Com. v. Corliss, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUSTIN CORLISS,
Appellant No. 1690 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order April 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001748-2013
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J. AND STRASSBURGER,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2018
Appellant, Justin Corliss, is once again before us pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order entered on February 23, 2018, which
vacated our March 9, 2016 disposition and remanded for our reconsideration
in light of its decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa.
2017). After considering Muniz, we vacate the trial court’s order entered on
April 16, 2015 and discharge Appellant for failing to comply with registration
requirements pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
[… Appellant was] convict[ed] in 1998 for certain sexual
offenses. [Appellant] was sentenced and served his full
sentence, gaining release in 2008. Upon his release,
[Appellant] was subject to registration requirements of
Megan’s Law as a sexual offender. On December 20, 2012,
Act 91 of 2012 took effect, and was known as Megan’s Law
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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IV. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10, et seq.[1] This Act provided
additional registration requirements for sexual offenders. At
the time, [Appellant] was no longer serving a sentence, and
he was not on parole or probation for any offenses.
[Appellant, however,] was still required to register as a sex
offender under [a] prior version[] of Megan’s Law, and he
had not yet completed the time period in which he was
required to register as such. In 2013, he allegedly failed to
[report his vehicles to authorities, a newly-imposed
registration requirement adopted under SORNA.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
three counts of failing to register properly pursuant to the
requirements of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1.]
[Appellant] was initially represented by counsel who filed
timely omnibus motions. [Appellant thereafter] discharged
counsel and chose to proceed pro se in this matter in
January 2014.
* * *
[I]n an attempt to bring finality to the pre-trial issues raised
by [Appellant] in this case, [the trial court entered an order
allowing an appeal to be taken by permission under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b) on April 16, 2015.]
Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/2015, at 1-2 (parenthetical omitted). This appeal
resulted.2
____________________________________________
1 This Act is commonly referred to as Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9799.10- 9799.41. For ease of discussion, we will refer to it as such
throughout this memorandum.
2 On May 12, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se petition for an interlocutory
appeal by permission with this Court. On June 15, 2015, this Court entered
a per curiam order treating the petition for permission to appeal as a notice
of appeal under Pa.R.A.P 1316(a)(1).
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On March 9, 2016, in an unpublished memorandum, we affirmed the
trial court’s order dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed by Appellant. In
our memorandum decision, we determined that SORNA was constitutional
and did not violate the ex post facto doctrine. Accordingly, we sought to
remand the matter for trial on the Commonwealth’s charges for failing to
comply with registration requirements under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1.
Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our
Supreme Court. On February 23, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted Appellant relief, vacated our decision, and remanded the case for
consideration of its July 2017 decision in Muniz. We determined that no
further briefing or supplementation of the record was required under
Pa.R.A.P. 2140. Thus, we will reconsider Appellant’s previously presented
issues in light of Muniz.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
1. Whether 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10, et seq. (Act 2012-91), as
amended, applied to Appellant on its effective date contrary
to the dicta of Commonwealth v. Richardson, 784 A.2d
126 [(Pa. Super. 2001)], and its progeny, as application of
the Statutory Construction Act provides that [Appellant] was
not subject to SORNA.
Subquestion:
Whether 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.13(3) (Act 2012-91) identified
[Appellant] as one who must register under SORNA, as he
had not previously “failed to register.”
Appellant’s Brief at 8 (complete capitalization omitted).
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Appellant claims that the trial court erred by finding the application of
SORNA was constitutional as applied to him. Appellant’s main contention is
that SORNA changes the legal consequences for conduct completed before
its effective date (i.e., as of Appellant’s 1998 conviction, there was no
requirement to register a vehicle). Appellant argues that at the time of his
conviction in 1998, he was not required to register his vehicles with the
Commonwealth “under the law in effect at that time (Megan’s Law I)” and
“SORNA makes [the failure to register a vehicle] a felony offense.”
Appellant’s Brief at 17. Thus, Appellant suggests SORNA is an
unconstitutional, ex post facto law. Id. Because Appellant argues that he
was not subject to SORNA’s reporting requirements, he contends the
Commonwealth cannot charge him with failing to report his vehicles
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1. Id. For the reasons that follow, we
agree.
A prior panel of this Court recently summarized Muniz as follows:
[O]ur Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v.
Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), announcing that SORNA
registration requirements are tantamount to punishment.
There, [Muniz] was convicted of two counts of indecent assault
on February 7, 2007. [Muniz] failed to appear for his May 8,
2007 sentencing hearing, absconding until he was arrested in
Rhode Island in September 2014. At the time of his 2007
sentence, “he would have been ordered to register as a sex
offender with the Pennsylvania State Police for a period of ten
years pursuant to then-effective Megan's Law III.” Muniz, 164
A.3d at 1193.
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At his 2014 sentencing, [Muniz] was subject to SORNA's lifetime
registration provisions, which had replaced Megan's Law III
during the time he absconded. [Muniz] filed a post-sentence
motion seeking the application of Megan's Law III's ten-year
registration requirement. The trial court denied his motion.
[Muniz] appealed to this Court, challenging the application of
SORNA on the basis of the ex post facto clauses of the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. We affirmed his
judgment of sentence.
Our Supreme Court on appeal reversed our decision and vacated
the portion of [Muniz’s] sentence that required his compliance
with SORNA. Five of the six participating justices concluded that,
despite the General Assembly's characterization of SORNA's
registration provisions as nonpunitive, the provisions constitute
punishment. They further concluded that a retroactive
application of SORNA's registration provisions violates the ex
post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at
1223, 1239 (Wecht, J. concurring). The Court observed that
[Muniz’s] seven-year absence from the Commonwealth did not
affect its decision, because had [Muniz] been sentenced in 2007
and subject to registration under Megan's Law III, his ten-year
registration period, under Section 9799.13 of SORNA, would
have converted to a lifetime registration when SORNA became
effective. Id. at 1193 n.3.
In light of our Supreme Court's announcement in Muniz, [this
Court was] constrained to hold that SORNA's registration
requirements [were] no longer merely [] collateral
consequence[s], but rather punishment.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 666–667 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(footnotes omitted).
In this case, there is no dispute that Appellant completed service of his
underlying term of incarceration. He was not on probation or parole at the
time the legislature enacted SORNA. Likewise, there is no dispute that
SORNA created additional registration requirements for Appellant, including
registration of his vehicles with the Commonwealth. In light of Muniz, these
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additional requirements were not collateral to Appellant’s conviction, but
constituted additional, retroactive punishment in violation of the ex post
facto doctrine. Thus, we are constrained to conclude that Appellant was not
required to comply with newly imposed registration requirements under
SORNA. Hence, because Appellant was not required to register his vehicles
with the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth could not subsequently charge
him with failing to do so. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order
denying Appellant relief and discharge Appellant for failing to comply with
registration requirements under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1.
Order vacated. Appellant discharged. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/18/18
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