McFadden, M. v. 403 Gordon Drive, LLC ( 2022 )

J-A03036-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MARK E. MCFADDEN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
403 GORDON DRIVE, LLC AND PENN : No. 154 EDA 2021
FOUNDATION :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 2020-05835-ML
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2022
Mark E. McFadden (Appellant) appeals pro se from the orders entered,
at the same trial docket, in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, which:
(1) sustained the preliminary objections of 403 Gordon Drive, LLC (403
Gordon Drive) and Penn Foundation (collectively, Appellees); and (2) struck
Appellant’s mechanic’s lien claims1 as untimely filed. The trial court also
suggests Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was untimely filed.
Appellant raises nine issues for our review. After careful review, we decline
to find waiver based on an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, but agree that
the mechanic’s liens were untimely filed. Accordingly, we affirm.
____________________________________________
1 See Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963, 49 P.S. §§ 1101 – 1902.
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I. Procedural History
According to Appellant’s pleadings, he performed contracting work or
renovations at a commercial property in Exton, Chester County. 403 Gordon
Drive is the owner of the property, and Penn Foundation is the tenant.
Appellant alleges that Appellees owe $22,724.48, for services rendered by him
on the construction project.2
This matter commenced with Appellant’s pro se electronic filing of two
mechanic’s lien claims: one against 403 Gordon Drive and one against Penn
Foundation. Appellant filed both together in one filing.3 We note all the
documents in the certified electronic record, whether relating to one Appellee
or both, bear one docket number: 2020-05835-ML.
The trial docket date for the mechanic’s lien claims filing is August 20,
2020. Trial Docket, 3/10/21, at 3. In both claims, Appellant averred the
following, emphasizing the relevant date:
[Appellant] completed his work at the property on February 17,
2020, which is six months before the filing of this claim. Final
invoices were sent to [403 Gordon Drive] on February 18, 2020.
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2 Appellant states that on June 4, 2020, he filed a related, counseled civil
complaint in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, at trial docket 2020-
03579-CT. Appellant’s Brief at 18. As a part of that case, on January 29,
2021, 403 Gordon Drive “issued a partial payment” of $16,815.49 to
Appellant, and thus “the remaining balance” due is $5,908.99. Id. at 13.
Appellant avers “[t]his matter is still ongoing.” Id.
3 The mechanic’s lien claim against 403 Gordon Drive is marked with page
numbers 1 through 4, and the claim against Penn Foundation is paginated 5
through 8.
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Appellant’s Mechanic’s Lien Claim, 403 Gordon Drive, LLC, 8/20/20, at 4;
Appellant’s Mechanic’s Lien Leaseholder Claim, Penn Foundation, 8/20/20, at
8.
On October 1 and 7, 2020, respectively, 403 Gordon Drive and Penn
Foundation filed preliminary objections (PO’s). Again, we note that both
parties’ PO’s bear the same trial docket number, 2020-05835-ML. Both
Appellees argued that Appellant’s mechanic’s lien claims were untimely filed
beyond the six-month period set forth in Section 1502(a)(1) of the Mechanic’s
Lien Law. See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(1) (“To perfect a lien, every claimant must
. . . file a claim . . . within six (6) months after the completion of his work[.]”).
Appellees claimed that by Appellant’s own admission, he completed the work
at the property on February 17, 2020, and thus he was required to file a
mechanic’s lien claim by August 17, 2020. Appellees argued that the claims,
filed on August 20th, must therefore be stricken.
Appellant filed responses to both Appellees’ PO’s, acknowledging he was
last present at the property on February 17, 2020, but insisted the work was
not completed until February 18th, “when all final paperwork and invoices
were compiled and submitted to” Appellees. See Appellant’s Answer in
Opposition to Preliminary Objections of 403 Gordon Drive, 10/19/20, at 2.
