Com. v. Sodomsky, K. ( 2015 )

J-S11045-15
2015 PA Super 133COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
KENNETH F. SODOMSKY, :
:
Appellee : No. 870 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered on April 25, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,
Criminal Division, No. CR-06-CR-0001025-2005
BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2015
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order granting
the suppression Motion filed by the defendant, Kenneth F. Sodomsky
(“Sodomsky”).1 We affirm.
In a prior appeal, this Court summarized the relevant history of this
case as follows:
Richard Kasting [“Mr. Kasting”] was the senior sales assistant in
the technology department of the Circuit City [s]tore located on
Woodland Road, Wyomissing, Berks County[, Pennsylvania]. Mr.
Kasting testified that on October 15, 2004, [Sodomsky] came to
Circuit City and asked Mr. Kasting to install an optical drive and
DVD burner into his computer. The work order that [Sodomsky]
executed that day authorized Circuit City to install and configure
the optical drive unit and DVD in his desktop computer.
1
As required to take an appeal as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), the
Commonwealth has certified that the suppression court’s Order substantially
handicapped the Commonwealth’s ability to proceed in this case.
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In accordance with store practice, Mr. Kasting summarized
to [Sodomsky] “what is done during the installation.” N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 9/28/05, at 16. [Sodomsky] was informed
that as part of the installation process, the installer would “have
to make sure [that the DVD burner] works.” Id. at 17. There is
no indication that [Sodomsky] asked how the DVD burner would
be tested or in any manner restricted what procedure could be
utilized to confirm the burner’s operability. [Sodomsky]
requested that the work be performed on an expedited basis,
and Mr. Kasting instructed him to return in approximately one
hour.
Toby Werner was in the middle of the installation process
when Stephen Richert [“Mr. Richert”], the head of personal
computer repairs at Circuit City, arrived. Mr. Richert testified
that the DVD drive was installed when he arrived in the
department, but the software had not yet been installed. Mr.
Richert explained that all DVD burners and players were
accompanied by software.[FN] Mr. Richert testified specifically
that at Circuit City, with “every installation” of the hardware,
“any supplementary software” was installed both as a courtesy
“and to make sure when it leaves the store, we can guarantee
that it is working.” Id. at 21.
[FN] [Sodomsky] maintains that he did not request installation of
the DVD software. However, it is clear that Circuit City could not
test the hardware without installing the software and always
installed any software accompanying a hardware installation.
[Sodomsky] was told that the hardware would be tested.
After the software was installed, Mr. Richert performed a
general search for a video [file on Sodomsky’s computer] to test
the new DVD drive. More specifically, he testified as follows:
Well, after we installed the software, we did a generic
search of the PC where you click on the start menu, you
click on search, and this being the [W]indows XP, a
search box comes up and it is custom made to this
operating system. In this case, this system, it’s about
half way down the screen on the left-hand side there’s a
search, and you can enter—in this case, you could enter a
specific name of a file that you’re looking for and find it.
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We weren’t looking for anything specific, so we did a
generic search. …
* * *
… [I]n this case, we wanted to make sure that all types
of files were working fine so that you wouldn’t get any
type of errors….
Id. at 22-23.
Mr. Richert testified that once the search button was
activated for a given object, the computer automatically loaded
the requested files onto the screen, which continued to enlarge
by itself. Thus, after the search was initiated, Mr. Richert did not
manipulate the computer further to see the entire list of videos.
Id. at 30-31. The first few video titles that appeared from
[Sodomsky’s] video list were innocuous. However, as the video
log continued to compile on the computer screen, which occurred
without any human intervention, some of the files appeared to
be pornographic in nature due to their titles[,] which included
masculine first names, ages of either thirteen or fourteen, and
sexual acts. Mr. Richert clicked on “the first one” that appeared
questionable, and the video contained the lower torso of an
unclothed male, and when a hand approached the male’s penis,
Mr. Richert immediately stopped the video. Id. at 24. Mr.
Richert contacted his manager and then telephoned the
Wyomissing police.
During cross-examination, Mr. Richert admitted that he
had been told by a Pennsylvania State Police Officer to contact
police if he ever ran across what appeared to be child
pornography while at work. At the time, Mr. Richert was taking
a course at a local college and hoped to enter the law
enforcement field.
