Stocki, P. v. Goble, J. Lallave v. Swaydis, F. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A04014-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    PATRICK R. STOCKI                             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JESSE GOBLE, VICTORINA LALLAVE
    A/K/A VICTORINA LALLAVE GOBLE,
    FORREST M. SWAYDIS
    Appellants               No. 999 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 24, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
    Civil Division at No.: 2015-02937
    BEFORE: STABILE, NICHOLS, AND RANSOM,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED JUNE 14, 2018
    Appellant/defendant Victorina Lallave a/k/a Victorina Lallave Goble
    (“Defendant”),1 appeals from the May 24, 2017 order of the Court of Common
    Pleas of Lackawanna County (“trial court”), denying her petition to open a
    default judgment entered in favor of Appellee/plaintiff Patrick R. Stocki
    (“Plaintiff”). Upon review, we remand for further proceedings.
    The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. On April
    28, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this civil action by filing a praecipe for writ of
    summons against defendants. On May 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a praecipe to
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1Defendants Jesse Goble and Forrest M. Swaydis are not parties to the instant
    appeal.
    J-A04014-18
    reissue the writ of summons. The docket indicates that on June 23, 2015, a
    Deputy Sheriff of Lackawanna County allegedly served the writ of summons
    on all defendants by handing it to Maulik Reeves, identified as “person in
    charge,” at 169-171 Sussex Street, Old Forge, Pennsylvania 18518 (the
    “Address”). On August 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint against the
    defendants, alleging negligence.2 Plaintiff alleged that on May 27, 2013, he
    was walking his dog near his home when the defendants’ dog, that was
    unrestrained, attacked him.         Specifically, the defendants’ dog allegedly bit
    Plaintiff on the right arm, causing him to fall to the ground. Plaintiff alleged
    that, because of the attack, he suffered and continues to suffer a laceration of
    the right arm, scars to his right arm, abrasions to his left hand, nightmares,
    and a shock to his nerves and nervous system.
    The record indicates that Plaintiff allegedly served the complaint on the
    defendants by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, and First Class at the
    Address. On October 13, 2015, approximately fifty-five days after service of
    the complaint, Plaintiff filed a certificate of service, indicating that he served
    on the defendants a notice of default judgment by Certified Mail, Return
    Receipt Requested, and First Class at the Address. On November 23, 2015,
    approximately forty-one days after allegedly serving on the defendants a
    notice of default judgment, Plaintiff filed a praecipe for entry of default
    ____________________________________________
    2The complaint contained a notice to defend, as required under Pa.R.C.P. No.
    1018.1.
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    judgment. The Clerk of Judicial Records entered default judgment against the
    defendants. On the same date, Plaintiff filed another certificate of service,
    indicating that he served on the defendants a praecipe for entry of judgment
    by default and entry of judgment by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested,
    and First Class at the Address.
    On March 8, 2017, more than a year after the entry of default judgment,
    Defendant filed a petition to open the default judgment to which she attached
    her proposed answer to the complaint in accord with Pa.R.C.P. No. 237.3(a).
    In the petition, Defendant alleged that she never was served with a copy of
    the complaint and that, at the time of the alleged service of the complaint,
    she did not reside at the Address. Rather, Defendant alleged that she resided
    at an undisclosed location in light of a protection from abuse order entered
    against her husband and co-defendant, Jesse Globe. She further alleged that
    she never received a copy of the ten-day notice of default, as required under
    Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 237.1(a)(2) and 237.5.     On the same date, the trial court
    issued a rule to show cause, indicating that a hearing would be held on May
    3, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. on Defendant’s petition. The docket, however, does not
    reveal that a hearing was conducted on Defendant’s petition to open default
    judgment consistent with Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 206.6 and 207.
    Instead, on May 24, 2017, the trial court denied without a hearing
    Defendant’s petition to open the default judgment. Defendant timely appealed
    to this Court. The trial court ordered Defendant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement of errors complained of on appeal. Defendant complied, raising
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    sixteen assertions of error. In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a) opinion, concluding that Defendant was not entitled to relief.