Appellant further asserted he initially filed the mechanic’s lien claims on
August 18, 2020, and the August 20th filing was made merely to “correct a
clerical issue[, when he] was advised to remove the cover sheets from” his
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August 18th filing. Id. Finally, Appellant claimed Appellees improperly raised
an affirmative defense — the statute of limitations — in their PO’s, when
Pa.R.C.P. 1030 requires such a defense to be presented as a new matter. Id.
On December 7, 2020, the trial court entered the underlying orders,
sustaining Appellees’ PO’s and striking Appellant’s mechanic’s liens claims.
The court agreed with Appellees that the claims were untimely filed beyond
Section 1502’s six-month period.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.4 On January 8, 2021, the trial
court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal within 21 days, or by Friday, January 29th. Appellant
filed a seven-page statement, which was entered on the trial docket with a
____________________________________________
4 While the trial court opinion states that Appellant filed a “single appeal from
[its] two Orders[,]” the court does not aver this appeal relates to different two
trial docket numbers. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 977 (when a single order
resolves issues arising on more than one trial court docket, separate notices
of appeal must be filed), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Young, ___
A.3d ___, ___, 2021 WL 6062566 at *1 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021) (reaffirming that
Pa.R.A.P. 341 requires separate notices of appeal when single order resolves
issues under more than one docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits
appellate court to consider appellant’s request to remediate error when notice
of appeal is timely filed).
Our review of the electronic certified record reveals two copies of the
trial court’s order, stamped as “filed” at the same time, 11:05 a.m. on
December 7th. The two orders, including their time-stamps, appear to be
identical. The captions include both Appellees — 403 Gordon Drive and Penn
Foundation — and, like all the documents in the record, bear one trial docket
number: 2020-05835-ML. Under these circumstances, we conclude Walker
is not implicated.
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filing date of January 30th. The trial court issued an opinion, suggesting this
appeal should be quashed for an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, and
furthermore that the statement was not concise but instead “somewhat
rambling.” Trial Ct. Op., 2/26/21, at 2. The court also opined, in the
alternative, that its order should be affirmed on the ground Appellant’s
mechanic’s lien claims were untimely filed.
On March 8, 2021, Appellant filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of
Opinion and Order,” contesting, inter alia, the trial court’s finding that his Rule
1925(b) statement was untimely. Appellant explained that he attempted to
electronically file the statement at 11:56 p.m. on January 29th, the filing
deadline, but could not attach the certificate of service and other documents.
He thus further reviewed the electronic-filing system to “determine the proper
way to include attachments,” and at 12:15 a.m. — on January 30th — filed
the same Rule 1925(b) statement, along with the attachments. Appellant’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Opinion & Order, 3/8/21, at 2. In
support, Appellant attached a report, entitled “My Filings,” from the court
prothonotary’s electronic-filing system, which showed a filing at 11:56 p.m.
on January 29th and a second filing at 12:15 a.m. on January 30th. The trial
docket does not indicate any action by the trial court on this motion.
II. Statement of Questions Involved
Appellant raises nine issues for our review:
A. Did the Trial Court timely transmit the Record as required in
Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1931?
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1. Was the Trial Court Opinion filed with the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania within 60 days of the Notice of Appeal?
2. Was the Trial Court Record filed with the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania within 60 days of the Notice of Appeal?
B. [Is t]he Trial Court Record on Appeal . . . incomplete, as
required in Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1921?
C. Did [Appellant] timely file the Concise Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal, with the Trial Court in the underlying
matter?
D. Was [Appellant’s] timely Concise Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal “Concise”?
E. Does the Pennsylvania Statutes require electronic filings to be
added to the Trial Court Docket, by the Prothonotary, in order to
Satisfy the “filing” requirements in the statutes?
F. Did [Appellant] file the Mechanics Lien timely?
G. Did the Trial Court err by allowing [Appellees] to submit a
question of “Fact” into the Preliminary Objections?
H. Did the Trial Court violate . . . Appellant’s Due Process Rights
under the Pennsylvania Constitution?
