Com. v. Landis, W. ( 2022 )

J-A05036-22
2022 PA Super 97COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM R. LANDIS JR. : No. 611 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered April 16, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0005405-2009
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
DISSENTING OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2022
Initially, I would find that the Commonwealth waived its challenge to
the trial court’s discretionary ruling. On the merits, I would find that the trial
court properly considered the issue that William R. Landis, Jr. raised in his
post-sentence motion for a new trial and did not abuse its discretion by
granting the motion. Finally, even if the trial court did not apply the correct
standard, I would remand for it to do so. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The preeminent issue throughout this case’s extensive history has been
whether Landis had the requisite mental state for murder of the first degree.
At this second trial, both sides presented evidence and argument to the jury
about the diminished-capacity defense, which would demonstrate that Landis
was intoxicated to an extent that he was unable to form the requisite intent.
Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 630 (Pa. 2015) (citing
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (Pa. 2006)). Notably, if
Landis had already formed the specific intent to kill before becoming
intoxicated, this defense would fail. See Commonwealth v. McMurray, 47
A. 952, 953–54 (Pa. 1901) (approving a jury instruction that once a defendant
forms “the specific purpose to kill,” his subsequent voluntary intoxication does
not prevent a conviction for murder of the first degree).
The Commonwealth’s forensic psychiatrist, Dr. John O’Brien, testified
directly to the key issue of whether Landis could and did possess the intent to
kill. Dr. O’Brien concluded that Landis was capable of forming the intent to
kill. N.T., 9/15/20, at 1140. Dr. O’Brien based his conclusion in part on
investigative interviews of the two Florida hotel witnesses, which he claimed
documented that Landis discussed his intention to kill and said he was going
to shoot his wife. Id. at 1138, 1146. Dr. O’Brien continued:
So there’s an awful lot there that indicates that [Landis] did have
a presence of mind, an awareness of the gun and did use the gun
in a manner that reflected that it was shot a number of times, not
just once as you would expect to see in an accidental gun
discharge, and that the victim was a moving victim so that it
required moving of the gun, and the aim improved with each shot.
And so in my opinion, there is evidence that is consistent
with the shooting being an intentional act. But that’s not my
assessment to perform. That’s not my opinion to render.
Id. at 1146. The jury convicted Landis of murder of the first degree.
Landis filed a post-sentence motion in which he argued that the evidence
demonstrated that he did not have a specific intent to kill the victim, detailing
why his own expert Dr. Larry Rotenberg’s testimony was better supported
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than Dr. O’Brien’s. He challenged Dr. O’Brien’s testimony, which was the only
time that the jury heard the unsupported assertion that Landis had previously
expressed an intention to shoot his wife.1 The trial court heard argument and
granted a new trial on exactly this basis.
As a threshold matter, I would find that the Commonwealth waived its
issue. In its brief, the Commonwealth conflates the standards for challenges
to the sufficiency and to the weight of the evidence, as well as a harmless-
error standard. Commonwealth’s Brief at 21–29 (arguing that the weight of
the evidence, including Dr. O’Brien’s testimony, was “sufficient” and that his
inaccuracy was harmless error because the jury could infer intent from the
other evidence). Landis cogently argues that we should find waiver based on
the same defect in the Commonwealth’s statement of matters complained of
on appeal. Landis’ Brief at 9–11. I would find that by failing to indicate how
the trial court abused its discretion, the Commonwealth has not properly
framed its issue for our review. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 259 A.3d
539, 541–42 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding a challenge to a trial court’s ruling on
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1 The Majority emphasizes that when Dr. O’Brien testified, the jury had already
heard the witnesses whose police statements he described. Majority Opinion,
at n.7. However, the jury could not glean from the witnesses’ testimony what
they had told the police—Ms. Brown did not remember, and Ms. Johnson was
not asked. N.T., Trial Vol. II, 9/10/20, at 502 (“Q. You gave a statement to
[the detectives]? A. I don’t remember what I said; but, yes, I do. I think I
did. I don’t remember.”); id. at 533 (addressing only the setting of the police
interview, not the contents). Both were excused before Dr. O’Brien testified.
Dr. O’Brien’s testimony was the only evidence before the jury of what Ms.
Brown and Ms. Johnson told police.
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a weight-of-the-evidence claim to be meritless where the appellant did not
argue that the court abused its discretion).2
Conversely, I would find that Landis preserved his challenge to the
weight of the evidence. Landis filed a timely post-sentence motion, in which
he detailed why the weight of the competing experts was in his favor on the
specific issue of diminished capacity. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3) (providing
for challenges to the weight of the evidence to be raised in a post-sentence
motion). He noted defects in Dr. O’Brien’s testimony and argued that the
weight of the evidence favored Landis. N.T., 2/11/21, at 8–11, 21. The trial
court granted Landis’ motion for a new trial based on these arguments.
Because Landis argued a specific issue, which the trial court addressed, he
preserved his challenge. Cf. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 689 A.2d 211 (Pa.
1997) (finding a challenge to the weight of the evidence to be preserved where
the trial court addressed it, despite the defendant not filing a post-sentence
motion).
