Com. v. Williams, J. ( 2022 )

J-S04023-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1722 EDA 2021
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0007513-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2022
James Williams (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his
serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In November 2012, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder
and a firearms offense. The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to
life in prison. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 116 A.3d 696 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Table) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 119 A.3d 351 (Pa. 2015).
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant filed two PCRA petitions between 2015 and 2018, both of
which were unsuccessful. On December 20, 2020, Appellant filed in the trial
court civil division, the underlying pro se “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,”
which was eventually transferred to criminal division and docketed on January
14, 2021. The criminal court properly treated the filing as a serial PCRA
petition.1 In sum, Appellant claimed his legal rights had been violated, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to try or sentence him, and his sentence
exceeded the lawful maximum. See generally PCRA Petition, 1/14/21.2
The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss the
petition without a hearing after concluding Appellant’s serial petition was
untimely. Appellant filed a pro se response. By order entered June 25, 2021,
the court dismissed Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a pro se notice of
appeal on August 17, 2021.3
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1 “[A]ny petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be
treated as a PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521
(Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and ellipses omitted); see also Commonwealth
v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (Pa. 2013) (“The PCRA … subsumes the remed[y]
of habeas corpus” where the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (same).
2Appellant filed additional pro se pleadings with the PCRA court. See PCRA
Court Memorandum Opinion, 6/25/21, at unnumbered 3, n.5 (describing the
pro se filings).
3Appellant’s notice of appeal is facially untimely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (30-
day appeal period). However, this defect does not deprive us of jurisdiction
because there is no indication in the PCRA court docket that it notified
Appellant of the dismissal order. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1) (appeal period
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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At the outset, we find waiver. Appellant has failed to include in his brief
a statement of questions involved as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No
question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions
involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); see also Krebs v. United Ref.
Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding waiver).
In addition, Appellant’s brief in no way conforms to the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Our Supreme Court has stated:
The briefing requirements, scrupulously delineated in our
appellate rules, are not mere trifling matters of stylistic
preference; rather, they represent a studied determination by our
Court and its rules committee of the most efficacious manner by
which appellate review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right
to judicial review ... may be properly exercised. Thus, we reiterate
that compliance with these rules by appellate advocates ...
is mandatory.
Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 837-38 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted;
emphasis added).
We recognize that Appellant is pro se. However,
[u]nder Pennsylvania law, pro se defendants are subject to the
same rules of procedure as are represented defendants. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, … 896 A.2d 523, 534 (Pa. 2006)
(pro se defendants are held to same standards as licensed
attorneys). Although the courts may liberally construe materials
filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit
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begins to run on the date the clerk of courts “mails or delivers copies of the
order to the parties”); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.Crim.P.
907(4); Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super.
2000) (finding breakdown in PCRA court and deeming petitioner’s appeal
timely where clerk of courts failed to notify petitioner of order denying
collateral relief); Commonwealth v. Barreto, 258 A.3d 540, n.4 (Pa. Super.
2021) (unpublished memorandum) (Table) (same).
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upon a litigant, and a court cannot be expected to become a
litigant’s counsel or find more in a written pro se submission than
is fairly conveyed in the pleading.
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014); see also
Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“any
person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a
reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be
his undoing.”).
Waiver notwithstanding, we reiterate that a PCRA petition must be filed
within one year of the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becoming final. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466,
468 (Pa. Super. 2007). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). “If a
PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has
jurisdiction over the petition.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124,
1140 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).
Appellant’s sentence became final in October 2015. Appellant did not
file the instant PCRA petition until December 2020, over five years after his
judgment of sentence became final. Accordingly, the petition is facially
untimely.
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Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the
petitioner pleads and proves an exception in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-
(iii). Here, Appellant does not allege that his late filing was due to interference
by government officials (§ 9545(b)(1)(i)), the facts underlying his petition
were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by due diligence
(§ 9545(b)(1)(ii)), or that he is asserting a retroactive constitutional right (§
9545(b)(1)(iii)). “[I]t is the petitioner’s burden to plead in the petition
and prove that one of the exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Crews,
863 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted; emphasis in original);
Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Pa. 2005) (same).
Thus, Appellant’s petition is time-barred, and neither this Court nor the PCRA
court has jurisdiction. See Reid, supra.4
Finally, while Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence, see PCRA
Petition, 1/14/21, at 2-4, and “challenges to the legality of a sentence cannot
be waived,” a court must first have jurisdiction to address legality.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 60 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted);
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (“Although legality
of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first
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4 There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the “time bar restrictions are of
no force or effect in this instant matter.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2
(unnumbered). As explained above, the PCRA subsumes the remedy of
habeas corpus where, as here, the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim.
See Turner, supra.
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satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.”). Because we
lack jurisdiction due to Appellant’s failure to plead or prove an exception to
the PCRA time-bar, we may not address his legality of sentence claim. See
Fahy, supra; Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa. Super.
2014) (“a legality of sentence claim may [] be lost should it be raised ... in an
untimely PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving
the court of jurisdiction over the claim.” (citation omitted)).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/7/2022
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