Com. v. Carmon, S. ( 2017 )

J-S57021-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SHALAMAR R. CARMON
Appellant No. 549 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order dated January 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003283-2004
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2017
Appellant, Shalamar R. Carmon, appeals pro se from the order
dismissing his third petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On October 3, 2006, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder,
and he was sentenced that same day to life imprisonment without parole.
He filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on
January 4, 2008. Commonwealth v. Carmon, 947 A.2d 822 (unpublished
memorandum). On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court denied his allocatur
petition. Commonwealth v. Carmon, 951 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 2008).
Appellant did not petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. Therefore, his judgment of sentence became final on September
J-S57021-17
24, 2008, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
allocatur petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13.
Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition, within one year, on June 12,
2009. The PCRA court appointed counsel, held an evidentiary hearing, and
dismissed the petition. Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed the
denial of relief. Commonwealth v. Carmon, 29 A.3d 830 (Pa. Super.
2011) (unpublished). Appellant petitioned for collateral relief a second time
on February 3, 2012. This time, the PCRA court denied relief on the ground
that the petition was untimely. Appellant unsuccessfully appealed.
Commonwealth v. Carmon, 62 A.3d 463 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished).
Appellant filed the petition that is now before us, his third, on
December 12, 2016. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely by
an order dated January 23, 2017. Appellant filed a timely appeal in which
he raises five issues:
[1.] Whether Appellant is entitled to Post-Conviction Relief,
when the evidence of record support[s] Appellant’s claim that he
is being detained illegally, in violation of due process of law,
under an illegal sentence, where he was never sentenced by a
judgment of the law of the land that lawfully authorizes the
deprivation of his liberty, as required by the Due Process Clause
of the Pa.Const. art.1 §9 and the 14th amendment of the
U.S.Const.?
[2.] Whether 18 Pa.C.S.§ 1102(a)(1) could have ever lawfully
authorized an imposition of a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon Appellant, as
a result of his 1st degree murder conviction?
[3.] Whether the PCRA Court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
PCRA petition as untimely, when Appellant established his illegal
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sentence claim within the plain language of the timeliness
exception of 42 Pa.C.S.§ 9545(b)(1)(i) & § 9545(b)(2), where
the evidence of record substantially supports the material fact
that the Sentencing Judge’s failure to satisfy the Due Process
requirement of Notice, reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances pertaining to the judgment of sentence imposed
upon Appellant, interfered with this illegal sentence claim being
presented previously?
[4.] Whether the PCRA Court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
PCRA petition as untimely, when the evidence of record does not
support the PCRA Court’s conclusion that Appellant’s argument,
demonstrating that he did not know he was being illegally
detained under an illegal sentence, within the plain language of
42 Pa.C.S.§ 9545(b)(1)(ii) & § 9545(b)(2), was unavailing,
because Appellant was convicted of 1st degree murder, and on
October 3, 2006, was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, which is a mandatory sentence, pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S.§ 1102(a)(1)?
[5.] Whether the PCRA Court erred in dismissing Appellant’s
PCRA petition as untimely, when the PCRA Court’s jurisdiction to
address the merits of Appellant’s illegal sentence claim is clearly
seen, where Appellant’s judgment of sentence could have never
become final, because the evidence of record support[s]
Appellant’s argument that the judgment of sentence imposed
upon Appellant was never legally determined by a statute that
lawfully authorized the deprivation of Appellant’s liberty?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, this
Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the
conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016). The PCRA
court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for them in
the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
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A PCRA petition must be timely. In order to be timely, it must be filed
within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes
final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3). However, an untimely petition may be considered when the
petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that one of the three limited
exceptions to the time for filing the petition set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1) is met. A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed
within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to proceed under an exception
to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove
specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time
frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164,
1167 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Whether a PCRA petition is timely is a question of law; this Court’s
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013). It is well
settled that “[t]he filing mandates of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature
and are strictly construed.” Id. Consequently, “[a]n untimely petition
renders this Court without jurisdiction to afford relief.” Id.
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Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on
September 24, 2008. He therefore had to file a timely petition by
September 24, 2009. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Because Appellant filed the
underlying petition on December 12, 2016, we agree with the PCRA court
that the petition is untimely and we lack jurisdiction to review it. After a
thorough review of the record, the applicable law, and the opinion of the
Honorable Douglas G. Reichley, sitting as the PCRA court, we affirm on the
basis of Judge Reichley’s comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, which
holds that Appellant’s third PCRA petition is untimely, and that “Appellant did
not establish the existence of any applicable exception to the PCRA’s time
requirements,” and states, “while the [PCRA court] does not have
jurisdiction to address the merits, the [PCRA court] observes that Appellant’s
sentence [of life imprisonment for first degree murder in accordance with 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711] is not illegal.” PCRA Court Opinion, 2/27/17, at 4-5
(unpaginated). In the event of future filings, the parties are instructed to
attach a copy of the PCRA court’s February 27, 2017 opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/5/2017
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Circulated 11/15/2017 04:04 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
vs. No. 3283/ 2004
EDA 2017
SHALAMAR R. CARMON,
Defendant
ORDER
AND NOW, this r)1-k day of February, 2017, it appearing that the Appellant has
filed a Notice of Appeal in the above -captioned matter; and it further appearing that the
accompanying Memorandum Opinion satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a);
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Courts, Criminal, transmit the record in
the above -captioned matter to the Superior Court forthwith.