    On appeal, Defendant raises seven issues for our review:
    [I.] Did the trial court err by refusing to open the default judgment
    where the record reflects that [Defendant] was not served causing
    a fatal defect in the procedural aspects of service of original
    process upon [Defendant]?
    [II.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
    [Defendant’s] petition to open the default judgment where
    [Plaintiff] could not establish that original process was served
    upon [Defendant] in compliance with [Pa.R.C.P. No. 402]?
    [III.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
    law where it appears from a review of the record that there is no
    evidence to support the court’s findings?
    [IV.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
    law in failing to call witnesses, permit the presentation of evidence
    and cross-examination of witnesses, before issuing its May 24,
    2017 order?
    [V.] Did the trial court err in denying the petition to open the
    default judgment and failing to consider all three criteria for
    opening a default where numerous meritorious defenses to the
    allegations were contained in [Defendant’s] proposed answer with
    new matter to [Plaintiff’s] complaint, where [Defendant] provided
    a reasonable explanation for failing to file a timely responsive
    pleading, and when [Defendant], through present counsel,
    promptly filed a petition to open default?
    [VI.] Where [Defendant’s] petition to open possessed a
    reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for her default, did
    the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to give weight to
    [Defendant’s] meritorious defenses to the complaint?
    [VII.] Did the trial court err in denying the petition to open the
    default judgment by failing to consider the equities of the matter,
    the prejudice to [Defendant] if the petition to open was denied
    and whether [Plaintiff] would suffer any prejudice if the petition to
    open default was granted?
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    Defendant’s Brief at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted).
    At the outset, we note that, “[a]lthough orders of court denying motions
    to strike or petitions to open default judgments are interlocutory, Pennsylvania
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 provides that ‘[a]n appeal may be taken as
    of right . . . from [ ] [a]n order refusing to open, vacate or strike off a
    judgment.’” Keller v. Mey, 
    67 A.3d 1
    , 3 (Pa. Super. 2013). The fact that
    Plaintiff here obtained default judgment against Defendant only on liability is
    of no moment. There is “no support for the proposition that an aggrieved
    party cannot seek to open, strike or vacate the entry of a default judgment
    prior to the assessment of damages or the entry of a final decree.”
    Mother’s Rest. Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 
    861 A.2d 327
    , 335 (Pa. Super. 2004)
    (en banc) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this appeal is properly before us.
    We now turn to the merits of Defendant’s appeal.         Our standard of
    review of a denial of a petition to open a default judgment is as follows:
    A petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the
    equitable powers of the court. The decision to grant or deny
    a petition to open a default judgment is within the sound
    discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn that
    decision ‘absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error of
    law.’
    Dumoff v. Spencer, 
    754 A.2d 1280
    , 1282 (Pa. Super. 2000)
    (citation omitted). This Court may, after a review of the case, find
    an abuse of discretion if equity clearly favored opening the
    judgment. 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not
    a mere error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion, the law
    is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
    manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
    or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is
    abused.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
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    J-A04014-18
    Generally speaking, a default judgment may be opened if the
    moving party has (1) promptly filed a petition to open the default
    judgment, (2) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations
    contained in the complaint, and (3) provided a reasonable excuse
    or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading. 
    Id. at 1281
    .
    Seeger v. First Union Nat. Bank, 
    836 A.2d 163
    , 165 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    Instantly, the trial court concluded that Defendant’s answer contained a
    meritorious defense in accord with the second prong. The dispute, therefore,
    turns on the first and third prongs. Plaintiff and Defendant proffer a different
    version of the facts. Defendant claims that she was never served with the
    complaint and the notice of default because she did not reside at the Address
    during the timeframe in question, and thus, was unable to participate
    meaningfully and timely in this action. Plaintiff disagrees, claiming that he
    effectuated proper service upon Defendant. Given this conflict in facts and
    the lack of an evidentiary hearing, we are unable to review the merits of this
    appeal. In other words, to determine whether Defendant promptly filed her
    petition to open default judgment and whether she provided a reasonable
    excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading, the trial court
    must hold an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact, which we, as a
    reviewing court, cannot do. We, therefore, remand this matter to the trial
    court with instruction to hold an evidentiary hearing.
    Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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    J-A04014-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 06/14/2018
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