Com. v. Cruz, I. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ILDELFONSO CRUZ, : No. 1324 EDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 12, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0008945-2011,
CP-51-CR-0008946-2011
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 06, 2018
Appellant, Ildelfonso Cruz, appeals from the June 12, 2014 judgment
of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
following his conviction of attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession
of an instrument of crime, rape, kidnapping, and sexual assault. 1 The trial
court sentenced appellant to an aggregate 22½ to 45 years’ imprisonment.
After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history:
On April 21, 2011, [E.P.2] went to her home located
at 3325 Argyle Street in Philadelphia to pack clothes
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 901(a), 2702(a), 907(a), 3121(a), 2901(a), and
3124.1, respectively.
2 In order to protect her privacy, the victim’s name has been replaced with
initials.
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to bring to her mother’s house. [E.P.] asked
Luis Ramon and his younger brother, Ricardo
Ramon, to accompany her because she was having a
problem with her ex-boyfriend, [appellant.]
[E.P.], Luis, and Ricardo arrived at [E.P.’s] home at
approximately 11:00 p.m. that night. While [E.P.]
was packing her belongings, [appellant] arrived.
[Appellant] did not have a key to [E.P.’s] house nor
did he have permission to be there. At some point
thereafter, [appellant] began attacking Luis; he
grabbed Luis from behind and stabbed him
repeatedly; Luis sustained five stab wounds to the
left back and two stab wounds to the left shoulder
region. Luis eventually managed to escape to a
nearby home of someone he knew; the resident
there called an ambulance. Luis was transported to
Temple Hospital where he was treated for multiple
injuries including a collapsed lung. Luis was
discharged from Temple Hospital on April 26, 2011.
Moments after attacking Luis, [appellant] grabbed
[E.P.] and pushed her against a wall; he began
hitting her in the face with a closed fist. [Appellant]
then forced [E.P.] to walk to his brother’s house by
grabbing her and poking her with scissors. Once
they arrived at [appellant’s] brother’s house, they
went into a bedroom; [appellant] pushed the bed
against the door, preventing [E.P.] from leaving.
[Appellant] proceeded to curse at [E.P.] and hit her
about her face and body. [Appellant] then threw
[E.P.] on the floor and stabbed her in her forehead
with the scissors. At some point, [E.P.], who was
tired and in pain, fell asleep. When [E.P.] woke up,
her clothes had been removed and [appellant] was
having sex with her. [Appellant] eventually drove
[E.P.] to Einstein Hospital. [E.P.] was treated for
multiple injuries including lacerations on her
forehead and left palm. [E.P.] was subsequently
transferred to Episcopal Hospital for a sexual assault
evaluation. She was later discharged.
[Appellant] was arrested on April 23,
2011.[Footnote 1] He was charged with two counts
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of Attempted Murder, two counts of Aggravated
Assault, two counts of Possession of an Instrument
of Crime, two counts of Simple Assault, two counts
[of] Recklessly Endangering Another Person, one
count of Rape, one count of Kidnapping, one count of
Burglary, one count of Intimidation of Witnesses or
Victims, one count of Conspiracy, one count of
Sexual Assault, one count of Criminal Trespass, one
count of Indecent Assault, one count of Unlawful
Restraint, one count of Terroristic Threats, and one
count of False Imprisonment on Bills of Information
CP-51-CR-0008945-2011 and CP-51-CR-0008946-
2011.
[Footnote 1] See CP-51-CR-0008945-
2011 (charges involving Luis Ramon).
The arrest date for the charges involving
[E.P.] was April 29, 2011 (CP-51-CR-
0008946-2011).
A jury trial commenced on February 27, 2014.
[Appellant] was represented by Trevan Borum,
Esquire. At trial, the Commonwealth presented as
evidence the live testimony of (1) [E.P.],
(2) Luis Ramon, (3) Ricardo Ramon, (4) Police
Officer Mitchell, (5) Police Officer Moore, (6) Police
Officer Bowe, (7) Police Officer Krawcyzk,
(8) Detective King, (9) Detective Newbert,
(10) Dr. Cernetich, and (11) Dr. Goldberg. The
defense did not present any witnesses.