Wyomissing Police Detective George Bell [“Detective Bell”]
and two other police officers responded to the call and viewed
the same video clip [while at the Circuit City store]. When
[Sodomsky] arrived to retrieve his computer, Detective Bell
informed him that his computer was being seized because police
suspected that it contained child pornography. [Sodomsky]
responded that he knew what they had found and that his “life
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was over.” Id. at 87. Police took the computer to the police
station, obtained a warrant to search it, and discovered child
pornography.
Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 939 A.2d 363, 364-66 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(one citation omitted; footnote in original).
On March 11, 2005, Sodomsky was charged with two counts of sexual
abuse of children, and one count of obscene and other sexual materials and
performances.2 Subsequently, Sodomsky filed an Omnibus Pre-trial Motion
to suppress the evidence seized from his computer. After a hearing, the trial
court granted the suppression Motion, after which the Commonwealth filed
an interlocutory appeal to this Court.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that
the trial court erred in concluding that [Sodomsky] retained a
privacy interest in the computer because he volitionally
relinquished any expectation of privacy in that item by delivering
it to Circuit City employees knowing that those employees were
going to install and test a DVD device….
Id. at 366 (emphasis added). A panel of this Court agreed, in part, with the
Commonwealth’s contention. Id. Reversing the suppression court’s Order,
the panel reasoned that, “when an individual evidences an intent to
relinquish control over personal property, he or she has abandoned a privacy
interest in property and cannot object to any ensuing search of the item by
police.” Id. In so holding, the panel focused solely upon Sodomsky’s
expectation of privacy:
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6312(d), 5903(a)(3).
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The issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense,
but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily
discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in
the property in question so that he could no longer retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of
the search.
Id. at 366-67 (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Shoats, 366
A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. 1976)). The panel additionally applied the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 718
A.2d 265 (Pa. 1998), explaining that in Hawkins,
the defendant handed an item to another individual, who then
placed it in his mouth. Police seized the individual and extracted
the property, which consisted of illicit drugs. Our Supreme Court
refused to allow the defendant to object to the seizure of the
drugs, noting that under current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, a defendant cannot object to a search unless he
establishes a legitimate expectation of privacy, “in the area
searched or the effects seized” and that such interest must also
be sanctioned by society as reasonable and justifiable.”
[Hawkins,] … 718 A.2d at 267. … [A] “legitimate expectation
of privacy is absent where an owner or possessor meaningfully
abdicates his control, ownership or possessory interest” in his
personal property. Id. … at 267. …
Sodomsky, 939 A.2d at 367. Ultimately, the panel concluded that
Sodomsky had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he had
“abandoned” his computer, for one hour, for the installation of a DVD drive.
Id. at 369. Accordingly, the panel reversed the suppression court’s Order,
and remanded for further proceedings.3
3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal, and the
United States Supreme Court denied Sodomsky’s Petition for Certiorari.
Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 962 A.2d 1196 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1282 (2009).
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On remand, Sodomsky filed a Petition to introduce new evidence,
claiming that such evidence was unavailable to the defense prior to the
evidentiary hearing on his suppression Motion. The trial court issued a Rule
to Show Cause why the Petition should not be granted, and scheduled an
evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Sodomsky presented two experts, who
testified about industry standards and the methods used by Mr. Richert to
install the DVD burner. First, William Scott Ardisson testified that opening
the computer’s video files was not a proper method for testing the
installation of a DVD burner. N.T., 2/15/11, at 15. Next, Charles Mance
testified that the methods used by Mr. Richert to test the drive were not
consistent with industry standards. Id. at 56. Based upon Sodomsky’s new
evidence, the suppression court again found that Sodomsky had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the digital data on his computer.
Therefore, on March 22, 2011, the suppression court granted Sodomsky’s
suppression Motion. Once again, the Commonwealth appealed the
suppression court’s ruling.
During its second appeal, the Commonwealth argued, inter alia, that
the trial court had erred in granting suppression “because [Sodomsky] ‘failed
to establish that he retained any expectation of privacy in his computer after
he turned it over to Circuit City employees.’” Commonwealth v.
