Ferguson, J. v. Stengle, L. ( 2018 )

J-A28034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOHN FERGUSON IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
LINDA J. STENGLE, ESQUIRE,
INDIVIDUALLY, STENGLE LAW, THE
ARRAS GROUPS, INC., AND ROBERT
MADSEN
Appellee No. 3623 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order October 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 150302491
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.
DISSENTING STATEMENT BY PANELLA, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2018
I agree with my esteemed colleagues in the Majority that Appellant’s
complaint would be properly transferred to Montgomery County if we were
constrained to considering whether Linda Stengle, Esquire, “regularly
conducted business” in Philadelphia. However, it is undisputed Attorney
Stengle represented Ferguson even after October 2011, when she left the Firm
to found Stengle Law. See N.T., Deposition of Linda Stengle, 4/26/16, at 12;
Affidavit of Linda Stengle, 3/29/16, at ¶ 14. Attorney Stengle did not have an
independent retainer agreement with Ferguson. See N.T., Deposition of Linda
Stengle, 4/26/16, at 75; Affidavit of Linda Stengle at ¶ 14. Rather, she had a
fee agreement with the Firm that included representation of Ferguson. See
J-A28034-17
N.T., Deposition of Linda Stengle, 4/26/16, at 22-23; Affidavit of Linda Stengle
at ¶ 14.
It is also undisputed that this retention agreement contained a forum
selection clause that was intended to mandate that any “dispute[s] between
Clients and Counsel” be heard in Philadelphia. N.T., Deposition of Linda
Stengle, 4/26/16, at 80. Thus, the contract governing Attorney Stengle’s
representation of Ferguson requires this dispute be heard in Philadelphia.
It is true this forum selection clause requires arbitration of the claim.
Thus, Ferguson may be required to submit his claims to binding arbitration.
However, that issue is not properly before us. Nor does the ultimate resolution
of that issue change the fact that the proper judicial venue for resolution of
whether the claims must be arbitrated is Philadelphia.
Furthermore, I conclude Ferguson’s brief sufficiently presented this
issue for our review. He argues the retention agreement requires this dispute
be heard in Philadelphia. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12. And he then cites to the
Rules of Civil Procedure as authority for his argument. See id.
While his argument is inartful, I conclude its deficiencies do not rise to
the level of waiver. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
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