De Boer, C. v. Pott, L. ( 2015 )

J-A10033-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CLAIRE DE BOER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LEONARDUS POTT
Appellant No. 1476 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order August 19, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 00810-DR-13
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2015
Leonardus Pott (“Husband”) appeals from the August 19, 2014 order
of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
denying Husband’s request for attorney fees, costs, and expenses
occasioned by spousal support proceedings brought by Husband’s then-wife
Claire de Boer (“Wife”). We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent
with this decision.
On July 10, 2003, Husband and Wife executed a prenuptial agreement
in the State of New York (“Agreement”). The Agreement included, inter alia,
the following waiver of future support and/or alimony claims:
V. RIGHTS UPON DISSOLUTION, DIVORCE OR
SEPARATION
Upon the divorce, or temporary or legal separation of the
parties or upon the dissolution or annulment of their marriage
the parties hereby agree that:
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A. Provided that neither party is disabled and unable to work
due to such disability, each party renounces any right to claim
any temporary or permanent maintenance in accordance with
New York General Obligations Law Section 5-311[.]
Agreement, p. 4., R.R. 51a. Disclosure required prior to execution of the
Agreement revealed that Husband had considerably more assets and
earnings than Wife at that time.
Additionally, the Agreement included a provision for awarding
attorneys’ fees to the victor of future enforcement actions that read as
follows:
IX. ENFORCEMENT
The parties hereto agree that if one party incurs any
expense in the enforcement of any of the provisions of this
agreement, the other will be responsible for and will pay any and
all expenses incurred, including but not limited to legal fees,
court costs, investigator fees and travel costs, if the parties [sic]
so incurring the expense prevails in an action for the
enforcement thereof.
Agreement, p. 7, R.R. 54a.
Against the advice of counsel, Wife signed the Agreement because
Husband refused to marry her without its execution. The next day, on July
11, 2003, Husband and Wife married in the State of New York.
Following their marriage, Husband and Wife resided in Hershey,
Pennsylvania. They later separated, and on May 29, 2013, Wife filed a
complaint seeking spousal support in the Dauphin County Court of Common
Pleas Domestic Relations Division. Husband answered, claiming the
Agreement barred Wife’s claim for spousal support. In response, Wife
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claimed the Agreement was invalid for multiple reasons, including Husband’s
failure to disclose a foreign bank account at the time of the Agreement’s
execution. Following discovery, the trial court conducted a hearing on
December 23, 2013. After allowing the parties to submit memoranda on the
validity of the Agreement under New York law, on February 26, 2014, the
trial court issued an order that found the Agreement valid. Neither party
appealed the trial court’s determination.
On April 16, 2014, Husband filed a Petition for Reimbursement of
Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses (“reimbursement petition”) seeking
reimbursement of approximately $25,000.00, which Husband claimed to
have expended to litigate the Agreement’s validity. The trial court
conducted a hearing on the reimbursement petition on July 17, 2014, and
denied the reimbursement petition on the same date. Husband appealed. 1
Husband raises the following issue for our review:
I. Whether the court erred in denying reimbursement of counsel
fees, costs and expenses to [Husband], as is permitted in
accordance with the prenuptial agreement, after the court found
in favor of [Husband] in an action to enforce and determine the
validity of the prenuptial agreement.
Husband’s Brief, p. 4 (all capitals removed). Otherwise stated, Husband
argues that the trial court erred in denying him contractual attorneys’ fees
incurred in the enforcement of the Agreement.
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1
Both Husband and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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The interpretation of the terms of a contract presents a question of law
for which this Court’s standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review
is plenary. McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769, 773 (Pa.2009).
Initially, both the trial court and Wife assert that, because the
underlying action centered on the “validity” of the contract, as opposed to its
“enforcement,” Husband is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. See 1925(a)
Opinion, pp. 2-3; Wife’s Brief, pp. 20-22. We disagree.