I. Did the Trial Court violate . . . Appellant’s Due Process Rights
under the U.S. Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.
III. Standard of Review & Mechanic’s Lien Law
At this juncture, we note the relevant standard of review:
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the
averments in the complaint, together with the documents and
exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of
the facts averred. The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the
legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading would
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permit recovery if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the
trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections only where
there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. When
sustaining the trial court’s ruling will result in the denial of claim
or a dismissal of suit, preliminary objections will be sustained only
where the case is free and clear of doubt.
Phila. Constr. Servs., LLC v. Domb, LLC, 903 A.2d 1262, 1266 (Pa. Super.
2006) (citation omitted).
This Court has explained:
The Mechanics’ Lien Law is a creature of statute in derogation of
the common law, and any questions of interpretation should be
resolved in favor of a strict, narrow construction. To effectuate a
valid lien claim, the contractor or subcontractor must be in strict
compliance with the requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien Law.
A mechanics’ lien is an extraordinary remedy, which should only
be afforded to subcontractors who judiciously adhere to the
requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien Law, as an aggrieved
subcontractor also has an action sounding in breach of contract:
The Mechanics’ Lien statute provides an expeditious
method to obtain a lien at very little cost to the
claimant. Therefore, it is the claimant’s principal
responsibility to ensure timely service of the claim. If
a Mechanics’ Lien claim is not timely perfected,
however, the claimant still has an adequate remedy in
a suit for monetary damages arising out of a breach
of contract. The advantage of a Mechanics’ Lien is
that the lien takes effect sooner and assumes priority
over other liens. By contrast, a judgment lien takes
effect and priority on the date of entry of judgment.
Thus, a claimant who desires a Mechanics’ Lien must
be vigilant in adhering to the service requirements in
the statute.
Phila. Constr. Servs., LLC, 903 A.2d at 1267.
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IV. Appellant’s Applications to Strike & Supplement Trial Record
In reviewing Appellant’s first and second issues, we first set forth the
following context. The trial court transmitted the trial record to this Court on
March 11th — 65 days after Appellant’s January 5, 2021, notice of appeal.5
On March 24th, Appellant filed an application with this Court to strike both the
trial court opinion and trial record, arguing they were untimely transmitted on
appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1931. See Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) (“[Generally,] the
record on appeal . . . shall be transmitted to the appellate court within 60 days
____________________________________________
5 Appellant’s notice of appeal was entered on the trial docket as “filed” on
January 5, 2021. However, he avers he initially filed an electronic notice of
appeal on January 4th, but it was rejected due to the lack of payment of the
filing fee. Appellant’s Brief at 29. Appellant thus filed a second notice of
appeal, with the filing fee, on January 5th.
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 902,
[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but it is subject to such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
remand of the matter to the lower court so that the omitted
procedural step may be taken.
Pa.R.A.P. 902. “Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the clerk shall
immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that date shall constitute
the date when the appeal was taken, which date shall be shown on the
docket.” Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(3) (emphases added).
In any event, whether the notice of appeal was filed on January 4th or
5th, it was timely under the 30-day filing period of Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of
appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the
appeal is taken).
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after the filing of the notice of appeal.”). On March 26th, Appellant filed an
application to correct and supplement the record, seeking, inter alia, to add
his “My Filings” report, which showed an attempt to file his Rule 1925(b)
statement at 11:56 p.m. on January 29th. On April 5th, this Court issued a
per curiam order denying both applications. Appellant filed an application for
reconsideration of our order, which was denied per curiam on April 14th.
In his first issue on appeal, Appellant again requests this Court to
reverse our April 5, 2021, per curiam order, denying his application to strike
the trial court record. He reiterates the trial court transmitted the record to
this Court after the 60-day period set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1).
Appellant’s Brief at 29-31. No relief is due.
