Com. v. Jiles, S. ( 2017 )

J-S07014-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
STEPHEN EUGENE JILES
Appellant No. 1063 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0002718-2009
CP-67-CR-0002719-2009
CP-67-CR-0002745-2010
CP-67-CR-0003039-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS, AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2017
Stephen Eugene Jiles appeals from the order denying his PCRA
petition. Appellant’s case returns to us after we remanded this matter with
directions to counsel to file a Turner/Finley1 brief addressing the issues
raised by Appellant in his original pro se PCRA petition. For the following
reasons, we again remand this case with instructions to counsel.
____________________________________________
1
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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We previously set forth the relevant factual and procedural history of
this matter. See Commonwealth v. Jiles, 1063 MDA 2016 (Pa.Super. filed
March 7, 2017) (unpublished memorandum) at *1-2. As is pertinent herein,
we remanded this matter with instructions to counsel to file a Turner/Finley
brief addressing the issues raised in Appellant’s original pro se PCRA
petition, or in the alternative, to file an advocate’s brief. Counsel partially
complied with our directive, filing a Turner/Finley brief and no-merit letter
addressing the majority of Appellant’s claims.
PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley brief directs this Court’s attention to
four issues of possible merit:
1. Whether trial counsel, Kevin Hoffman, rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to move for dismissal of case No. CP-67-CR-
00[2]745-2010 based on a denial of due process and
prosecutorial misconduct?
2. Whether trial counsel, Kevin Hoffman, rendered ineffective
assistance for offering erroneous advice with regard to accepting
or rejecting a plea offered by the Commonwealth that was
significantly less onerous than the prison time imposed following
trial?
3. Whether Appellant was subjected to structural error when a
Judge who decided pre-trial motions was involved in an intimate
relationship with the assistant district attorney, who prepared
and submitted said motions, resulting in a denial of due process?
4. Whether trial and direct appeal counsel, Kevin Hoffman, was
ineffective for failing to file an application for relief in appellate
court when he discovered that the pre-trial motions Judge was
intimately involved with the assistance district attorney who
prepared and submitted several pre-trial motions decided by that
Judge?
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Turner/Finley brief, 1/23/17, at 6.
At the outset, we must address whether counsel has met the
requirements of Turner/Finley. The Turner/Finley decisions provide the
manner for post-conviction counsel to withdraw from representation. The
holdings of those cases mandate an independent review of the record by
competent counsel before a PCRA court or appellate court can authorize an
attorney’s withdrawal. Counsel must then file a “no-merit” letter detailing
the nature and extent of her review and list each issue the petitioner wishes
to have examined, explaining why those issues are meritless.
Commonwealth v. Freeland, 106 A.3d 768, 774 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Counsel is required to contemporaneously serve upon her client her no-merit
letter and application to withdraw along with a statement that, if the court
granted counsel’s withdrawal, the client may proceed pro se or with a
privately retained attorney. Id. at 774. This Court must then conduct its
own independent evaluation of the record and agree with counsel that the
petition is meritless. Id.
Here, we find that counsel has not fully complied with the
requirements of Turner/Finley. Counsel detailed her review of the record
and concluded that Appellant’s claims are meritless. She notified Appellant,
and furnished him with a copy of her no-merit letter, advising him of his
right to proceed pro se or to retain private counsel. However, in regard to
Appellant’s second issue, counsel framed Appellant’s challenge as only
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concerning trial counsel’s failure to advise him of the maximum punishment
he faced for each charge upon conviction. Although the record reveals that
Appellant raised some concern about trial counsel’s failure in this regard, the
heart of his contention relates to his assertion that trial counsel misled him
regarding the likelihood of acquittal at trial. See PCRA Petition, 3/5/14, at
unnumbered 14-15 (stating, “Instantly, [Appellant] went to trial rather than
enter the plea offered by the prosecution, a decision based on counsel’s
representation that the Commonwealth could not prove their case against
[Appellant].”). PCRA counsel did not address the merits of this claim.
Since PCRA counsel has again failed to satisfy the technical
prerequisites of Turner/Finley, we are constrained to deny counsel’s
request to withdraw and must again remand this matter for counsel to
amend her Turner/Finley brief and no-merit letter in order to address the
claims raised by Appellant in his 3/5/14 PCRA petition, or in the alternative,
to file an advocate’s brief, taking the necessary steps to ensure Appellant’s
issues are presented on appeal.
Record remanded. Counsel shall comply with the mandates of this
decision within sixty days of remand of the record. Jurisdiction retained.
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