Wife’s underlying spousal support action occasioned the discussion and
evidence of the Agreement’s validity in this matter. Because the Agreement
expressly precluded spousal support, Husband defended Wife’s claim by
asserting that she had waived all claims to spousal support by signing the
Agreement. Simply put, Husband sought to enforce the Agreement. Wife’s
claim that the Agreement was invalid, requiring the trial court to hear
evidence as to the Agreement’s formation, does not change the analysis:
Husband sought enforcement of a specific provision of the Agreement –
Section V(A) – because Wife sought spousal support, which was governed by
the Agreement.2, 3
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2
We need not comment on whether a party might bring a separate action
questioning the validity of a contract without seeking its enforcement.
Under the facts of this case, Wife brought an action seeking spousal support
and Husband defended that action by seeking the enforcement of a provision
of the Agreement.
3
Wife suggests that the fact that she ceased her spousal support action
after the trial court ruled on the Agreement’s “validity” illustrates that her
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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After ruling the Agreement valid, the trial court ruled in favor of
Husband and denied Wife’s spousal support claim pursuant to Section V(A),
i.e., it enforced the Agreement. Because the underlying spousal support
claim – or, more specifically, Husband’s defense thereof – amounted to an
enforcement action, Agreement Section IX, by its express terms, entitles the
victorious party to attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing
to award Husband attorneys’ fees. Consequently, we must reverse the trial
court’s order and remand this matter for the award of attorneys’ fees to
Husband pursuant to Agreement Section IX.
Husband claims that, because the Agreement does not contain a
qualifier that attorneys’ fees expended be “reasonable”, he is entitled to the
entirety of the $25,000.00 he alleges he expended in defense of Wife’s
spousal support claim. See Husband’s Brief, pp. 9-15. While he may be
entitled to some or all of this claimed figure, husband is only entitled to
reasonable attorney fees.4
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(Footnote Continued)
underlying action only challenged the “validity” and not the “enforcement” of
the Agreement. See Wife’s Brief, pp. 20-21. This argument is
unconvincing. As discussed supra, Wife had lost her spousal support action.
She was required to discontinue her claims. Because Wife brought no
actions for enforcement of the Agreement does not mean that Husband’s
required defense of her spousal support action is not properly characterized
as an enforcement action.
4
We find unconvincing Wife’s argument that Husband waived his claim to
attorneys’ fees by not presenting them at her spousal support hearing. See
Wife’s Brief, pp. 10-12. As the matter was ongoing, Husband’s attorneys’
fees were undetermined at that time, and he could not have accurately
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A prenuptial agreement is a contract between the parties. See
Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.1990) (stating that prenuptial
agreements are contracts); Strong v. Dubin, 48 A.D.3d 232, 232, 851
N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (2008) (recognizing prenuptial agreements as contractual
agreements strongly favored by public policy). Under either Pennsylvania
law or New York law, a reasonableness assessment is appropriate when
awarding contractual attorneys’ fees to a petitioning party, even where the
contract contains no provision or language regarding the “reasonableness” of
the fees. See McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769, 776-77 (Pa.2009) (finding
that parties may contract for breaching party to pay attorney fees of
prevailing party in breach of contract case, but absent express specification
for “reasonable” fees in a contract, trial court may still consider whether
claimed fees are reasonable and reduce them if appropriate); SO/Bluestar,
LLC v. Canarsie Hotel Corp., 33 A.D.3d 986, 987, 825 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81-82
(2006) (“[a]n award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to such a contractual
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(Footnote Continued)
accounted for his full legal fees. Likewise unconvincing is Wife’s argument
that Husband waived his attorneys’ fee claim by not presenting it in a timely
fashion after the conclusion of the underlying matter. Id. at 13-15.
Husbands’ claim for attorneys’ fees is a separate claim from the underlying
matter, the conclusion of which triggered Husband’s cause of action for
attorneys’ fees under Agreement Section IX. Since neither party filed an
appeal of the trial court’s February 27, 2014 order, the order became final
thirty days thereafter, or on March 29, 2014. Husband timely filed his
reimbursement petition on April 18, 2014, only twenty days after the
expiration of the appeal period.
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provision may only be enforced to the extent that the amount is reasonable
and warranted for the services actually rendered”).
Accordingly, while Husband is entitled to attorneys’ fees based on the
trial court’s determination of the underlying enforcement action, he is
entitled only to reasonable attorneys’ fees as determined by the trial court.
Order reversed; matter remanded for further proceedings; jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/27/2015
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