Rule 1931(a)(1) provides that generally, “the record on appeal,
including the transcript and exhibits necessary for the determination of the
appeal, shall be transmitted to the appellate court within 60 days after the
filing of the notice of appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1). Assuming Appellant filed
the notice of appeal on January 5, 2021, as indicated on the trial docket, 6 the
sixtieth day thereafter was Saturday, March 6th. Any filing deadline would
have thus fallen on Monday, March 8th.7 Appellant correctly points out that
____________________________________________
6 See n.5, supra.
7 See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (when last day of any period of time referred to in any
statute falls on Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, such day shall be omitted
from computation); In re Nomination Papers of Lahr, 842 A.2d 327, 333
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the trial court did not transmit the record until three days thereafter, on March
11th.
Nevertheless, Appellant has cited no authority, nor has this panel
discovered any, for his proposition that we may simultaneously “strike” the
entire trial court record and — implicit in his argument — continue to review
this appeal in his favor. Contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, no appellate
review can be undertaken without the trial record. As stated above, in
reviewing a trial court’s sustainment of PO’s, we “must examine the averments
in the complaint, together with the documents and exhibits attached thereto,
. . . to evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred.” See Phila. Constr.
Servs., LLC, 903 A.2d at 1266. Instead, striking the entire trial record would
be tantamount to discontinuing or striking this appeal — in other words,
depriving Appellant of appellate review. For the foregoing reasons, we decline
to strike the trial court opinion or trial record.
In Appellant’s second issue, he avers this Court should reverse our April
5, 2021, per curiam order denying his application to supplement the record.
Again, this Court previously denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration.
Appellant reiterates the record should be supplemented with his “My Filings”
____________________________________________
n.6 (Pa. 2004) (“The courts have generally employed Section 1908 in
circumstances that require counting forward[.]”).
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report, which showed an attempt to file his Rule 1925(b) statement at 11:54
p.m. on January 29th. Appellant’s Brief at 31-32.
This Court has long held that it is “the appellant’s responsibility to ensure
the record is complete prior to its transmission to this Court.” See Cresci
Constr. Servs. v. Martin, 64 A.3d 254, 266 n. 18 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Furthermore, in light of our disposition of Appellant’s next issue, we decline to
grant the relief requested.
V. Timeliness & Conciseness of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement
In Appellant’s third issue, he disputes the trial court’s suggestion that
his Rule 1925(b) statement was untimely filed. He again cites his attempt at
11:56 p.m. on the day of the filing deadline, January 29, 2021, to
electronically file the statement, and the alleged “difficulties uploading
attachments.” Appellant’s Brief at 33. Appellant states he filed the same
statement at 12:15 a.m. on January 30th, and the trial court clerk “accepted
and attached to the docket [this] second filing,” a “decision . . . out of
[Appellant’s control.]” Id. We decline to find waiver, albeit on different
grounds.
When ordered to do so by the trial court, an appellant must file a timely
Rule 1925(b) statement to preserve issues for appellate review. See Greater
Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225
(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). It is well-settled that any issues not raised in a
timely Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal. See Commonwealth
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v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
Nevertheless, “[i]n determining whether an appellant has waived his issues
on appeal based on non-compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, it is the trial court’s
order that triggers an appellant’s obligation . . . therefore, we look first to the
language of that order.” Rahn v. Consol. Rail Corp., 254 A.3d 738, 745–46
(Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). Accordingly, when the court’s order “is
inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3)(iii), we hold that the
waiver provisions of subsection (b)(4)(vii) do not apply.” Id. at 746.
Here, the trial court’s January 8, 2021, Rule 1925(b) order stated:
Appellant . . . has appealed from the Orders of this Court
entered in this matter on December [7], 2020. Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Appellant is hereby DIRECTED to file of record
and serve to this Court a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal, no later than twenty-one (21) days after today’s
date. Any issue not properly included in the timely-filed and
served Statement shall be deemed waived.
Order, 1/8/21.
