Brown, M. v. Zhang, T. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MONA LISA BROWN 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
TIAN XIAO ZHANG
Appellant No. 1399 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 6, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): October Term, 2013 No. 00857
BEFORE: OTT, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MAY 08, 2017
Appellant, Tian Xiao Zhang, appeals from the judgment entered May 6,
2016. At issue in this appeal is the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
Appellee, Mona Lisa Brown, instituted a negligence action on April 17,
2014, following a slip and fall at a property owned by Appellant. See
Complaint, 4/17/2014, at III 1-18. Appellant represented himself pro se
and prevailed at arbitration. See Answer to Complaint, 4/24/14, at III 1-6;
Report and Award of Arbitrators, 7/22/14. Appellee timely appealed the
arbitrators' award, and the matter proceeded to trial by jury. See Notice of
Appeal from Award, 7/24/14. On April 14, 2015, the jury entered a verdict
of $175,000.00 in favor of Appellee and against Appellant. See Jury Verdict
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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for Plaintiff, 4/14/15, at 1-2. At no time during the proceedings did
Appellant aver that his wife was a co-owner of the Property.
Appellant, now represented by counsel, untimely filed a motion for
post -trial relief. See Motion for Post Trial Relief, 7/15/15, at 1-12. The
motion did not aver that Appellant's wife was a co-owner of the property.
The trial court dismissed Appellant's motion as untimely. Appellant timely
appealed, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P.
3517. See Order, 9/14/15, 2109 EDA 2015.
On November 30, 2015, Appellant filed a motion seeking to dismiss
Appellee's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Motion to
Dismiss, 11/30/15, at III 1-10. The motion averred that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as Appellee had failed to join an
indispensable party. According to Appellant, his wife was a co-owner of the
Proeprty and had not been named as a defendant. Id. Appellee filed an
answer in opposition. The trial court denied Appellant's motion.
On May 5, 2016, Appellant timely appealed the denial of his motion.'
Appellant filed a court -ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial
court issued a responsive opinion.
' On May 6, 2016, Appellee filed a praecipe to enter judgment on the verdict
and judgment was entered that same day. As such, the appeal has been
perfected and is properly before this Court. See generally, Johnston the
Florist, Inc. v. Tedco Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 513 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(en banc) (holding that jurisdiction in this Court may be perfected after an
appeal notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final judgment).
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On appeal, Appellant raises a single question for our review:
Whether a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain a personal injury action alleging an unsafe condition of
property, when the record owners of the property are not named
as defendants?
Appellant's Brief at 1-2.
Appellant argues that the initial action was improperly brought against
Appellant individually and not against the joint owners of the property as
required by Pennsylvania law. See Appellant's Brief at 4. As Appellee failed
to join an indispensable party, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
and the action should be dismissed, as the verdict and judgment are
nullities. Id.It is well settled that the failure to join an indispensable party is a non-
waivable defect that implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Sabella v. Appalachian Dev. Corp., 103 A.3d 83, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014).
In examining whether a party is indispensable, courts may consider the
following criteria: 1) whether absent parties have a right or interest related
to the claim; 2) the nature of the right or interest; 3) whether the right or
interest is essential to the merits of the issue; and 4) whether justice may
be afforded without violating the due process rights of absent parties. See
Mechanicsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Kline, 431 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. 1981).
If no redress is sought against a party, then its rights would not be
prejudiced and accordingly, it is not essential. See Grimme Combustion,
Inc., 595 A.2d 77, 81 (Pa. Super. 1991).
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Here, the trial court noted that the judgment was in personam and not
in rem. See, generally, Insilco Corp. v. Rayburn, 543 A.2d 120, 123-
124 (noting the differences between an in rem judgment against a property
and an in personam judgment against individuals). The trial court concluded
that, as Appellant cannot execute judgment against property held by tenants
in the entireties, or any other property owned by Ms. Zhang, she will not be
adversely affected by the judgment. Thus, Ms. Zhang's rights and interest
in this case did not rise to the level to make her an indispensable party.
See Kline, 431 A.2d at 956; Grimme, 595 A.2d at 81. We see no error in
this conclusion, and accordingly, affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 5/8/2017
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