On March 7, 2014, the jury found [appellant] guilty
of the following charges on [b]ill of information
CP-51-CR-0008945-2011: [a]ttempted [m]urder,
aggravated [a]ssault, and [p]ossession of an
[i]nstrument of [c]rime. [Appellant] was found
guilty of the following charges on [b]ill of
[i]nformation CP-51-CR-0008946-2011: [r]ape,
[k]idnapping, and [s]exual [a]ssault.[ ] On June 12,
3
2014, [the trial c]ourt sentenced [appellant] to an
aggregate sentence of twenty-two and one half
(22½) to forty-five (45) years’ imprisonment.
3 The jury acquitted appellant of all other aforementioned charges.
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On June 18, 2014, defense counsel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of Sentence. On October 20, 2014,
[appellant’s] Motion was denied by operation of law.
On October 24, 2014, [appellant] completed a Notice
of Appeal form. Although timely, defense counsel
did not file the Notice; thus, the appeal period
lapsed.
On March 17, 2015, [appellant] filed a pro se
Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition.
J. Matthew Wolfe, Esquire, was subsequently
appointed to represent [appellant.] Mr. Wolfe filed
an Amended PCRA petition on August 20, 2015; the
basis of the petition was that [appellant] was denied
his rights to due process and effective assistance of
counsel because trial counsel failed to file a direct
appeal to the Superior Court despite [appellant’s]
request to do so. [Appellant] requested that his
appellate rights as well as his right to file post-
sentence motions be reinstated nunc pro tunc. On
April 1, 2016, [the trial c]ourt granted [appellant’s]
PCRA petition and reinstated [appellant’s] appellate
rights.
On April 29, 2016, [appellant] filed a Notice of
Appeal. On May 5, 2016, [the trial c]ourt directed
[appellant] to file a Statement of Matters Complained
of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
[Appellant] filed a 1925(b) Statement on May 31,
2016; [appellant] filed an amended 1925(b)
Statement on November 22, 2016.
Trial court opinion, 3/13/17 at 1-4 (footnote and citations to notes of
testimony omitted). The record reflects that the trial court filed an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on March 13, 2017.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court err in failing to grant
[a]ppellant’s post sentence motion because the
sentence was excessive due to the court’s not
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adequately considering the mitigating
circumstances surrounding [a]ppellant’s
mental illness?
2. Did the lower court err in failing to grant
[a]ppellant’s motion to exclude the color
photographs of a complaining witness into
evidence?
3. Did the lower court err in granting the
Commonwealth’s motion to admit into
evidence other prior criminal acts?
Appellant’s brief at 11.
In his first issue for our review, appellant avers that the trial court
erred when it failed to “adequately consider the mitigating circumstances
surrounding [appellant’s] mental illness.” (Id. at 15.) Specifically, appellant
contends that the trial court deviated substantially from the Sentencing
Guidelines and did not include a legally sufficient contemporaneous
statement on the record when sentencing appellant in excess of the
guidelines. (Id. at 18).
[T]he proper standard of review when
considering whether to affirm the
sentencing court’s determination is an
abuse of discretion. . . . [A]n abuse of
discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will
not have abused its discretion unless the
record discloses that the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable,
or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our
Court recently offered: An abuse of
discretion may not be found merely
because an appellate court might have
reached a different conclusion, but
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requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of
support so as to be clearly erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad
discretion and the concomitantly
deferential standard of appellate review
is that the sentencing court is in the best
position to determine the proper penalty
for a particular offense based upon an
evaluation of the individual
circumstances before it.
[Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa.