Although the trial court’s order is generally compliant with Rule
1925(b)(3), it fails to designate “the place the appellant can serve the
Statement in person and the address to which the appellant can mail the
Statement” as required by Subsection (b)(3)(iii). See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(3)(iii) (stating trial court “shall specify” place of service); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Note (subparagraph (b)(3) “specifies what the judge must
advise appellants when ordering a Statement”) (emphasis added). Because
the trial court’s order is inconsistent with the requirements of the Rule, which
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both Appellant and the trial court must strictly comply, we conclude “the
waiver provisions of subsection (b)(4)(vii) do not apply,” and Appellant has
not waived his claims on appeal. See Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
Inc., 6 A.3d 1002, 1011 (Pa. 2010) (plurality).
In Appellant’s fourth issue, he challenges the trial court’s suggestion
that his Rule 1925(b) statement was not concise, but instead “somewhat
rambling.” Appellant’s Brief at 35. He states he “has not been able to find a
clear definition of concise,” and contends that “[w]ithout a clear explanation
within the Rules and Statutes, this appears to be up to interpretation.” Id.We decline to find waiver.
Rule 1925(b)(4) provides the following:
(i) The Statement shall set forth only those errors that the
appellant intends to assert.
(ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each error that the
appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the
issue to be raised for the judge. The judge shall not require the
citation to authorities or the record; however, appellant may
choose to include pertinent authorities and record citations in the
Statement.
* * *
(iv) The Statement should not be redundant or provide
lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-
frivolous issues are set forth in an appropriately concise manner,
the number of errors raised will not alone be grounds for finding
waiver.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i), (ii), (iv).
This Court has stated:
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[A Rule 1925(b)] statement must be “concise” and coherent as to
permit the trial court to understand the specific issues being raised
on appeal. Specifically, this Court has held that when appellants
raise an “outrageous” number of issues in their 1925(b)
statement, the appellants have “deliberately circumvented the
meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby
effectively precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now
seek to raise.”
* * *
Appellants [engage] in misconduct when they “attempt[ ] to
overwhelm the trial court by filing [a] Rule 1925(b) statement that
contain[s] a multitude of issues that [Appellants] d[o] not intend
to raise and/or c[an] not raise before this Court.”
Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 211 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations
omitted).
Here, Appellant’s pro se Rule 1925(b) statement spanned seven pages
and included three and a half pages of his alleged factual history. Under the
heading, “Issues in Dispute,” Appellant set forth five sub-headings in bold
type: (1) “Timeliness for filing of the Mechanics Lien in this matter;” (2)
“Method for addressing ‘issues of fact’ as provided under the ACT;” (3)
“Potential lack of due process;” (4) “[Appellees’] additional Preliminary
Objection as to the time stamp of [Appellant’s] filings;” and (5) “Harm to
[Appellant] as a result of Courts decision.” Portions of the statement are not
clear. For example, Appellant’s sole discussion of his third issue is:
Based on a question as to an “issue of fact” without any
opportunity for [Appellant] to address directly with the court
and/or have further debate to ensure the “issue of fact” is clarified,
there may be a violation of due process.
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Appellant’s Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 1/30/21, at
6. This statement is indecipherable and equivocates as to whether there was
even a due process violation.
On the other hand, we note the trial court clearly sustained Appellees’
PO’s and struck the mechanic’s lien claims on one ground: the untimely filing
of the claims. While commenting that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was
“not ‘concise,’” the court also discerned the specific issues he wished to raise:
However, it appears that [Appellant] is making the following
arguments. First, he asserts that February 18, 2020 was the last
day working “on” the project and therefore, the six months should
start from that date. Second, he argues that he initially
electronically filed the Claim at 11:52 pm on August 18th;
however, due to a technical problem, he was required to refile the
Claim, which was ultimately accepted on August 20th.
Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Finally, we observe the trial court did not find any bad faith
on Appellant’s part, but instead merely described his statement was
“rambling.” See id. On balance, under the particular facts presented in this
appeal, we decline to find waiver for a non-concise Rule 1925(b) statement.
