Com. v. Lowry, A. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S18008-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ANDRE LOWRY
    Appellant                  No. 823 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the PCRA Order entered May 9, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at Nos: CP-02-CR-0000158-1997,
    CP-02-CR-0009751-1997
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., MUSMANNO, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED MAY 22, 2018
    Appellant, Andre Lowry, appeals pro se from the order entered May 9,
    2017 dismissing his sixth petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
    42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-95. We affirm.
    On January 26, 1998, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of
    first degree murder and other charges.           He was sentenced to life
    imprisonment.    On April 13, 2000, this Court affirmed his judgment of
    sentence, and on August 30, 2000, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
    his petition for allowance of appeal.
    On January 24, 2001, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, after which
    counsel was appointed. On February 19, 2002, the PCRA court entered notice
    of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition, and on January 14, 2003, the
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    petition was denied. On appeal, this Court vacated the lower court’s order
    dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and remanded for the appointment of
    new counsel. On remand, new counsel was appointed, and Appellant filed an
    amended PCRA petition on July 18, 2007. Following a hearing, the PCRA court
    denied Appellant’s petition on November 14, 2008. This Court affirmed on
    September 8, 2010.
    On September 30, 2010, Appellant filed his second pro se PCRA petition.
    On October 28, 2010, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss this
    petition.   On November 23, 2010, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
    petition as untimely. On September 11, 2011, this Court affirmed.
    Between 2012 and 2015, Appellant filed three more PCRA petitions. All
    were dismissed without hearings.
    On March 15, 2017, Appellant his sixth pro se PCRA petition, the petition
    presently under review, claiming that the coroner acted outside of his legal
    authority by holding Appellant for trial. On April 27, 2017, the PCRA court
    issued a notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. On May 9,
    2017, less than twenty days later, the PCRA court dismissed the petition.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the PCRA
    court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises three issues in this appeal:
    A. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error when it
    dismissed the pro se Appellant’s PCRA petition, a petition raising
    circumstances similar to those in Commonwealth v. Bennett
    and pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(1)(ii), that were never
    considered prior to dismissal of his petition?
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    B. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error when it
    determined State Senator Jay Costa’s explanation of the
    legislative intent of the General Assembly’s construction of the
    Coroner’s Statute did not qualify as a new fact under the newly
    discovered and previously unknown fact exceptions of the PCRA
    statute?
    C. Whether coroners are judicial officers, pursuant to Pennsylvania
    Constitution Article V, Section 1, the unified judicial system and
    State Senator Jay Costa’s explanation of the legislative intent of
    the General Assembly’s construction of the Coroner’s Statute?
    Appellant’s Brief at 8.
    The PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely.
    PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the time the judgment of
    sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). The timeliness requirement
    of Section 9545(b)(1) is jurisdictional; we cannot address the merits of an
    untimely petition. Commonwealth v. Abu Jamal, 
    941 A.2d 1263
    , 1267–68
    (Pa. 2008).   Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final at the end of
    November 2000, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for
    allowance of appeal in his direct appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant
    filed his present petition on March 15, 2017, over sixteen years after his
    judgment of sentence became final. Thus, it is untimely on its face.
    Furthermore, Appellant’s petition fails to satisfy any of the three
    exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Appellant attempted to invoke the newly discovered facts
    exception, which required him to prove "the facts upon which the claim is
    predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
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    ascertained by the exercise of due diligence." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
    Appellant relied upon a letter received from Candice Corbett, an employee of
    Senator Jay Costa, dated January 19, 2017, advising that coroners are not
    members of the judiciary and cannot bind persons for trial at preliminary
    hearings. Appellant appears to argue that (1) his preliminary hearing was
    defective because a coroner held him over for trial instead of a judge, and (2)
    his acquisition of knowledge about the coroner’s status is a newly-discovered
    “fact,” because he was unaware that coroners lacked the authority to hold
    persons for trial until he received Corbett’s letter. We disagree.
    Legal principles or developments are “law”; they are not “facts” under
    Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Commonwealth v. Watts, 
    23 A.3d 980
    , 987 (Pa.
    2011) (“an in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law, for it is simply
    the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events. The events
    that prompted the analysis, which must be established by presumption or
    evidence, are regarded as fact”). Thus, Appellant’s acquisition of knowledge
    about the coroner’s legal status merely constitutes a new point of law. It does
    not constitute a new “fact” under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).
    For these reasons, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s sixth
    PCRA petition as untimely.1
    ____________________________________________
    1 Technically, the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s sixth petition was
    premature under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), because the court entered its order less
    than twenty days after issuing its notice of intent to dismiss the petition.
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    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/22/2018
    ____________________________________________
    Nevertheless, this is not reversible error because the record is clear that the
    petition is untimely. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 
    148 A.3d 849
    , 851 n.2 (Pa.
    Super. 2016) (failure to issue Rule 907 notice is not reversible error where
    record is clear that PCRA petition is untimely).
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 823 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 5/22/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/22/2018