Sodomsky, 47 A.3d 1257 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum at
10) (quoting Commonwealth’s Brief at 17)). The panel agreed, holding that
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[a]fter careful review, we conclude that none of the evidence
presented at the second suppression hearing alters this Court’s
previous conclusion that [Sodomsky] relinquished control of the
video files on his computer when he took the computer to Circuit
City to install a DVD burner[,] and thereby abandoned his
privacy interest in the files….
Id. (unpublished memorandum at 13). Based upon a theory of
abandonment, the panel concluded that “the trial court erred in finding [that
Sodomsky] retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the video files.”
Id. (unpublished memorandum at 14). The panel reversed and remanded
for further proceedings.4 Id.On remand from this Court, on December 9, 2013, Sodomsky filed a
Petition to Re-Open Suppression Hearing based on Intervening Change of
Law, i.e., the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again denied allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 63 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2013). Sodomsky’s
subsequent Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court also
was denied. Sodomsky v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 212(2013).
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Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).5 The suppression court
granted Sodomsky’s Petition, and, after a hearing, again granted
Sodomsky’s suppression Motion, based upon the Jones decision.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed the instant timely appeal, and a court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on
appeal.
The Commonwealth now presents the following claims for our review:
a. Whether the trial court erred by re-opening the suppression
hearing in this case since Jones … was decided before the
Superior Court made its decision on the last appeal, before
the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court denied allocatur, and
before the U.S. Supreme Court denied [certiorari] in the last
appeal?
b. Whether [Sodomsky] has identified any intervening changes
in the law that would have affected the resolution of the
issues raised by [Sodomsky] during the prior appeal in this
case?
c. Whether the trial court erred in holding that law enforcement
officers interfered with the possessory interest in
[Sodomsky’s] computer, or engaged in a physical intrusion of
this computer property to the extent that they committed a
trespass for the purposes of obtaining information, thereby
violating [Sodomsky’s] Fourth Amendment rights[?]
Brief for the Commonwealth at 5.
5
On January 23, 2012 (one week before the scheduled Superior Court oral
argument for Sodomsky’s second appeal, but after appellate briefs had been
filed), the United States Supreme Court filed its decision in Jones. The
Superior Court’s Memorandum Opinion did not discuss the applicability of
Jones. Rather, the decision discussed only Sodomsky’s lack of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data on his computer. Sodomsky, 47 A.3d
1257 (unpublished memorandum at 14).
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The Commonwealth first claims that the trial court erred in re-opening
the issue of suppression, based upon Sodomsky’s claim of an intervening
change of law. Id. at 13-14. The Commonwealth contends that the Jones
decision is not an intervening change of law, as the Pennsylvania Superior
Court was aware of the Jones decision during the second appeal. Id. at 14.
The Commonwealth points out that Sodomsky’s counsel addressed the
applicability of Jones during oral argument before the Pennsylvania Superior
Court panel, and in his Petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Id.
Our careful review of the record discloses that prior to the hearing and
Order underlying the instant appeal, the suppression court had no
opportunity to discuss or apply the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Jones. During the second appeal, this Court focused upon whether the
suppression court had erred or abused its discretion when it ruled that
Sodomsky had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer data.
Because the applicability of Jones (an intervening change of law) previously
has not been addressed by this Court, we are not barred from addressing
the issue during the instant appeal. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 664
A.2d 1326, 1332 (Pa. 1995) (stating that the law of the case doctrine does
not apply where there exists an intervening change in the applicable law).
Accordingly, the Commonwealth is not entitled to relief on this claim.
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In its second claim, the Commonwealth argues that Sodomsky failed
to identify any intervening change in the law that applies to his suppression
claim. Brief for Appellant at 15. The Commonwealth contends that Jones
only reiterated that “a traditional property law analysis still existed ….” Id.The Commonwealth asserts that “any property right [Sodomsky] might have
had in his computer, … he relinquished to Circuit City for the limited purpose
of doing whatever the technicians need to do to make the DVD burner work
correctly.” Id. at 17.
Similarly, in its third claim, the Commonwealth argues that Jones
does not apply where, as here, the defendant gave up his property rights.
