Com. v. Jones, I. ( 2018 )

J-S54036-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ISAAC JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 398 WDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 16, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0002958-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
Isaac Jones (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
After careful consideration, we affirm.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant factual and
procedural history of this case as follows:
At trial, the victim, Alvester Clay, testified that during the morning
of December 24, 2011, he was preparing to open the bar and
restaurant he owned. At around noon, the door buzzer rang, and
he allowed a young, tall man into the bar. The man requested a
drink, and as Clay turned to get one, the man produced a gun.
The young man pointed the gun at Clay and told him to get on the
floor. As Clay complied with the order, the young man opened
the door and allowed another man to enter. This man had his face
partially covered, but at some point the covering shifted, and Clay
was able to recognize him as a former employee and regular
patron at the bar: [Appellant].
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[Appellant] demanded that Clay give him the keys to Clay’s
upstairs apartment. When Clay refused, [Appellant] retrieved a
knife from the kitchen and held it to Clay’s neck. Clay relented
and opened the door to the upstairs apartment.
The two assailants escorted Clay upstairs to his apartment, where
they bound Clay’s hands and feet with duct tape, before locking
him in a closet. [Appellant] and his accomplice then proceeded to
ransack Clay’s apartment. After over an hour in the closet, Clay
was able to free himself and contacted police. He immediately
identified [Appellant] as one of his assailants.
In contrast, two alibi witnesses testified that [Appellant] was
otherwise occupied at the time of the robbery. Tracee
Russell, [Appellant’s] girlfriend and mother of his child, testified
that [Appellant] was home all day playing a video game. Marcus
Lewis, a friend of [Appellant], testified that he was playing a
videogame over the internet with [Appellant] from approximately
8:30 that morning until noon or 1:00 p.m.
The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict on charges of
robbery—serious bodily injury and conspiracy to commit robbery.
The trial court sentenced [Appellant] to a term of imprisonment of
five to ten years. [Appellant] filed post-sentence motions, which
the trial court denied. . . .
Commonwealth v. Jones, 729 WDA 2013, at *1 (Pa. Super. June 1, 2015)
(unpublished memorandum)
Appellant filed a direct appeal with this Court; we affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence on June 1, 2015. See id. Our Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 16, 2015.
On January 23, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.
Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf on
July 24, 2017. On February 15, 2018, the PCRA court held a hearing on
Appellant’s petition. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on February
16, 2018. Appellant filed a timely appeal with this Court. On March 21, 2018,
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the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a statement of matters complained of
on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure. On April 11, 2018, Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b)
statement.
On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for our review: “Did the PCRA
[c]ourt err in concluding that Appellant did not suffer prejudice as a result of
trial counsel’s omissions at trial and failure to take available reasonable
measures to undermine the credibility of the Commonwealth’s key witness?”
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (PCRA court and suggested answers omitted).
“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA
court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quotations and
citations omitted). “To be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, [that] his conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)[.]” Id.
In deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin with the
presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v.
Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome that presumption,
the petitioner must establish: “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit;
(2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3)
the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
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proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). To
demonstrate prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the
petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If an
appellant fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any of the three
prongs, the Court need not address the remaining prongs of the test.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 863 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2004).
Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in concluding that trial
counsel was not ineffective when counsel failed to discredit the testimony of
Clay or implicate Clay’s stepdaughter, Linda Freeman, in the robbery.
Appellant’s Brief at 10-25. Appellant asserts that Clay’s testimony was
contradictory and that his age impacted his credibility. Likewise, Appellant
contends that Freeman “was similarly aware that there was substantial cash
in the apartment” and was a person-of-interest during the police investigation.
Id. at 15. Appellant submits that trial counsel was ineffective because he
failed to implicate Freeman in the robbery or attack Clay’s testimony during
trial.
In rejecting Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the PCRA
court concluded that Appellant failed to establish that he suffered actual
prejudice as a result of trial counsel’s alleged omissions. The court explained:
8) Initially, the court notes that it retains a clear recollection of
the trial. The court vividly recalls that trial counsel fiercely and
zealously represented his client, conducted a detailed and
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thorough cross-examination of [Clay], and delivered a passionate
argument to the jury as to why [Appellant] should not be
convicted.
9) However, as noted in this court’s Opinion issued on September
15, 2014, [Clay] in this case provided clear, consistent, and
compelling identification testimony, which was believed by the
jury. (Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 9/15/14, pp. 5-8). [Clay]
maintained at all times that [Appellant] was one of the two male
perpetrators of the robbery. Significantly, [Clay] was well familiar
with [Appellant] and he identified [Appellant] to the police
immediately following the incident. [Clay] then identified
[Appellant] when the authorities presented him with a photo
array, and subsequently identified [Appellant] in court at trial.
(TCO, pp. 3-4). Despite PCRA Counsel’s attempt to cast doubt
over [Clay’s] testimony, [Clay] never wavered in his identification
of [Appellant] as one of the robbers, and this court, as well as the
jury, found the victim’s identification testimony to be highly
credible.
10) Considering the thorough and zealous cross-examination of
[Clay] by trial counsel, and considering the credibility of [Clay],
the court finds that there is no reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different if trial counsel had
attempted to point the finger at a female as an additional
accomplice, badgered [Clay] regarding his timeline of events, or
exploited [Clay’s] initial difficulty in remembering exactly what
happened to his eyeglasses at the time of the struggle.
11) To be sure, [Clay] clearly identified the two perpetrators of
the robbery as males, and the fact that a woman named Linda
Freeman may somehow have been involved as an accomplice does
not exonerate [Appellant] in any way or increase the probability
of an acquittal or hung jury.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/16/18, at 3-4.
In advancing his argument, Appellant essentially asks this Court to
reconsider the evidence in the light most favorable to him and deem his
version of the facts credible. However, the PCRA court, who also sat as the
trial court, discredited Appellant. Indeed, as discussed above, the PCRA court
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found Clay’s testimony to be credible and determined that there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome of Appellant’s trial would have been
different if trial counsel had implicated Freeman in the robbery. In cases
where a PCRA court passes on witness credibility, its credibility determinations
should be provided great deference by reviewing courts. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 293 (Pa. 2006);
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 2004) (Opinion
Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (“[W]e are bound by the PCRA court’s
credibility determinations where there is record support for those
determinations.”); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 99 (Pa.
1998) (“Just as with any other credibility determination, where the record
supports the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, those determinations are
binding on this [C]ourt.”).
In sum, the record evinces ample support for the PCRA court’s
determination that Appellant failed to present a meritorious ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. We therefore discern no basis upon which to
reverse the order denying PCRA relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/13/2018
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