By the Court:
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Dougla G. Reichley, J.
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEHIGH COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
vs. No. 3283/ 2004
EDA 2017
SHALAMAR R. CARMON,
Defendant
1925(a) Opinion
Shalamar Carmon, Appellant, has appealed from the Court's order dismissing his third
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition on January 23, 2017. For the reasons set forth
herein, the Court was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant's PCRA petition and said
petition was properly dismissed.
Factual and Procedural Background
This case stems from a 2004 homicide, which was litigated in Case No. CP-39-CR-
0003283-2004. Appellant was charged with and subsequently convicted of Murder in the First
Degree for the murder of Jason Fritchman. A jury convicted Appellant in October of 2006 and he
was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Superior Court affirmed that sentence,
Commonwealth v. Carmon, 947 A.2d 822 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished memorandum), and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Appellant's allocatur petition on June 26, 2008.
Commonwealth v. Carmon, 951 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 2008) (table).
Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging ineffectiveness of pretrial and trial
counsel for failing to seek suppression of identification testimony and failing to object to the
introduction of photographs of the crime scene. His PCRA petition was denied and dismissed on
June 11, 2010. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed. Commonwealth v.
Cameron, 29 A.3d 830 (Pa. Super. 2011) (table). The Supreme Court rejected the Appellant's
appeal. Commonwealth v. Cameron, 29 A.3d 370 (Pa. 2011) (table).
On December 12, 2016, Appellant filed the instant PCRA Petition. On December 20,
2016, the Court reviewed that petition and determined it was untimely. Accordingly, the Court
entered an order placing Appellant on notice of the Court's intent to dismiss his PCRA petition
without a hearing. Appellant filed a response to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss on
January 6, 2017.
On January 23, 204, the Court entered an order dismissing the PCRA petition. Appellant
filed a Notice of Appeal on February 8, 2017 and timely filed a Concise Statement on February
22, 2017.
This Opinion follows.
Discussion
Appellant has raised 5 issues on appeal, but only the first issue requires consideration.
Appellant alleges the Court erred in dismissing his PCRA petition because he met an exception
to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA as a result of the alleged imposition of an illegal
sentence.
Second or subsequent PCRA petitions "will not be entertained unless the petitioner
presents a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred."
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 94J A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v.
Carpenter, 725 A.2d 154, 160 (Pa. 1999)). "A petitioner makes a prima facie showing if he
demonstrates that either the proceedings which resulted in his conviction were so unfair that a
miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society could tolerate, or that he v4as jznocapt
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Super. 2003) (en banc) (citations omitted).
The timeliness requirements of the PCRA must be strictly construed and are jurisdictional
in nature; thus, courts are precluded from addressing the merits of issues raised in a PCRA
petition if it is untimely. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1267. Petitions under the PCRA, including
second or subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year from the date the judgment
becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final either after direct review,
including discretionary review, or after the expiration of the time for seeking review. Id. §
9545(b)(3).
There are three very narrow exceptions to the one year time period:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by
government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
Appellant and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
after the time period provided ... and has been held by that court to apply
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If the PCRA petitioner can successfully demonstrate the applicability of any of the three
exceptions, he may file his petition within 60 days of the date that his claim could have been
presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2).
In the within matter, Appellant asserted he is eligible for relief because he is challenging
the legality of the sentence imposed. He claims that he is being held illegally "because there is no
statute given by the court order, related to [Appellant's] sentencing proceeding, that ever had the
lawful authority to give the Dept. of Corrections any power to enforce any provisions remotely
close to accepting, confining and depriving Appellant of his liberty in any way...." (Post -
Conviction Relief Act Petition, at 19.) In Appellant's Response to the Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, Appellant explained that his petition is timely because he "did not know he was being
illegally detained under an illegal sentence." (Defendant's Response to the Court's Notice of
Intent to Dismiss, at 2.)
Appellant was convicted of Murder in the First Degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a). On
October 3, 2006, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
which is a mandatory sentence. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1). Appellant's assertion that he was
unaware that his sentence is illegal and that he only came to learn this in October of 2016 was
unavailing. Furthermore, while the Court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits, the
Court observes that Appellant's sentence is not illegal. Id. ("[A] person who has been convicted
of murder of the first degree . shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment in
accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure for murder fir
degree).").
conclusion
Because Appellant did not establish the existence of any applicable exception to the
PCRA's time requirements, the Court properly dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition without a
hearing. Consequently, the Court respectfully recommends that its order dismissing the PCRA
Petition be affirmed.
By the Court:
ouglas . Reichle(,J.
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