Com. v. Gibision, J. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S04022-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    JOSEPH GIBISION                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1239 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 12, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0000345-2020
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2022
    Joseph Gibision (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed after he pled guilty to four counts of robbery, and one count each of
    burglary, criminal conspiracy, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person,
    and carrying a firearm on public streets or property in Philadelphia.1 Upon
    review, we affirm.
    On January 23, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a 32-count criminal
    information charging Appellant with numerous offenses related to a June 25,
    2019 home invasion involving Appellant and two co-conspirators.2 Trial was
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3502(a)(1)(i), 903, 6105(a)(1), and 6108.
    2The criminal information erroneously states the date as June 25, 2016. See
    Criminal Information, 1/23/20, at 1-9; N.T., 9/22/20, at 22.
    J-S04022-22
    scheduled to begin on September 22, 2020. The morning of jury selection,
    after unsuccessfully litigating a suppression motion, Appellant decided to
    plead guilty to the above charges. N.T., 9/22/20, at 1-10. In return, the
    Commonwealth nolle prossed the 24 remaining charges.         On February 12,
    2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 5 to 10 years of incarceration.
    On February 22, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
    plea. Appellant claimed, “he believed he would be able to withdraw his plea
    of guilty within 10 days of sentencing if he had a change of heart and wanted
    to proceed to trial.”    Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea/Modify Sentence,
    2/22/21, at 1 (unnumbered). Appellant asserted “he entered his plea of guilty
    based primarily on the allegations of conspiracy and maintains he was not
    guilty of some or all of the charges, e.g., the charge of [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 6105
    as he avers he did not possess a firearm.” Id.
    The trial court denied the motion without a hearing on February 23,
    2021. However, “upon request of Counsel for Defense and without objection
    by the Commonwealth,” the trial court vacated its February 23, 2021 order
    and scheduled a hearing on the motion for May 21, 2021. Trial Court Opinion,
    8/26/21, at 1. The record reflects no hearing took place. The docket denotes
    a May 21, 2021 order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion. That order
    is not in the certified record. Notwithstanding, Appellant timely appealed.
    Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -2-
    J-S04022-22
    Appellant presents a single issue for our review: “Did not the [trial]
    court err in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea without a hearing?”
    Appellant’s Brief at 2 (some capitalization omitted).
    “It is well-settled that the decision whether to permit a defendant to
    withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
    Commonwealth v. Hart, 
    174 A.3d 660
    , 664 (Pa. Super. 2017). The term
    discretion,
    imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach
    a dispassionate conclusion, and discretionary power can only exist
    within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
    purpose of giving effect to the will of the judges. Discretion must
    be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
    personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary action. Discretion is
    abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error
    of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
    or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
    the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
    Commonwealth v. Kehr, 
    180 A.3d 754
    , 756-57 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
    omitted).
    There are different standards for reviewing requests to withdraw a guilty
    plea before and after a sentence is imposed. Commonwealth v. Flick, 
    802 A.2d 620
    , 623 (Pa. Super. 2002).      Pre-sentence, the court administers its
    discretion liberally in favor of the accused, and “any demonstration by a
    defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless
    withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.”
    Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 
    115 A.3d 1284
    , 1292 (Pa. 2015).               In
    contrast,
    -3-
    J-S04022-22
    post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher
    scrutiny since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas as
    sentence-testing devices. A defendant must demonstrate that
    manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny his post-
    sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Manifest injustice may
    be established if the plea was not tendered knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily. In determining whether a plea is
    valid, the court must examine the totality of circumstances
    surrounding the plea. A deficient plea does not per se establish
    prejudice on the order of manifest injustice.
    Commonwealth v. Broaden, 
    980 A.2d 124
    , 129 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations
    omitted).
    We presume when an appellant has entered a guilty plea, he was aware
    of what he was doing; it is his burden to prove the plea was involuntary. See
    Commonwealth v. McCauley, 
    797 A.2d 920
    , 922 (Pa. Super. 2001). Where
    the record demonstrates the trial court conducted a guilty plea colloquy and
    the appellant understood the nature of the charges against him, the plea is
    voluntary. See 
    id.