Accordingly, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Rather, it properly assessed the specific challenge that Landis raised. Whether
to grant a new trial based on the weight of the evidence is within the trial
court’s sound discretion:
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2Although the Commonwealth correctly stated that the standard of review is
abuse of discretion, it never argued how the trial court’s decision overrode or
misapplied the law or how the trial court’s judgment was manifestly
unreasonable or was the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
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[O]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new
trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not
against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be
granted in the interest of justice. A new trial is warranted in this
context only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence that
it shocks one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is
imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to
prevail.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations
omitted).
In this context,
the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner. Tibbs [v. Florida, 457
U.S. 31, 38 n.11 (1982)].fn3 . . . A new trial should not be granted
because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge
on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion.
[Commonwealth v.] Thompson, [648 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1994)]. A
trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the
witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the
verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the
thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine
that “notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice.” Id.[footnote 3] In Tibbs, the United States Supreme Court found the
following explanation of the critical distinction between a weight
and sufficiency review noteworthy:
When a motion for new trial is made on the ground that the
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the issues
are far different.... The [trial] court need not view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict [winner];
it may weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself
the credibility of the witnesses. If the court concludes that,
despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily
against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may
have occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new
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trial, and submit the issues for determination by another
jury.
Tibbs[,] 457 U.S. at 38 n.11[,] quoting United States v.
Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313 ([8th Cir.] 1980).
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (Pa. 2000). Indeed, “it
is not only a trial court’s inherent fundamental and salutary power, but its
duty to grant a new trial when it believes the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Sprang & Co. v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 545 A.2d 861, 866 (Pa. 1988) (quoting Thompson v. City
of Phila., 493 A.2d 669, 672 (Pa. 1985)). While the credibility of witnesses
is “primarily” a determination for the jury, “when the trial court is satisfied
that the jury’s verdict was based on incredible or unbelievable evidence, the
court is obligated to grant a new trial.” Houseknecht v. Walters, 590 A.2d
20, 24 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citing Gougher v. Hansler, 130 A.2d 150 (Pa.
1957)).3 Finally:
Regarding the “abuse of discretion” standard of review, [the
Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has explained that the term
“discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so
as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of
the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to
the will of the [trial] judge. Absent an abuse of that discretion,
an appellate court should not disturb a trial court’s discretionary
ruling. An appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion
based on a mere error of judgment, but rather ... where the [trial]
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3 Houseknecht quoted Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 354 A.2d 545,
550 (Pa. 1976), to illustrate that review of jury determinations of credibility is
inherent in only the trial court’s task in ruling on a motion for a new trial, not
in appellate review of that ruling. Although Farquharson has since been held
to pertain to a sufficiency claim, Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139,
1157 n.18 (Pa. 2012), its logic stays true as underpinning a weight claim.
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court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the
law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable,
or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Importantly, an appellate court should not find that a trial
court abused its discretion merely because the appellate court
disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion. Indeed, when
reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, it is improper for
an appellate court to “step[ ] into the shoes” of the trial judge and
review the evidence de novo. In other words, an appellate court
may not disturb a trial court’s discretionary ruling by substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297–98 (Pa. 2021) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court observed the entire proceeding and understood that
whether Landis could and did form the specific intent to kill was the central
issue of the case. Opinion, 4/16/21, at 4 (“This court . . . knows this case
better than any other one presided over in the last twenty-nine years on the
bench.”); id. at 2, 5 (summarizing defense at trial). The court described the
weight of the testimony from Dr. Rotenberg and Dr. O’Brien, the two experts
who addressed this central issue. Id. at 2–4. The court found six defects
with Dr. O’Brien’s presentation: (1) he did not retain his notes, (2) he misled
the jury about his reasons for doing so, (3) he falsely testified that Landis had
told the Florida hotel witnesses that he intended to shoot his wife, (4) he had
framed this evidence in the context of the jury’s crucial determination in this
case, (5) his report was never admitted into evidence, and (6) he falsely
testified about the order of shots and that Landis improved his aim. Trial
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Court Opinion, 6/29/21, at 11–14. The trial court concluded that these defects
unfairly surprised and prejudiced Landis. Id. at 16.
Nothing here reflects that the trial court abused its discretion.
DiStefano, supra. Although the trial court did not use formulaic terms like
“miscarriage of justice” or “shocks one’s sense of justice,” it assessed the
effect on justice of the key expert testimony that the Commonwealth and
Landis presented. Indeed, it is hard to read the court’s conclusion that after
“Dr. O’Brien misled the jurors with lies, speculation, and undocumented
opinions,” they “were unable to make a knowing decision based on the facts,
the evidence, and the expert reports,” which caused an unlevel “playing field”
as anything but a finding of a miscarriage of justice that shocks the conscience
of the trial court. See Houseknecht, supra (obligating a trial court to grant
a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence when it finds
“that the jury’s verdict was based on incredible or unbelievable evidence”).
Therefore, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Finally, even if the trial court did not apply the correct standard when it
granted Landis a new trial, the appropriate remedy would be to remand for
the trial court to apply the correct standard. It is not to simply reverse the
grant of a new trial and reinstate the judgment of sentence. Based on our
standard of review, when a trial court does not apply the correct standard in
evaluating a weight-of-the-evidence claim, our role is to remand with
directions to determine whether the jury verdict shocks the trial court’s sense
of justice. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 807 (Pa. Super.
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2003) (citing Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, and Commonwealth v. Brown, 648
A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994)).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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