See Jiricko, 947 A.2d at 211.
VI. Timeliness of Appellant’s Mechanic’s Lien Claims
In Appellant’s fifth issue, he avers he timely filed the mechanic’s lien
claims. Whereas Appellant’s mechanic’s lien claims stated he “completed his
work at the property on February 17, 2020,” he now contends the
Mechanic’s Lien Law Section 1502 six-month filing period should have
commenced on February 18th, the day he completed any work for Appellees.
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See Appellant’s Mechanic’s Lien Claim, 403 Gordon Drive, LLC at 4;
Appellant’s Mechanic’s Lien Leaseholder Claim, Penn Foundation at 8.
Appellant maintains that on that day, he completed “paperwork and invoices”
and returned unused construction materials. Appellant’s Brief at 36.
Appellant further contends his claims should be deemed filed as of his initial
attempt to file them — 11:51 p.m. on August 18, 2020. He explains “[t]his
initial filing was rejected by the [trial court’s] Prothonotar[y’s] office, with a
request to ‘Remove the Cover Sheets’ which were attached with the initial
filing.” Id. We conclude no relief is due.
As stated above, we review a trial court’s sustaining of PO’s by
evaluating the sufficiency of the facts averred in the complaint and whether
the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately proven. Phila. Constr.
Servs., LLC, 903 A.2d at 1266. With respect to interpreting the statutory
provisions of the Mechanic’s Lien Law, this Court has stated: “The language of
the Mechanics’ Lien Law is clear and unambiguous and, as such, must be
construed pursuant to common usage.” Furthermore, we note: “In construing
[statutory] language . . . and giving it effect, ‘we should not interpret statutory
words in isolation, but must read them with reference to the context in which
they appear.’” Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1267 (Pa. 2016).
Section 1502(a)(1) of the Mechanic’s Lien Law provides: “To perfect a
lien, every claimant must . . . file a claim with the prothonotary as provided
by this act within six (6) months after the completion of his work[.]” 49 P.S.
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§ 1502(a)(1). The Law defines the phrase, “completion of the work,” as
“performance of the last of the labor or delivery of the last of the
materials required by the terms of the claimant’s contract or agreement,
whichever last occurs.” 49 P.S. § 1201(8) (emphasis added). We further note
the term “labor” is defined to “include[ ] the furnishing of skill or
superintendence.” 49 P.S. § 1201(9).
As stated above, Appellant maintains that his preparation of invoices
and return of unused material constitutes “skill” under the Mechanic’s Lien
Law. The term “skill,” which appears in the definition of “labor,” is not defined.
However, the term “skill” appears in two other definitions, which we consider:
(4) “CONTRACTOR” means one who, by contract with the owner,
express or implied, erects, constructs, alters or repairs an
improvement or any part thereof or furnishes labor, skill or
superintendence thereto; or supplies or hauls materials,
fixtures, machinery or equipment reasonably necessary for and
actually used therein; or any or all of the foregoing[.]
(5) “SUBCONTRACTOR” means one who, by contract with the
contractor, or pursuant to a contract with a subcontractor in direct
privity of a contract with a contractor, express or implied, erects,
constructs, alters or repairs an improvement or any part
thereof; or furnishes labor, skill or superintendence
thereto; or supplies or hauls materials, fixtures, machinery or
equipment reasonably necessary for and actually used therein; or
any or all of the foregoing[.]
49 P.S. § 1201(4), (5) (emphases added). The phrase, “labor[ or] skill,” is
set forth in the above definitions in close connection with the erection,
construction, alteration, or repair of any improvement or property. See id.;
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Giulian, 141 A.3d at 1267. Meanwhile, the task of generating invoices does
not appear anywhere in the definitional section.
After careful review of the above statutory provisions, the parties’
arguments, and the trial court’s opinion, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion, “There is no support for [Appellant’s] assertion that sending
invoices constitutes continued work on the project.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 3.