Id. at 18. The Commonwealth also contends that the “plain view exception
applied to the police view of 19 seconds of the video Circuit City employees
observed.” Id. at 19. The Commonwealth argues that, based upon the
evidence, Sodomsky relinquished his property rights and any expectation of
privacy in the video clip used by Mr. Richert to test the DVD burner. Id.
“The appellate standard of review of suppression rulings is well-
settled. This Court is bound by those of the suppression court’s factual
findings which find support in the record, but we are not bound by the
court’s conclusions of law.” Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 685
(Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1269 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (stating that “[w]here the record supports findings of the
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suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.”) (citation omitted).
Here, the suppression court granted Sodomsky’s suppression Motion,
explaining that
[t]he Katz[6] test of reasonable expectation of privacy is never
reached, just as it was never reached in Jones. This court is
again constrained, this time under the Jones holding, to
suppress the evidence that was obtained by the unauthorized
trespass by the government….
Suppression Court Opinion, 4/25/14, at 4 (footnote omitted, footnote
added).7 The suppression court concluded that the search of Sodomsky’s
computer files, and the seizure of his computer, violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 3-4. Upon careful
review, we are constrained to agree.
The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.8 A warrantless
search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, 389 U.S.
at 357.
6
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
7
The Commonwealth has not challenged Sodomsky’s ownership of the
desktop computer, or that Sodomsky was told to retrieve his computer one
hour after leaving it at Circuit City.
8
This right is enforceable against the states as part of the due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961). Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional protections
must be excluded. Id.- 11 -
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The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for
much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its
protections: When “the Government obtains information by
physically intruding” on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment
has “undoubtedly occurred.” [] Jones, 565 U.S. [] ___, 132 S.
Ct. 945, [951 n.3,] 181 L. Ed. 2d 911, 919 [n.3] (2012). By
reason of [the United States Supreme Court’s] decision in
Katz[,] … property rights “are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations,” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,
64, 113 S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992)[,] but though Katz
may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the
Amendment’s protections “when the Government does engage in
[a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area[.]”
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286, 103 S. Ct. 1081,
75 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
Florida v. Jardines, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013)
(emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth
Amendment protects possessory and liberty interests, even when privacy
rights are not implicated. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 63-64. While Katz and its
progeny shifted the emphasis in Fourth Amendment law from property to
privacy, “[t]here was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed
out the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 64.
In Jones, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether police
officers had engaged in a “search,” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, when they installed and monitored a Global Positioning System
tracking device on a suspect’s car. Jones, 565 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
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946. In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court explained that “Fourth
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” Jones,
565 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 950. Rather, the Supreme Court expressed
“a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons,
houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment] enumerates.” Id. In
rediscovering the trespassory origins of the Fourth Amendment, the Jones
majority observed that the more recently adopted “reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.” Id., 565 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 952. Applying an
“exclusively property-based approach,” the Supreme Court held that a
search occurred when the government “physically occupied private property
for the purpose of obtaining information,” which “would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
was adopted.” Id., 565 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50 (citation omitted).
In Jardines, the Supreme Court again applied a property-based
analysis of Fourth Amendment protections. The Supreme Court ruled that a
warrantless search of the curtilage of a house by a drug-sniffing dog violated
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether “the officers’ investigation of
[the defendant’s] home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz.”
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
Applying this same property-based analysis, in Riley v. California,
___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the United States Supreme Court
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held that police may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a
cell phone seized incident to an arrest. Id. at 2480, 2495. In holding that
an unconstitutional search of the defendant’s papers and effects had
occurred, the Supreme Court emphasized the quantity and quality of
information stored on a cell phone:
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from
physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also
qualitatively different. An Internet search and browsing history,
for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and
could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—
perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with
frequent visits to WebMD. Data on a cell phone can also reveal
where a person has been. Historic location information is a
standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
around town but also within a particular building….
Mobile application software on a cell phone, or “apps,” offer a
range of tools for managing detailed information about all
aspects of a person’s life. There are apps for Democratic Party
news and Republican Party news; apps for alcohol, drug, and
gambling addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for
tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget;
apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving
your romantic life. There are popular apps for buying or selling
just about anything, and the records of such transactions may be
accessible on the phone indefinitely. There are over a million
apps available in each of the two major app stores; the phrase
“there’s an app for that” is now part of the popular lexicon. The
average smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together
can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.
