Com. v. Stoudt, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JOSHUA EDWARD STOUDT : No. 1985 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered, November 28, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0001703-2017.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JUNE 28, 2018
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting Joshua Stoudt’s
motion to suppress the test results of a warrantless blood draw. We reverse.
The facts of this case as stipulated by the Commonwealth and adopted
by Stoudt are as follows:
On December 27, 2016 at 7:25 p.m., Trooper Vincent Lopez
responded to the area of a motor vehicle accident in
Ruscombmanor Township, Berks County. When the trooper
arrived at the scene, he observed a vehicle parked on the
front lawn of a home close to the front porch stoop. Stoudt
was the driver of the vehicle. Upon speaking to Stoudt,
Trooper Lopez noticed a faint odor of alcohol on his breath.
An empty prescription pill bottle was on the floor at his feet.
The trooper spoke to the eyewitness who followed Stoudt,
and suspecting that Stoudt was impaired, he conducted field
sobriety testing. In all three tests, Stoudt displayed signs
of impairment. Upon questioning, Stoudt admitted to
having a few drinks, but he denied consuming prescription
medication or other drugs. Stoudt explained that the empty
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pill bottle was used to transport over-the-counter
medication when needed.
Trooper Lopez arrested Stoudt for suspicion of DUI and
transported him to St. Joseph’s Hospital for blood testing.
Trooper Lopez read Stoudt the DL-26B form verbatim,
Stoudt signed it and he submitted to blood testing. The
trooper did not threaten, force, or coerce Stoudt into signing
the form, and there was no mention of jail time or additional
penalties. This testing was negative for blood alcohol
content, but revealed the presence of amphetamine,
methamphetamine, Clonazepam and its metabolite.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. (citations omitted).
Stoudt filed a pretrial motion, seeking to suppress the warrantless blood
draw based on the decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 136
S. Ct. 2160 (2016), and a writ of habeas corpus. A suppression hearing was
held September 8, 2017, where the suppression court granted Stoudt’s motion
with respect to the blood test results.
The Commonwealth raises the following two issues on appeal:
1. Did the trial court err in suppressing evidence pursuant
to Birchfeld v. North Dakota, where the DL-26B Form was
modified to remove the objectionable language regarding
the enhanced penalties for a blood testing refusal, rendering
the consent to the blood draw voluntary?
2. Did the trial court err in suppressing the evidence
pursuant to Birchfield v. North Dakota, where the totality
of the circumstances indicates that the consent to the blood
draw was voluntary?
Commonwealth Brief at 4.
We begin our analysis by stating our Court's well-settled standard of
review for a suppression ruling. Our review is limited to determining whether
the record supports the findings of fact of the suppression court and whether
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the legal conclusions drawn from those findings are correct. Commonwealth
v. Mistler, 912 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Pa. 2006). We are bound by the factual
findings of the suppression court, which are supported by the record, but we
are not bound by the suppression court's legal rulings, which we review de
novo. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 963 A.2d 396, 400 (Pa. 2009).
Our scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Ennels, 167 A.3d 716 (Pa. Super.
2017). Because Stoudt prevailed on the issue before the suppression court,
we are limited to considering Stoudt’s evidence and so much of the
Commonwealth’s evidence, only to the extent that it does not contradict the
context of the record as a whole. Id. at 718-19.
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. “The
administration of a blood test, performed by an agent of, or at the direction
of the government, constitutes a search under both the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, (Pa.
2016) (citations omitted). If an officer performs a blood-draw search without
a warrant, it is “unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissibile,
unless an established exception applies. Exceptions to the warrant
requirement include the consent exception. For the consent exception to
apply, the consent must be voluntary.” Id.