We reject Appellant’s unsupported contention that, under Section 1502, the
phrase “completion of work” encompasses the preparation of invoices or the
return of unused materials. “Completion of work” is defined to include
“delivery” — not the return — “of the last of the materials required by the
terms of the claimant’s contract or agreement.” See 49 P.S. § 1201(8)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the definitions of “contractor” and
“subcontractor” refer to “materials” “actually used therein.” See 49 P.S. §
1201(4), (5) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Section 1502(a)(1)’s six-
month filing period: (1) began to run on February 17, 2020, when Appellant
completed the renovation of construction work at the property; and (2)
concluded on Monday, August 17, 2020. Appellant’s mechanic’s lien claims,
docketed as filed on August 20th, were therefore untimely. See 49 P.S. §
1502(a)(1). While Appellant missed the deadline by mere days, we emphasize
that “the contractor . . . must be in strict compliance with the requirements of
the Mechanics’ Lien Law,” and that “a claimant who desires a Mechanics’ Lien
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must be vigilant in adhering to the service requirements in the statute.” See
Phila. Constr. Servs., LLC, 903 A.2d at 1267. We thus conclude the trial
court did not err in sustaining Appellees’ PO’s and striking Appellant’s
mechanic’s lien claims. See id. at 1266.
Appellant’s next argument is that the trial court prothonotary erred in
rejecting his first electronic filing, on August 18, 2020, of the mechanic’s lien
claims. He avers the court clerk rejected this filing because he attached a
cover sheet, in contravention of the local Chester County Rules of Civil
Procedure, which require a cover sheet for each filing. Appellant’s Brief at 38.
No relief is due, as we have concluded Appellant had until August 17,
2020, to file the mechanic’s liens claims. His present claim, that we should
deem his claims were filed on August 18th, is thus moot. Moreover, Appellant
cites no authority for the proposition that an appellate court can excuse his
ignorance of statutory filing requirements.
In his eighth issue, Appellant accuses 403 Gordon Drive of making
“intentional, false, misleading, and misrepresent[ed] statements” in its PO’s,
when it cited his mechanic’s lien claim as stating “he completed his work on
the subject property on February 17, 2020.” Appellant’s Brief at 43. Appellant
emphasizes that his claim also stated, “Final invoices were sent to [403
Gordon Drive] on February 18, 2020.” Id. at 44. We incorporate our above
discussion and conclude no relief is due.
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VII. Due Process Violations Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1030
In his final issue, Appellant claims the trial court violated Pa.R.C.P. 1030
and his Pennsylvania and United States constitutional due process rights, by
permitting Appellees to raise “affirmative defenses and questions of facts” in
their PO’s. Appellant’s Brief at 45, 47. While Appellant does not provide any
further discussion of Rule 1030, we note it states, in part, that “all affirmative
defenses including . . . statute of limitations . . . shall be pleaded in a
responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter.’” See Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a).
Appellant then states, somewhat inconsistently with his first argument, “The
court denied the due course of law by not allowing for the collection of
evidence or filings to clarify the questions of fact raised by” Appellees. See
Appellant’s Brief at 45. No relief is due.
While Appellees’ PO’s alleged the untimely filing of Appellant’s
mechanic’s lien claims, they did not, as Appellant insists, raise the defense of
the statute of limitations. The statutes of limitations — filing periods for
commencing various causes of action — are set forth in Sections 5521 through
5527.1 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5521-5527.1. Here, Appellees did
not rely on these statutes, but instead on the Mechanic’s Lien Law, specifically
Section 1502(a)(1). Accordingly, Appellant’s reliance on Rule of Civil
Procedure 1030 is mistaken, and he was not denied due process under that
Rule.
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VIII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders sustaining
Appellee’s PO’s and striking Appellant’s mechanic’s lien claims.
Orders affirmed.
Judge Stabile joins the Memorandum.
Judge Dubow files a Concurring Memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/2022
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