Id. 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citations omitted). Ultimately, the Supreme Court
extended Fourth Amendment protections to the digital data stored on a cell
phone:
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Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell
phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is
generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone
is seized incident to arrest. Our cases have historically
recognized that the warrant requirement is “an important
working part of our machinery of government,” not merely “an
inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of
police efficiency.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
481, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). Recent
technological advances similar to those discussed here have, in
addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more
efficient. See [Missouri v.] McNeely, 569 U.S., at ___, 133 S.
Ct. 1552[,] 1573, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696, 720 ); id., at ___ (Roberts,
C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (133 S. Ct. 1552;
1573, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696, 720) (describing jurisdiction where
“police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads
[and] judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back
to officers in less than 15 minutes”).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
Here, the same quality and quantity of information found on a cell
phone also is digitally stored on a desktop computer. 9 For the same reasons
that the Riley Court considered it necessary to protect the digital data
stored on a cell phone, such protections naturally extend to the digital data
stored on a desktop computer. Applying the property-based Fourth
Amendment analysis explained in Jones, and relied upon in Riley, we
conclude that the digital data stored on Sodomsky’s desktop computer is
subject to Fourth Amendment protections, regardless of his reasonable
expectation of privacy. Under this rubric, we review the search of
Sodomsky’s computer.
9
Similar to cell phones, desktop computers now have “apps,” store financial
records, and even may store a back-up of the data from a cell phone.
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“[A] search warrant is required before police may conduct any search.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 614 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). “Absent the application of one of a few clearly delineated
exceptions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable.”
Id. One of these exceptions is the “plain view” doctrine, upon which the
Commonwealth relies.
The plain view doctrine permits the warrantless search and seizure of
an object when “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point;
(2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and []
(3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.” Commonwealth
v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 637 (Pa. Super. 2013). In determining whether
the incriminating nature of an object is “immediately apparent” to a police
officer, courts should evaluate the “totality of the circumstances.” Id.“Although courts have recognized that a police officer can never be certain
that an object in plain view is incriminating, the officer’s belief must be
supported by probable cause.” Id.The parties here do not dispute that the police were lawfully present in
the Circuit City store and that Sodomsky’s computer was in plain view.
However, the record does not support a finding that the digital data forming
the basis of the charges against Sodomsky was in plain view, or that the
incriminating nature of Sodomsky’s computer was immediately apparent.
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Our review of the record discloses that police officers were called to
the Circuit City store after Mr. Richert, a Circuit City employee, conducted a
search of video files on Sodomsky’s computer. N.T., 9/28/05, at 23-24, 26.
Upon arriving at the scene, Wyomissing Police Officer John Phillips (“Officer
Phillips”) asked Mr. Richert to describe what he had seen on Sodomsky’s
computer. Id. at 42. Upon the express direction of Officer Phillips, Mr.
Richert double-clicked on the file to open it, and then played the video file
for the officer. Id. at 38. The file was not visible on Sodomsky’s computer
until Officer Phillips directed Mr. Richert to open the video data file. Id. at
38, 42.
Thus, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Sodomsky,
established that the suspect video file was not in “plain view” when Officer
Phillips arrived at the scene, nor was its criminal nature readily apparent.
The incriminating nature of the video became apparent only after Officer
Phillips directed Mr. Richert to open and play the digital data file. By
directing Mr. Richert to open and play the computer digital data file, Officer
Phillips effectuated a warrantless search of the digital data stored on
Sodomsky’s desktop computer.
Under Jones and Riley, the warrantless search of Sodomsky’s digital
data files, stored on his desktop computer, violated Sodomsky’s Fourth
Amendment protections. Consequently, the officers’ subsequent seizure of
the computer, and additional searches conducted thereafter, were unlawful
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as “fruits of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963) (recognizing that evidence discovered as a result of
a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from
evidence).
Based upon the foregoing, we are constrained to affirm the Order of
the suppression court.
Order affirmed.
Panella, J., joins the opinion.
Ott, J., files a dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/5/2015
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