanded with instructions.     Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/15/17
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2754 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 12/15/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/15/2017