2007)] (internal citations omitted).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing
do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912
(Pa.Super. 2000). An appellant challenging the
discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to
determine: (1) whether appellant has
filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the
issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed
from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533
(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 909 A.2d 303(Pa. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Objections to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally
waived if they are not raised at the sentencing
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hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence
imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
794 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 831 A.2d
599 (Pa. 2003).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial
question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828
(Pa.Super. 2007). A substantial question exists
“only when the appellant advances a colorable
argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of
the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Sierra, supra at 912-913.
As to what constitutes a substantial question, this
Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing
errors. Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d
1247, 1252 (Pa.Super. 2006). An appellant must
articulate the reasons the sentencing court’s actions
violated the sentencing code. Id.Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-170 (Pa.Super. 2010).
Here, we begin our analysis by determining whether appellant has
complied with the procedural requirements of challenging his sentence.
First, appellant timely filed his notice of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903. Second, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence
on June 18, 2014, in which he averred that the trial court failed to
adequately consider mitigating circumstances surrounding his mental illness.
Upon further review of his brief, appellant also appears to raise the issue as
to whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by deviating from
the sentencing guidelines. (See appellant’s brief at 17-19.)
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Upon our review of the record, we find that appellant, in his motion for
reconsideration of sentence, did not raise any issue pertaining to the trial
court’s deviation from the sentencing guidelines and has thus waived this
issue. It is well settled that an appellant may not raise an issue for the first
time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302; Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 41
(Pa.Super. 2017) (“issues not raised in the lower court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). We shall continue our
analysis pertaining only to appellant’s contention that the trial court failed to
adequately consider mitigating circumstances surrounding his mental illness.
The third procedural prong set forth in Evans requires us to determine
whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect—or put another way, fails to
include a statement containing the reasons relied on for an allowance of an
appeal “with respect to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.” See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Appellant includes such a statement in his brief, in which
he alleges that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to
adequately consider the mitigating circumstances surrounding his mental
illness. (Appellant’s brief at 15.)
Finally, we must now determine whether appellant has raised a
substantial question. Here, appellant devotes a vast majority of his
argument to his contention that the trial court deviated from the sentencing
guidelines. As we stated supra, this issue has been waived on appeal. The
only reference appellant makes in his argument pertaining to his mental
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illness is as follows: “The excessiveness claim can only be considered
together with the claim that the court failed to consider mitigating
circumstances.” (Appellant’s brief at 19.) We have specifically held that an
averment that the trial court failed to adequately consider mitigating
circumstances does not raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v.
Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing Commonwealth v.
Matroni, 923 A.2d 444, 455 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 952 A.2d
675 (Pa. 2008). Additionally, the trial court had the benefit of a mental
health evaluation and a pre-sentence report. We therefore find that
appellant failed to raise a substantial question. Accordingly, we do not have
jurisdiction to decide appellant’s first issue on the merits.
For his second issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court
erred when it allowed color photographs of Ramon’s injuries to be shown to
the jury. (See appellant’s brief at 19-20.) When reviewing an admission of
photographs of a victim’s injuries at trial, we are subject to the following
standard:
“The admission of evidence is solely within in the
discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings will be reversed on appeal only
upon an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 493 (Pa. 2014). An abuse of
discretion will not be found based on a mere error of
judgment, but rather occurs where the court has
reached a conclusion that overrides or misapplies the
law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will. Commonwealth v. Davido, 106
A.3d 611, 645 (Pa. 2014).
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When the Commonwealth seeks to introduce
photographs of a [victim’s injuries] into evidence,
the trial court must engage in a two-part analysis.
First, the trial court must examine whether the
particular photograph is inflammatory.
Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 156 (Pa.
2013). If the photograph is not inflammatory, the
trial court must determine whether the photograph is
of such essential evidentiary value that its need
clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the
minds and passions of the jurors. Id.Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 494 (Pa. 2015),
cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 92 (2016).
Here, appellant specifically argues that the photographs in question
were “unnecessarily gruesome” and that the “prejudice outweighed the
probative value.” (Appellant’s brief at 20.) The record reveals that
appellant only sought to exclude any color photographs of Ramon’s injuries.
