Com. v. Peoples, R. ( 2014 )

J-S67019-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RICARDO ALPHONSO PEOPLES
Appellant No. 424 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 17, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008708-1997
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2014
Appellant, Ricardo Alphonso Peoples, appeals pro se from the January
17, 2014 order dismissing as untimely his second petition filed pursuant to
the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After
careful review, we affirm.
The certified record discloses the following factual and procedural
history of this case. On February 4, 1999, a jury found Appellant guilty of
one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder1
for the May 14, 1997 killings of Orlando Price and his girlfriend, Dionda
Morant. At the time of the offenses, Appellant was 17 years old but he was
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 2502(b), respectively.
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tried as an adult.2 Immediately following the verdict, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility
of parole. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 28,
2000, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on
January 18, 2001. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 761 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super.
2000) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 766 A.2d 1246 (Pa.
2001). His judgment of sentence became final on April 18, 2001, when the
filing period for a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court expired. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. S.
Ct. R. 13(1).
Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on December 11,
2001. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on August 13, 2002, and this
Court affirmed on August 11, 2003. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 833 A.2d
1148 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of
appeal with our Supreme Court.
On July 9, 2012, Appellant filed pro se a second PCRA petition that is
the subject of this appeal. On November 6, 2013, the PCRA court issued a
notice of intent to dismiss the petition. Appellant was subsequently granted
permission to amend his PCRA petition. On December 12, 2013, Appellant
filed an “Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Under Article I, Section
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2
Appellant’s date of birth is September 13, 1979.
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14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and for Post-Conviction Relief Under the
[PCRA]” (Amended Petition). The PCRA court gave notice of its intent to
dismiss this Amended Petition. Appellant did not respond to this notice. On
January 17, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed the Amended Petition as
untimely, and filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Appellant timely filed pro se a
notice of appeal on February 13, 2014.3
On appeal, Appellant raises the following two issues for our review.
I. Whether the [PCRA] court abused its discretion
in concluding that relief under habeas corpus
ad subjiciendum is unavailable?
II. Whether Article 1, Section 13 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution should be construed
as providing greater protections than its
quasi[-]analogous provision of the [] United
States Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at iix.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013). “[Our] scope of review
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3
The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). The PCRA court’s
January 17, 2014 1925(a) statement states that the petition was dismissed
because it was time-barred without supplying any further reasoning.
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is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court
level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(3). “[T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to the
PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244,
259 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
We must first address whether the PCRA court properly treated
Appellant’s Amended Petition as solely a PCRA petition even though the
Amended Petition sought both a writ of habeas corpus and PCRA relief.
[I]t is well established that pursuant to Pennsylvania
law, the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus
unless the claim does not fall within the ambit of the
PCRA statute.
Our Supreme Court has consistently held that
the PCRA statute and its eligibility requirements are
to be broadly construed. Nevertheless, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has recognized
that certain unique claims do not give rise to a
cognizable claim under the PCRA statute. In those
rare instances that a post-conviction claim does not
fit within the statutory scheme of the PCRA, a writ of
habeas corpus may be appropriate.
Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations omitted). “Only if neither the PCRA nor any other remedy is
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available for the condition alleged may the writ of habeas corpus then
issue.” Commonwealth v. O’Brian, 811 A.2d 1068, 1070 (Pa. Super.
2002).
The following relief is encompassed by the PCRA.
§ 9543. Eligibility for relief
(a) General rule.--To be eligible for relief under
this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove
by a preponderance of the evidence all of the
following:
(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a
crime under the laws of this Commonwealth
and is at the time relief is granted:
(i) currently serving a sentence of
imprisonment, probation or parole for
the crime;
(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of
death for the crime; or
(iii) serving a sentence which must
expire before the person may commence
serving the disputed sentence.
(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted
from one or more of the following:
(i) A violation of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so
undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could have taken
place.
…
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(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater
than the lawful maximum.
…
(3) That the allegation of error has not been
previously litigated or waived.
(4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to
or during trial, during unitary review or on
direct appeal could not have been the result of
any rational, strategic or tactical decision by
counsel.
…
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a).
The issues raised in the portion of Appellant’s Amended Petition
seeking a writ of habeas corpus are that Appellant’s mandatory sentence of
life without parole violates Article 1, Sections 1, 9, and 13 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. Appellant’s pro se Amended Petition, 12/12/13, at
12-20. Appellant’s claims of constitutional violations concerning the legality
of his sentence are encompassed within the PCRA, and as such, the PCRA is
the proper and sole avenue for obtaining relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(2)(i), (vii). As a result, the trial court properly treated Appellant’s
Amended Petition as his second PCRA petition, and we review it as such.
Burkett, supra.Before we may address the merits of a PCRA petition, we must first
consider the petition’s timeliness because it implicates the jurisdiction of
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both this Court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d
44, 52 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.
2012). “Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition.” Williams, supra. The PCRA “confers no authority
upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-
bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (citation
omitted). This is to “accord finality to the collateral review process.” Id. “A
petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition,
must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless
the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time
for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii),
is met.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Pa. Super.
2009), appeal denied, 982 A.2d 1227 (Pa. 2009).
Section 9545 provides, in relevant part, as follows.
§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings
…
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter,
including a second or subsequent petition, shall
be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim
previously was the result of interference
by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of
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the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or
laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is
predicated were unknown to the
petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional
right that was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section
and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception
provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within
60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.
…
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
In this case, Appellant’s second PCRA petition is patently untimely as it
was filed over 11 years after his judgment of sentence became final.
Therefore, Appellant must plead and prove one of the three enumerated
statutory exceptions to the time-bar. See Harris, supra. Appellant’s
Amended Petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus asserts the newly
recognized constitutional right exception to the time-bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s brief does not develop this argument, but we
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note it cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).4 Appellant’s Brief at 2-5, 7-11. To the
extent this could be construed as raising an exception to the time-bar, our
Supreme Court has held that Miller does not create such an exception as it
does not apply retroactively to judgments of sentence that were final at the
time Miller was decided. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11
(Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014). Further, to the extent
Appellant’s brief could be read as arguing for this Court to apply broader
retroactivity principles under state law, we note that Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
requires the alleged new constitutional right to have been held to be
retroactive by either our Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court
only. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). As set forth above, our Supreme
Court has determined that Miller does not apply retroactively.
Cunningham, supra. As noted, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became
final on April 18, 2001, which is over 11 years before Miller was decided on
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4
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “that mandatory life
without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’” Miller, supra at 2460. This holding does not “categorically
bar” the sentence of life without parole for juveniles, but “[i]nstead, it
mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an
offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular
penalty.” Id. at 2471.
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June 25, 2012. Therefore, Miller is inapplicable to Appellant’s judgment of
sentence and cannot form the basis of a time-bar exception.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly
dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA
court’s January 17, 2014 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.
Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/19/2014
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