    A valid plea colloquy examines:
    1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis for the plea, 3)
    the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the
    sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s power to deviate from
    any recommended sentence.
    Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
    878 A.2d 102
    , 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
    omitted).
    Here, the record reflects that Appellant waived his challenge to the
    voluntariness of his guilty plea. We have explained:
    In order to preserve an issue related to a guilty plea, an appellant
    must either “object[ ] at the sentence colloquy or otherwise raise
    -4-
    J-S04022-22
    [ ] the issue at the sentencing hearing or through a post-sentence
    motion.” Commonwealth v. D’Collanfield, 
    805 A.2d 1244
    ,
    1246 (Pa. Super. 2002).            See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1),
    (B)(1)(a)(i); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the
    lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on
    appeal.”).
    Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 
    163 A.3d 466
    , 468–69 (Pa. Super.
    2017).
    The transcript of the sentencing proceedings reveals Appellant did not
    seek to withdraw or otherwise challenge his guilty plea during sentencing.
    See N.T., 2/12/21, at 1-56. While Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea, he never claimed his plea was unknowing,
    unintelligent, or involuntary.   See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea/Modify
    Sentence, 2/22/21, at 1 (unnumbered).       Rather, Appellant challenged his
    conviction of possessing a firearm. Id. ¶ 4. Appellant first challenged the
    voluntariness of his plea in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Statement of
    Errors Complained of on Appeal, 7/28/21, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
    On appeal, Appellant again abandons the claims he raised in his motion
    to withdraw, and instead argues his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent,
    and voluntary because he “was not clearly informed of his rights with respect
    to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea rights,” and was “extremely stressed”
    at the time he entered the plea. Appellant’s Brief at 6. Because Appellant did
    not challenge the voluntariness of his plea until his Rule 1925(b) statement,
    he waived the issue. See Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d at 468-69; see also
    Commonwealth v. Baez, 
    169 A.3d 35
    , 41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (finding waiver
    -5-
    J-S04022-22
    where appellant argued issues not raised in his motion to withdraw guilty plea
    on appeal); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 
    19 A.3d 1111
    , 1118 (Pa. Super.
    2011) (issues raised for first time in Rule 1925(b) statement are waived);
    Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
    In any event, Appellant’s claim does not merit relief. Appellant’s oral
    and written colloquies both met the standards set forth in Morrison, 
    supra.
    See N.T., 9/22/20, at 9-30; Guilty Plea Colloquy, 9/22/20, at 1-4 see also
    Morrison, 
    878 A.2d at 107
    . Appellant indicated on his written colloquy that
    no one forced or threatened him to plead guilty; he was satisfied with plea
    counsel; and he entered the plea “voluntarily.”      See Guilty Plea Colloquy,
    9/22/20, at 1-4.
    Appellant asserts “what was told to [him] about his rights with respect
    to a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was less than ideal.” Appellant’s Brief
    at 9. Appellant does not cite any legal authority for his supposition that the
    lack of guidance regarding withdrawal of his plea renders it unknowing,
    unintelligent or involuntary. The trial court cautioned Appellant, “what you do
    here today, Mr. Gibision, is pretty much final.” N.T., 9/22/20 at 17. The trial
    court also reminded Appellant it was prepared to begin jury selection and start
    trial that day and/or place Appellant on a list for a bench trial. Id. at 10, 14-
    17. The record contains no support for Appellant’s claim that he was led to
    believe he could withdraw his plea if he changed his mind.
    -6-
    J-S04022-22
    We further observe that in the five months prior to sentencing, Appellant
    at no point sought to withdraw his plea. Appellant waited until ten months
    after tendering his plea (and ten days after sentencing) to claim an
    unknowing, unintelligent and involuntary guilty plea.
    Upon review, we discern no error by the trial court refusing to allow
    Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.       See Morrison, 
    878 A.2d at 107
    ;
    McCauley, 
    797 A.2d at 922
    ; see also Commonwealth v. Yager, 
    685 A.2d 1000
    , 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc) (citation omitted) (“The law does not
    require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a
    plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to plead guilty
    be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”).
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/16/2022
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1239 EDA 2021

Judges: Murray, J.

Filed Date: 2/16/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/16/2022