V.E.B. v. A.N.W. ( 2018 )


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  • J. S47018/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    V.E.B.                                   :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                     :
    :
    A.N.W.,                                  :          No. 126 EDA 2017
    :
    Appellant         :
    Appeal from the Order Dated November 30, 2016,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No. 2009-23833
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:              FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2018
    A.N.W. appeals from the November 30, 2016 order entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County that awarded attorney’s fees
    to appellee, V.E.B. (“Mother”), in the amount of $10,000 as a discovery
    sanction against appellant in the underlying support action. We quash.
    The trial court set forth the following:
    This appeal is from an Order awarding
    [Mother’s] attorney’s fees from [appellant] for
    conduct involved in the resolution of issues arising
    from support of the parties’ minor child. The parties
    had entered into an agreed order of support in
    February 26, 2015.          In September of 2015,
    [appellant] filed a Petition to Modify the agreed upon
    order. On [sic] [Mother] filed a Motion to Dismiss
    the Petition, because inter alia, relevant responses
    to Requests for Production had not been provided by
    [appellant] despite an order having been entered to
    compel that discovery. [Appellant] and his counsel
    failed to appear at a hearing on March 30, 2016
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    before a discovery master to address [appellant’s]
    failure to respond to the Requests for Production.
    The Motion to Dismiss further stated that on June 7,
    2016 the Honorable Stephen Barrett entered an
    Order requiring [appellant] to comply with [Mother]’s
    request for [p]roduction within twenty days and
    noting that failure to do so could result in sanctions.
    On July 14, 2016, a hearing was held on the
    Exceptions and on the Motion to Dismiss the
    Exceptions, which included a request by [Mother] for
    attorney’s fees. The hearing was scheduled to begin
    at 9:30 a.m. Counsel whose appearance had been
    entered for [appellant], Mr. Abdul-Rahman, did not
    attend this hearing. [Appellant] informed the court
    that Mr. Abdul-Rahman would not be coming to the
    hearing, but Attorney Chisholm would attend on his
    behalf.   Mr. Chisholm was not present at 9:30.
    [Appellant]    then   informed   the   Court   that
    Mr. Chisholm was appearing at another hearing in
    Montgomery County. The Court waited until 9:43,
    and then opened court. Mr. Chisholm appeared at
    10:00 a.m.
    At this hearing, Mr. Machles, counsel for
    [Mother], informed the court that a motion to modify
    custody was pending, which could affect the support
    ordered. Based upon this information, this court
    granted      the     Motion      to   Dismiss      the
    Exceptions.[Footnote 1] At this hearing [Mother]’s
    counsel also directed the court to the requested
    attorneys’ fees, and submitted an affidavit in support
    of these fees. In response, Attorney Chisholm noted
    that “as related to the fees, Attorney Abdul-Rahman
    is probably more in line to deal with the
    appropriateness of what happened.”            Attorney
    Chisholm requested that Attorney Abdul-Rahman be
    given a week to respond to the request. The Court
    then told Attorney Chisholm that this response was
    expected from Attorney Abdul-Rahman a week from
    that day, and Attorney Chisholm responded, “[h]e
    will send it to Your Honor . . . . Absolutely[.]” The
    response to the request for attorney’s fees was not
    timely received within one week.[Footnote 2] After
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    more than five months of waiting passed, on
    November 30, 2016, this Court granted [Mother]’s
    request for attorney’s fees, awarding an amount
    found reasonable, which was less than the amount
    requested.
    [Footnote    1]     The   Order    entered
    dismissing the exceptions provided that
    the exceptions were dismissed without
    prejudice for [sic] any party to seek relief
    following a change in custody or any
    other circumstances.
    [Footnote 2] The undersigned had no
    “ex parte”       communication      with
    [Mother]’s counsel. After months passed
    without the promised response from
    Attorney Abdul-Rahman, Mr. Machles did
    contact chambers to check on the status
    of the motion. Court staff did eventually
    contact Attorney Abdul-Rahman’s office
    to check whether his response would be
    sent, to no avail.
    This award of attorney’s fees was appealed.
    Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), this Court ordered
    [appellant] to file of record and to serve this Court a
    Concise Statement of Errors Complained of On
    Appeal no later than twenty one days after the date
    the 1925(b) Order was docketed. [Appellant] timely
    filed this statement and listed ten alleged errors.
    Trial court opinion, 2/17/17 at 1-3 (record citations omitted; some brackets
    in original).
    The record reflects that on February 17, 2017, this court ordered
    appellant to show cause within ten days of the date of that order as to the
    appealability of the November 30, 2016 order.           (Order of court, 2/17/17.)
    In his timely response, appellant responded, in relevant part, as follows:
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    As Senior Judge Tilson points out in his trial
    court Opinion, the award of attorney’s fees was due
    to the lower court’s finding [appellant] in contempt
    of a discovery order.        [See trial court opinion,
    2/17/17], at 3, 5[]. Thus, in this case, the award of
    attorney’s fees is final and appealable.          See
    Wolanin v. Hashagen, 
    829 A.2d 331
    , 332-33
    (Pa.Super. 2003) (“Rather, we conclude that, for a
    contempt order to be properly appealable, it is only
    necessary that the order impose sanctions on the
    alleged contemnor, and no further court order be
    required before the sanctions take effect”). See
    also Diamond v. Diamond, 
    792 A.2d 597
    , 600
    (Pa.Super. 2002) (“a contempt order is appealable
    because it is a final order imposing sanctions”).
    Correspondence in response to 2/17/17 show-cause order, 2/27/17.
    The record reflects that this court discharged the show-cause order on
    February 28, 2017; referred appellant’s appeal to this merits panel; and
    advised appellant that this panel may revisit the appealability issue and,
    therefore, that appellant should be prepared to address the issue. (Order of
    court, 2/28/17.)   Because “[t]he appealability of an order goes directly to
    the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt asked to review the order[,]” Takosky v.
    Henning, 
    906 A.2d 1255
    , 1258 (Pa.Super. 2006), we must determine the
    appealability of the November 30, 2016 order that appellant wishes to
    appeal.
    In his response to this court’s show-cause order, as well as in his brief
    to this court, appellant maintains that the November 30, 2016 order
    awarding Mother attorney’s fees is appealable because it imposed sanctions
    following a contempt finding. (See correspondence in response to 2/17/17
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    show-cause order, 2/27/17; see also appellant’s brief, passim.) Appellant
    stated that the proceeding that resulted in the trial court’s November 30,
    2016 order was a contempt proceeding when the record demonstrates that it
    was actually a hearing on Mother’s exceptions to appellant’s petition to
    modify support or limit support in the underlying child-support action during
    which Mother requested attorney’s fees due to appellant’s failure to comply
    with discovery requests.     (See Mother’s “motion in limine to dismiss
    petition to modify support or limit same with memorandum of law,” 7/11/16;
    see also notes of testimony, 7/14/15, passim.) Additionally, we note that
    the trial court’s opinion, with respect to its reasoning for entering the
    November 30, 2016 order awarding attorney’s fees, as well as the record,
    demonstrates that the trial court awarded Mother attorney’s fees as a
    discovery sanction pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019(a)(1)(viii). (See trial court
    opinion, 2/17/17 at 5; see also Mother’s “motion in limine to dismiss
    petition to modify support or limit same with memorandum of law,” 7/11/16;
    notes of testimony, 7/14/15, passim.)
    It is well settled that a contempt order that imposes sanctions
    constitutes a final, appealable order. N.A.M. v. M.P.W., 
    168 A.3d 256
    , 260
    (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).    It is also well settled that an order
    imposing discovery sanctions is not appealable until final judgment in the
    underlying action.   West v. Andersen, 
    626 A.2d 606
    , 608 (Pa.Super.
    1993). Here, we have reviewed the voluminous certified record in this case,
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    and again, it reveals that the trial court entered the November 30, 2016
    order awarding attorney’s fees as a discovery sanction against appellant.
    Additionally, nothing in the certified record before us indicates that the trial
    court entered final judgment in the underlying support action prior to entry
    of that order.    Therefore, because no final judgment in the underlying
    support action had been entered prior to the entry of the November 30,
    2016 order that awarded attorney’s fees to Mother as a discovery sanction
    against appellant, it is not a final, appealable order. See 
    id. Appeal quashed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/22/18
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