(Notes of testimony, 2/28/14 at 4.) The color photographs in question
depict the nature and extent of Ramon’s injuries, which would not have been
as detectable in a black and white photograph. See Woodard, 129 A.3d at
494-495. The trial court determined that the photographs were not
inflammatory, and that the need of the photographs outweighed the
likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jury. We therefore
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
appellant’s motion in limine and permitted the Commonwealth to introduce
color photographs of Ramon’s injuries into evidence.
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In his third and final issue, appellant avers that the trial court erred
when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of appellant’s
prior bad acts pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b). As noted supra, the admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and such decisions will
only be overturned upon a finding that the trial court abused its discretion.
See Woodard, 129 A.3d at 494.
The particular Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
governing the admission of “prior bad acts” is
Pa.R.E. 404(b) which provides, in relevant part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity
therewith.
(2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts may be admitted for other
purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or
absence of mistake or accident.
(3) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts proffered under subsection
(b)(2) of this rule may be admitted
in a criminal case only upon a
showing that the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its
potential for prejudice.
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(3). Under this rule, the
admission of prior “bad acts” is inadmissible for the
sole purpose of proving the defendant has a bad
character, or a “criminal propensity.”
Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 419 (Pa.
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2008). Nevertheless, this rule permits the
admissibility of such evidence for other relevant
purposes such as:
showing the defendant’s motive in
committing the crime on trial, the
absence of mistake or accident, a
common scheme or design, . . . to
establish identity [,][or] where the acts
were part of a chain or sequence of
events that formed the history of the
case and were part of its natural
development.
Id. However, admission for these purposes is
allowable only whenever the probative value of the
evidence exceeds its potential for prejudice. Pa.R.E.
404(b)(3).
Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 336-337 (Pa. 2011),
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 889 (2011).
The Commonwealth contends that it sought to introduce evidence of
appellant’s prior bad acts in order to establish E.P.’s lack of consent
pertaining to the rape charge and to establish “the sequence of events that
was part of the history of the case and that formed the natural development
of the facts.” (Commonwealth’s brief at 20.) We shall begin with the use of
prior bad acts to establish lack of consent. Our supreme court has held that
a trial court may admit evidence of a defendant’s prior verbal or physical
intimidation of a victim. Commonwealth v. Richter, 711 A.2d 464, 467
(Pa. 1998). Similar to the instant case, our supreme court found that
evidence of prior verbal and physical intimidation was “properly admitted to
prove the element of forcible compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion
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where the victim testifies that she did not consent to the act of intercourse.”
Id. at 468.
Here, E.P. testified at trial that she used to date appellant. (Notes of
testimony, 3/4/14 at 22-23.) E.P. also testified that over the course of her
relationship with appellant, appellant had physically abused her. (Id. at 41.)
During trial, E.P. further testified that she did not consent to appellant
having sex with her. (See id. at 33-34.) Accordingly, we find that the trial
court properly admitted evidence of appellant’s prior physical abuse of E.P.
in order for the Commonwealth to establish lack of consent pertaining to the
rape charge.
The Commonwealth also contends that evidence of appellant’s prior
bad acts was admissible in order to establish a sequence of events and to
form the natural development of facts. (Commonwealth’s brief at 20.)
Indeed, our supreme court has stated that “evidence may also be admitted
where the acts were part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the
history of the case and were part of its natural development.”
Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 419 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1131 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Kemp, 753 A.2d 1278,
1284 (Pa. 2000).
Here, the trial court stated that “the Commonwealth presented
evidence that [E.P.] had recently ended a romantic relationship with
[appellant]. Evidence of [appellant’s] prior assaultive behavior explained
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why [E.P.] asked Luis Ramon and his brother to accompany her while she
packed clothes to bring to her mother’s house[.]” (Trial court opinion,
3/13/17 at 20.)
We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it admitted evidence of appellant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b).
Accordingly, appellant’s third issue is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Dubow, J. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/6/18
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