Com. v. Murray, B. ( 2018 )

J-S71027-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRUCE MURRAY
Appellant No. 588 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-1111091-1982
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 17, 2018
Appellant Bruce Murray, pro se, appeals from the February 3, 2016,
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“PCRA
court”), which dismissed as untimely his fourth request for collateral relief
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (the “PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
Upon review, we affirm.
Briefly, on June 24, 1983, a jury found Appellant guilty of second-degree
murder, robbery conspiracy and possession of instruments of crime. On April
23, 1984, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for second-
degree murder, and lesser, but consecutive, terms of incarceration for the
remaining convictions. Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S71027-17
December 1, 1985.1 On April 10, 2015, Appellant filed the instant, his fourth,
PCRA petition.2 Following the PCRA court’s issuance of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, the PCRA court
denied Appellant PCRA relief on February 3, 2016. Appellant timely appealed
to this Court.
On appeal,3 Appellant presents three issues for our review, reproduced
here verbatim:
[I.] Whether, Judge Savitt refusing to Take Oath Of Office, VOIDS
ANY ACY DONE, ACCORDING TO LAW 42 Pa.C.S. § 3151?
[II.] Did the Judge properly dismis action, knowing
timeliness/defects in filing was corrected in the Civil Division? Noll
v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 (1987) See: also Heines v. Kerner,
________ ( ). Pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to
less stringent standards?
____________________________________________
1 We affirmed his judgment of sentence on November 1, 1985. Appellant,
however, filed an untimely petition for allowance of appeal, which our
Supreme Court denied on November 26, 1986. Accordingly, his judgment of
sentence became final on December 1, 1985.
2 Although the petition was characterized as a habeas corpus petition, the
PCRA court treated it properly as a PCRA petition. The plain language of the
statute provides that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
remedies for the same purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. Cognizant of the
stated purpose of the PCRA, we have held that “any petition filed after the
judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also
Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 842 (Pa. 2002) (noting that if relief
is available under the PCRA, the PCRA is the exclusive means of obtaining the
relief sought).
3“In PCRA proceedings, an appellate court’s scope of review is limited by the
PCRA’s parameters; since most PCRA appeals involve mixed questions of fact
and law, the standard of review is whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pitts,
981 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
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[III.] Whether a MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE TO
APPELLANT/GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE BY THE
PROSECUTOR IN PROCEEDINGS?
Appellant’s Brief at vi (sic).
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the court erred in
dismissing as untimely Appellant’s PCRA petition. The PCRA contains the
following restrictions governing the timeliness of any PCRA petition.
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
period provided in this section and has been held by
that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Section 9545’s timeliness provisions are
jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).
Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers no
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authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations
omitted).
Here, as stated earlier, the record reflects Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on December 1, 1985. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3);
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Because Appellant had one year from December 1, 1985,
to file his PCRA petition, the current filing is facially untimely given it was filed
on April 10, 2015, nearly three decades later.
The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner
alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. Here, Appellant has failed to allege, let alone
prove, any exceptions to the one-year time bar. Accordingly, the PCRA court
did not err in dismissing as untimely Appellant’s instant, his fourth, PCRA
petition for want of jurisdiction.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/17/18
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