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In granting Stoudt’s motion, the trial court concluded that Stoudt did
not voluntarily consent to the blood-draw, because at the time Stoudt
underwent the blood-draw, the Motor Vehicle Sections had not yet been
amended to cure the constitutional defects. The trial court reasoned that
“while [Stoudt] was not informed of the enhanced criminal penalties when
Trooper Vincente Lopez read the DL-26B to him, a citizen is presumed to know
the laws of this Commonwealth.” In essence, the trial court reasoned that
Stoudt was presumed to know of § 3804 as it appeared in the Vehicle Code at
the time of his arrest. Consequently, he would have weighed the criminal
sanctions provided by that law in deciding whether to consent to the blood-
draw, thereby rendering his consent involuntary. We disagree.
The issues in this case stem from the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Birchfield. In that case, the defendant was arrested for a DUI.
Prior to a warrantless blood-draw, the arresting officer informed the defendant
that refusing the blood-draw had criminal consequences. Upon being
informed of the criminal sanctions, the defendant consented to the blood-
draw. Id. at 2172. The defendant argued that “his consent to the blood test
was coerced by the officer’s warning that refusing to consent would itself be
a crime.” Id. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, holding that
motorists could not be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test
on pain of committing a criminal offense. Id. at 2185-86.
The critical inquiry following Birchfield is whether the officer conveyed
the threat of enhanced criminal penalties at the time of the arrest when
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seeking a warrantless blood-draw. Since the decision of Birchfield, this Court
has decided several cases consistent with this inquiry. See Commonwealth
v. Ennels, 167 A.3d 716, 724 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that “police may not
threaten enhanced punishment for refusing a blood test in order to obtain
consent; whether that enhanced criminal punishment is … ultimately imposed
is irrelevant to the question of whether the consent was valid.”);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 A.3d 915 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that
denial of suppression was proper when the arresting officer never told the
defendant that he would be subjected to greater criminal penalties if he
refused the blood-draw).
Our most recent decision in Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 1198
MDA 2017, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 528 * (Pa. Super. May 21, 2018), is similar
to Stoudt’s case. In Johnson, the defendant was arrested for a DUI. Id. at
*1. The defendant had existing knowledge that § 3804 provided for increased
penalties upon refusal to consent to a blood-draw. Id. at *2. The officer,
however, used a DL-26 form that did not contain any reference to enhanced
penalties for refusing to consent to the blood-draw. Id. Additionally, the
officer never told the defendant that she would be subject to enhanced
criminal penalties. Id. There, because § 3804 was not yet amended, the trial
court in Johnson, believed the driver should have been notified of a change
in the law prior to giving her consent. We reversed and held that the
defendant’s consent to the blood-draw was voluntary under these
circumstances, and that the defendant’s ignorance of Birchfield, which
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rendered the threat of enhanced penalties illegal, including those on the books
at § 3804 was irrelevant. Id. at *8.
As in Johnson, the arresting officer in Stoudt’s case never told Stoudt
that he would be subject to enhanced criminal penalties if he refused to
consent to a blood-draw. Also, the DL-26B form used in Stoudt’s case
accorded with Birchfield, because it did not threaten additional criminal
sanctions for refusal. The coerced consent by the police in Birchfield was not
present in Stoudt’s case.
The trial court overlooked the maxim that the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme Law of the Land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2. The
constitutional pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court have
immediate and national consequence. On the day Birchfield was announced,
it became the new law of the land. And, because Stoudt was presumed to
know the law, it was constructively imputed that he was aware that §
3804(c)’s additional criminal sanctions were without force or effect of law.
The fact that the Vehicle Code had not yet been amended prior to
Stoudt’s arrest was irrelevant. The Supreme Court’s constitutional decision in
Birchfield became the reigning law, which Stoudt was presumed to know.
Johnson, supra. Because the arresting officer did not convey any threat of
enhanced criminal penalties during Stoudt’s arrest, and the DL-26B did not
threaten criminal sanctions for refusing to submit to a blood-draw, Stoudt’s
consent was voluntary. The court was incorrect in concluding otherwise.
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Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/28/2018
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